This article explores how the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) has dealt with allegations of violations of the right to life during an armed conflict and, in particular, how it has dealt with allegations of violation of the obligation to investigate such allegations. The article notes that international humanitarian law (IHL) was initially used by the Court to strengthen the general obligations of states to protect the rights guaranteed by the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Later IHL began informing the interpretation of specific rights. This change has been more significant in relation to the interpretation of the right to life under the ACHR than in the examination of state compliance with the right of access to justice, which encompasses the duty to investigate allegations of violations of the right to life during an armed conflict. The analysis of the Court's jurisprudence demonstrates that the different ways in which the Court has addressed the relationship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) have been informed by its primary effort to ensure that the interpretation of the ACHR provides the widest protection possible to individual rights.

The Knesset has recently amended Basic Law: The Judiciary to eliminate the ability of the courts to issue an injunction against the government or any of its ministers based on the reasonableness of their decisions. This article examines this amendment from various angles. The first section posits the amendment as part of a larger plan of the coalition to eliminate judicial review and provide the government with unlimited power. The second section emphasises that the amendment was legislated by the Knesset for itself, raising concern over a conflict of interest. This is followed by a brief explanation of the reasonableness standard in Israeli law, and an assessment of the duty to act reasonably, which stems from the democratic principle of the rule of law. The next two sections assess the many risks that the amendment creates, such as the types of decision that could be made without adhering to a standard of reasonableness, and the trimming of the power of the Attorney General as a legal ‘gatekeeper’. Special emphasis is given to the dangers that the amendment holds for the quality and diversity of the civil service. Finally, the article discusses the multiple reasons why the government should not be immune from a reasonableness check and tackles the arguments against the use of the standard of reasonableness by the courts.

This multifaceted analysis leads to the conclusion that the elimination of the reasonableness standard undermines basic features of democracy and fractures the social contract between the citizens and the government. Therefore, it should not be immune from judicial review.

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“the Interim Agreement”) represents another stage in the implementation of the framework established in the Declaration of Principles signed between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”), commonly known as the “Oslo process”. In essence, the Interim Agreement provides for the establishment of self-government arrangements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as envisaged in the Declaration of Principles, while explicitly superseding the arrangements which applied in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area since May 1994. In addition, the Interim Agreement provides for “direct, free and general political elections” to be held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The aim of this section is to acquaint lawyers with the general framework of the Agreement, and the primary legal and political issues dealt with by the Interim Agreement, rather than to describe the specifics of each of its many provisions. Where required, reference will be made to the Declaration of Principles and to previous Agreements concluded between the Parties. At times, reference will also be made to the Camp David Framework of 1978.

The economic provisions of the agreement between Israel and the PLO are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29th 1994. Concluding nearly six months of negotiations, the Protocol spells out the arrangements regulating economic relations between the Palestinian Authority, established under the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP), and Israel. Its eleven articles deal with the foreign trade, monetary and fiscal regimes of the areas under this jurisdiction, and with the movement of labour and goods between them and Israel. The Protocol also treats some more specific matters, such as the licensing of tour operators, access to tourist sites and compulsory motor vehicle insurance.

There are two key limitations to the literature that explores the relationship between truth and closure in post-violence societies. The first is that this relationship has been assessed mostly as part of a larger debate focusing on the links between the truth and the seemingly related concept of reconciliation. The second is that to the extent that the literature has addressed the connections between truth and closure as such, it has focused almost exclusively on the operations and effects of courts and truth commissions. The article addresses both limitations by examining the relationship between truth and closure through the prism of a different institution, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. Relying on 34 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including relatives of missing persons on the island, it argues that the Committee's delivery of the truth has promoted closure in three distinct ways. At the same time it acknowledges that the type of truth and the way in which it is delivered can have detrimental consequences for the promotion of closure. A short video summarising the findings of this article is available here.

This article discusses the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in the 2021 case of Georgia v Russia (II) in relation to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to the conduct of hostilities. The article describes the arguments advanced by the Court to support the idea that the Convention does not apply to extraterritorial hostilities in an international armed conflict. In the light of past decisions, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the law of the treaties, it is argued that the Court's conclusion is unconvincing and the arguments seem to be based on extralegal considerations, rather than on a sound interpretation of the notion of state jurisdiction under the Convention.

How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the ‘democratic minimum core’: (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances.

We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either ‘abusive’ or ‘proto-abusive’ in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the ‘democratic minimum core’ in Israel.

The principal claim made by this Article is that the realization of full and effective equality for all citizens and residents within a multi-ethnic state requires “participatory equality.” Creating a system of participatory equality entails, for most states, making drastic and fundamental changes to the state's legal system, public spaces, social and economic structures, and funding and space provided for ethnic, cultural, and religious institutions; however, this type of transformation is the only means of respecting human dignity and ensuring peace. This claim is first made as a normative moral claim based on principles of justice and dignity; as this Paper will show, a broad and effective interpretation of international law concerning minority rights supports the same normative claim.

This Article first reviews existing international law and other legal frameworks regarding national minority rights, including discussions of the specific case of indigenous peoples'rights and the intersection between individual and collective rights. The bulk of the Paper proposes a universal model, building upon existing legal frameworks, for building participatory equality for all members of a society, which requires the full and equal sharing of its resources in three primary domains: the public, the internal, and the historical domain. The need for such a model is all the more so for indigenous and minority groups of substantial size living under systems that cater to a majority based on ethnicity, religion, race or other dominant traits. Only when a nation's legal system secures the rights of all citizens to share equally in all of these domains can that nation fulfill the purpose of international minority rights legal bodies and deliver substantive equality to majority and minority concerns, both in law and practice.

The law's treatment of abortion has undergone a fundamental transformation in the present century which has been marked by a clear trend towards decriminalization of the matter vis-à-vis the abortionist and the woman. The increasing secularization of society, the advance of libertarian thinking in western democracies and the movement towards social equality for women has increasingly led to the view that the abortion decision is one which properly belongs to the private realm of the individual woman. This view has been reinforced by utilitarian arguments founded on acknowledgement of the fact that the criminal prohibition has always been evaded by a resort to illegal procedures with all the danger to the woman's health that this entails.

Despite religious and moral objections based on the interest in protecting fetal life, the law has responded to pressures for the legitimization of abortion in varying degrees. In some countries abortion has been totally decriminalized and indeed made available on demand; in others decriminalization has been only partial and abortion allowed only upon a showing of cause defined by statute (abortion on cause) or only at certain stages of pregnancy.

On the whole, the law has remained silent as to the status of the father in the abortion decision; in any event he was not subject to any criminal sanction.

The following commentaries are responses to the rough drafts of six lectures—the Hourani Lectures—that I delivered at the University of Buffalo in November of 2006. This draft manuscript is being extensively revised and expanded for publication by Oxford University Press as a book provisionally called The Morality and Law of War. Even though in January 2007 the book was still both unpolished and incomplete, David Enoch at that time generously organized a workshop at the Law School of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to discuss its ideas and arguments. George Fletcher chaired the meeting and Re'em Segev, Yuval Shany, and Noam Zohar all presented superb commentaries. The following papers have all grown out of that memorable occasion.

Justinian, in his Corpus Iuris Civilis, showed great interest in the Samaritans, in the context of his lifelong effort to make Orthodox Christianity the prevailing faith of the Roman empire. In general, Justinian's relationship to non-Catholic religions was one of discrimination and degradation. The Samaritans were subjected to especially harsh treatment and repressive legislation, due to their sanguinary rebellions. This cycle of repression and rebellion had dire economic consequences in Palestine for the entire general population, including Christians, and contributed to the general population's dissatisfaction with Imperial policy.

In the Theodosian Code, the first official collection of Imperial constitutions, Samaritan-related legislation was grouped together with legislation related to Jews and Caelicolae, in the general context of the relationship between the Empire and the Church.

In its landmark decision In re Gault (1967), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a minor brought before the juvenile court was in principle entitled to the guarantees of due process available to adult defendants in criminal trials. That momentous decision sparked off a debate which has continued ever since in academic and policy-making circles, both on the national and international levels. In essence, the controversy relates to the question of the nature of social control measures to be adopted by the legal system to deal with errant juveniles. Should these be essentially criminal and punitive in character, or are they better considered as welfare proceedings, the essential purpose of which is to determine the appropriate treatment? Thus, the legal, or punitive, model of juvenile justice may be juxtaposed to the welfare or treatment (or even “therapeutic”) model.

It is becoming increasingly apparent to criminal justice scholars that single theory models of criminal procedure — whether termed inquisitorial or adversarial — are being stretched beyond their capacity by the phenomena they are designed to control. Virtually everywhere, formal systems of charge and adjudication cannot possibly be enforced in accordance with the premises underlying them. There are simply too many offenses, too many offenders and too few resources to deal with them all. One result has been a steady movement towards a convergence of legal systems — towards borrowing from others those institutions and practices that offer some hope of relief.

In this transnational effort to cope with system overload, two issues have emerged as more than ordinarily significant: The first is the desirability of abandoning the principle of obligatory prosecution, so common in Continental Europe, and turning instead to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The second is the question whether the ban on guilty pleas and plea bargains should be lifted, as in adversarial systems.

Nobody would deny that in a considerable proportion of cases which come before a judge for decision, the law is clear, and indeed often undisputed by the parties. In these cases, the Judge's duty raises no special problem so far as the law is concerned, though it may do so as to the facts. But it is also true that there are a significant number of cases in which the law or at least its application, is unclear, and the nature of the judicial role is then more controversial. During the last few decades legal theorists and judges themselves have often discussed these questions in various public pronouncements. In this lecture I want to focus principally on a number of assumptions and views about the judicial role which appear to be largely peculiar to the English, or perhaps Commonwealth judiciary. But before I look more closely at the English judiciary, I would like to set the discussion into a broader theoretical framework.

Ever since the American and the French revolutions, it was taken for granted that a written, formal, Constitution was essential to the functioning of a modern State. Old-established States, as they moved toward modernization or away from absolutism, hurried to provide themselves with Constitutions. New States enacted Constitutions as a matter of course, as one of the first acts of a newly-found sovereignty, often copying them from available models and without pausing to consider to what extent the provisions copied would suit the particular characteristics and goals of their respective societies. The well-known process of “reception” of laws was followed by a similar trend to “receive” Constitutions. To have a formal Constitution well-nigh became a universal fashion, a symbol of modernism. In the aftermath of the First World War, only two groups of fully independent States remained without Constitutions. One of them comprised countries still in their pre-modern stage, in respect both of their political and of their general social set-up, and without pretensions to modernity: Afghanistan, Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), Saudi Arabia, Thailand (then Siam), Yemen; since then, each of these, bent on modernization, provided itself with some kind of constitutional chart. The other group consisted of the one and only Great Britain, looked upon by everybody as a case apart.