¹ For a further explanation on the difference between yield (rendement) and productivity (productivité) see Bairoch, P., Victoires et déboire: Histoire économique et social du monde du XVIe siccle a nos jours I (Paris 1997) 276–280.Google Scholar For a comparison of the number of agriculturalists working per acre in various regions in the world see Bairoch, P., Révolution industrielle et sous-développement (The Hague 1974) 140–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For data on the situation in 1700, see Maddison, A., Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (Paris 1998) 27–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For data on grain yields per acre in Europe see van Zanden, J.L., ‘The Development of Agricultural Productivity in Europe 1500–1800’, NEHA-Jaarboek 61 (1998) 66–85Google Scholar, and for England M. Overton, ‘English Agrarian History, 1500–1850’, Ibid., 46–65, an abstract of his Agricultural Revolution in England, 1500–1850: The Transformation of an Agrarian Economy (Cambridge 1996).Google Scholar For data on some non-Western regions see Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 32. For information on the Chinese structure of occupation see Feuerwerker, A., Studies in the Economic History of Late Imperial China (Ann Arbor 1995) 87–122, and 13–45, where it is claimed that never in the last millennium of Imperial China more than twenty percent of total population was working outside agriculture. For data on early modern England see Overton, English Agrarian History, 53. For a comparison of the rates of urbanisation in Europe and China see Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 35, where he claims that in China during 1650 and 1800 about four percent of the population was living in cities widi more than 10,000 inhabitants, while in Europe this was eight to ten percent. Figures for North-western Europe were substantially higher.Google Scholar

² Landes, D., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are so Rich and Some so Poor (London 1998) 525, the third note of the entire book.Google Scholar

³ Bairoch, Maddison and Braudel to whom I refer in note 6 of my review, and to whom Frank is also referring, are far less outspoken in supporting Frank's thesis than Frank suggests.

⁴ Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 25 and 40–41.

⁵ I refer to the ideas he propagates in Goldstone, J.A., ‘The Problem of the “Early Modern” World’, Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 41 (1998) 249–284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ See Vries, P.H.H., ‘Culture, Clocks and Comparative Costs: David Landes on the Wealth of the West and the Poverty of the Rest’, Itinerario 22/4 (1998).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ For data on GNP per capita in Europe from 1450 to 1800 see Malanima, P., Economia preindvstriale: MilleAnni: dal IX al XVIII secolo (Milan 1995) 599.Google Scholar It is instructive to compare this with data on the development of European population in the same period in Bardet, J.P. and Dupaquier, J. eds, Histoire des populations de l'Europe I: Des origines aux prémices de la révolution démographique (Paris 1997) 239–261.Google Scholar

⁸ Overton, Agricultural Revolution, 75.

⁹ Frank, ReOrient, 168 and 170.

¹⁰ Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 25 and 40–41. According to Maddison between 1280 and 1700 there was no per capita growth in China. This is also true for the period 1700–1820.

¹¹ Lavely, W. and Wong, R. Bin, ‘Revising the Maldiusian Narrative: The Comparative Study of Populadon Dynamics in Late Imperial China’, Journal of Asian Studies 57 (1998) 714–748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Frank, ReOrient, 264–275.

¹³ Ibid., 263–264.

¹⁴ Ibid., 276.

¹⁵ Ibid., 349.

¹⁶ A similar analogy can already be found in Goldstone, J A., ‘Trend or Cycles? The Economic History of East-West Contacts in the Early Modern World’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 36 (1993) 104–119.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Vries, P.H.H., ‘Should we really ReOrient?’, Itinerario 22/3 (1998) 25. Here the reader can also find references to the relevant texts of O'Brien and Bairoch.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Frank, ReOrient, 117. See also the chapter called ‘Summary of a Sinocentric World Economy’, 126–130.

¹⁹ See for example Vries, P.H.H., ‘Sociaal-Economische Structuren en Veranderingen van de Vijftiende tot het Einde van de Achttiende Eeuw’ in: Diederiks, H. A. et al., Van Agrarische Samenleving naar Verzorgingsstaat: De Modemisering van West-Europa sinds de Vijftiende Eeuw (Groningen 1987) 67–144, 107–117.Google Scholar

²⁰ Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 47–53 and Osterhammel, J., China und die Weltgesellschaft: Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit (München 1989) 171–201.Google Scholar

²¹ See Vries, ‘Should we really ReOrient’, 27.

²² See for example Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, 35; Osterhammel, China und die Weltgesellschaft, 36–37 and Feuerwerker, Studies in the Economic History of Late Imperial China, 87–122 and 13–45.

²³ Vries, ‘Should we really ReOrient’, 29.

²⁴ See also Ibidem, 288 and 301–308 where Frank approvingly refers to Elvin who thinks capital was scarce in China, that was caught in a high-level equilibrium trap. See Ibidem, 303.