The applicant was seeking a declaration that the respondent was the father of her minor child. While the matter was still pending, she sought an order compelling the respondent to submit himself to a blood test to determine whether he could be excluded as the possible father. She submitted that the court's inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own procedure extended to the compulsory ordering of a blood test. The respondent contended that the court lacked the statutory power to make such an order since the Children's Status Act, 1987, section I merely created a presumption of paternity where it was proved that sexual intercourse with the mother had occurred at any time when the child could have been conceived, while section 2 provided that where a party failed to submit to a blood test in paternity proceedings it would be presumed that such refusal was aimed at concealing the truth. He also contended that if such power existed, it contravened sections 11 and 13 of the 1993 Constitution.