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The Aouzou Strip Dispute—A Legal Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Gino J. Naldi
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Extract

The outbreak of further hostilities between Chad and Libya in August 1987 was occasioned by a dispute concerning sovereignty over the so-called Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. The extent of Libyan involvement in Chad is motivated to a large degree by this territorial claim. This dispute must be distinguished from Libya's wider ambitions for Arab unity or its involvement in Chad's civil war, although it would appear true to say that Libya was thereby seeking to consolidate its hold on the Aouzou Strip. Documentary evidence exists to support the contention that a genuine territorial claim exists. In addition, it is interesting to note that, while Libya appeared to have resigned itself to the victory of President Habre's forces in the civil war and the defeat and expulsion of its forces from the rest of Chad in the early part of 1987, the capture of Aouzou by Habre's forces in August 1987 resulted in an ongoing military response brought to a tentative conclusion in September 1987 by the OAU. Colonel Gadafi has been reported as saying that, if Chad ceded the Aouzou Strip, he would regard the war as over and would never again interfere in Chad's internal affairs. Moreover, Colonel Gadafi's support for the rival factions in Chad has wavered according to their position on the question of the Aouzou Strip. The purpose of this short article is to analyse Libya's territorial claim to the disputed territory.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , Spring 1989 , pp. 72 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 1989

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References

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3 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ibid.

4 Ambatielos Case (Jurisdiction), ICJ Reports 1952, p. 43;Google ScholarMcNair, Lord, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, 1961) Chapter VII. Cf.Google ScholarMavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (1924) PCIJ, Series A, No 2, p 5 (but note Judge Moore, dissenting at p. 57);Google Scholar Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald, , “Do Treaties Need Ratification?”, 15 BYIL (1934) 129.Google Scholar It is interesting to note that, when drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission suggested that in principle treaties should require ratification before they could be considered legally binding but this proposal was dropped in the face of substantial opposition, see Sir Sinclair, Ian, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester, 2nd ed., (1984) pp. 39–41.Google Scholar

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6 Greig, D. W., International Law (London, 1976) p. 158.Google Scholar

7 Kelley, M. P., A State in Disarray: Conditions of Chad's Survival, (Boulder, 1986), p. 36.Google Scholar

8 The principle of coercion invalidating a treaty is recognised by Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which states that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force.

9 ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 at p. 119Google Scholar

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An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made, (at p. 267).

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14 See also Article 5, paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 1974. Definition of Aggression, which states that “no territorial acquisition … resulting from aggression is or shall be recognised as lawful”.

15 Article 3(a) of the Definition of Aggression, which the ICJ found reflected customary international law in the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 at p. 103,Google Scholar states that the invasion or armed attack by armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or an annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof qualifies as an act of aggression.

16 Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554 at p. 565.Google Scholar

17 ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554.Google Scholar For comment, see Naldi, G. J.. “The Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali): Uti Possidetis in an African Perspective” 36 I.C.L.Q. 1987, 893.Google Scholar

18 In Brownlie, I., Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford 1971), pp. 360–61.Google Scholar

19 Ibid.

20 ICJ Reports 1986, p. 565.Google Scholar

21 The Ad Hoc Reconciliation Committee, composed initially at ministerial level and subsequently in 1987 at Head of State level, of Algeria, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal under the chairmanship of President Bongo of Gabon, was established by the OAU at its Twentieth Summit Assembly at Addis Ababa, seeing Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXI, 1985, p. 33326.Google Scholar The Reconciliation Committee is in essence the successor to an ad hoc committee created in 1977 to investigate Chadian allegations of Libyan subversion but which was unable to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The Reconciliation Committee concluded that only direct talks could achieve a lasting peace but Libya's boycott of its meetings has meant that it has been unable to make any headway on the substance of the dispute.

22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIV, 1988, p. 35877.Google Scholar