1 It may be sufficient to mention, in support of this statement, the fact that less than two years after the original publication of the book Dworkin could add a lengthy chapter of responses to criticism which were published after the book. A quick look through the notes in this review will reveal the richness and variety of scholarly response to Dworkin's views.

2 Dworkin is extremely good at getting his work reprinted. For the history of the pieces collected in the book see the review by Caplan, R.L., (1978) 66 Georgetown L.J. 951–973.Google Scholar Noticeable in its absence is Dworkin's first publication on judicial discretion: “Judicial Discretion” (1963) 60 J. Phil. 624–638. The republication of the essays in book form is nevertheless a step forward because many of them, originally published in the N.Y. Rev. of Books, were not easily accessible. Also, the book triggered more comments, which in their turn made Dworkin provide more clarification of his position.

3 MacCallum, , “Dworkin on Judicial Discretion” (1963) 60 J. Phil. 638–641CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sartorius, , “The Justification of the Judicial Decision” (1968) 78 Ethics 171–187CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Christie, , “The Model of Principles” (1968) Duke L.J. 649CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sartorius, , “Social Policy and Judicial Legislation” (1971) 8 Am. Phil. Q. 15Google Scholar; Tapper, , “A Note on Principles” [1971] Mod. L.R. 628CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carrio, , Legal Principles and Legal Positivism (1971)Google Scholar; Raz, , “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 823CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, , “Understanding the Model of Rules: Towards a Reconciliation of Dworkin and Positivism” (1972) 8 Yale L.J. 912Google Scholar; Greenawalt, , “Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges” (1975) 75 Col. L.R. 359CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sartorius, , Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account of Social Union and the Rule of Law (1975)Google Scholar; Reynolds, , “Dworkin as Quixote” (1975) 123 U. Pa. L.R. 574–608CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, , (Umana) “Dworkin's Rights Thesis” (1976) 74 Mich. L.R. 1167–1197Google Scholar; Perry, , “Contested Concepts and Hard Cases” (1977) 88 Ethics 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for an early minidebate in Hebrew see the Shapira-Raz exchange (Shapira, (1970) 2 Mishpatim 57 and Raz, ibid., at 317).

4 In addition to articles by Greenawalt, Munzer, Richards, Nickel Bodenheimer, and Brilmayer which constitute almost a complete issue of the Ga. L.R. (fall 1977), see: M. Cohen, Book Review in N.Y. Rev. of Books, 26 May 1977; Waltzer, Book Review in The New Republic, 25 June 1977; Lyons, D., “Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory” (1977) 87 Yale L.J. 415CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mackie, , “The Third Theory of Law” (1977) 7 Phil. Public Affairs 3–16Google Scholar; Raz, , “Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights” (1977) 26 Pol. Studies 123–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Caplan, supra n. 2; Caplan, “Professor Dworkin's Jurisprudence” 22 Am. J. of Jur. (forthcoming); Soper, , “Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute” (1977) 75 Mich. L.R. 473–579CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levinson, , ‘Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on Thinking Like a Lawyer” (1978) 30 Stan. L.R. 1071–1109CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In addition to these works which are primarily devoted to Dworkin's views, or contain systematic treatments of them, there are innumerable discussions of his views in other works. To mention just two, see Sandalow, , “Judicial Protection of Minorities” (1977) 75 Mich. L.R. 1162CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 1166–1172, and Weinreb, , “Law as Order” (1979) 91 Harv. L.R. 909.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 For an interesting plea against such spending of time see Danzig, R., “The Death of Contract and the Life of the Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia” (1977) 29 Stan. L.R. 1125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Dworkin himself has dealt with some of the criticisms on three occasions. In The Model of Rules II, originally published in 1972, he dealt with the points raised by Sartorius, Raz, Carrio, Christie and MacCallum, supra n. 3. The Georgia Law Review has solicited his response to the articles published there, and it was published as ‘seven Critics” (1977) 11 Ga. L.R. 1201–1268. In the paperback edition of the book published in 1978 he added that piece to the book and included some comments about Soper, Raz, and Mackie, supra n. 4. Dworkin is almost alone in this battle, but joining him does not mean that he cannot handle the situation.

7 See, e.g., Raz, Levinson, supra n. 4.

8 Thus, avoiding the draft is right because although people usually have to obey the law, they are entitled to choose their own interpretation of the law when it is controversial (ch. 8). Reverse discrimination is right and constitutional because there is only one way of interpreting the constitution and this is the way compatible with the principle that each individual has an equal right to respect, but not a right to equal treatment in all cases (ch. 9). The law should not make homosexual behaviour a criminal offence since the feeling against such behaviour is not a moral judgment, but only prejudices and rationalisations, which society has no right to enforce (ch. 10). Anti-slavery judges enforced the fugitive slave laws because of a “mistake of jurisprudence”, Book Review of Cover's Justice Accused in the Times Literary Supplement, 5 June 1975. The most recent applications by Dworkin of his theory to practical issues are a critique of the Bakke decision and support of the decision in Farber, imposing a duty on a reporter to let a defendant in a trial he precipitated see his notes and check his sources: N.Y. Review of Books, August 1978 and 26 October 1978.

9 E.g., Levinson, supra n. 4.

10 Dworkin has more recently tried to articulate what he means by ‘liberalism’ in “Liberalism”, in Hampshire, S. ed., Private and Public Morality (1978) 113.Google Scholar

11 There seems to be a conscious effort to supply as few footnotes as possible, and not to burden the arguments by frequent references to the work of others. The absence of “scholarliness” is never explained. (See e.g., explanations of such absence in Llewellyn, , The Bramble Bush (1950) 8Google Scholar; Hart, explaining why he chose to put notes at the end of his book, The Concept of Law (1961) viiv). The lack of footnotes may be partly explained by the forum in which many of the papers were originally published, see supra n. 2.

12 One such critic is obviously Fuller, who started challenging Positivism and the distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be in the Law in Quest of Itself (1941), through a debate with Hart in (1958) 71 Harv. L.R. and Nagel (1959) 3 Natural Law Forum 68–104, (1960) 4 Natural Law Forum 26–43, culminating in his The Morality of Law (revised ed., 1969). It is interesting to note, however, that Dworkin “defended” Positivism against Fuller's attack: “Philosophy, Morality and the Law—Some Observations Prompted by Prof. Fuller's Novel Claim” (1965) 113 U. Pa. L.R. 668, and that this defence came after his own first critique of Hart's Positivism had been published. Still, Dworkin owes to Fuller, and to the “Process School” (reflected primarily by H. Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process), the concept of law as an “enterprise”, rather than as a “system of rules”. For some comments as to the status of Dworkin's critique of Positivism versus other such critiques see Mackie, supra n. 4. Another unacknowledged debt to Fuller seems to be the insistence on the importance of seeing law as a purposeful activity.

13 See Rawls, , Theory of Justice (1971)Google Scholar; Nozick, , Anarchy, State and Utopia (1973)Google Scholar; Hampshire, , “Morality and Pessimism” in Hampshire, S., ed., Public and Private Morality (1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fried, , Right and Wrong (1977)Google Scholar; Barry, B., “And Who is My Neighbour?” (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Without implying that Dworkin is an advocate of “natural law” (although I think in a way he is, and see Mackie, supra n. 4). it seems appropriate to cite Kelsen, considered by many a paradigm of legal positivism, on natural law, positivism, and their interrelations: “At this moment of our intellectual history, the present essay attempts to explore the foundations of natural-law theory and of positivism. It will have succeeded if it has been able to show that the contrast between these two elementary tendencies of legal science is rooted in the ultimate depths of philosophy and personality; and that it involves a never-ending conflict”: General Theory of Law and State (1945) 466.

15 See e.g., Hart, H.L.A., “American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream” (1977) 11 Ga. L.R. 969Google Scholar, 982–89, and Dworkin's response, “Seven Critics” (1977) 11 Ga. L.R. 1201, 1202–1203.

16 Acknowledged by him to be a peculiar American preoccupation. See also H.L.A. Hart (preceding note) at 969–71. It is less clear if he realises that any account of legal systems cannot ignore legislation and administration if it is to claim completeness, and that his description is, at best, partial.

17 Dworkin, supra n. 15, at 1203.

18 E.g., Dworkin, , “Liberalism” in Hampshire, S., ed., Public and Private Morality (1978)Google Scholar; “No Right Answer” (1978) 53 N.Y.U.L.R. 1.

19 A good example is Dworkin's famous “unique right answer” thesis, first presented in 1963. Sartorius was the only one supportive of it (supra n. 3) and as a result of criticisms the argument is now presented in a much more sophisticated way in Dworkin's “No Right Answer” in Hacker and Raz, eds., Laws, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart and in ch. 13 of his book. But cf. contra. Perry, supra n. 3 and Munzer, , “Right Answers, Pre-existing Rights and Fairness” (1977) 11 Ga.L.R. 1055–1068.Google Scholar

20 “Seven Critics”, supra n. 6 at 1265.

21 Ibid., at 1240.

22 In this he departs from two other American critics of Legal Positivism. Dworkin does not accept the rule-skepticism of the Realists, and he also rejects Fuller's concept of law as a way of governing conduct through a system of rules of conduct. It is interesting to note, though, that Dworkin's account of adjudication is similar in many respects to that given by Llewellyn, a self-defined Realist, in his The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1961), and that his insistence on seeing the law as a process and on a purposive account of adjudication remind one of Fuller's position. Dworkin, presumably, would say that Fuller did not go far enough when acknowledging that judges in fact applied rules, and that this application was determined by their concept of what the law ought to be. Dworkin would want to argue, it seems, that the best description of adjudication is that it is a process aimed at enforcing rights.

23 See especially his Model of Rules II.

24 See Raz, supra n. 3 and Raz, Practical Reason and Norms.

25 Sartorius, supra nn. 3 and 4; Soper, supra n. 4; and Note, supra n. 3. See also Fuller's treatment of Dworkin in The Morality of Law (supra n. 12) pp.

26 For an acute perception of the element of guided choice, see e.g., Cardozo, , The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)Google Scholar; see also, Soper, supra n. 4.