¹ Clapham, Andrew, ‘Detention by Armed Groups under International Law’ (2017) 93 International Law Studies 1, 9Google Scholar.

² Hill-Cawthorne, Lawrence, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2016) 66–76Google Scholar.

³ Chairman's Commentary to The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, ‘The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations’, 2012, para 1.3; Dörmann, Knut and others, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Cambridge University Press 2016) 246 paras 717–18Google Scholar.

⁴ Doswald-Beck, Louise, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford University Press 2011) 253–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Sivakumaran, Sandesh, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2012) 71Google Scholar; Hill-Cawthorne (n 2) 76 (where he concludes that ‘unlike in international armed conflicts, where IHL confers detention authority on states, in non-international conflicts, IHL presumes such powers already exist in domestic law and regulates them’). See also Clapham (n 1) 5, 1 (where he explains that the assumption by states that they could easily detain NSAGs for their activities under domestic law has been overtaken by the current international nature of NIACs).

⁶ Heffes, Ezequiel, ‘Detention by Armed Opposition Groups in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Towards a New Characterization of International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 20 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 229, 230CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clapham, Andrew, ‘Detention and Prosecution in the DoD Manual’ in Newton, Michael A (ed), The United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual: Commentary and Critique (Cambridge University Press 2019) 282–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Dörmann and others (n 3) 246 para 717.

⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘The Roots of Restraint in War’, 18 June 2018, 13–14.

⁹ Daragh Murray, ‘Non-State Armed Groups, Detention Authority in Non-International Armed Conflict, and the Coherence of International Law: Searching for a Way Forward’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 435, 436 (remarking that ‘[t]his is not an academic issue. Detention by armed groups is a routine activity in armed conflict, and often one of the first activities that an armed group engages in’).

¹⁰ ibid.

¹¹ Dörmann and others (n 3) 246 para 718 (where this form of detention is described).

¹² Moir, Lindsay, ‘The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict’ in Clapham, Andrew, Gaeta, Paola and Sassòli, Marco (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 391Google Scholar, 407 para 41 (where Moir correctly suggests that the ability to perform certain obligations under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions could ‘be difficult without a secure territorial base’).

¹³ Sivakumaran (n 5) 549; Clapham (n 1) 3.

¹⁴ Hill-Cawthorne (n 2) 74; Clapham (n 1) 11–12.

¹⁵ Cassese, Antonio, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 125Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Rejoinder by Clapham against the legitimisation of violence argument in Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) 46–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I), art 3, particularly the last paragraph.

¹⁸ Gerald Irving Anthony Dare Draper, The Red Cross Conventions (Stevens and Sons 1958) 14, and particularly 17.

¹⁹ Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178–80.

²⁰ See, eg, ECtHR, Demopoulos and Others v Turkey, App nos 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04 and 21819/04, 1 March 2010, para 96.

²¹ Here the term ‘armed non-state actors’ is used to refer to the broader category of which non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are a constituent. Entities with de facto governmental control may not just be referred to as NSAGs. This spectrum is explored later in the article. However, this distinction is not strict, as the terms ‘armed non-state actor’ and ‘NSAG’ may be used interchangeably by some.

²² See, eg, ECtHR, Mozer v Republic of Moldova and Russia, App no 11138/10, 23 February 2016, paras 124–27.

²³ See Clapham (n 1) 3 (where he makes the point that ‘one can argue that if all detention by armed groups is illegal then there will be no incentive to detain rather than kill their captives’).

²⁴ Heffes (n 6) 246; Sassòli, Marco, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5, 18–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Heffes (n 6) 248.

²⁶ ‘Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Chatham House and International Committee of the Red Cross, London, 22–23 September 2008’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 859, 865; Clapham (n 1) 12–13; Hill-Cawthorne (n 2) 46.

²⁷ Clapham (n 1) 13.

²⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute).

²⁹ This challenge is observed in Deborah Casalin, ‘Taking Prisoners: Reviewing the International Humanitarian Law Grounds for Deprivation of Liberty by Armed Opposition Groups’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 743, 750 (where she also refers to the example of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) seeking to differentiate between hostage-taking and other types of detention in its statement, ‘Resolution to reiterate MILF policy of strongly and continuously condemning all kidnap for ransom activities in Mindanao and everywhere, and to take drastic action against the perpetrators of this heinous crime in all MILF areas’, 26 February 2002).

³⁰ David Tuck, ‘Taking of Hostages’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 12) 297, 309–10 (where he highlights the tension with criminality under hostage taking that could exist if all detentions by an NSAG were considered unlawful).

³¹ International Criminal Court (ICC), Elements of Crimes (ICC 2011) 33 (art 8(2)(c)(iii). The 3rd Element states: ‘The perpetrator intended to compel a State, an international organization, a natural or legal person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or the release of such person or persons’. This is a broad definition of the subjective element, which can invite liability for any detention by an NSAG.

³² Heffes (n 6) 246.

³³ ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the Appeal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-01/05-01/08 A, Appeals Chamber, 8 June 2018, [166]–[170]; see also Clapham (n 1) 14.

³⁴ For discussion of the relationship between ‘command responsibility ’ and ‘responsible command’ see ICTY, Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović, Mehmed Alagić and Amir Kubura, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility, IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 16 July 2003, [21]–[23].

³⁵ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II).

³⁶ Debuf, Els, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Editions A Pedone and Hart 2013) 451Google Scholar.

³⁷ Tuck (n 30) 310 (where he makes a similar observation on the reading of CA3).

³⁸ See Dörmann and others (n 3) 188 para 539 (and footnote) (where it is explained (in the context of CA3) that at the Diplomatic Conference, the term ‘detention’ was preferred over ‘captivity’ because ‘captivity’ ‘implied the status of a prisoner of war and was incompatible with the idea of civil war’. Inherent in this discomfort was the appreciation of the parallels between internment by both NSAGs and states).

³⁹ Tuck (n 30) 310 (where he makes a similar observation on the import of ‘regularly constituted court’).

⁴⁰ ibid; Olson, Laura M, ‘Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2009) 40 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 437, 440Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Tuck (n 30) 310.

⁴² Claude Pilloud and others, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) para 4564 (emphasis added).

⁴³ GC I (n 17) art 3(1).

⁴⁴ Dörmann and others (n 3) 187 para 535.

⁴⁵ GC I (n 17) art 3(1)(d).

⁴⁶ Goodman, Ryan, ‘The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rowe, Peter, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 697CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goodman, Ryan, ‘Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 155Google Scholar; Murray (n 9).

⁴⁷ See Zegveld, Liesbeth, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sassòli, Marco and Olson, Laura M, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 599CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 623; Casalin (n 29) 752.

⁴⁸ Although the authority of the ICRC on the law and practice of IHL may be questioned, it remains the only international institution with a mandate in the main IHL documents that has undertaken considerable research and publication on the customary rules in IHL. It is also a depository of numerous manuals and other similar documentation from states.

⁴⁹ Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 863.

⁵⁰ ibid.

⁵¹ ibid.

⁵² ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges’, Opinion Paper, 2014, 7 (ICRC Opinion Paper).

⁵³ Dörmann and others (n 3) 248 para 728.

⁵⁴ Mohammed v Ministry of Defence and Others [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) (UK), paras 241–48 (where Justice Leggatt discusses the thrust of these obstacles to the idea of an inherent authorisation to detain in NIAC).

⁵⁵ Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’, EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts.

⁵⁶ For the nature of customary law, see Cassese (n 15) 153; Klabbers, Jan, International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 29Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Murray (n 9) 445.

⁵⁸ Sari, Aurel and Aughey, Sean, ‘Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 60, 95–96Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ ibid.

⁶⁰ Murray (n 9) 446.

⁶¹ Debuf (n 36) 468.

⁶² Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 55).

⁶³ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I).

⁶⁴ McCoubrey, Hilaire, ‘Jurisprudential Aspects of the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts’ in Meyer, Michael A (ed), Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1989) 41–43Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Greenwood, Christopher, ‘The Relationship between Ius Ad Bellum and Ius in Bello’ (1983) 9 Review of International Studies 221, 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 55); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari’, EJIL: Talk!, 2 June 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/locating-the-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-rejoinder-to-aurel-sari.

⁶⁷ Debuf (n 36) 459–60.

⁶⁸ ibid 462

⁶⁹ Heffes (n 6) 238–41.

⁷⁰ See Heller's assessment of the position of an ICRC Background Paper and Rule 99 of its Customary Law Study (Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I: Rules (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2005, revised 2009) (ICRC Study)), in which he observes that the ICRC relies on both IHL and IHRL for the substantive detention rules: Kevin Jon Heller, ‘What Exactly Is the ICRC's Position on Detention in NIAC?’, Opinio Juris, 6 February 2015, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/06/exactly-icrcs-position-detention-niac.

⁷¹ Murray (n 9) 439.

⁷² ibid; Hill-Cawthorne (n 2) 118; the prohibition is viewed as a universal rule underpinning legal frameworks that regulate detention in key treaties.

⁷³ Murray (n 9) 440.

⁷⁴ See Debuf (n 36) 465; Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 66).

⁷⁵ Murray (n 9) 446–49.

⁷⁶ ibid 448.

⁷⁷ Kevin Jon Heller, ‘IHL Does Not Authorise Detention in NIAC: A Response to Murray’, Opinio Juris, 22 March 2017, http://opiniojuris.org/2017/03/22/33037.

⁷⁸ Clapham (n 6) 287 (pointing out this ‘apparent distinction’).

⁷⁹ ‘Resolution 1 of the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent – Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’ (2015) 97 International Review of the Red Cross 1390 (ICRC Resolution 1) (emphasis added).

⁸⁰ ICRC Opinion Paper 2014 (n 52) 7.

⁸¹ Heller (n 70) (in which he argued that the ICRC position did ‘rely on both IHL and IHRL for the substantive detention rules they endorse –  and do not adequately disentangle the two legal strands’).

⁸² ibid.

⁸³ Andrew Clapham, ‘The Complex Relationship between the Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 12) 701, 734–35 para 87.

⁸⁴ See Clapham (n 1) 8.

⁸⁵ It could be tactical. It is observable that in the Expert Meeting in 2008, the position of NSAGs was clarified, based on the principle of equality of parties: Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 870. However, in its Opinion Paper the ICRC did not address equality of parties and its import: ICRC Opinion Paper 2014 (n 52) 7–8; nor did it do so in the Commentary: Dörmann and others (n 3) 249 para 728. This indicates hesitance in being clearly affirmative about the inherent power to detain applying to NSAGs. Furthermore, the quote above from the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2015 (n 79) seems also to take a state-based stance, which would be opposed to the position taken at the Expert Meeting in 2008.

⁸⁶ Moir, Lindsay, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2002) 194CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clapham (n 83) 733 para 83.

⁸⁷ Heffes (n 6) 238–39; Sassòli, Marco, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare and Controversies (Edward Elgar 2019) 196 para 6.67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁸ Sivakumaran, Sandesh, ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kleffner, Jann K, ‘The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘The Addressees of Common Article 3’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 12) 415; Murray, Daragh, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups’ (2015) 20 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fortin, Katharine, The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 177–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁹ Sivakumaran, ‘The Addressees of Common Article 3’ (n 88) 417 para 10.

⁹⁰ Fortin (n 88) 203–04.

⁹¹ Moir (n 86) 52.

⁹² Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 870.

⁹³ Casalin (n 29) 749–50.

⁹⁴ Somer, Jonathan, ‘Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 655, 663CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁵ Heffes (n 6) 239; Somer (n 94) 663.

⁹⁶ Casalin (n 29) 750; see also Bangerter, Olivier, ‘Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 353, 377–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 379–380 (providing perspective on the reality of the practice of armed groups and the fact that equality of application of rules is critical for compliance).

⁹⁷ Clapham (n 6) 285.

⁹⁸ Heffes (n 6) 231, particularly fn 10.

⁹⁹ Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 863.

¹⁰⁰ ICRC Opinion Paper 2014 (n 52) 7.

¹⁰¹ Dörmann and others (n 3) 249 paras 727–28.

¹⁰² ibid fn 671; ICRC Resolution 1 (n 79) para 1; Kleffner, Jann K, ‘Operational Detention and the Treatment of Detainees’ in Gill, Terry D and Fleck, Dieter (eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) para 26.03Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ ICRC Study (n 70) r 99.

¹⁰⁴ Marco Sassòli, ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Occasional Paper Series, 2006, 6; Vité, Sylvain, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 69, 89–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marko Milanovic, ‘The Applicability of the Conventions to “Transnational” and “Mixed” Conflicts’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 12) 27, 42 para 53.

¹⁰⁵ Heller (n 70).

¹⁰⁶ ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Moir (n 86) 194.

¹⁰⁸ Sassòli and Olson (n 47) 626–27.

¹⁰⁹ Moir (n 86) 193–94.

¹¹⁰ Sassòli and Olson (n 47) 621–64; Clapham (n 16) 25.

¹¹¹ For extensive commentary on IHRL and NSAGs see Clapham (n 16); Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016); Fortin (n 88).

¹¹² Annyssa Bellal, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council’, Academy In-Brief No 7, The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, December 2016, 9–10; Clapham (n 16) 49.

¹¹³ Bellal (n 112) 10.

¹¹⁴ Clapham (n 16) 286–89.

¹¹⁵ The best example in this respect is the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (entered into force 6 December 2012) (Kampala Convention), particularly arts 1(e), 1(n), 2(e) and 7(5).

¹¹⁶ Fortin (n 88) 281–84; Murray (n 111) 151–54.

¹¹⁷ See, for example, ECtHR, Foka v Turkey, App no 28940/95, 24 June 2008; Mozer v Moldova and Russia (n 22), which will be addressed later in the article.

¹¹⁸ Foka v Turkey (n 117) para 114.

¹¹⁹ ibid paras 85–89; Mozer v Moldova and Russia (n 22) paras 145, 150.

¹²⁰ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).

¹²¹ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person) (7–31 October 2014), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (General Comment 35), para 15.

¹²² ibid.

¹²³ ibid para 64 (emphasis added).

¹²⁴ Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 863 (emphasis added).

¹²⁵ Clapham (n 83) 731 para 76.

¹²⁶ General Comment 35 (n 121) para 15; Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards (n 26) 863; ICRC Opinion Paper 2014 (n 52) 8; Dörmann and others (n 3) 249 para 728.

¹²⁷ Diane Webber, ‘Hassan v. United Kingdom: A New Approach to Security Detention in Armed Conflict?’, American Society of International Law, 2 April 2015, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/7/hassan-v-united-kingdom-new-approach-security-detention-armed-conflict.

¹²⁸ ibid.

¹²⁹ ECtHR, Hassan v United Kingdom, App no 29750/09, 16 September 2014, para 104.

¹³⁰ Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence, Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [44], [61].

¹³¹ Clapham (n 1) 8.

¹³² Hassan v United Kingdom (n 129) para 106; Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence (n 130) [67], [108].

¹³³ Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence (n 130) [164].

¹³⁴ ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para 96.

¹³⁵ ibid para 91.

¹³⁶ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16 [125].

¹³⁷ ibid.

¹³⁸ ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para 436.

¹³⁹ ibid para 460 (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁰ ibid paras 400–01.

¹⁴¹ The principles were in their nascent stages in Cyprus v Turkey (n 134) paras 231, 236–37; and were distilled clearly in Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (n 138) paras 436, 460.

¹⁴² Mozer v Moldova and Russia (n 22) paras 124–27.

¹⁴³ ibid paras 146–48.

¹⁴⁴ ibid paras 149–50.

¹⁴⁵ Foka v Turkey (n 117) para 81.

¹⁴⁶ ibid paras 82, 84.

¹⁴⁷ ibid paras 76–77.

¹⁴⁸ ibid paras 86–87.

¹⁴⁹ ECtHR, Banković and Others v Belgium and Others, App no 52207/99, 12 December 2001, paras 59–61.

¹⁵⁰ Cyprus v Turkey (n 134) paras 69–81.

¹⁵¹ Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (n 138) paras 314–16, 382; Cyprus v Turkey (n 134) para 77.

¹⁵² Foka v Turkey (n 117) para 83; Demopoulos v Turkey (n 20) para 95; Mozer v Moldova and Russia (n 22) para 110.

¹⁵³ Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (n 138) paras 332–52; Mozer v Moldova and Russia (n 22) para 100.

¹⁵⁴ For insight into the notion of the everyday life of a civilian under the control of an armed non-state actor see Katharine Fortin, ‘The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life under Rebel Control’ (2016) 63 Netherlands International Law Review 161.

¹⁵⁵ Banković v Belgium (n 149) paras 59, 67, 74, 82 (read together).

¹⁵⁶ Fortin (n 88) 261–62.

¹⁵⁷ Cyprus v Turkey (n 134) para 78.

¹⁵⁸ Sassòli (n 87) 176 para 6.20 (footnotes omitted).

¹⁵⁹ Thompson, Peter G, Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat (Rowman & Littlefield 2014) 4–6Google Scholar, 53–69 (for an attempt at defining NSAGs). See also Bellal (n 112) 7–8, 26–28 (for attempts at a typology of armed groups). Also, de facto entities are defined herein as armed non-state actors or entities with effective authority over territory.

¹⁶⁰ See an instructive classification of these groups by the ICRC in ICRC (n 8) 23–24 (drawing a distinction between centralised NSAGs, decentralised NSAGs and community-embedded armed groups).

¹⁶¹ See Geneva Call, ‘Administration of Justice by Armed Non-State Actors: Report from the 2017 Garance Talks’, The Garance Series, Issue 2, 10–13 (in a meeting and engagement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército de Pueblo (FARC-EP), and the Southern Front in Syria – groups that at any one point enjoyed territorial control – revealed that all three groups had ‘court’ systems and processes for the administration of justice, and could detain persons on clear grounds, and not randomly or arbitrarily).

¹⁶² See the connections drawn between de facto non-state authorities and armed non-state actors that exercise territorial control in Bellal (n 112) 28–30.

¹⁶³ Sivakumaran (n 5) 186–87.

¹⁶⁴ Moir (n 12) 406–07 paras 40–41; Sivakumaran, Sandesh, ‘Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 489, 494CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶⁵ ECtHR, Ramirez v France, App no 28780/95, 24 June 1996; ECtHR, Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, 16 November 2004; ECtHR, Öcalan v Turkey, App no 46221/99, 15 May 2005; ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v France, App no 3394/03, 29 March 2010.