This article addresses how and why liberal democratic constitutions, such as the United States, have come to recognise the tension between liberal values of equal liberty and patriarchy in three areas – contraception, abortion, and gay/lesbian sex acts – and to resolve them in the way in which they have: by extending constitutional protection to these activities on the basis of a constitutional right to privacy. The article begins with some historical understanding of the background of the rise of patriarchy, and why the control of sexuality in general, and women's sexuality in particular, was so central to its aims. It then turns to how and why liberal constitutionalism has found these aims to be so problematic as a basis for law.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–12 reaffirmed the commitment of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to positive complementarity. The Prosecutor recognised the inability of the ICC to deal with all cases of mass atrocities and the importance of relying on national systems if international criminal justice is to be effective. The article first proposes a two-pronged approach to complementarity that distinguishes between its legal and policy dimensions. On the basis of the analysis of the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Colombia, it will be argued that the OTP has taken controversial decisions from the viewpoint of complementarity stricto sensu and positive complementarity that may undermine filling the impunity gap as well as the legitimacy of the ICC. Attention is then drawn to the common substratum of the ad hoc tribunals' completion strategy and positive complementarity. It is explained how the experience of the completion strategy offers a valuable cluster of lessons to be applied within the spectrum of positive complementarity. In concluding, the article suggests measures for the execution of positive complementarity and the Law Enforcement Network, with the intention of optimising efforts and resources within the ICC system.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) were created to deliver accountability for the atrocities committed during Rwanda's genocide of 1994 and Sierra Leone's civil war of the 1990s. The capacity of these courts, however, like other international criminal tribunals, is limited in terms of the number of persons they can prosecute. If most perpetrators evade justice, the ability of international tribunals to deliver accountability may be seriously undermined. To mitigate this risk, national justice systems should deal with the perpetrators who are not addressed by international tribunals. When national systems do not do so (or fail to do so effectively), international tribunals are well placed to encourage (or improve) national atrocity-related judicial proceedings, thereby increasing their chances of delivering accountability.

This article assesses empirically the impact of the ICTR and SCSL on national atrocity-related judicial proceedings in their target countries, thus contributing to an overall assessment of these tribunals. The article also compares the national impact of the ‘pure international’ ICTR to that of the ‘hybrid’ SCSL and tries to identify features that affect the national impact of an international tribunal. Understanding the interactions between international and national justice systems, and the features that affect the national impact of international tribunals, is particularly important given the shift to ‘positive complementarity’ at the International Criminal Court.

Research on compliance has shown that people can be induced to comply with various requests by using techniques that capitalise on the human tendencies to act consistently and to reciprocate. Thus far this line of research has been applied to interactions between individuals, not to relations between institutions. We argue, however, that similar techniques are applied by courts vis-à-vis the government, the legislature and the public at large, when courts try to secure legitimacy and acceptance of their decisions. We discuss a number of known influence techniques – including ‘foot in the door’, ‘low-balling’, ‘giving a reputation to uphold’ and ‘door in the face’ – and provide examples from Israeli case law of the use of such techniques by courts. This analysis offers new insights that can further the understanding of judicial decision-making processes.

That a ‘secular’ government should not sponsor religious expressions may seem almost like an analytic truth. And yet, in practice, liberal democratic governments often support religious symbols and expressions. So, are governments that purport to be secular and yet support religious symbols or expressions just being hypocritical, or incoherent? This article, written for a conference on ‘Freedom from Religion’ held in Tel Aviv in December 2011, considers three different versions of secularity – what I call the ‘classical’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘agnostic’ versions – and concludes that none of these versions forbids religious expressions by ‘secular’ governments.

The undeniable impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the legal systems – and the wider society – of Member States of the Council of Europe would not have been possible without its unique monitoring system, centred around the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The present article assesses the extent to which the European Court's judgments that have found violations of the procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to investigate unlawful killings, disappearances, acts of torture or other ill-treatment have, in fact, led to an improvement in the capability of the domestic legal systems of states parties to ensure accountability for such abuses. On the basis of four case studies, it is concluded that the European Court's judgments, coupled with the supervisory powers of the Committee of Ministers, have the potential to make a very great impact on the capability of domestic legal systems to deal with gross violations of fundamental human rights, and have led to clear and positive changes within the domestic legal systems of respondent states. Nevertheless, this is by no means always the case, and it is suggested that, in order for the Convention system to achieve its full potential in the most politically charged cases, the European Court should adopt a more proactive approach to its remedial powers by ordering specific remedial measures, to include in particular the opening or reopening of investigations.

This article seeks to give an impression of the way in which domestic courts are contributing to the development of international criminal law. Have they predominantly followed the case law of international tribunals and, by doing so, have they corroborated those standards? Or have they rather ventured in new directions and, as a consequence, been involved in a creative process, establishing and refining international criminal law?

Four different approaches, reflecting the position of domestic courts vis à vis the standards and case law of international criminal tribunals, are identified and analysed: strict compliance, antagonism, judicial construction, and ‘casuistry’. The author concludes that the most important contribution of domestic courts to the development of international criminal law consists of further interpretation of open-ended norms. While this is obviously inherent in the process of ‘judicial creativity’, the feature is reinforced by the non-hierarchical nature of international criminal law. As a consequence, international criminal tribunals lack the power and authority to impose their interpretation of international criminal law on domestic courts. The risk of fragmentation is mitigated, however, by the nature of criminal law, which requires strict and clear standards, and by the increasing interactions between courts at different levels.

In the case 9535/06 Abadallah Abu Massad and Others v Water Commissioner and Israel Lands Administration (2011), the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the right to water deserves constitutional protection under Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. The Court also found support for the right to water under both international human rights law and Israeli statutory law. At the same time, the Court held that the right to water is not absolute but must be balanced against the rights of the state. The case was brought by residents of unrecognised Bedouin villages in the Negev, a desert region in southern Israel, who do not have access to household water. The Court found that in exercising its discretion regarding additional water access points, the Israeli Water Authority could consider the ‘illegal’ nature of these villages. Applying the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, the Court ultimately affirmed the Israeli Water Authority's policy in unrecognised villages in the Negev. Despite this administrative deference, the invocation of constitutional and international human rights law raises the level of scrutiny that should be applied to a review of the Israeli Water Authority's exercise of discretion. The Court's opinion is coloured and influenced by long-standing land disputes between the indigenous Bedouin population and the State of Israel. Drawing on empirical research conducted in December 2011, the analysis attempts to place the Abu Massad decision in its proper historical and political context. The dispute over land in the Negev can be traced back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. More recent efforts by the Israeli government as set out in the Goldberg Report and the Prawer Plan, and the international community's response to these efforts, are discussed. In light of the history and current political context, it may be prudent for the Israeli Water Authority to re-assess the effectiveness of its existing water policy in unrecognised Bedouin villages in the Negev.

The article attempts to examine the structures of the EFTA Court in order to gain insights into its effectiveness. For this purpose the article relies on a rational system approach developed within social sciences to improve understanding the performance of public organisations and calibrated to examine international courts by the ERC Project Researching Conditions for Effective International Adjudication. Under the conceptual and analytical framework advanced by the Effectiveness Project the article, therefore, examines the main structures of the EFTA Court: for example, the Court's budget, jurisdictional rules, judicial independence and main legal doctrines. The article will also, in relation to some aspects, attempt to conduct a qualitative assessment of how some of these features relate to the effectiveness of the Court.

The advent of the principle of complementarity under the Statute of the International Criminal Court has shifted the focus on prosecuting international crimes to the national courts. One of the potential difficulties in this shift is that there is no uniform standard for incorporating and applying international legal norms in the national systems. This article examines how two very distinct national courts – the state Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the military courts of the Democratic Republic of Congo – have implemented and applied international legal norms. Despite the differences between these particular courts in the methods of implementation and application, international courts have had an impact on the national systems that have helped the latter to follow international criminal legal norms.

Throughout its history, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled in a significant number of cases on the state's obligations to investigate and prosecute grave human rights violations and international crimes. Regardless of the existence of this body of international jurisprudence, an important question remains unanswered: Can the Inter-American Court's decisions have any significant normative impact on national jurisdictions when it comes to the prosecution of international crimes? This article argues that such an impact is possible provided that the national courts have a specific judicial identity, better associated with the idea of neo-constitutionalism. In this context, international law and regional human rights jurisprudence becomes a relevant argumentative resource, which can be incorporated into judicial decisions in order to ensure the effective prosecution of gross human rights violations and international crimes.

Among the various bills proposing amendments to Israel's Defamation (Prohibition) Law that were presented to the 18th Knesset, the most controversial one is the bill proposing an increase in the caps on statutory damages (without proof of special or general damage). The current NIS 50,000 cap (NIS 100,000 when the publication was intended to cause injury) will be replaced, if the bill is approved, by a NIS 300,000 cap (NIS 600,000 when the publication was intended to cause injury). This proposed massive change has ignited a heated public debate. The bill, according to its proponents, is targeted principally at the media. Its aim is deterrence and even punishment, accomplished by attaching a higher price tag to libellous publications while focusing on remedies and leaving liability tests (including defences) untouched.

I claim that this bill is both unnecessary and detrimental.

Based on case law from the eight-year period 2004–11 on damages awarded by Israeli courts in defamation cases – both damages awarded ‘without proof of damage’ (the plaintiff does not need to prove damage caused by the publication) and damages awarded for ‘general damage’ (some general damage needs to be proved) – I conclude that the spectrum of judicial discretion is sufficiently broad to accommodate any level of deterrence seen fit by the courts in any circumstances. The fact that average damages awards do not reach the statutory caps indicates that, for all practical purposes, legislative intrusion in the manner proposed is erroneous. As to the normative standards the bill strives to convey, I maintain that absent reasonable justifications based on identifiable changes in cultural, social or other circumstances over time, the attempt to change the currently accepted balance between the rights of reputation and freedom of speech in Israeli defamation law in terms of damages awards is also erroneous.

Even if some modification of the current balance between reputation and free speech, as a result of specified changes in circumstances, do indeed appear to be necessary, the particular content, form and measure of this specific bill – which have yet to be examined and assessed – do not seem to provide the right approach to achieve such modifications.

Article 215 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the entry point for international law into the DRC legal complex. It provides that international treaties and agreements duly ratified by the state predominate over Acts of Parliament. Cases and studies involving the direct effect or self-executing norms of international law in domestic cases are rare in the DRC. The correct ways of applying Article 215 of the Constitution and international law in domestic cases have not yet been authoritatively settled. The basic dilemma is whether courts should read the provisions of relevant international treaties into disputed provisions of DRC laws or read the disputed provisions in the light of the relevant treaty provisions.

Using as a case study the emerging practice of DRC military courts of directly applying international criminal law in domestic cases, the article argues that carelessly cutting and pasting formulations found in international treaties into the texts of applicable municipal laws infringes state sovereignty. Instead, the article proposes a strategy that would avoid unpleasant friction between international criminal law and municipal law, while encouraging cultural pluralism and the judicious intervention of international law in municipal law.

International actors and observers have afforded greater attention in recent years to the role of national courts in bringing to justice perpetrators of international crimes. Not only are national courts typically less expensive to operate than international courts, they also enjoy at times more legitimacy in the eyes of local constituencies than their international counterparts. They can also reach deeper into society and cast a wider net than international criminal courts. Indeed, there is an increased tendency to view international criminal courts as mechanisms primarily designed to support and complement the work of national criminal procedures, and to pay closer attention to the interaction between the two sets of judicial institutions. It is against this background that the Project on Studying the Impact of International Courts in Domestic Criminal Procedures in Mass Atrocity Cases (the DOMAC project) has sought to draw lessons from the experience accumulated by the interactions that took place between national and international courts in the two decades that have passed since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This was done in the hope that such lessons may guide such interactions in the future. Indeed, DOMAC reports have looked into interactions relating to specific legal aspects (applicable laws, prosecution rates, sentencing policies and capacity development) and/or at specific geographical regions (for example, the Balkans, Africa, Latin America, East Timor) and provide many interesting stories of success and failure, from which valuable lessons can be learned. The purpose of this article is to offer, on the basis of the said DOMAC reports, some general observations on the impact of international courts on domestic criminal processes (in the aftermath of mass atrocity situations), and to discuss the structural deficiencies that may have led until now to sub-optimal levels of cooperation and division of labour between international and national criminal procedures. On the basis of these critical observations, a number of general recommendations for future policy planners will be considered. The article first describes some of the main impacts of international courts on domestic courts handling mass atrocity cases. It then discusses four overarching problems, which may have hampered such interactions: the lack of a comprehensive legal response to mass atrocities, inadequate allocation of resources, the absence of ultimate responsibility over the international response, and legitimacy deficits. The concluding section sketches a number of proposals based on the discussion in the two immediately preceding sections.

The principle of proportionality is one of the core principles of international humanitarian law. The principle is not easy to apply on the battlefield, but is even harder to apply retrospectively, in the courtroom. This article discusses the challenges in applying the principle during international criminal trials. It discusses the principle itself, followed by an explanation of the general challenges of dealing with violations of international humanitarian law, and more specifically the rules related to the conduct of hostilities, during war crime trials. The way in which the principle has been used before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is examined, including an in-depth discussion of the recent Gotovina case. The second part consists of an evaluation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and discusses the difficulties the International Criminal Court would face in cases dealing with violations of the principle of proportionality.

In 2012 the Knesset approved a new sentencing law. Israel thus became the latest jurisdiction to introduce statutory directions for courts to follow in sentencing. The approach of the United States to structuring judicial discretion often entails the use of a sentencing grid with presumptive sentencing ranges. In contrast, the Sentencing Act of Israel reflects a less prescriptive method: it provides guidance by words rather than numbers. Retributivism is clearly identified as the penal philosophy underpinning the new law, which takes a novel approach to promoting more proportionate sentencing. Courts are directed to construct an individualised proportionate sentencing range appropriate to the case in hand. Once this is established, the court then follows additional directions regarding factors and principles related to sentencing. Although other jurisdictions have placed the purposes and principles of sentencing on a statutory footing, this is the first such legislative declaration in Israel. The statute also contains a methodology to implement a proportional approach to sentencing as well as detailed guidance on sentencing factors. This article describes and explores the new Sentencing Act, making limited comparisons to sentencing reforms in other jurisdictions – principally England and Wales, New Zealand and the United States. In concluding, we speculate on the likely consequences of the law: will it achieve the goals of promoting more consistent and principled sentencing?