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ANTHONY DOWNS, MAESTRO DI MOLTI MODELLI

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Ian Budge

Introduzione

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Se venisse chiesto loro di elencare i più importanti testi della disciplina degli ultimi cinquanta anni, molti scienziati politici — probabilmente un gran numero se non la maggioranza — opterebbero per Una teoria economica della democrazia. È un fenomeno quasi unico che questo libro sia più citato cinquanta anni dopo che all'epoca della sua pubblicazione, pur avendo attratto l'attenzione anche allora. È stato un testo seminale per lo sviluppo dell'approccio della «scelta razionale», ora egemonico nella disciplina. E il suo influsso si è esteso ben oltre la cerchia di chi fa uso di modelli matematici, sino a informare la prospettiva della gran parte degli scienziati politici del pianeta — non male per una tesi di Ph. D solo un po' rielaborata!

Summary

Summary

Anthony Downs is unusual in having been active in economic and political research during the 1950s and 1960s, and then turning to real estate and urban planning for the rest of his career. He quitted political economy in spite of the great and enduring success of his first book, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). A new Ms on the Theory of Democracy is currently circulating. This paper concentrates on the Economic Theory, starting from the fact that the book presents not one, but many theories of democracy even if they are all generally couched in economic terms. Some of these theories (or models) of party competition and voting have mutually contradicting predictions, such as parties sticking to the same policies to demonstrate reliability and responsibility, while in terms of the two-party spatial model they will converge in policy terms. The confusion is heightened when assumptions and conclusions from one model are grafted on to another in the text.

This paper expounds the argument of the Economic Theory systematically and sequentially, covering: a) the general non-spatial model of party competition; b) the effects of information shortage; c) party reliability and responsibility; d) the two party spatial model; e) the multi-party spatial model; j) further consequences of information shortage; g) problems of voting turnout.

Evidence from quantified election programmes is used to show that the models leading to limited party policy movement and nonconvergence are the n10re realistic ones. The Appendix provides the full set of 22 assumptions necessary to derive Downs' proportions at the end of the Economic Theory. In spite of its defects the book laid down the agenda for mathematical political theory and empirical research over the last 50 years and has a fair claim to being the most inBuential single book written on politics in that period.

Type
Saggi
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , December 2003 , pp. 375 - 408
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna 

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