The political trajectories in Southeast Asia are much more complex than neat theoretical models would suggest. In particular, the diverse experience of post-authoritarian states are far from linear – often moving forward, backward, and forward again, or stalling for a number of years. Political trajectories can thus be uneven and erratic, as exemplified by Thailand's military coups, graduating from hegemonic to competitive electoral authoritarian rule in Singapore and Malaysia and lingering within the zone of low-quality democracy as characterized by Indonesia's poor governance and neo-patrimonial dynamics. Indeed, since 2014, Freedom House no longer classifies Indonesia as ‘Free’, following the passage of legislation restricting the activity of civil society and the human rights violations against religious minorities. Similarly, Thailand lost its ‘Free’ ranking in 2006 and the Philippines in 2007.

This article is about the contestation of two different forms of nationalism in Singapore during and after two elections in 2011. Manufactured nationalism is top-down, state-defined and economically driven, concerned mainly about accumulation of national wealth through globalization that would eventually ‘trickle down’ to the masses. This view is promoted by the ruling People's Action Party (PAP). The PAP projects Singapore as a state born out of the party's triumph over colonialism, racial violence, and communist insurgency. Popular nationalism, on the other hand, is bottom-up and people driven, concerned about local issues concerning national identity, social cohesion, and an appreciation (or at least an understanding) of local heritage. Proponents of popular nationalism emphasize a common beginning (birth of independent Singapore on 9 August 1965), shared historical memories (local heritage), several elements of a common culture (such as the use of Singlish), and an association with a specific ‘homeland’ (born and raised in Singapore and, for males, the completion of conscription). They view Singapore as a nation-state with a unique and evolving identity destabilized by a liberal immigration policy. The elections generated considerable attention due to the gains by the opposition parties and the public airing of frustrations against the PAP government. These frustrations are strongly driven by the influx of new migrants, especially those classified as ‘foreign talent’ by the PAP government. In this article, I argue that popular nationalism has emerged in twenty-first century Singapore and examine the debates over the future of Singapore during and after the elections.

Singapore's long-serving People's Action Party (PAP) government suffered from a major electoral setback in the 2011 general election and subsequent by-elections. The high-growth population policy, underpinned by the influx of migrants and foreign workers, has strongly fuelled the groundswell of public discontent and is commonly perceived to have contributed to widening income disparities, wage stagnation, and cost of living pressures. This article attempts to make sense of the PAP leadership's dogged commitment to the high-growth population policy despite the electoral backlashes and policy criticisms by prominent public intellectuals and others closely connected to the PAP establishment. It considers Singapore's high-growth population policy and widening income disparity within the context of the authoritarian developmental state's shift away from the ‘growth with equity’ social compact. The article also examines the impact of widening income inequality and other policy lapses on the legitimacy of the PAP government as the clamor for a renewed social compact based on ‘growth with equity’ gathers momentum in the repoliticized polity.

This paper examines the prospects of ethnic politics and consociationalism in Malaysia, in terms of their structures and capabilities. Towards this end, the Barisan Nasional's (BN) policies from 2008 to 2013, the BN's and the Pakatan Rakyat's (PR) 2013 electoral strategies, and the results of the 2013 election will be analysed. As political parties in both the BN and the PR have generally represented ethnic interests and identities, an ethnic-based political structure has been maintained. A consociational political system, which is based on an ethnic-based political structure, has been adopted by both political coalitions. An examination of the 2013 election results indicates that the BN's ethnic politicking as a vote-gathering device has become ineffective. The BN's consociationalism has suffered from a legitimacy deficit, particularly within ethnic minority communities. However, it may be premature to claim that the Malaysian political culture is on the cusp of transcending the BN's paradigm of ethnic politics and consociationalism. The shift from ethnic politics will generate stronger momentum when the PR parties are incorporated into one political party.

In recent years much has been said about how new democracies are backsliding or have regressed since the turn of the century when hope and optimism about the future spread of democracy was widespread. However, ideas that democracy would spread were based on institutional and governance indicators rather than from the perspective of everyday citizens. When we look at public attitudes towards democracy during this period, we can see that such optimism was perhaps misplaced or premature. Drawing on findings from the AsiaBarometer and the World Values Survey, this research finds that public attitudes during this time were not overly convinced by democracy and certainly not yet satisfied with their government's performance in terms of providing basic democratic freedoms and independence.

How democratic is contemporary Indonesia? While analysts differ, Indonesian citizens, when asked in systematic public opinion surveys conducted regularly by the authors since 1999, consistently express strong support for democratic principles and also believe that their country's democratic performance is high. Support for democratic performance is highly correlated with support for government performance, as measured by perceptions of the condition of the national economy and political system. At the same time, higher levels of education and income, in Indonesia as in other countries, have created a considerable number of critical citizens, that is, citizens who value democracy but are critical of its performance. On our evidence for Indonesia, it is members of this group who are the most motivated and best prepared to demand a higher level of democratic performance from their elected officials.