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Utilitarianism, Justice and Punishment: Comments on Smart and Flew
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2016
Extract
Perhaps the greatest attraction of the utilitarian view of punishment presented so forcefully in Smart's paper is its empirical character. This empirical, scientific approach to social and moral problems typical of utilitarianism is made possible by its monistic nature: by its claim to have found in consequences of actions the principle of a uniform interpretation of all the various moral concepts, rules, ideals, a universal moral currency in which all the pros and cons of any moral issue that might arise can be cashed. This moral monism is seen by utilitarians as one of the main advantages of their theory; but it is also a source of some of its most persistent troubles. For whereas some moral notions may lend themselves to utilitarian interpretation, some others seem resistant to it.
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- Theories of Punishment
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1991
References
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