The first step in application by treaty of IHL norms to non-international armed conflicts, adoption of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949, was taken before the dramatic development of international human rights law (IHRL). The assumption was that unless international humanitarian law (IHL) norms were applied to such conflicts, the way States acted would be unrestrained by international law. With the development of IHRL this assumption is no longer valid. Application of IHL in such conflicts should therefore be re-examined. The Article argues that moving away from IHL in non-international armed conflicts should be based on the following principles: 1. In cases other than international armed conflicts, the presumption should be that the prevailing international legal regime is the human rights regime, based as it is on a law-enforcement model of law, rather than an armed conflict model. 2. The only justification for departure from that regime and for action under the armed conflict model, should be that the level and scope of organized armed violence are such that the State cannot reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the law-enforcement model. The rule of thumb in deciding whether this test has been met could be the definition of non-international armed conflicts adopted in APII. 3. There should be a return to the notion of minimum humanitarian standards or fundamental standards of humanity, which apply to all Parties in all situations, whether armed conflict, internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergencies. 4. A State should not be allowed to employ the armed conflict model, without at least some of the norms of protection that this model affords Parties in international armed conflicts. The ideal solution would be to demand that a State, which employs the armed conflict model has to draw the legal consequences and recognize as combatants those members of dissident forces who meet the substantive conditions of combatants under Article 4, paragraph 2 of Third Geneva Convention.

Transnational armed conflicts have become a reality. The increasing sophistication of terrorist organizations, their increasingly transnational nature, and their development of military strike capabilities, push and will continue to push States to resort to combat power as a means to defend against this threat. Relying on the factual fiction that the acts of such terrorists must be attributable to the States from which they launch their operations, or on the legal fiction that the use of military combat power to respond to such threats is in reality just extraterritorial law enforcement, fails to acknowledge the essential nature of such operations. Because these operations invoke the authority of the LOAC, they should and must be treated as armed conflicts.

LOAC principles must be identified and must be broad enough to provide the authority necessary to bring the transnational enemy to submission while ensuring that that authority does not override fundamental humanitarian protections for victims of war: This Article proposes three essential pillars of this regulatory foundation: military necessity, targeting (object/distinction and proportionality), and humane treatment. These principles provide the balance between authority and obligation that is so essential for the effective and disciplined application of combat power Like the treatment of internal armed conflict, these pillars can form a foundation for a more comprehensive treatment of regulatory analysis, encompassing other issues such as command responsibility, criminal liability, access to judicial review, perfidy and treachery, and medical obligations.

This Article offers a critical evaluation of the treatment of the suitability of applying human rights law to occupation situations offered by the English House of Lords in the Al-Skeini judgment of 2007. Al-Skeini concerned the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the United Kingdom in Iraq. In the decision, the majority asserted that the application of human rights law would amount to a form of “imperialism” in requiring an occupying State to impose culturally inappropriate norms in occupied territory. They also found that its application would undermine the status quo norm contained in occupation law, by obliging an occupying State to transform the legal system in occupied territory in order to bring it in line with the human rights standards in play. This Article argues that these two assertions are based on a mistaken understanding of the substantive meaning of human rights obligations in occupation situations, and the effect on this meaning of the interface with other areas of international law. It is suggested that the fear of “human rights imperialism” is, as articulated here, misconceived; that applying human rights law to occupation situations may not actually involve breaching the law of occupation; and that in any case a more sophisticated approach to the question of clashes in normative regimes needs to be adopted.

Although Israel no longer effectively controls Gaza, Israel's overwhelming physical dominance over Gaza, coupled with the historical links of dependence, were likely central to the balancing formula applied by the High Court of Justice in Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister. The proposed solution—Israel assumes obligations that go beyond the requirements of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in situations of siege but that fall short of the requirements applicable in situations of occupation—is the “basic humanitarian needs” standard.

The main weakness of the Court's decision is not the final outcome it prescribes but the underdeveloped legal analysis of the alternative grounds for imposing obligations on the Israel. This unnecessarily complicates attempts to grasp the full implications of the decision and to identify its precedential value. However, the judgment should be viewed as endorsing the need to step outside IHL and look for additional legal norms governing humanitarian interests which may reflect our moral sensibilities and contemporary needs in a more appropriate manner than the traditional rules of IHL.

Armed conflicts are always harmful for civilians and hence all attempts should be made to avoid them. However, considering that armed conflicts do occur; economic sanctions provide States with a viable alternative. This Article illustrates the need for limitations on the use of economic sanctions. It describes the characteristics of economic sanctions and the existing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) limitations and also suggests that economic sanctions should be further regulated offering three main principles to guide these limitations: the principle of severity, according to which the most severe economic sanctions should be prohibited; the principle of effectiveness, according to which economic sanctions should be allowed only if the State imposing the sanctions can plausibly demonstrate that the sanctions are effective; and the principle of conditionality, according to which the imposing State should declare specific achievable goals for the sanctions, and lift the sanctions immediately when these goals are achieved.

As we seek to identify new norms to bridge the gaps between extant law and the challenges that new conflict modes pose today, we confront a threshold question as to which methodological ground we should stand upon in doing so. Based on a background assumption of positivism as the source of substantive norms, the issue for some observers comes down to a clash between pragmatism and formalism. To formalism's proponents, the concept of pragmatism—which sees law as a functional instrument to be used in pursuit of pre-envisioned ends—has contributed to a dearth of moral obligation in international humanitarian law discourse. Such a view considers that the emphasis on empiricism found in pragmatism both legitimizes and shrouds the reality of effective power lurking behind the law. The alternative they prefer, championed most articulately by Professor Koskenniemi, is a “culture of formalism” that sees law as an object of universal obligation and as a form of critique that unmasks the pragmatic mode for what it is, namely, a rationalization of might. As this Article suggests, this understanding misapprehends the true nature of pragmatism, which is neither a smokescreen nor an apoloay. Rather, pragmatism's focus on real-world effects and consequences holds far greater promise for advancing the actual humanitarianism of IHL. Formalism, moreover; is subsumed within the constellation of factors that pragmatic analysis demands. These ideas are explored on a theoretical level, and are then illustrated by a look at the Israel separation barrier cases decided by the International Court of Justice and the Israeli High Court of Justice.

When exploring the sources of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) obligations of multinational peacekeeping forces, legal scholars have thus far focused mainly on the UN (and, to a lesser extent, NATO), whilst other organizations have remained largely in the shadows. Whereas the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law has been widely debated and extensively investigated, little or no attention has been paid to self-regulatory solutions adopted by other international and regional organizations.

This Article focuses on the European Union (EU), holding that this regional organization—by virtue of its sui generis nature and of its increasing engagement in the field of crisis management—can be regarded as one of the most interesting newcomers to the realm of jus in bello. More specifically, it looks at the EU's internal legal order with a view to verifying whether and to what extent it may complement customary IHL in regulating the conduct of the EU as a military actor. The Article surveys the primary and secondary sources of EU legislation which may prima facie spell out obligations for the EU-led troops engaged in European Security and Defence Policy military operations. Finally, the Article seeks to draw some broader conclusions on the nature of the relationship between EU law and IHL, as well as on the complementarity and inherent normative value of their sources.