¹ Governability is here understood as the ability of governments to make policies decisively − Coppedge, Michael, ‘Prospects for Democratic Governability in Venezuela’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 36 (2) (1994): 39–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Michael Coppedge, ‘Party Systems, Governability and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America’, Paper presented at the Representation and Democratic Politics in Latin America, Buenos Aires, 7–8 June 2001.

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⁹ Lawson, Kay, ‘When Linkage Fails’, in Lawson, K. and Merkl, P. H. (eds), When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. xCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹¹ Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, p. 3.

¹² Ibid.: 53.

¹³ 1994, cited in ibid.: 53

¹⁴ Jose Antonio Cheibub, ‘Minority Governments’.

¹⁵ Jose Antonio Cheibub, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian M. Saiegh, ‘Government Coalitions’; Cheibub, ‘Minority Governments’; Robert Elgie, Divided Government; Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub and Limongi, Fernando, ‘Presidential Power, Legislative Organisation, and Party Behavior in Brazil’, Comparative Politics, 32 (2) (2000): 151–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Randall, Vicky and Svåsand, Lars, ‘Party Institutionalization in New Democracies’, Party Politics, 8 (1) (2002): 5–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ By Korean scholarship here I refer not only to Korean scholars, but in general to all those working on the country.

¹⁷ Hyeokjae Son, ‘Gukmin Musihan Jeongchigwonui Saepanjjagi: Jeonggyegaepyeonui

Hyeonhwanggwa Gwaje [Making New Political Frame Ignoring People: The Situtation and Assignments of Political Reorganization]’, Donghyanggwa Jeonmang [Tendency and Prospect], 41 (1999): 60–72

¹⁸ Park, Chanpyo, ‘Hanguk Jeongdang Minjuhwaronui Banseongjeok Seongchal: Jeongdang Minjuhwainga Taljeongdanginga? [Reflective Aspects on Party Democracy in South Korea: Is It Party Democracy or Defecting from Party?]’, Sahoe Gwahak Yeongu [Social Science Studies], 11 (2003): 137–64Google Scholar.

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²⁰ Donga Ilbo, 20 December 2002.

²¹ The United New Democratic Party (UNDP) was founded by a group of people that defected from the Uri Party before the presidential elections in 2007. The UNDP later merged with the New Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and renamed the merged party as the Democratic Party.

²² Lee Hoe-chang defected from the Grand National Party and became a non-party affiliated candidate for the presidential election in 2007 and gained 15% of total votes ranking the third in the presidential votes. The first was Lee Myung-bak gaining 48% and the second was Chung Dong-young with 26%.

²³ Chosun Ilbo, 19 January 1999.

²⁴ Since democratization regionalism has emerged as a crucial political cleavage in South Korea's politics. Kim Dae-jung had strong support from Jeolla Province and Kim Jong-pil from Chungcheong Province and the Lee Hoe-chang from Gyeongsnag province.

²⁵ The National Congress for the New Politics (NCNP) was the ruling party led by Kim Dae-jung. In January 2000, it changed its name to the New Millennium Democratic Party (MDP).

²⁶ Sekye Ilbo, 18 August 1998.

²⁷ Chosun Ilbo, 9 February 1998.

²⁸ When Kim Young-sam merged his party, the New Democratic Party, with two other parties, the Democratic Liberty Party and the United Liberal Democrats in 1990 some party members, including Lee Ki-taek and Roh Moo-hyun, left the party and founded the Democratic Party but after failing in the general election they all scattered; some such as Roh Moo-hyun joined the New Millennium Democratic Party and some the Grand National Party. Since that time, the Democratic Party is often called the ‘little’ Democratic Party.

²⁹ Interview held in Seoul on 2 March 2006.

³⁰ Kukmin Ilbo, 4 November 1999.

³¹ When the MDP was the opposition party (Kim Young-sam administration), the way it protested against the ruling party was very similar. For example, the members protested outside the National Assembly and refused to attend National Assembly meetings.

³² A mass party is ‘a party open to all and/or followed by masses of people’, see Sartori, Giovanni, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)Google Scholar. It is highly bureaucratized and the elites control the party organization. On the other hand, cadre party is built around a select group of influential persons. These support candidates, conduct electoral campaigns, and handle the finances of the party.

³³ Duverger, Maurice, ‘Caucus and Branch, Cadre Parties and Mass Parties’, in Mair, Peter, The West European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 41Google Scholar.

³⁴ Jeong, Youngguk, ‘Hangukjeondangeu Jigudang Jojiggwa Gineung [Organizational System and Functions of the District Party Chapters in Korean Politics: An Alternative argument]’, Hangukgwa Gukjejeongchi [Korea and International Relations], 6 (2000): 239Google Scholar.

³⁵ Kim, Youngho, Hanguk Jeongdang Jeongchiui Ihae [Understanding Party Politics in Korea] (Seoul: Nanam Publisher, 2001), p. 299Google Scholar.

³⁶ Yongho Kim (ibid.) notes that the Korean data are based on the Central Electoral Committee report, 2000, 99 Party Activities and Revenue Report, p. 16, and pp. 33–4, whereas those EU-related are based on Mair and Van Biezen, 2001, Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000, p. 9.

³⁷ Kil, Soonghoom, ‘Hanguke Isseoseo Jeongdangjeongchiwa Jeongchimunhwa [Party Politics and Political Culture]’, Hanguk Nondan, 4 (1990): 46–53Google Scholar; Youngho Kim, Hanguk Jeongdang Jeongchiui Ihae; Chanpyo Park, ‘Hanguk Jeongdang Minjuhwaronui Banseongjeok Seongchal’.

³⁸ Richard Kats and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy’ 8–19.

³⁹ Hoon Jang, ‘Jeongdang Jeongchiwa Jibangjachi; Hanguk Minjuhwa 10 Nyeonui Jeongdang Jeongchi; Yeonsokseonggwa Byeonhwa [Party Politics and Local Politics]’, Paper presented at the Hankuk Jeongchi Hakhoe Conference, Seoul 1997; Also see Hoon Jang, ‘Cartel Jeongdangchejeui Hyeongseonggwa Baljeon: Minjuhwa Ihuui Hangukui Gyeongu [the Rise of the Cartel Party System in Democratic Korea]’, Hangukgwa Gukjejeongchi [Korea and International Relations], 19(4) (2003): 31–60.

⁴⁰ Gunther, Richard and Diamond, Larry, ‘Species of Political Parties: A New Typology’, Party Politics, 9 (2) (2003): 170CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Panebianco, Angello, Political Parties: Organization and Power, Translated by Silver, Marc (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 40Google Scholar.

⁴² Donga Ilbo, 19 December 1997

⁴³ Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, ‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism’, World Politics, 46 (1) (1993): 1–22Google Scholar; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.

⁴⁴ Interview held in Seoul on 9 March 2006.

⁴⁵ Angello Panebianco, Political Parties.

⁴⁶ Donggyo-dong is a name of area in Seoul where Kim Dae-jung's former house was located. As his former secretaries or colleagues, the members of his faction, spent their political life with Kim Dae-jung, literally decades since the Park Jeong-hee administration.

⁴⁷ This trend of sharing official positions by the ruling parties did not change even during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The president-elect Lee Myung-bak hinted at widespread corruption and the need reform in state-owned public enterprises such as the Korea Expressway Corporation, Korea Electric Power Corporation, Korea Development Bank, and Korea Telecom. The posts of president of the state-owned companies were often used to reward those who had helped the presidential candidate in his political career. The practice was often referred to as ‘parachute personnel’ as the personnel are appointed from the top, and not following the company's internal appointment procedures (Seoul Finance, 6 January 2008).

⁴⁸ Kim, Panseok, ‘Daetongryeonggwa Insa: Jeongmu Gowijik Insahyeoksin [Presidential Personnel: Personnel Reform for Presidential Appointees]’, Hankuk Jeongchi Hakhoe [Journal of Korean Political Association], 37 (2) (2004): 392Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Kay Lawson, ‘When Linkage Fails’, p. 15.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Key, Valdimer Orlando, Public Opinion and Public Policy Models of Political Linkage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 14Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Donga Ilbo, 10 December 1998.

⁵⁵ Sim, Jiyun and Kim, Minjeon, ‘Hanguk Jeondangui Suipgujo Yeongu – 1997–2002 Nyeondo Jeongdang Hoegyebogo Jaryoreul Jungsimeuro [Revenue Structure of Korean Political Parties]’, Hankukkwa Kukjejeongchi, 38 (3) (2002): 157Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 163.

⁵⁸ If a party member makes the donation, it seems to be classified as membership dues. However, the average amount of donation is far too large to call it party dues.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 166.

⁶⁰ Some candidates for the general election write autobiographies before the election.

⁶¹ The Roh Moo-hyun administration faced fierce opposition over the new reform policies on Private School Laws, which aimed at introducing an open process of selecting board members. According to the new laws, a few members of the school board would have to be recommended by parents and teachers associations of the school in order to prevent corruption by the school owners or founders. The GNP led by Park Geun-hye deserted the National Assembly meetings opting for protesting outside the legislature (Oh My News, 9 December 2005). Available from: http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=263007&rel_no=1 [Accessed 5 October 2006].

⁶² Interview held in Seoul on 8 March 2006

⁶³ Kukmin Ilbo, 11 May 1999; Seoul Sinmun, 10 May 1999.

⁶⁴ The political parties’ local branches were abolished in March 2004 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

⁶⁵ People in South Korea gather for key family events but these not only involve the family but also friends and acquaintances. On such occasions, guests typically bring money gifts. This kind of gathering shows the person's social status: that is, the higher position or wealthier he or she is the more money is given, the more flowers on display at a particular event and so forth.

⁶⁶ Interview held in Seoul on 9 March 2006.

⁶⁷ Interview was held in Seoul on 10 March 2006.

⁶⁸ Helgesen, Geir, Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Interview was held in Seoul on 8 March 2006.

⁷⁰ Youngho Kim, Hankuk Jeongdang Jeongchieu Ihae; Diamond, Larry and Kim, Byung-Kook, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Colorado, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chanpyo Park, ‘Hanguk Jeongdang Minjuhwaronui Banseongjeok Seongchal.

⁷¹ (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiech, ‘Government Coalitions’; Cheibub, ‘Minority Governments’; Elgie, Divided Government; Figueredo and Limongi, ‘Presidential Power’; Randall and Svåsand, ‘Party Institutionalization’.