Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2009
The recent thesis propounded by Fisher and Rowland regarding the role of firearms in the Central Sudan requires considerable modification. While one must concede that the observable effects of firearms in the nineteenth century were not profound, this statement must be qualified to account for the incipient revolution in military technology, army organization, and political structure that occurred in many of the Central Sudanese states in the last quarter of the century. The relative ease with which European imperial powers conquered these states has tended to obscure from historians the dynamics of internal change that became manifest during the last decades of their independent existence.
It is clear from the evidence presented in this article that the increasing use of firearms intensified the tendencies toward bureaucratization and the centralization of power in the states of the Central Sudan. The creation of regular standing armies, the formation of slave musketeer units commanded by slave officers, and the progressive devaluation of feudal institutions in favour of bureaucratized political and military structures, were the distinguishing characteristics of this period. Although history is irreversible, it is interesting to ponder the possible alternative outcomes of this nascent revolution. Its directions were clear, its destination unknown. In this article we have argued that these developments in politico-military organization did in fact represent a new departure which, if permitted to run its course, would have radically affected the subsequent history of the Central Sudan. It is our contention that the Fisher-Rowland thesis underestimates and misinterprets the nature of these changes.
1 In the 1971 (vol. XII) issues of J. Afr. Hist., for example, there are numerous articles on firearms. See also the collection of papers on the theme ‘War and Society in Africa’, which includes several on the role of firearms, in the Proceedings of the Social Science Council, University College, University of East Africa, Nairobi, 1969. These papers are being edited for publication by Bethwell Ogot.Google Scholar
2 ‘Firearms in the Central Sudan’, J. Afr. Hist. XII, 2 (1971), 215–39.Google Scholar
3 Ibid. 239.
4 Fisher and Rowland repeat the commonly held view that the Central Sudanese states depended almost exclusively on North Africa for their supply of arms. While this is doubtless true for the states of the eastern Central Sudan, the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate acquired their munitions almost entirely from European merchants trading at Nupe. The evidence to support this statement is documented in considerable detail in J. P. Smaldone, ‘The firearms trade in the Central Sudan in the nineteenth century’, in McCall, Daniel F. and Bennett, Norman R. (eds.), ‘Aspects of West African Islam’, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 151–71. Again, the necessity of giving full weight to the evidence from the Caliphate is apparent.Google Scholar
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8 Ibid. 289; Katagum fieldnotes. I am grateful to Dr. Low for permitting me to use his fieldnotes on warfare in the border emirates. Katagum participated in this trade with Rabeh despite explicit orders from Sokoto to the contrary.
9 M. G.Smith, Katsina fieldnotes, book 5, p. 37a. I am greatly indebted to Dr Smith for allowing me to consult his extensive fleldnotes and unpublished manuscripts on several of the emirates.Google Scholar
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20 This change is documented in Smaldone, ‘Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate’, 50–3, 116–19. The best description of the modified battle order, with an accompanying sketch, is in Mission Tilho, II, 524–6. See Smith, Government in Zazzau, 96–8, for the infantry-cavalry-reserve pattern.
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44 Mockler-Ferryman, , Up the Niger, 198–9, 204Google Scholar; C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 12, 20, 21. There is evidence that, even in previous centuries, Central Sudanese rulers had kept armies in the field for years in order to subjugate recalcitrant peoples. Fisher and Rowland cite the examples of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu and Sarkin Kano Kanajeji who, in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries respectively, were reported to have campaigned the year round, laying waste to the farmlands of their enemies and preventing them from planting or harvesting new crops. Such prolonged sieges effectively disrupted the agricultural cycle of these people, who were ultimately starved into submission. However, the nineteenth-century Ilorin example appears to have had a different motivation. The warriors at Ofa were engaged less in siege warfare than in actual offensive operations against Ibadan. Of a served as a war-camp or staging area for mounting attacks on Ilorin's Yoruba enemies. Of a took on all the manifestations of a permanent military encampment, with its large population (7,000), mud walls, and town-like appearance.
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46 The extent of the rulers' control over firearms seems to have varied from one state to another. In theory the ruler enjoyed an exclusive monopoly of these instruments of force. Such a prerogative followed from his role as the personification of the state which, by definition, monopolizes the means of legitimate physical coercion. In practice, however, the control of firearms sometimes devolved upon the fief-holding officials, who armed their own slaves with these weapons. Thus in Bornu and Wadai, as Fisher and Rowland point out, certain notables were able to use their firearms to assert their independence of the throne (‘Firearms in the Central Sudan’, 235–6). In Zinder, on the other hand, Sultan Tanimu used firearms to enhance royal power. In the Sokoto Caliphate most of the emirates employed firearms to centralize politico-military organization; however, in relation to Sokoto, it appears that the emirs' possession of guns enabled them to become more independent of the Caliph's authority.
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49 ‘Feudal’ and ‘bureaucratic’ elements had existed in the Central Sudanese state structure for centuries. The relative strengths of the two varied considerably in the history of individual states and in the region as a whole. It is tempting indeed to regard Central Sudanese history in terms of shifting forces, changing balances, the moving arm of a pendulum, recurring cycles, or other mechanistic metaphors, and to see the centralizing tendencies of the nineteenth century simply as a repetition of the ‘bureaucratic’ phase. Such a view fails to consider the possibility of alternatives. It is our contention that the increasing availability and use of firearms made possible for the first time the elimination of the ‘feudal’ element and the consolidation of the ‘bureaucratic’.
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