Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 December 2019
To nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholarship, the early modern expansion of powers like Spain, Portugal, England and Holland, was a necessary preliminary step towards Europe's ultimate domination of the Asian and African continents. Moreover, the relative ease with which colonial powers manhandled regions like North Africa and the Indo-Pak subcontinent suggested that their early modern ‘pioneering’ counterparts must have shared similar experiences. While some historians highlighted superior business concepts (joint-stock companies, profit-sharing) or superior shipbuilding and navigation techniques as the means with which trading powers like the Estado da India and the English East India Company penetrated and overwhelmed Indian Ocean commerce, other scholars boiled it down to the European affinity for using ‘men-of-war, gun, and shot’. The critical underlying assumption of any of these teleological explanations s i that ‘encountered’ cultures were unable to adequately respond to European technology, of course hinting at some deeper and more profound deficiency. Scholarship in recent decades has shorn such confidence and begun to scrutinise this seedling period of interaction between Europe and non-Europe, suggesting that the initial playing ground between ‘encounterer’ and ‘encountered’ was perhaps more level than previously portrayed.
1 Parts of this article were presented at the 1999 Middle East Studies Association meeting in Washington D.C. I would like to thank Kathryn Babayan, Maria Subtelny, and others for their comments.
2 Scammel, V.G., The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c. 1400–1715 (London 1980) 77–90Google Scholar.
3 A famous quote used for this argument come s from Jan Pieterszoon Coen's advice to the ruling Dutch council of the Heeren XVII in December of 1614: ‘From experience, your lordships ought to know very well that in India trade is driven and maintained under the protection and favour of your weapons, just as the weapons are furnished from the profits of trade, in such wise that trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without trade’. Tracy, James D., ‘Introduction’ in: Tracy, James D. ed., The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750 (Cambridge 1993) 1Google Scholar.
4 A seminal study of Asian commerce and its fledgling relationship with the different competing Europeans powers of England, Holland, and Spain was offered by Steensgaard, Niels, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of Caravan Trade (New York 1974)Google Scholar. Steensgaard asserts, among other things, that the English and Dutch were in fact quite leery of some of the Asian despotic regimes, and were reluctant to adopt aggressive trading policies for fear of introducing unjustifiable overhead costs, i.e. defensive fortifications, repairs, ammunition. It was only later towards the end of the seventeenth century that the English East India and Vereenigde Oosl-Indische companies became distinctly mor e controlling. Other studies, like Chaudhuri's, K. N. ‘Braudelian’ Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean From the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge 1990) andGoogle ScholarCurtin's, PhilipCross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, emphasise the European companies as simply another trading element in what was a large and complex trading rhythm in the Indian Ocean.
5 In 1607, Philip III signed the treaty of Sitva Torok with th e ‘Turk’, thus allowing the Ottoman sultan Mehmed III to concentrate on his campaigns in Persia.
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13 Robert and Anthony Sherley had arrived with twenty-six Europeans who claimed to be ‘representatives’ of various European monarchs. Anthony Sherley was sent shortly afterwards to different European powers with letters of accreditation while his brother remained behind as a hostage. Robert Sherley, in that time, became quite close to the shah and served as a military advisor, ambassador, and cultural attache until his death i n 1628.
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23 This is, of course, the ‘price revolution’ of the seventeenth century, which constituted one of the many features of what has been called ‘the seventeenth-century crisis’. See Trevor-Roper, H. R., ‘General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’ in: Ashton, T. H. ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, Essays from Past & Present (London 1965)Google Scholar; Hobsbawm, E. J., ‘The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’, Past & Present V and VI (1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Steens-gaard's, N. excellent article in Parker, G. and Smith's, L.edited collection of essays: The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London 1978)Google Scholar.
24 Steensgaard has reconstructed French exports from the Levant for the year 1621-1622 on the basis of a series of ships' manifests. Forty-four ships, sailing from Alexandria, Alexandretta, Smyrna, Acra, Seydon, Tripoli, and Constantinople, carried a total of 137,000 kg of silk, a figure substantially higher than for previous years. Steensgaard, , The Asian Trade Revolution, 185–187Google Scholar.
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