Most of the current scholarship focuses on the functional aspects of regionalism such as economic and security issues, and the literature tends to be too focused on American or European concerns (Katzenstein, 2005; Higgott, 2007; Ravenhill, 2008). Despite the early examination of varied ideas of Asian regionalism (Milner and Johnson 1997, He, 2004, Acharya 2009), there remains a substantive lack of critical scholarship that focuses on the study of Asian ideas, proposals, and visions of regionalism.

While the United States is an important Asia-Pacific actor, its engagement with the region is complex and often difficult. Not only must US regionalism balance the diverse requirements of an ambitious policy agenda, but also US policy norms and priorities often clash with those of other regional actors. This has important implications for the capacity of the United States to provide regional leadership. Recent years have seen growing policy convergence between the United States and other Asia-Pacific actors, particularly in economic terms, but US regionalism continues to feature competition alongside collaboration.

As a rising power, China has become actively involved in regional bilateral/multilateral arrangements in the post-Cold War, especially post-crisis (1997– 98 financial crises) era, and this has attracted much attention from within and outside East Asia. Diverse understandings of China's regional ambition have appeared, especially since the launch of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA). Aiming at deciphering the ideas behind China's regional thinking, this paper argues that China's perspective on regionalism is a broadened economic regionalism, which is basically economic-centered, because economic performance is vital both to its long-term strategic target and to its internal social stability. This economic regionalism will last for some time because China will be a developing country at least in the mid-term, which means China will have to focus more on its economic performance. In practice, China will engage bilaterally or multilaterally with others through its FTA strategy. Thus, China cannot be a main contributor to East Asian integration as expected, owing to the inward-looking nature of its economic regionalism. Also, the institutional integration of East Asia needs the effort of all the players in the region.

After being at the periphery for decades, India's proactive engagement with East and Southeast Asia has gradually transformed it into an active participant in Asian regional organizations and multilateral processes. This paper examines early Indian attempts at forging pan-Asian unity and assesses the motivations and impact of its Look East Policy. It evaluates India's changing role towards regional cooperation in South Asia and sub-regional groupings, the impact of domestic politics, and discusses how China has influenced Indian perceptions and strategy towards Asian regionalism. After a long gap, India is again contributing ideas on Asian integration and stresses that the broader East Asian integration process should remain open and inclusive.

Japan is geographically located on the fringe of Asia. Japan's location is often divided between those arguing that Japan is inside Asia and those arguing it is outside Asia. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism are thus immensely varied. This article details a number of Japanese ideas on Asian regionalism with author/agency, scope and method specified. Special mention is made of weak integration of government agencies, thus causing proliferation of many Japanese ideas within Asia. With the increasing self-assertiveness of China, the apparent peaking out of American hegemony, and the steady rise of non-Chinese Asians, Japan tries to maintain enduring alliance with the United States, to invigorate interdependence with China, and to reinvent new relationships with the countries of the East Asian Summit. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism take those templates as guidelines to develop new ideas of Asian regionalism.

In the past decade, ASEAN has been the primary driver of East Asian regionalism, and Korea has been an active supporter of ASEAN plus Three. Korea has explored the idea of an East Asian Community, and has been relatively open to notions of Asia–Pacific regionalism. The ROK has involved itself comparatively heavily in regional projects as both an initiator and a participant, but its notion of ‘region’ has oscillated between more and less inclusive forms of regionalism. This article examines how competing conceptions of region have influenced Korea's pursuit of regional initiatives. By revisiting historical understandings of Korea's regional identity, we explore the normative bases and material interests which motivate Korean regional initiatives, and assess the impact of its proposals.

Australia has experienced difficulties engaging with Asia-Pacific regional integration. Despite Australian attempts to punch above its weight in regional forums and to be a regional leader, it is still not regarded as a full member or as quite fitting into the region. It is an ‘awkward partner’ in the Asian context, and has experienced the ‘liminality’ of being neither here nor there. The former Rudd government's proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ (APC) by the year 2020 was a substantive initiative in Australia's ongoing engagement with Asia. It has, however, attracted a high level of criticism both at home and abroad. The main critical analysis of the proposal has focused on institutional building or architecture, or its relationship with existing regional institutions, but overlooks a host of often fraught questions about culture, norms, identities, and international power relations. The APC concept needs to be scrutinized in terms of these questions with a critical eye. This paper examines the cultural, cognitive, and normative dimensions of Rudd's proposal. It analyses four dilemmas or awkward problems that the APC faces.

This paper will examine the various ways in which the regional imaginary has been conceptualized and developed in maritime Southeast Asia, primarily focussing on Indonesia. Utilizing the recent debate on the notion of a ‘Postcolonial International Relations,’ this paper examines the role of imperialism and the colonial experience on the development of Indonesian ‘ideas’ of region and regionalism. This paper is structured into four sections. First of all, it explores the link between postcolonial theory and regionalism studies. Second, it takes into account early ideas of regionalism in the post-independence era. This includes President Sukarno's ‘neutralist’ foreign policy culminating in Indonesia's hosting of the Bandung Conference as well as President Suharto's endorsement of ASEAN. The third and final section examines Indonesia's foreign policy orientation and practices in the post-authoritarian period, particularly under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. With its embrace of democracy in the post-New Order era, the concluding discussion suggests that Indonesia appears to be increasingly prepared to expand its regional engagement concentrically beyond the immediate Southeast Asian region. The question of the ‘imperial’ role of the US – which has its own foreign policy ambitions in the region – is instrumental in this regard, and can be usefully understood from a postcolonial framework.

This article traces the development of major ideas about integration in Europe. It examines the historical development of, and competition between, ideas about the EU, exploring the clash of integration models and ideals. It draws on the visions of European unity that led to the creation and development of the EU. Regional integration in the EU is distinctive and not necessarily ‘exportable’. The article examines governing norms, material interests, power, and security. It demonstrates that the narrative of shared experience and history formed part of a need to both overcome hyper-nationalism and to share sovereignty, while also privileging some memories. EU norms are also enshrined in a distinctive institutionalized structure, based on a co-existence of national and EU interests and a balancing among often competing interests.