1 Under the Knesset Rules, the Government has priority in deciding the Knesset's agenda, and ministers enjoy priority in addressing the house and in the time allotted them.

2 The Bejski Inquiry Commission on the Bank Shares Crisis (Justice M. Bejski, chairman, Jerusalem, 1986).

3 Klein, Claude, “The Legal Definition of the Parliamentary System and the Israeli Model” (1974) 5 Mishpatim 308Google Scholar.

4 Thus, for example, a Knesset member from a coalition faction may not table a private member's bill without the approval of the coalition executive and may not vote contrary to the coalition's position. Absent a predetermined coalition stand, a Knesset member of the coalition must vote in accordance with the vote of the responding minister in regard to any motion brought before the plenum (see sees. 2.3b and 2.3c of the coalition agreement as published in Ha'aretz, 2 December 1988).

5 The discussion on the judiciary is based on a study of judicial independence in Israel which I carried out under the auspices of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, part of which have already been published.

6 See sec. 2 of the Basic Law: Judicature (38 L.S.I. 101).

7 Shetreet, , “Judicial Independence: Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges” in Shetreet, , Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (Dordecht, 1985) 590Google Scholar.

8 “International Bar Association Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence”, Approved in New Delhi at the 19th Biennial Convention of the International Bar Association. The text of the standards was developed at the IBA Jerusalem Conference, March 1982 (General Reporteur: Dr. Shimon Shetreet). For the text of the IBA standards see International Bar News, April 1983 and see also Shetreet, supra n. 7, at 388-392.

9 Shetreet, , “Judicial Responsibility” in Israeli Reports to the XI International Congress of Comparative Law, Goldstein, , ed. (Jerusalem, 1982) 88Google Scholar, and text at n. 29 therein.

10 “Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice” (Montreal, June 1983)Google Scholar. Unofficial text of the Declaration can be found in the Institute of Judicial Administration Report (Summer, 1983). The author served as head of the team that drew up Chapter B of the Universal Declaration that deals with national judges (the other chapters deal with international judges, lawyers, jurors and lay assessors). For the text see also Shetreet, supra n. 7, at 395-402.

11 Section 2.02 of the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice.

12 Loc. cit.

13 Ibid., sec. 2.04.

14 Sec. 2.40.

15 Secs. 2.41 and 2.42.

16 The Declaration restricts the scope of intervention by the executive in the appointment of judges (sec. 2.14) and in disciplinary measures against judges (sec. 2.33).

17 Closing down the courts (sec. 2.07(c)), frustration of a judicial decision by a priori or post factum act or omission (sec. 2.07(d)); intervention in the judicial process or in judicial matters (sec. 2.07 (a) and (b)).

18 Allocation of judges and the distribution of work among them (secs. 2.16 and 2.43), and the transfer of a judge from one place to another (secs. 2.16 and 2.18).

19 Klein, , “The Constitutional Power in Israel” (1970) 2 Mishpatim 51Google Scholar; Rubinstein, A., The Constitutional Law of Israel (Tel Aviv, Schocken, 3rded., 1980, in Hebrew) 279–282Google Scholar; Klein, , “A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law” (1971) 6 Is.L.R. 376Google Scholar; Likhovski, E., “Can the Knesset Adopt a Constitution which will be the Supreme Law of the Land?” (1969) 4 Is.L.R. 61Google Scholar; Gavison, R., “The Controversy over Israel's Bill of Rights” (1985) 15 Is. Yrbk. Human Rights 113Google Scholar; Bergman v. Minister of Finance (1969) 23(i) P.D. 693; Rubinstein v. Speaker of the Knesset (1983) 37(iii) P.D. 141; Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority (1981) 35(iv) P.D. 1; Mi'ari v. Speaker of the Knesset (1988) 42(iv) P.D. 868.

20 See Shetreet, supra n. 7, at 610-622.

21 The Committee to Examine Judicial Ethics (Justice Landau, M., chairman) (Sept. 1985) 6 Alon Ma'arechet HaShiputGoogle Scholar.

22 While the Minister (as well as the President of the Supreme Court) may propose a candidate for the Committee, three other members jointly can also do so: sec. 7(b) of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 1984 (38 L.S.I. 271).

23 In the past, the fact that the Minister of Justice served as chairman of the committee produced no difficulties. However, in 1986, Justice Minister Abraham Sharir made improper use of his power as chairman by impeding the functioning of the committee, due to his dispute with the President of the Supreme Court over the procedural rules of the committee. This would appear to be an isolated incident, that should not serve as a basis for a change in the existing set-up, such as the transfer of the chairmanship of the committee to the President of the Supreme Court. Such a change could become necessary should the Ministers of Justice exhibit disrespect for the traditions that have developed over the years as to the working methods of the committee and the proper measure of self-restraint becoming its chairman.

24 Shetreet, , “Reinforcement of the Judiciary and Restriction of the Minister of Justice's Power” (1975) 6 Mishpatim174, at 177Google Scholar. In practice, out of the nine committee members, three are judges while two government ministers and two M.K.s represent the political arm — the Government and the Knesset. Two lawyers, nominated by the Israel Bar Association, are there to reflect professional interests. It thus transpires that the three judges and two lawyers constitute a majority on the committee from the legal profession, as opposed to the four representatives of the political branches. Some would in fact view the two lawyers as having a political “link” taking into account their own personal political viewpoint. The existence of such a political link, however, in no way alters my position, for the reason stated here, on the need to retain the present balance held by representatives of the Government and Knesset, on the Committee for the appointment of judges.

25 See Shetreet, , “On Assessing the Role of Courts in Society” (1980) 10 Manitoba L.J.357, at 398–405Google Scholar; Shetreet, supra n. 7, at 171-172.

26 See supra n. 10.

27 In secs. 13-14 of the Draft Basic Law: Judicature ((1978) H.H. no. 1364, p. 326) it was proposed to co-opt onto the Committee two members to be elected by the staff of the Law Faculties of the universities. However, one could also consider co-opting other professionals, such as additional lawyers or judges.

28 A similar wording was proposed in sec. 14 of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts ((1978) H.H. no. 1348, p. 237). Cf. sec. 4 of the Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence of the IBA, supra n. 8.

29 Cf. sec. 5 of the IBA Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, supra n. 8.

30 For analysis of the powers of the Minister of Justice, see Shetreet, supra n. 24.

31 The Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (sec. 6) provides that the power to make rules of procedure should be conferred exclusively on the judiciary, subject to parliamentary approval, unless the procedure of the courts is laid down by legislation. Cf. the proposal of the Israeli Bar whereby the power to promulgate rules of procedure should be conferred on the President of the Supreme Court (see sec. 19 of the Draft Basic Law: Judicature as proposed by the Bar). These proposals were ultimately rejected.

32 Courts Ordinance, 1940, P.G. Supp. no. 1 (no. 31 of 1940) 143.

33 See R. Gavison, in this issue, p. 431.

34 Secs. 108-109 of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 1984, supra n. 22.

35 Emergency Regulations (Arrangements in Government Service in Times of Emergency) 1985, K.T. no. 4830, p. 1612.

36 See Landau Commission Report, supra n. 21, at 3-4.

37 Gavison, in this issue, p. 431.

38 H.H. (1978) no. 1348, p. 237.

39 See “Memorandum of Draft Basic Law: The Courts” (1971) 27 HaPraklit 136Google Scholar.

40 For a discussion of the basic principles of the judicial system, i.e., judicial independence, justice and fairness, efficiency of the judicial process and of the judicial system, availability of that system and public confidence in the courts, see Shetreet, “Practical and Value Problems in Administration of Justice”, in Collection of Lectures Delivered at the Seminar for Judges 1976, Shetreet, S., ed. (Jerusalem, 1977, in Hebrew) 80Google Scholar. See also Shetreet, , “Administration of Justice, Practical Problems, Value Conflicts and Changing Concepts” (1979) 13 U.B.C.L.R. 52Google Scholar; Shetreet, , The Limits of Expeditious Justice (Canadian Institute of Administration of Justice, 1979) 11Google Scholar.

41 7 L.S.I. 124.

42 Not published. A copy is in the hands of the author. Referred to in Olshan, I., Din U-Devarim (Schocken, Tel Aviv, 1978, in Hebrew) 225Google Scholar.

43 Interviews by the author with persons connected with the subject.

44 Among the proposals that were eventually rejected were the following: the right of the President of the Supreme Court to bring a complaint against a judge (sec. 14 of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts, which also appeared in sec. 14 of the Draft Basic Law: Judicature); obligation to consult the President of the Supreme Court concerning the establishment of District and Magistrates' Courts (sec. 17 of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts as well as sec. 17 of the Draft Basic Law: Judicature); determination of the number of judges in those courts (sec. 18 of the Draft Law) and fixing of administrative arrangements (sec. 24 of Draft). All these proposals were dropped from the agenda. The proposal requiring the Minister of Justice to obtain the consent of the President of the Supreme Court for the appointment of the Director of Courts (sec. 24 of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts) was also rejected in the end.

On the other hand, other proposals requiring the Minister to consult the President of the Supreme Court were accepted, e.g., on the appointment of Presidents and Deputy Presidents of the District and Magistrates' Courts (sec. 9 of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 1984).

45 See wording of secs. 19 and 20 of Draft Basic Law: Judicature as proposed by the Bar. Sec. 12 of that Draft proposed that employees of the judiciary should be subordinate to the President of the Supreme Court or to the Director of Courts.

46 The principle parliamentary responsibility relates to the administration and budgeting of the courts, to the efficient working of this administrative machinery and the quality of the service offered to the members of the public having recourse to them: litigants, witnesses and lawyers. A parliamentary responsibility exists on these matters which is partly substantive i.e., responsibility on the merits — the Justice Minister is able to act to improve the administrative machinery. On judicial and procedural matters and questions arising from particular decisions, however, parliamentary responsibility requires only the reporting of these activities since here the Executive arm is prevented from interfering. In this regard mention should be made of the legal advisor to the Government (the Attorney General). The parliamentary responsibility of the government does not extend to his actual decisions — thus, decisions in criminal law, to put on trial or for a stay of proceedings, are in the exclusive domain of his own independent discretion. Parliamentary responsibility does come into play however with regard to the extension of his term of office, which is a government decision. Similarly, substantive parliamentary responsibility extends to legislative policy, for which the Justice Minister himself is responsible.

47 See Friesen, et al. , Managing the Courts (Indianapolis, 1971) 28 U.S.C. Section 605, pp. 87–88Google Scholar.

48 See Judiciary, N.Y.Law, section 211, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Vol. 29Google Scholar. On two matters, the actions of the President of the Appeals Court require approval of the Administrative Council, i.e., appointment of a Director of Courts, and confirmation of administrative arrangements made by the Director: ibid., sec. 213.

49 N.Y. Judiciary Law, sec. 212, ibid.

50 The responsibility for administration of the Federal Courts is entrusted to the Judicial Conference headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The practical management is carried out by the administrative office of the Federal courts. In addition to the judicial conference, there are also regional judicial conferences which are responsible for the various United States judicial circuits. A number of years ago, a statute was enacted establishing an administrative system to assist the regional judicial conferences headed by regional judicial administrators, thereby improving their functioning. On the regional judicial councils, their powers and operation, see McKay, R.B., “Use of Judicial Councils and Judicial Conferences”, in Klein, F.ed., The Improvement of the Administration of Justice (6th ed., 1981) 113Google Scholar; Flanders, S.and McDermott, J.T., Operation of the Federation Justice Councils (1978)Google Scholar.

51 See Y. Taniguchi, “Japan”, in Shetreet, Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate, supra n. 7, at 205-208; N. Kumanoto, “Judicial Independence in Japan”, ibid., at 219-225.

52 This is the position in Australia with respect to the High Court; in West Germany, with respect to the Federal Constitutional Court; as well as in Canada, where a similar arrangement prevails, with wider administrative autonomy being entrusted to the Supreme Court than to other courts. See Shetreet, supra n. 7, at 646-649.

53 Sec. 82 of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 1984, supra n. 22.

54 This was the model proposed in sec. 24(a) of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts, which provided that administrative rules would be laid down by the Minister of Justice in consultation with the President of the Supreme Court.

55 Shetreet, “Administration of Justice…”, supra n. 40, at 57-60.

56 Shetreet, supra n. 24.

57 See Shetreet, “Administration of Justice…”, supra n. 40, at 60-62; Shetreet, “Practical and Value Problems…”, supra n. 40, at 19-39.

58 Cf. Canadian Minister of Justice, in Canadian Parliamentary Deb. C.Vol. V, 1977, at 5318Google Scholar.

59 Sec. 24(b) of the Draft Basic Law: The Courts. In the Draft Basic Law: Judicature, there is no reference to this matter, so presumably the intention is to leave the position as it is, without any formal intervention on the part of the President.

60 Sec. 24 of the Knesset Regulations; sec. 24 of the State Comptroller Law (Consolidated Version), 1958 (12 L.S.I. 107). Cf. Draft Basic Law: Judicature presented by the Bar (sec. 14) whereby the budget of the courts would be approved by a joint committee of the Finance and the Constitution and Law Committees of the Knesset, on the proposal of the President of the Supreme Court. Cf. Shetreet, “Practical and Value Problems…”, supra n. 40, at 91-93.

61 Sec. 2 of the State Comptroller Law, ibid.and cf. Shetreet, ibid.

62 Cf. Shetreet, ibid.

63 Sec. 22 of the Courts Ordinance, 1940. See also other powers which were invested in the Chief Justice, e.g., appointment of acting judges (sec. 14(2)). The powers of the Chief Justice to make rules for the administration of the courts were transferred to the Minister of Justice under sec. 10 of the Courts (Transitional Provisions) Ordinance, 1948, P.G. No.7, Suppl. A., p. 17. Under the Draft presented by the Bar (sec. 19 of Draft Basic Law: Judicature) the power to make rules of procedure would be invested in the President of the Supreme Court, but this was not accepted.

64 Irrespective of the personality of the authority holder, I repeat my proposal for the total abolition of the office of acting Judge in the Supreme Court. Cf. Shetreet, , “The Overburdening of the Supreme Court in Israel — The Problems, The Effects and The Remedies”, in Israeli Reports to the Tenth International Congress of Comparative Law, Goldstein, S., ed. (Jerusalem, 1978) 56, at 112Google Scholar.

65 See details of proposals eventually rejected, at supra n. 44.

66 This happened when in 1974 Minister Zadok issued administrative provisions fixing the hours for hearing of cases.

67 Cf. the proposal of the Bar for sec. 19 of the Draft Basic Law: Judicature.

68 For an analysis of the status of the President of the Israeli Supreme Court see Shetreet, supra n. 9, at 115-116.

69 Inter alia, an administrative instruction was issued providing that postponement of a trial could only be granted by the judge hearing the case if approved by the administrative judge (the judge who heads the judicial unit to which the trial judge belongs); moreover, the power to transfer judges from one venue to another has been exercised for the sake of greater efficiency. The judges have not accepted this approach, and this is also reflected in the case law which put to the test the legal force of these measures, and in certain cases cast doubt on them. See, e.g., Morgenthau v. Cooke, 56 N.Y., 2nd 24 (1982); Barker Trust v. Braten, 101 Misc. 2d 227 (1979); Marthon v. Evans, 83 A. D. 2d 415. See also professional comments: “Chief Judge Defends Programs, Says Critics are Misguided”, New York Journal, March 22, 1982Google Scholar.

70 There has been criticism of the activity of the judicial councils, in that they restrict judicial independence, but this is a minority view: Flanders and McDermott, supra n. 50, at 47.

71 In the United States, the focus on the Federal level has shifted from the National Judicial Council to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, owing to the strengthening of bureaucracy within the administration of the judiciary. See Baar, C., “Federal Justice Administration: Political Strategies and Organizational Change”, in Wheeler, and Whitcomb, , eds., Judicial Administration: Text and Readings (1977) 97–98Google Scholar. In Japan, the judicial council has delegated some of its powers to the President of the Supreme Court. See Taniguchi, supra n. 51.

72 This can be derived from sec. 24(1) of the Basic Law: Judicature.

73 Ibid., sec. 10.

74 Abu Seniora v. State of Israel (not published).

75 Shetreet, “Administration of Justice …”, supra n. 40.

76 For a detailed discussion of the authority of the President of the Supreme Court, see Shetreet, , “Presidents of the Courts” (1987) 10 Alon Ma'arechet HaShiput 11Google Scholar.

77 See Olshan, supra n. 42, at 247-252.

78 Ha'aretz, March 5, 1978.

79 See Olshan, supra n. 42, at 239-245, 300-305.

80 See Zidon, , The Elected Assembly (Achiassaf, 5th ed., 1969, in Hebrew) 345ffGoogle Scholar. See Divrei HaKnesset (1952) vol. 11, at 1116, 1461, 1719Google Scholar, and see also Olshan, supra n. 42, at 243-244.

81 Ha'aretz, Aug. 29, 1977; Ma'ariv, Sept. 28, 1977.

82 Ha'aretz, Aug. 28, 1977.

83 Daylight saving time: Segal v. Minister of Interior (1980) 34(iv) P.D. 429; Berger v. Minister of Interior (1983) 37(ii) P.D. 29. Exemption from conscription of yeshiva students: Ressler v. Minister of Defence (1982) 36(i) P.D. 81; Ressler v. Minister of Defence (1982) 36(i) P.D. 708; Ressler v. Minister of Defence (1982) 36(iv) P.D. 421; Ressler v. Minister of Defence (1988) 42(ii) P.D. 441. Allocating broadcasting time for election propaganda: Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority, supra n. 19. Retroactive increase in allocations of funds to political parties for financing campaign: Rubinstein v. Speaker of the Knesset (1985) 39(iii) P.D. 122. Immunity of Knesset members: Mi'ari v. Speaker of the Knesset (1987) 41(iv) P.D. 169. Rights of a one-man faction in the Knesset: “Koch” Party Group v. Speaker of the Knesset (1985) 39(iii) P.D. 141. General Security Services Pardon case: Barzilai v. Government of Israel (1986) 40(iii) P.D. 505, 6 S.J. 1. The Nakash case: Aloni v. Minister of Justice (1987) 41(ii) P.D. 1. Time for no-confidence vote in Knesset: Sarid v. Speaker of the Knesset (1982) 36(ii) P.D. 197. Allocation of funds to yeshivot: Yeshivat Tomhai Tmimim v. State of Israel (1984) 38(ii) P.D. 273.

84 Dweikat v. Government of Israel (1980) 34(i) P.D. 1.

85 The Nakash case, supra n. 83.

86 Shetreet, , “Judicial Independence and Accountability” (1984) 33 Int'l Comp. L.Q.979, at 983–987CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

87 See Shetreet, ibid., at 988-990, and also Shetreet, supra n. 9, at 129-158.

88 For details on the laws of validation, see Freudenheim, J., “The Laws of Validation and The Rule of Law” (1967) 23 HaPraklit 381Google Scholar, and see additional examples on legislative reactions to judgments of the courts in Klinghoffer, , “Reactions of the Legislator on Judgment of the Judiciary” in Seminar of the Association of Parliamentarians (1986) 3Google Scholar.

89 Supreme Court Judges (Validation of Appointments) Law, 1950 (4 L.S.I. 113).

90 Dayan v. Minister of Religion (1955) 9 P.D. 997; Rabbinical Council (Miscellaneous Provision) Law, 1955 (9 L.S.I. 129).

91 See J. Freudenheim, supra n. 88, at 381-382, 384.

92 Ibid., at 383-384.

93 Bergman v. Finance Minister, supra n. 19.

94 Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law, 1969 (23 L.S.I. 221).

95 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 7) Law, 1981 (35 L.S.I. 411).

96 Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority, supra n. 19.

97 Schwartz v. Minister of Finance (1977) 31(ii) P.D. 800.

98 Freudenheim, supra n. 88, at 382; Emergency Regulations (Validity of Acts), 1951, K.T. 226, p. 286. These regulations came as a consequence of the judgment in Asian v. Military Governor (1951) 5 P.D. 1480.

99 See the Rabasiyah case, mentioned in Asian, ibid., and see Rubinstein, supra n. 19, at 216.

100 See the Soblen case, mentioned in Kawasmeh v. Minister of Defence (1981) 35(iii) P.D. 113, at 119.

101 Al-Natche, not published, mentioned in Kawasmeh, ibid., at 119.

102 Abu-Karen Suliman v. Israel Lands Authority (1980) 34(iv) P.D. 567 (Al-Lakiyeh case); Shachadeh v. Commander of Judea and Samaria (1977) 31(ii) P.D. 475 (Attempt to administratively cancel a driver's license, after the courts denied the appeal of the judgment which dealt with this matter.

103 See supra n. 74.

104 The Nakash case, supra n. 83.

105 An improvement in the allocation of budget and other resources came towards the end of 1989 when 21 judicial posts and a number of the other administrative posts were created. This move came when the system showed signs of giving way under the weight of cases being dragged out, delays and inefficiencies.

106 Emergency Regulations (Arrangements in Government Service in Times of Emergency) 1985, supra n. 35.

106a Towards the end of 1989 twenty-one judgeships were added as well as a number of administrative offices, in face of the backlog and the overburdening of the courts.

106b Abu Hatzeira v. State of Israel (1981) 35(iv) P.D. 699.

106c State of Israel v. Livni and 14 others (1990) (iii) P.M. 330; Allon, G., “The Daily Conversation with the Attorney General”, Ha'aretz, May 28, 1984Google Scholar.

106d 1 L.S.I. 3.

107 Regarding the constitutional presumptions made by the court, see Barak, , Judicial Discretion (Yale University Press, 1989) 222CrossRefGoogle Scholaret seq., and see Barak, , “Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary”, in Shetreet, , The Role of Courts in Society (Martinus Njjhoff, 1988)Google Scholar.

108 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior (1953) 7 P.D. 871, at 884; 1 S.J. 90, at 105.

109 Harari, Resolution, Divrei HaKnesset (1950) vol. 5, p. 1743Google Scholar.

110 True in 1988 the Ministry of Education declared that year (the fortieth anniversary of the State's independence) as the year for the Declaration of Independence to be studied in schools. Perhaps the Declaration of Independence should have been studied on a regular basis and not just in honour of the fortieth year. During this period I lectured numerous times before teachers and pupils on the Declaration of Independence. Much interest was displayed, but little real knowledge.

111 Al-Karbuteli v. Minister of Defence (1949-50) 2 P.D. 5.

112 Aslan v. Military Governor, supra n. 98.

113 Al-Khouri v. Chief of Staff (1950) 4 P.D. 34.

114 Alrahman v. Minister of Interior (1952) 6 P.D. 364.

115 Abu Hilu v. State of Israel (1973) 27(ii) P.D. 169. And see Geva, , “On the Proper Balance between the Security of the State and Civil and Human Rights” (1974) 5 Mishpatim 685Google Scholar; see also Al-Asmar v. Commander of the Central Region (1971) 25(ii) P.D. 197, at 199.

116 Dr. Sheib v. Minister of Defence (1951) 5 P.D. 399; 1 S.J. 1.

117 Supra n.84. See also Samara v. Commander of Judea and Samaria (1980) 34(iv) P.D. 1.

118 For a comprehensive presentation of this view, see Shetreet, , “The Scope of Judicial Review of National Security Considerations in Free Speech and Other Areas: The Israeli Perspective” (1989) 18 Is.Yrbk. Human Rights 35Google Scholar.

119 It was agreed, for example, that it was a special case since the Ministers themselves disagreed on the security questions. See Gavison, in this issue, p. 431, at 445.

120 Supra n. 117.

121 East Jerusalem Electric Company v. Minister of Energy and the Commander of Judea and Samaria (1981) 35(ii) P.D. 673.

122 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor (1988) 42(iv) P.D. 617.

123 Ibid., at 639-640.

124 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Region (1989) 43(ii) P.D. 529.

125 Beranseh v. General of the Command (1982) 36(iv) P.D. 247, at 251 per Shamger J.; Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, supra n. 122, at 641 per Barak J.

126 Al-Asad v. Minister of Interior (1980) 34(i) P.D. 515; Asli v. Jerusalem District Commissioner (1983) 37(iv) P.D. 837.

127 Mahoul v. Jerusalem District Commissioner (1983) 37(i) P.D. 790.

128 Tamimi v. Minister of Defence (1987) 41(iv) P.D. 57.

129 Inash El Usra Association v. The Commander of the I.D.F. Forces in Judea and Samaria (1989) 43(iii) P.D. 673.

130 Sejdiah v. Minister of Defence (1988) 42(iii) P.D. 801.

131 Kawasmeh v. Minister of Defence, supra n. 100, at 136, and see Kawasmeh v. Minister of Defence (1981) 35(i) P.D. 617.

132 Arjuv v. Commander of the I.D.F. (1988) 42(i) P.D. 353, at 378, 380.

133 Nafsu v. Chief Military Prosecutor (1987) 41(ii) P.D. 631.

134 Briskman, D., “High Court of Justice Petitions on Occupied Territory Matters—Practitional Aspects” (1990) 2 Israel Association of Public Law Journal 13Google Scholar.

135 Ha'Etzni v. Ben Gurion (1957) 11 P.D. 403.

136 See Conway v. Rimner (1968) A.C. 910, where a similar decision was laid down 11 years after the Ha'Etzni case.

137 11 L.S.I. 186.

138 Cohen v. Attorney General (1963) 17 P.D. 2257.

139 Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979 (33 L.S.I. 89).

140 Secret Monitoring Law, 1979 (33 L.S.I. 141).

141 For an analysis of this subject see Shetreet, , “A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An Assessment of the Israeli Law” (1984) 14 Is.Yrbk. Human Rights182, at 193–194Google Scholar.

A recent illustration of this policy of the Supreme Court is in Poraz v. Minister of Construction and Housing (1990) 44(iii) P.D. 317, where the court set aside emergency regulations promulgated by the Minister for easing the procedures of zoning and planning bodies due to the urgent need of preparing housing for the immigration of the Jews from the U.S.S.R. The regulations were set aside on the basis that the extreme measure of emergency regulations was a wrong measure for achieving the legitimate purpose for preparing housing for the immigrants. It should be noted, however, that this case is extraordinary, for the regulations were promulgated at the same time that a bill on the matter was pending before the Knesset, and its legislative stage was expedited.

142 The Founding Fathers laid down as part of their credo the principle that the State “will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel”. Further on in the Declaration, in the part where various appeals are made for co-operation, the founders extend “our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and call on the Arab inhabitants of the State to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State”. The Declaration projects a profound and powerful message on the need for a State for the Jewish people and a homeland of its own where it can find the security that it has lacked since it was exiled from its land.

143 Sec. 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948 (1 L.S.I. 7). In this connection see Klinghoffer, , “Emergency Regulations in Israel” in Pinhas Rosen Anniversary Book (Jerusalem, 1962, in Hebrew) 86Google Scholar; Bracha, B., “Emergency Legislation According to the Basic Law: Legislation Bill” (1977) 31 HaPraklit 491Google Scholar; Bracha, B., “Restriction of Personal Freedom without Due Process of Law According to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945” (1978) 8 Is.Yrbk. Human Rights 296Google Scholar; S. Shetreet, “A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An Assessment of the Israeli Law”, supra n. 141.

144 For a discussion of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1941, see Bracha, ibid.

145 Basic Law: The Knesset (12 L.S.I. 85); Basic Law: Israel Lands (14 L.S.I. 48); Basic Law: The President ofthe State (18 L.S.I. 111); Basic Law: The Government (22 L.S.I. 257); Basic Law: State Economy (29 L.S.I. 273); Basic Law: The Army (30 L.S.I. 150); Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (34 L.S.I. 209); Basic Law: Judicature (38 L.S.I. 101); Basic Law: State Comptroller (S.H. no. 1237, p. 30).

146 Landau, M., “On Justiciability and Reasonableness in Administrative Law” (1989) 14 Iyunei Mishpat 5Google Scholar.

147 See, for instance, the argument of Prof. Ruth Gavison in the Israel Bar Association Journal, July 1988, pp. 12-13.