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The Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik, 1896–1898

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2009

G. N. Sanderson
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Extract

This paper examines the contention that between 1896 and 1898 the main object of Menelik's foreign policy was expansion westwards in collaboration with the French. It concludes, from both European and African evidence, that on the contrary Menelik subordinated his territorial aspirations in the Nile Valley to the promotion of good relations with the Khalifa; and that he frustrated rather than assisted the French missions to the Nile. The overriding anxiety of the Negus was that ‘Abdallāhi should not be distracted from his struggle with Kitchener by fears for security of his eastern frontier. Menelik saw in a Mahdist victory the best insurance against a renewal of European aggression in Ethiopia, fearing as he did that the subjugation of Ethiopia was the ultimate objective of British action in north-east Africa.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of African History , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , March 1964 , pp. 87 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1964

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References

1 Marcus, H. G., ‘Ethio-British Negotiations concerning the Western Border with Sudan’, J[ournal of] A[frican] H[istory], iv, i (1963), 82–8.Google Scholar

2 Sanderson, G. N., ‘Contributions from African Sources to the History of European Competition in the Upper Valley of the Nile’, J.A.H., iii, i (1962), 69–70, 83–9.Google Scholar

3 Marcus, ut supra, 86.Google Scholar

4 Michel, C., Mission de Bonchamps, Paris, n.d. [1900], 205–28, 241–2.Google Scholar

5 Ibid. 113–15, 137–9, 149, 163–70, 206–28, 236. Michel believed (op. cit. 115, 146, 241) that the obstacles placed in the way of de Bonchamps were the result of a request by Lagarde to the Negus that the Clochette mission (which was under Lagarde's personal control) should not be overtaken by that of de Bonchamps (which was not). Lagarde was an excessively vain man, jealous of his authority to a pathological degree and not without a strong streak of malice; and it is not impossible that this request was actually made, though Michel nowhere cites his evidence for saying so. But in fact the Ethiopians sabotaged both missions impartially (Michel, op. cit. 147–9, 226–8, for their behaviour towards the Clochette mission).

10 De Bonchamps to Lebon, 27 July 1897, printed Michel, op. cit. 166. D.D.F., xiii, Nos. 325, 334, Lebon to Lagarde, 15 Sept., 27 Sept. 1897.Google Scholar

11 Translation of Menelik to Tassama, 20 Oct. 1897, printed Michel, op. cit. 250–1. The sabotage nevertheless persisted, and was connived at by Ethiopian officials (ibid. 258–69).

12 Lagarde to de Bonchamps, 10 Oct. 1897, printed ibid. 253–5. Cf. ibid. 309–10.

13 D.D.F., XIII, 347, Lebon to Lagarde, 30 Oct. 1897.Google Scholar

14 F.O.M., III 36a (Mission Marchand), undated note by de Bonchamps, ‘Causes d'impossibilité de jonction avec Marchand’. De Bonchamps was beginning to doubt the reality of Menelik's support as early as Sept. 1897. On 2 Sept. 1897 he wrote to the Negus, ‘Je crois de mon devoir de demander respectueusement à Votre Majesté si ses intentions n'ont pas changé à notre égard’ (Michel, op. cit. 217–18). His next remark, disclaiming any personal belief that this was so, was of course a necessary politesseGoogle Scholar.

15 Marcus, loc. cit.Google Scholar

16 D.D.F., xiii, No. 159, Convention pour le Nil Blanc, 20 March 1897, Arts. 1 and 2.Google Scholar

17 Marcus, ut supra, 83–6.Google Scholar

18 F.O. 1/34, Harrington to F.O. No. 7, 30 April 1898; to Walker, 11 May; to F.O., Nos. 10 and 11, 15 May.Google Scholar

19 Marchand's Rapport Général, entry for 14 Sept. 1898, printed D.D.F., XIV, p. 903, footnote.Google Scholar

20 S[udan] I[ntelligence] R[eport], No. 60 (May–Dec. 1898): Appendix 53, F. L. Maxse, Report on the Sobat, 18 Dec. 1898; Appendix 54, T. Capper, Report on the Pibor, 23 Dec.; Appendix 55, W. H. Cowan, Report on the Baro, 15 Dec.; Appendix 57, Reports by J. G. Maxwell, 4 Jan. 1899.Google Scholar

21 F.O. 1/34, Harrington to F.O. No. 10, 15 May 1898. (The attribution of this despatch to Rodd is incorrect.)Google Scholar

22 Michel, op. cit. 243, 259, 395–6.Google Scholar

23 Marcus, Ut supra, 87–90.Google Scholar

24 The mission to Roseires consisted of two Ethiopian officials, a guide and five servants (S.I.R. No. 60: Appendix 72, A. Hunter, Report on the Expedition to Roseires, 2 Oct. 1898). That to Matamma had a small military escort (Marcus, Ut supra, 87 footnote).Google Scholar

25 S.I.R. No. 60: loc. cit.; Appendix 78, J. Collinson, Report on the occupation of Gallabat, 17 Dec. 1898. At Gallabat the Ethiopians were invited in by the local shaikh after the withdrawal of the Mahdists. For Roseires, cf. also F.O. 141 /333, Ras Bitwatid Mangasha to Ahmad abu Shūtāl (undated), enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury No. 163, 13 Oct. 1898.Google Scholar

26 ‘At Roseires it was understood as a matter of course that a treaty and perfect amity existed between the Khalifa and Menelik’—Hunter's report, S.I.R. No. 60, Appendix 72.Google Scholar

27 Marcus, ut supra, 82, 86–7.Google Scholar

28 Ibid. Appendix 72, Hunter's report, 2 Oct. 1898. Cf. footnote 32.

37 Ibid. General Intelligence Summary, p. 19.

38 Yūsuf Mikhā'īl—whom Wingate does not seem to have interrogated.Google Scholar

39 Michel, op. cit. 241–2.Google Scholar

40 Ibid. Ras Mangasha Bitwatid to ‘Abdallāhi, 6 Safar 1314/17 July 1896.

1 There were in fact only three main expeditions: those of Ras Makonnen to the Bani Shariqūl, of Ras Wolda Giorgis to Lake Rudolf, and of Dejazmach Tassama Nadao to the Sobat-Pibor. But a force under Ras Takla Haymanot (of whose operations little seems to be known) cooperated with Ras Makonnen; while Wolda Giorgis had under his overall command a smaller expedition under Dejazmach Tassama Darghie. (Cf. D.D.F., xiii, No. 386; F.O. x134, Harrington to F.O., No. 10, 55 May 1898.)Google Scholar

2 This evidently refers to Macdonald and Marchand.Google Scholar

3 This letter from the Khalifa has not been found in the Khartoum archives.Google Scholar

4 i.e. the Mahdist troops.Google Scholar

5 Literally, ‘think of another thing’.Google Scholar

6 This sentence was doubtless intended as an insurance against de Bonchamps reaching the Nile and making non-hostile contact with the Mahdists.Google Scholar