The “speciality principle” or “speciality rule”, governing extradition relations between States, finds its expression in the fact that the institution of extradition is intended, as far as its material grounds are concerned, to cover only a part of all criminal offences, that each case of the extradition of a particular person is closely connected with a specific offence and as a result of this, that the competence of the requesting State to try and punish him is limited by those restrictions imposed upon it, again from the material point of view, by the requested State.

The rule therefore, has two aspects, the “specificness of extradition” and the “limitation of competence”, which, although they are intertwined and interdependent, each has its own characteristics. They are to be viewed from the standpoint of the position of the State—whether as requested to extradite or requesting extradition—and the part the State plays in applying the principle.

It is my pleasure to contribute to the workshop on Mark Tushnet's manuscript. Good literature is sometimes identified by its ability to elicit responses on different levels. While reading Tushnet's compelling manuscript, my thoughts about the validity of the historical analysis were supplemented by immediate comparisons to the much shorter history of the rise of “rightspeak” in Israel. Then there were some thoughts about the possible links between this manuscript and Tushnet's earlier works and between this manuscript and other studies of the subject. Finally, I found myself linking and comparing Tushnet's implicit normative arguments with my own views on the role of courts in liberal democracy.

The legal concept of ‘amicus curiae’ (friend of the court) was unknown in Israeli law until 1999 when, in the course of a well-known legal decision (the Kuzli case), the Israeli Supreme Court adopted this common law concept as part of Israeli law. Almost fifteen years have elapsed since the legal precedent set in Kuzli, during which time the criteria for participation as an amicus curiae have been established.

The aim of this study was to empirically explore and analyse the ways in which the procedural institution of amicus curiae has been used and adopted under Israeli law, and the extent to which it has influenced judicial decisions. The study has used empirical methods, including the collection of quantitative data from computerised databases in Israel concerning cases in which an application to be recognised as an amicus curiae was made.

The main findings indicate that, over the last decade, the number of applications for recognition as an amicus curiae has grown steadily. Most of these applications were made by non-governmental organisations in attempting to support private individuals engaged in legal proceedings against the state or for-profit corporations. The findings reveal that the courts have approved most of these applications.

Reading Tushnet's careful analysis of the history of the American rights revolution filled me with envy. One of the great advantages of writing about law in the U.S. is the ability to experience and benefit from centuries of sustained legal evolution. The world of an Israeli law professor whose horizons barely reach the middle of the twentieth century is impoverished in comparison to the enriching experience of living in a mature and rich legal tradition such as that of the U.S.

Living in a different legal tradition and being ignorant of legal history—a field which only began to develop in Israel in the late 1990s—it will be pretentious on my part to try and challenge Tushnet's findings or even to try and explore the similarities and differences with the rights revolution in the Israeli legal system. Instead, I wish to explore the relevance of Tushnet's findings to constitutional theory and argue that constitutional theorists have some important lessons to learn from Tushnet's careful historical observations.

It is generally thought that Jerusalem is the most difficult problem that the peace-makers have to deal with. The centrality of the issue of Jerusalem derives neither from security considerations nor from economic interests, but from emotional and religious sensitivities. The complexity of the issue is the result of three factors: the city is holy for adherents of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, namely, it is sacred for many millions of people, most of whom do not live in the city; it is the subject of conflicting national claims of two peoples — Israelis and Palestinian Arabs; and its population is very heterogeneous. A solution to the conflicts about Jerusalem is a sine qua non for the achievement of a viable and durable peace in the area.

The Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, signed on May 4, 1994, seeks to implement the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements signed in Washington on September 13, 1993 and, in particular, to put into effect its Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Gaza and the Jericho Area. The primary purpose of the Agreement is then to transfer territory from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. Article V of the Agreement defines this territory as covering the Gaza Strip and Jericho, excluding the Settlements and the Israeli military installation area. The transfer of territory is naturally accompanied by a transfer of legal and political control from the Military Government to the Palestinian Authority. But the Agreement does not simply assign to the Palestinian Authority all legislative, executive and judicial functions within the territory transferred to its control.

Transitional countries have struggled to overcome impunity for human rights violations committed by past authoritarian regimes. While some scholars have hailed the emergence of a ‘justice cascade’, a ‘justice revolution’, and an ‘age of accountability’, our research highlights the persistence of amnesty laws despite efforts to erode them. This article examines 63 amnesties for human rights violations committed by state agents that were enacted in 34 transitional countries from 1970 to 2011, and the 161 challenges that endeavoured to undermine the power of these laws.

We find significant variation in the outcome of challenges. While some lead to the removal or weakening of amnesty laws, others validate them. We explain the variation using an explanatory model that focuses on the characteristics of four actors: civil society, international governmental and non-governmental agencies, domestic executives and judicial leaders. Time also plays a conditioning role in our framework. We illustrate our argument by presenting emblematic country case studies. We conclude that even when amnesty laws are displaced or eroded, impunity tends to persist in some form.

The question discussed in the articles published in this issue of the Israel Law Review is not really new. In 1978, published an article in this review dealing with the issue. At that time, it looked much more like an academic question with very few potential practical consequences. The reason for this is clear. It was like the discussions that took place in European countries a century ago regarding judicial review (of legislation). Even those who favored it were not able to consider any form of implementation. In the absence of an established principle of judicial review, the problem looked purely theoretical. Later, after World War II, judicial review of legislation became very fashionable and conquered almost all modern occidental democracies. The question arising now is whether we can expect a similar development as regards the validity and efficacy of eternity clauses. On the one hand, there is a growing number of eternity clauses; on the other hand, we have witnessed an extraordinary development in the field of judicial review, which is the result of the general growth of judicial activism in all countries. In other words, two parallel trends are coming increasingly close to one another and will certainly give rise to a new chapter in constitutional theory and practice.

In April 2010, the International Association of Constitutional Law (I ACL) held one of its two annual round tables in Jerusalem. Entitled “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments,” it was devoted to the issue of constitutional review. In this issue of the Israel Law Review, we present some of the papers presented at the round table by experts from various countries.

I have chosen for my subject some of the contributions made to Jewish law — in its widest sense — by German Christian scholars of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Some sixty years or more ago I became acquainted with the writings of John Selden, the 17th century English lawyer, parliamentarian and antiquarian, whose books on the Uxor Hebraica and De successionibus ad legem Ebraeorum, and De synedriis, were a revelation to me: for a non-Jewish scholar of that period to be capable of delving into biblical, talmudical and post-talmudical sources and to compare them with other ancient systems of law, was an unexpected feat. It is not only the impeccable command of Hebrew and Aramaic that excites wonder: it is also a sincere and genuine endeavour to comprehend and describe the workings of Jewish law objectively and without religious bias. We shall see that not all theologians always succeeded in suppressing their innate prejudices; there were even a good many who conducted their Judaistic research for hostile purposes (and with those I shall not deal). Even of Selden it was said that he had voiced now and then some antisemitic remarks, but there is no trace of any personal animus in his books on Jewish law.

The legal framework in effect in Germany since 1991, bars all research on human embryos and permits, since 2002, the import of embryonic stem cells only under the fulfillment of relatively demanding conditions. Legislation linked this position to the goal of ensuring freedom of biomedical research (only) to the extent that it could be justified in view of the state's obligation to protect human dignity and the right to life. Underlying this was the assumption, understood by the draft of the law that embryonic stem cells, given the destruction of embryos, which necessarily precedes their utilization, “cannot be viewed just like any other biological material from an ethical perspective.” In the meantime, however, the legal-political, would-be “enlightened”; Zeitgeist has become oriented toward a hidden or openly displayed “liberalization” of human embryonic stem cell research, which raises the question of what could have fundamentally changed about the previously named “ethical problem.” Great uncertainties obviously exist regarding the central significance of the “human dignity” guaranteed to be “inviolable” as well as about the relevance of this “iron ration” of libertarian-humanist legal thought in the context of destructive embryo research. The present essay gives an overview of the potential interpretive possibilities and subjects them to critical examination against the background of current legal-political developments, which are perceived in Germany not only as a “revolution” not only in the sphere of biological policy, but also ultimately in that of the central determining factors in general in the relationship between state and individual. In this light, how can the kernel of the ideal of human dignity be preserved even against the demands of the (post-) modern (age)?

The moral argument contends that crimes deserve retribution, that to impose the deserved punishment is to do justice, and that justice is a moral requirement, an end in itself, independent of any useful effects. The moral desirability of justice can be explained, but not demonstrated in non-deontological fashion. In penal matters, justice and deserved retribution are synonymous. It is for the sake of justice that we try to punish the guilty and not the innocent. Innocents do not deserve punishment. Because of justice, we would not impose punishment on them, even if it were useful to do so.

The first forty years of the State of Israel witnessed significant changes in the relative status of the various branches of government. The executive was quite powerful during the early decades of the State's existence, thanks to the strong leadership of the first Prime Minister and founding father, David Ben Gurion. Accordingly, the status of the Supreme Court during that period was weak in comparison to the Executive Branch, i.e. the Government. Subsequently, the government's position weakened as the judiciary gained strength. This phenomenon was expressed in the increasing recourse to the courts to consider issues that had previously been the exclusive domain of the government. The judiciary's broader role and enhanced position vis-à-vis the executive did not bring about commensurate constitutional protection of the judicial system. In fact, we may observe a certain decline in this respect that hopefully, will be rectified when the Constitution of the State of Israel is completed with the enactment of Basic Laws on Human and Civil Rights coupled with legislation that will provide the requisite constitutional protection.

The transport of different items of cargo stored in one receptacle called a “container” is of recent origin and has been called the greatest development in transport since the introduction of the steam-engine.

The advantages to be derived from the use of containers are so obvious as hardly to call for explanation. The cargoes sent for transport by different shippers are stored at the beginning of the transport by rail or lorry in a closed container, transferred to a ship and again unloaded on rail or lorry for transport to the place of ultimate destination, and only there is the container opened and the goods discharged. This manner of transport reduces the risk of shortage and damage. Packing material need not be as strong and as heavy as required in the usual way of transport outside a container, the costs of loading and discharging operations are considerably reduced, saving of storage space is possible, ships will be specially adapted for this kind of transport, the time required for the transport of cargo may be considerably shortened, insurance premiums may be calculated in accordance with the diminished risk, demurrage payments may be decreased and all concerned, including the consumer, might benefit from this revolutionary kind of transport. The container can bring the goods, as has been said, “from door to door”.

Both the facts of The State of Israel v. Siman Tov, and the solution adopted in that case by the Supreme Court, raise, it is felt, a number of legal problems which warrant particular attention.

The respondent, Siman Tov, owner of a grocer's shop, sold goods worth IL. 6,000 on credit to someone called Pressman. When Siman Tov requested payment from Pressman, the latter offered him U.S. $4,000 which Siman Tov was to deposit with a third party of his own choice in return for a loan of IL. 12,000, on the understanding that Siman Tov would deduct the money owing to him from this last sum and hand over the balance of IL. 6,000 to Pressman. Siman Tov accepted the offer and received from Pressman a package containing 4,000 ostensibly genuine dollar banknotes. He then approached a neighbour, Binat, who agreed to accept the dollars as security for a loan of the equivalent sum in Israeli pounds. On examining the package and finding that the dollars were counterfeit, Binat returned them to Siman Tov and refused to go on with the transaction. Siman Tov for his part had believed the notes to be genuine until Binat's disclosure.

There is evidence, in some recent legal thinking on the employment contract, of a readiness to abandon classical contract principles. This phenomenon is especially apparent in the formulation of the Employment Contract Bill, 1985. In this article, I shall examine this development in the framework of an analysis of the employment relationship and the extent to which it is to be regarded as a contractual relationship, both under differing theoretical approaches and under existing labour law principles.

The contemporary employment relationship emerges from a contractual undertaking between individuals to exchange wages for services, but its social significance is not limited to the issues raised by the terms of the contract.

Under the armistice régime, now a matter of history, a peculiar legal situation prevailed in Jerusalem, for no less than four distinct régimes of demilitarization could be found in the city: the Mount Scopus régime, the régime of the Government House Area, the régime of no-man's-land, and the régime of the limitation of military forces and equipment on both sides of the demarcation lines. The object of this article is to examine one of these régimes, that which obtained on Mount Scopus.

Today, the situation in Jerusalem is, of course, drastically changed, both with respect to the régime of the City as a whole, and with respect to Mount Scopus. The Jordanian attack of June 1967 resulted in a unification of this strife-torn city. Mount Scopus, for so long separated from Western Jerusalem, its humanitarian and cultural activities so long paralyzed, is slowly returning to life. The present study, which may be of interest to students of international law and relations, is of historical value only and does not relate to the current situation.

The method followed will be that of a pragmatic case study. In view of the special circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Mount Scopus Demilitarized Zone, a comparative, deductive or theoretical approach would be of limited usefulness. A special effort has been made to use primary rather than secondary sources. The writer has had the opportunity to consult the diplomatic archives of the Government of Israel.