There are two key limitations to the literature that explores the relationship between truth and closure in post-violence societies. The first is that this relationship has been assessed mostly as part of a larger debate focusing on the links between the truth and the seemingly related concept of reconciliation. The second is that to the extent that the literature has addressed the connections between truth and closure as such, it has focused almost exclusively on the operations and effects of courts and truth commissions. The article addresses both limitations by examining the relationship between truth and closure through the prism of a different institution, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. Relying on 34 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including relatives of missing persons on the island, it argues that the Committee's delivery of the truth has promoted closure in three distinct ways. At the same time it acknowledges that the type of truth and the way in which it is delivered can have detrimental consequences for the promotion of closure. A short video summarising the findings of this article is available here.

The main aim of the article is to test how states implement international humanitarian law (IHL) with regard to the families of missing persons. The article shows relevant IHL shortcomings and compares them with rules applicable in cases of enforced disappearance. The national legislation collected in the section titled ‘The Missing and Their Families’ of the National Implementation Database of the International Committee of the Red Cross is then examined. The analysis addresses three core questions that are particularly relevant for families of missing persons: (1) Who is considered a missing person under each law? Approaching this question allows the testing of whether states follow the understanding of ‘missing persons’ under IHL treaty law. The second and third questions address two issues that are crucial for families of missing persons that are not addressed in IHL: (2) How is the legal status of the missing person regulated? (3) Are family members provided with measures of reparation and/or assistance? This approach reveals that states rarely apply the IHL understanding of ‘missing persons’ and predominantly exceed IHL by addressing some of the identified shortcomings. It further shows that states provide families of missing persons either with reparation measures – in cases of human rights violations – or, less often, with measures of assistance in post-conflict situations.

This article is a lightly revised version of the Lionel Cohen Lecture 2021 given by the author in October 2021. It looks at the relationship between legal academics and judges. The title of the article derives from one of the judgments of the great Lord Goff. The article has three main parts. First, it explores the increased influence of legal academics on judges in England and Wales towards the end of the twentieth century. Secondly, it examines how academic work can assist judges and makes a plea for recognition of the importance of ‘practical legal scholarship’. Finally, drawing on the author's own recent experience, the article examines how being a judge of the United Kingdom Supreme Court differs from being an academic.

The article draws on scholarships in the areas of international law, inequality and energy justice to engage in a dialogue with the business and human rights literature, from the perspective of the global south and Latin America, in particular. It engages with Gwynne Skinner's monograph about overcoming barriers to judicial remedy for corporate abuses of human rights. Skinner argues that if victims of these abuses cannot secure remedy in the countries in which the abuses occur – because of weak or corrupt institutions, among other factors – then the victims have a right to remedy in the home countries of the corporations and in countries in which they may conduct business – specifically, the United States, Canada and Europe. Skinner recommends that new legislation be introduced in these countries to ensure that their courts have jurisdiction to hear cases, under international human rights law, even when the cases have little or no links with the forum countries. I argue that a more robust international law and interdisciplinary approach shows that international human rights law alone provides a weak basis for the recommendations. I also reflect on part of the narrative that supports Skinner's argument, which builds a negative image of the courts in developing countries, to argue that this is unnecessary and that expansions of the bases of jurisdiction should be implemented on specific and stronger reasons.