This paper draws upon fieldwork among a Muslim community in the Qinghai-Gansu borderland areas to explore how the desire of Muslims to achieve social mobility through education is blocked by the larger society which regards them as ‘familiar strangers’. This can be understood as a tension between their desire for full social citizenship in the form of rights to employment and education and the limited social and cultural capital they possess that prevents them from achieving the former. This tension is primarily caused by the party-state's ambivalence over the project of state nation building and minority rights. By focusing on Muslim narratives of their experiences in the cultural exclusion, this case study attempts to scrutinize how the cultural exclusion affects the engagement of ethnic minorities in education as well as the larger society, although it has been recognized that the experience of exclusion varies between minority groups.

The relationship between specific and global measures of life satisfaction or happiness is usually seen as an asymmetric bottom-up relationship. Domain satisfaction and general satisfaction are independently measured and the typical question is whether the former has an impact on the latter or to what extent the former contributes to the latter. This paper, in contrast, investigates whether general life satisfaction can be statisti-cally derived from domain-specific satisfaction. It is suggested to conceptualize life satisfaction as a second-order factor, which is only indirectly related to observable variables. In the first part of the empirical analysis, it is shown that such a model fits the data of the first AsiaBarometer quite well. The factor models for the Asian countries under investigation are not equivalent but strikingly similar. The four first-order factors refer to satisfaction with (1) the family, (2) social status and social health, (3) economic status, and (4) collective goods. These factors load highly on a second-order factor, which is called general life satisfaction.

The results suggest the calculation of a specifically weighted factor score for each country and to base the further analyses on these scores. In the second part of the empirical investigation, it is demonstrated, however, that simple unweighted indices, which are calculated under the assumption of meaning equivalence, are very highly correlated with the country-specific factor scores. The further analysis is therefore based on an unweighted index.

In the last part of the empirical study, the reliability and validity of the life satisfaction index is examined and compared with the validity of a single indicator of overall happiness. Similar variables are used in many international surveys. Index and indicator are moderately correlated. It is shown that the life satisfaction index on average correlates higher with well-established determinants of happiness than the single item. This is particularly true for the pooled international data set, which includes the data from all participating countries. Accordingly, indices seem to be more reliable and valid measures of general life satisfaction, and may be better suited for comparative analyses at least for the countries under investigation.

This article examines democratization as an aspect of human development where: human development is meant to proceed as people attain greater autonomous choice in shaping their lives. Democratization promotes this process in so far as it institutionalizes freedom of choice based on civil and political liberties. This perspective allows one to integrate modernization-based explanations and civic culture-based explanations of democratization under a common theoretical umbrella. For both types of explanations reflect aspects of human development. Modernization provides human resources that increase people's capabilities to act in accordance with their autonomous choices; and the rise of a civic culture promotes liberty aspirations that increase people's emphasis on autonomous choices. Linked through their common focus on autonomous human choice, human resources and liberty aspirations provide overlapping sources of pressure for the growth of freedom. Within the limits set by the extent to which freedom is not yet present, human resources and liberty aspirations are conducive to the growth of political freedom in interchangeable ways. These hypotheses are tested against the massive wave of democratization processes that occurred from the 1980s to the 1990s, using data from 62 nations of the World Values Surveys. We find that democratization is driven by social forces that focus on the growth of autonomous human choice, reflecting human development. From this perspective, modernization-based and civic culture-based explanations of democratization are manifestations of the same theme: the expansion of autonomous human choice.

One of the perennial controversies in the study of Japanese political economy has centred on the role of the government in the economy and in Japan's economic growth. The best-known model of Japanese political economy is the ‘capitalist developmental state’, which offers both a descriptive model of Japanese political economy and an explanation for Japan's postwar economic miracle in terms of bureaucracy-led intervention. As a descriptive model, the ‘capitalist developmental state’ both over-generalises and under-generalises key features of Japan's political economy. It over-generalises because it builds a model of Japanese political economy based on government-business relations in a number of large-scale, export-oriented manufacturing industries ignoring inefficient or ‘laggard’ sectors or admitting them only as system supports. The model under-generalises Japanese political economy because types and modes of bureaucratic intervention are consistent across different sectors of the economy, and in fact are more prevalent in weaker sectors, such as agriculture.

This article demonstrates that ubiquitous references to ‘power’ in English-language foreign policy discourse can be understood in the light of the inclination in international relations theory to place power on a par with capability. It makes two claims: that such a concept of power is ill-fitted for foreign policy analysis; and that much clarity would be gained by following the Japanese example of terminological pluralism and thus abandoning ‘power’ as a catch-all term. Foreign policy analysis would benefit from adopting a concept that takes power to reside in specific relationships. Its adoption would moreover dissolve a power paradox associated with the analysis of Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy.

Is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a pluralistic security community (PSC)? Does community cause security in Southeast Asia? In a PSC, member states are sovereign. So are the members of ASEAN. Before concluding that the ASEAN region is a PSC, however, one should distinguish between two versions: a thin or descriptive PSC, whose members share both a sense of community and the expectation of security, and a thick or explanatory version in which community has actually been shown to cause security. Depending on how a sense of community is defined, one may say that at certain times in its history, ASEAN probably has been a thin PSC. More recently, however, the cooperative identity of regional elites may have frayed, as democratization, especially in Indonesia, has incorporated non-elites into public life. Meanwhile the proposition that the assurance of security in Southeast Asia has resulted from this sense of community, that ASEAN is a thick PSC, remains to be proven.

This article examines the gender gap in political participation in Japan. Although previous studies indicate that women may face several external constraints on political participation, this idea has not been tested systematically. Using the Japanese component of the Asia-Europe Survey, the article demonstrates that work experience and age have very different impacts on participation across the sexes. It argues that men and women encounter very different working conditions and family circumstances at certain stages of their lives, which create a gender gap in political participation.

In this paper, we examine the micro-level implications of social capital for the development of democratic citizenship. By using a recent East Asia Barometer survey in Korea, we determine whether social networks and social trust, two key components of social capital, cultivate virtues of democracy among ordinary citizens. First, the analysis shows that the Korean people as a whole tend to be involved in small informal groups. Most of them stay away from formal associations. Second, the Korean people tend to differentiate trust-in-principle from trust-in-action. It turns out that a majority of the people display competence-based trust, if neither generalized nor particularized trust. Third, associational membership has no role in promoting support for democratic institutions and principles; it merely leads to more political activism. Fourth, social trust plays a role in promoting support for democracy. Yet it has little to do with political activism. It is concluded that in Korea, social involvement contributes to democratic citizenship behaviorally, whereas social trust contributes to it attitudinally.

This paper argues that international security studies can most profitably engage the issue of international terrorism by considering terrorist groups as transnational social movement organizations. It takes as its case Al Qaeda's role in Southeast Asia, focusing especially on the efforts of Al Qaeda leaders to align the demands and grievances of local Islamist movements and to spread a set of tactics and methods of political violence. In so doing, the paper builds on the often-neglected literature on the politics of terrorism while tying the argument to prevailing debates over social movements. The paper thus aims at clarifying the ways in which Southeast Asian organizations have adopted Al Qaeda's tactics and language but appear to be addressing primarily local or provincial concerns. This perspective also draws terrorism into current discussions of international security while maintaining a detailed focus on the interactions of individual agents and larger violent movements.

Although women have consistently outvoted men in elections in Japan since the 1970s, the country has a relatively poor record in terms of women being elected to representative bodies. In recent years, there have been increases, particularly in the number of women in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, but at the local level the rate of change has been slower.

As in other states, a number of propositions have been put forward to explain the low numbers of women in local assemblies. Drawing upon a variety of sources, including the developing literature and interviews with women councillors and others, this article seeks to identify the variety of factors that have contributed to holding down levels of female representation in local government in Japan. It examines these in the context of recent changes and considers the extent to which there is the prospect for further change.

This paper first reviews a number of epistemological and methodological issues relating to the estimation of party policy positions, particularly in a comparative context, with special reference to the methodology of ‘expert surveys’. It is argued that expert surveys, as systematic summaries of the views of country specialists, have a particular role in assessing the content validity of other types of estimates of party policy positions. The paper moves on to analyze the positions of Japanese political parties in a comparative context, using results from a new 47-country expert survey. Attention is paid both to the substantive policy content of the left–right dimension in Japan, and to the locations of Japanese parties in policy spaces, relative to the locations of comparable parties in other political systems.

For years Myanmar has been caught in a political stalemate generated both by deadlock between the military government and the democratic opposition, and by polar differences between China and the United States. In searching for ways forward, analysts might therefore want to look beyond these dominant actors. This article considers the contribution that a regional power, Japan, could make to political change. It examines first political stalemate in Myanmar, second Japan as a regional power, third Japanese engagement with Myanmar, fourth Japan and resolution of the Myanmar problem, and fifth future possibilities. The argument is that strong historical ties and good relations inside and outside Myanmar put Japan in a pivotal position. As part of its reassurance diplomacy in East Asia, Japan should take the lead in tackling this regional problem.

Since a May 1990 general election that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) secure a landslide victory and the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) respond by reinforcing its dictatorship, Myanmar has been in political stasis. Although progress has been made on some fronts, notably in relations between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military junta is now known, and the insurgent rebel armies with which it long fought civil wars, the uneasy political deadlock that settled on the country some 15 years ago has not been broken. Furthermore, within a complex internal context, the standoff between the two major protagonists from 1990 remains critical. Now, as then, the NLD, brandishing democratic legitimacy, charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and latent popular support, confronts the military junta, wielding guns, power, and fear.

Existing explanations of international financial liberalization tend to understate the economic and political importance of related policies governing domestic financial markets. Further, these approaches often fail to specify fully the links between the international economy and domestic politics. Initial financial liberalization is often ‘domestic bank-centered’, i.e. it preserves a privileged position for weakly regulated domestic banks as the capital account is opened. On the other hand, there is much greater variation in later-stage financial policy developments, particularly following banking or currency crises. Adequate explanations should be able to explain, not just the initial pattern of financial liberalization, but also subsequent policy developments. This paper's main refinement is to explore the nature and implications of ‘dispersed’ interest group preferences. Initially more passive, poorly organized dispersed groups are viewed as the key link between the economic effects of crisis and variation in crisis-response policies. The explanatory value-added is explored through case studies of financial sector policy change in South Korea, Mexico, and Hungary.

The Singaporean patriarch Lee Kuan Yew popularized the argument that ‘Asian values’ derived from Confucian cultural traditions are inconsistent with the development of democracy in East Asia. There is an active scholarly debate over whether the hierarchic and deferential social authority relations of Confucian traditions are incompatible with support for democracy. Drawing upon the newest wave of the World Values Survey, we analyze public opinion in six East Asian nations and four Western democracies. We first assess orientations toward authority, and then link these sentiments to support for democracy. The results contradict the core tenets of the ‘culture is destiny’ argument in the Asian values literature, and offer a more positive view of the prospects for political development in the region.

Japan and the Republic of Korea have been going through a painful process of reconciliation since World War II. But with the momentum created by the FIFA World Cup and the high popularity of Korean pop culture in Japan, the trend shifted and the two countries seem to be enjoying a more amicable relationship. This paper aspires to understand when and how the steps toward reconciliation were taken between the two countries. The overarching research questions are: what steps were taken, and what channels of communication contributed to or hindered the process of reconciliation? Section 1 first lays the historical context of the dispute, and Section 2 assesses the diplomatic steps taken toward reconciliation by applying Assefa's reconciliation model, which leads to an analysis of discrepancy between the governments and the civil societies. Section 3 considers the impact of the FIFA World Cup in 2002, when momentum for friendship was reinforced by the various exchange activities at civil society level, as well as the Korean pop culture. The in-depth interview adds insights and public opinion polls clarify the perceived status of reconciliation. Section 4 concludes by returning to the more generalized issue of how communication between the two nation states has changed with the information technology, which is key to understanding the dynamism of the lingering reconciliation process.

In 2004, a government-backed Japanese consortium signed an agreement with the government of Iran to develop the major Azadegan oil field. Not only has the project been given the go-ahead despite numerous political obstacles and poor prospects attributed it, but the agreement also appears to be in conflict with Japan's energy policy, materializing from the mid 1980s to date. Consequently it is important to evaluate Azadegan in terms of Japan's evolving oil policy. Three alternative arguments are proposed to evaluate the quality of policy change: Japan–Iran's ‘special relationship’, bureaucratic factors in the energy policy-making process, and the rise of China. The conclusion emerging from this article is that the rise of China and the growing competition between Tokyo and Beijing in the Middle East and elsewhere are the primary factors in Japan's decision to conclude the Azadegan oil deal. The Azadegan case study therefore sets a new precedent for Japanese energy policy which emphasizes the political and strategic rather than economic factors leading this policy formulation.

In the early 1990s, the Commonwealth reformed its political structure to allow interference in domestic affairs of member states. This article examines whether such an institutional transformation has helped the organization to fulfil its purpose to work in the common interests of member countries and of their people. The article demonstrates that, while, as a consequence of post-Cold War globalization, concerns about the Commonwealth's political credibility and public perception have relaxed Commonwealth leaders' reluctance to accept legally binding norms of the organization, strong resistance to Commonwealth interference in internal affairs exists among developing member states. It is argued that, because the new Commonwealth political structure lacks legitimacy and is contrary to the real interests of the majority of members, institutionalizing the Commonwealth has not contributed to the formation of a collective identity among Commonwealth members and to the resolution of the problem of inequality within and without the organization.