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DPJ's Political Leadership in Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

TOMOHITO SHINODA
TOMOHITO SHINODA*
Affiliation:
Professor of International Relations, International University of Japan, Niigata, [email protected]
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Abstract

The 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami damaged the nuclear reactors in Fukushima. Prime Minister Naoto Kan took this crisis seriously, and made himself personally involved with damage control, especially during the first week. This study examines the responses to the incident by the prime minister's office.

Universal wisdom is that crises are better handled at the level closest to which they occur. Shifting the decision making to the higher authority is needed when a crisis spills over the local boundary or when the local authority fails to deal with the situation. This is called ‘upscaling’.

Frustrated by the lack of communication coming from the bureaucracy and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), Kan upscaled the decision making and began micromanaging damage control. The upscaling, however, did not contribute to improvement in the accident situation in most cases. Even in one case, it exacerbated it.

On the other hand, upscaling made a significant difference when the TEPCO officials considered withdrawing from the accident. By upscaling to the higher authority, Kan stopped their withdrawal. After the establishment of a joint headquarters with TEPCO, the political leaders, instead of upscaling, moved down to a closer level to the accident and successfully coordinated the recovery work.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 14 , Special Issue 2: Japan's Crisis Management amid Growing Complexity: In Search of New Approaches , June 2013 , pp. 243 - 259
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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