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LA CRESCITA DEI POTERI REGOLATIVI NELLA COMUNITÀ EUROPEA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Giandomenico Majone

Introduzione

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La rilevanza conferita dal Trattato di Maastricht al principio di sussidiarietà se da un lato rivela una diffusa preoccupazione circa la tendenza alla crescita dei poteri di regolazione di Bruxelles, solleva anche diversi interrogativi interessanti sotto il profilo teorico. In primo luogo, è possibile una sovra-regolazione al livello europeo, nonostante che i governi nazionali siano fortemente rappresentati ad ogni livello del processo decisionale? In secondo luogo, se è vero che gli stati membri si sforzano di preservare il più ampio margine possibile di sovranità e di autonomia nel policy-making, come dimostrano le forti resistenze agli interventi comunitari in aree quali la politica macroeconomica e la tassazione indiretta, perché allora essi hanno accettato molte misure regolative non previste dai trattati originari e non strettamente necessarie per il funzionamento del mercato comune? Infine, per quello che riguarda la qualità più che la quantità delle regole comunitarie, quanto è davvero possibile l'innovazione in un sistema dove i poteri formali di iniziativa della Commissione, così come le sue funzioni esecutive, sembrano essere così severamente controllati?

Summary

Summary

The paper deals with the apparently unstoppable growth of the regulatory policies within the European Community, trying to define the extension of the phenomenon and to explain it. After discussing some examples related to the qualitative and quantitative growth of EC regulation, the author discusses the most important theories about the growth of the European policy making, from the inter-governmentalist to the neo-functionalist perspective. Starting from this theoretical debate, an interpretative model is developed, focusing particularly on the problem of policy process in the Community. This model has among its main variables the limited size of the EC budget. Some interesting implications derive from this analysis: in particular, the capacity of the Commission officials as «policy entrepreneurs» to play a crucial role in the EC policy making.

The paper concludes with some remarks on institutional reform, linking the theme of the regulatory growth with the problem of the «democratic deficit» within the EC.

Type
Saggi
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , December 1995 , pp. 409 - 439
Copyright
Copyright © Societ Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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