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The Legal Basis for the Prohibition on Abortion in Jewish Law*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
Extract
One of the main issues in almost every treatment of abortion in Jewish Law is the legal basis for its prohibition. The recent trend in Rabbinic literature to categorise abortion as a form of homicide, proscribed by Biblical law, seems to constitute a break with the classical Rabbinic view, according to which abortion is neither homicide, nor directly prohibited in the major literary sources of Jewish Law, i.e. the Bible and the Talmud. Moreover, in the few instances in which abortion is discussed in these sources, it would seem that no such prohibition exists.
This article will analyse the Biblical and Talmudic passages which deal with abortion, and survey the various Rabbinic opinions as to the legal basis for its prohibition. Particular attention will be paid to the argument that abortion is a biblically-proscribed form of homicide, and to the reasons which may underlie the adoption of that argument by a number of authorities in recent times. We will also analyse the significance in Jewish Law of the stages of foetal development.
Our analysis will be both historical and normative, and in this context it will be a valuable exercise to compare the position in Jewish Law to that in the Canon Law of the Church of Rome. Although the Church Fathers held that abortion was a form of homicide, and the contemporary position of the Catholic Church reflects this attitude strictly and unswervingly, the Medieval Canonists adopted the distinction between the formed and the unformed foetus, based on a tradition derived from the Septuagint version of the Biblical passage dealing with the consequences of striking a pregnant woman (Ex. 21:22–23).
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References
1 Ex. 21:22–23. See Jackson, B.S., Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History (Leiden, 1975) 75–107Google Scholar, for a comprehensive textual and legal analysis of this difficult passage.
2 Cf. Gen. 42:4, 38; 44:29; Jackson, at 78.
3 Mekhilta, ad loc.; Cassuto, U., A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. Abrahams, I. (Jerusalem, 1967) 275Google Scholar; Phillips, A., Ancient Israel's Criminal Law (Oxford, 1970) 88–89.Google Scholar See Jackson, at 77.
4 See Ex. 21:35 and Daube, D., Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge, 1947) 148.Google Scholar See also Jackson, at 90. According to Amram, D., “Retaliation and Compensation”, repr. Studies in Jewish Jurisprudence (“N.Y., 1974) vol. 2, p. 198Google Scholar, women would often adjudicate in disputes, thereby exposing themselves to blows of this nature. This may also account, to some extent, for the detailed treatment in both the Bible and other ancient Near-Eastern codes, of a situation which does not seem, at first sight, to deserve such extensive attention. But see Driver, G.R. and Miles, J.C., The Babyonian Laws, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1952) 416Google Scholar, for another approach to this question. The intentional nature of the blow is also indicated in Josephus, , Antiquities of the Jews, 4:8Google Scholar, and in Philo, , The Special Laws, 3:108.Google Scholar
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20 Tos. Sanh. 84b, s.v. hava.
21 M. Oholoth 7:6; cf. T. Yeb. 9:5; Arak. 1:4; Sifri Zutah, 334.
22 Generally taken as referring to the head; T. Yeb. ibid.; Yeb. 72b; M. Nidd. 3:5; Nidd. 29a; Y. Sanh. 8:9. See Maimonides, Hilkhot Rozeah 1:9.
23 M. Arakhin 1:4. See Tosafot R. Akiba Eiger, ad. loc. Similarly, a pregnant sotah was required to drink the prescribed potion in spite of the risk to her foetus; M. Sotah 4:4. See Aptowitzer, supra n. 15 at 103.
24 According to the Tosefta, the infant must also extend his hand out of the womb before execution is delayed. Apparently, this criterion was rejected and it does not appear in later sources: see Hasdei David, ad. loc.
25 Arakhin 7a.
26 R. Solomon b. Isaac (1040–1105), principal commentator on the Talmud whose grandsons founded the great Franco-German school of Talmud study, that of the Tosafists.
27 Arakhin 7a.
28 This argument is mentioned in various Rabbinic responsa as a grounds for leniency in permitting abortion, e.g. R. Jair Hayyim Bachrach (1638–1702), Responsa Havvot Yair, no. 31; Ouziel, R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai (1880–1953), Responsa Mishpetei Ouziel, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 46.Google Scholar
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32 Legal norms which according to Jewish Law are binding upon non-Jews. See M. Elon, supra n. 10, at 708.
33 Gen. 9:6 Sanh. 57b, cf. Y. Kidd. 1:1. See also Gen. Rabbah, ch. 34, sec. 6 (ed. Albeck) 325.
34 Whether or not Maimonides would maintain, on the basis of the Talmudic axiom “there is nothing which is permitted to an Israelite but forbidden to a non-Jew (n. 35, infra)” that Jews were bound by the Noachide Laws is a moot point. See. Sofer, R. Moses (1762–1839) Responsa Halam Sofer, Yoreh DeahGoogle Scholar, no. 19 and Schick, R. Moses (1807–1879), Responsa Maharam Schick, Yoreh Deah, 145.Google Scholar The general view of the modern authorities, however, is as stated in the body of the text. Also, see Erusi, R., “Abortion-Theory and Practice in the Halakha” (1977) 8 Dine Israel 125.Google Scholar For a criticism of Erusi's methodological points, see note 143.
35 Sanh. 59a.
36 Sanh. ibid. s.v. leka; Hull. 33a, s.v. ehad.
37 Weiss, I.H., Dor Dor V'Dorshav (Berlin, 1923) 23.Google Scholar However, according to Aptowitzer, supra n. 15 at 114, n. 187, this view is untenable, and he supports the idea that it reflects a separate legal tradition on abortion.
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41 See infra, p. 123 ff.
42 The translation of the Bible into Greek. See Elon, M., Hamishpat Haiwri, (Jerusalem, 1973) vol. 3, p. 841.Google Scholar
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44 Hittite Laws, 17.
45 De Historia Animalia, 7:3. Plato also believed that the foetus became a living body in its mother's womb; see Plutarch, , De Placitics Philosophorum 5:15.Google Scholar
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53 De Virtue, 18, based on an a fortiori argument from Lev. 22:28. He also accepted the distinction between the formation times for the male and the female foetus (Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesis, 1:15).
54 Elon, at 842.
55 See supra, n. 4. Also see Daube, supra n. 4 at 148, n. 12.
56 The double fine indicates the influence of the classical notion that the foetus is state property. See Aptowitzer, at 87, n. 187; Greenberg, M., “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law”, in Y. Kaufman Memorial Volume (Jerusalem, 1966) 210Google Scholar; Goodenough, supra n. 52 at 13; Weinfeld, at 136; cf. Cameron, A., “Exposure of Children and Greek Ethics” (1932) 46 Classical Review 111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
57 Antiquities of the Jews 4:8
58 Contra Apion 2:25.
59 Aptowitzer at 86, n. 117.
60 For a striking example, see Philo's explanation of Ex. 22:27 in De Specialibus Legibus 1:53, and compare it to Antiquities of the Jews, 2:2735, moreover, it is a moot point whether Philo had any knowledge of Hebrew.
61 Third century Alexandria. Clement brought the sophistication of his Alexandrian Greek philosophical training to Christian doctrine, see Osborn, E.F., The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1947).Google Scholar
62 Paedagogus 3:10; Alon, at 280, n. 29. See Richardson, C.C. (ed.), Library of Christian Classics (London, 1955) vol. 2, p. 17.Google Scholar
63 “Embassy for the Christians”, Richardson, idem, 338. Cf. Hilgers, and Horan, (ed.), Abortion and Social Justice (N.Y., 1972)Google Scholar Intro.
64 Written in Eretz Yisrael or in Syria in the first century, a few years after the destruction of the Temple (70 A.D.). See Alon, at 274, and Aptowitzer, at 85, n. 113. Also see Vokes, F.E., The Riddle of the Didache (London, 1938).Google Scholar
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66 c. 160–220. Tertullian was both a Roman jurist and a philosopher; see Shortt, C. de L., The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian (London, 1933).Google Scholar
67 Apologeticum ad Nationes, 1:15.
68 Weinfeld, at 142. According to this Judean sect, it was forbidden to sacrifice a pregnant animal on the basis of the verse in Lev. 22:28. In the Rabbinic tradition, no such prohibition exists.
69 One of the most important of the Qumran finds, it is probably late second century. See Yadin, Y., Megillat Hamikdash (Jerusalem, 1977)Google Scholar and Falk, Z., “The Temple Scroll and the Codification of Jewish Law” (1979) 2 Jewish Law Annual 33.Google Scholar
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72 Weinfeld, at 138.
73 Supra, n. 68.
74 See supra, n. 71.
75 Weinfeld also points out the differences in attitudes to contraception and sterilization. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
76 The period of the Rishonim (“early” scholars) extends from the middle of the eleventh century until the sixteenth century (the great codificatory age of R. Joseph Karo (1488–1575), R. Moses Isseries (1530–1572), and the Shulkhan Arukh (published in 1565). See Elon, supra n. 10, at 17.
77 Rashi, Sanh. 72b, s.v. yaza; Ramban (R. Moses b. Nahman, 1194–1270), novellae Nidd. 42b; Torat Ha'adam, Inyan Hasakanah (Jerusalem, 1964), 29; R. Menahem Hameiri (1249–1315), Bet Habehirah, Sanh. 72b; Shab. 107b, Ramah (R. Meir Abulafiah, c. 1170–1244) Yad Remah, Sanh. 57a, 72b; Ran, supra n. 30; Radbaz, supra n. 6. For Maimonides' view, see infra p. 121 ff. These sources deal with abortion as a criminal offence. Discussions of abortion in terms of ritual laws or homiletics are not included here, in the light of the observations in n. 31, supra. Moreover, the considerations involved in permitting the transgressing of the Sabbath in order to save a foetus are not in the same category as those involved in abortion, see e.g. Tzitz Eliezer, at 209.
78 See e.g. Zweig, R. Moses Jonah (1910–1963), “Al Hapalah Melakhutit” (1964) 7 Noam 47.Google Scholar
79 The written decisions of leading authorities on the various questions submitted to them. Elon, at 13.
80 See infra, p. 123 ff.
81 Sanh. 59a, s.v. leka, Hull. 33a, s.v. ehad. Elsewhere, the Tosafot state that although it is permitted to kill a foetus, the Sabbath may still be profaned in order to save its life (Nidd. 44a, s.v. ihu). According to the notes of R. Zvi Hirsh Chajes (1805–1855), ad. loc., we may imply from here that according to Tosafot it is permitted in the first instance to kill a foetus. According to R. Jacob Emben (1697–1776), however, the text is not to be understood literally, for “who would allow a foetus to be killed without reason, even though there is no capital punishment for doing so” (Notes, ad. loc.). Moreover, on logical grounds, Chajes' contention is untenable, and obviously the expression “patur” (exempt from punishment) ought to have been employed instead of “mutar”— permitted. See Schmelkes, R. Isaac (1828–1906), Responsa Bet Yitzhak, vol. 2, no. 162.Google Scholar According to R. Moses Feinstein (b. 1895), “it is abundantly clear that we are dealing with a scribal error and the text ought to read “patur” instead of “mutar”, “Bedin Harigat Ubar”, in R. Ezekiel Abramski Memorial Volume (Jerusalem, 1975) 462. See also Bleich, J.D., “Abortion in Halakhic Literature” (1968) 10 Tradition 110, n. 4.Google Scholar
82 Seridei Esh. 346.
83 See Faur, J., “The Legal Thinking of Tosaphot—An Historical Approach” (1975) 6 Dine Israel xliii.Google Scholar
84 See Pollock, F., Essays in the Law (London, 1922) 48.Google Scholar
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86 R. Moses b. Maimon (1135–1204). The greatest figure in post-Talmudic Judaism and brilliant innovator in the codification of Jewish Law. See Elon, at 128.
87 Sanh. 72b. Maimonides, , Hilkhot Rozeah 1:6–15.Google Scholar
88 Maimonides, ibid. 1:9.
89 Deut. 25:12.
90 Sanh. 72b.
91 See Bleich, at 89, and Feldman, D.M., Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law (N.Y., 1974) 276.Google Scholar
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93 (1713–1793). Responsa Noda Beyehudah, pt. 2, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 59.
94 Havvot Yair, 31.
95 (1853–1918). Novellae on Maimonides' Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rozeah 1:9.
96 According to R. Isser Judah Unterman (supra n. 59), the basis for Maimonides' view is the obligation to preserve life rather than any prohibition on foeticide.
97 Koah Shor, 20; Torat Hesed 13A. See also Enker, A., Hekhreah Vzorekh Bedinei Onshin (Ramat Gan, 1977) 221Google Scholar, n. 44 (with D. Frimer) and Warhaftig, I., “Haganah Azmit Beaverot Rezah Vehabalah” (1977) 81 Sinai 45.Google Scholar
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99 See infra, p. 126 ff.
100 See infra, nn. 126 and 127.
101 Lit. “Later scholars”. This period extends to the Emancipation of European Jewry in the eighteenth century, see Elon, at 18.
102 The Shulkhan Arukh is the authoritative code of Jewish Law. Elon, at 138.
103 Hoshen Mishpat, 425:2.
104 R. Joshua Falk, late sixteenth century, Sejer Me'irat Einayim (“Sma”), Hoshen Mishpat 425:8. See Noda Beyehudah, supra n. 93, for a criticism of the Sma's view and a defence of it by R. Landau. Also see R. Zweig, supra n. 78, at 41.
105 Cf. R. Zekhariah Mendel, middle eighteenth century, Be'er Hetev, ad. loc.
106 For a comprehensive analysis, see R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini (1823–1904) in his Sdei Hemed, Kelalim, Maarekhet Ha'alef 52, vol. 1, p. 175, Shiurei Hapeah, Maarekhet Ha'alef 19, vol. 1, p. 304, and Torat Hesed, supra n. 31.
107 (1500–1580). Responsa Maahrit nos. 97, 99.
108 Deut. 25:3.
109 On the inconsistencies in R. Trani's responsa, see Tzitz Eliezer, at 237 and R. Moses Feinstein, supra n. 81, at 461.
110 See Seridei Esh. 349.
111 Havvot Yair, supra n. 28.
112 Tos. Gitt. 41b, s.v. lo. On Onanism in general, see Tos. Sanh. 59b, s.v. veha, and Feldman, supra n. 91 at 144 ff.
113 Emden, R. Jacob, Responsa She'elat Ya'avetz, 43Google Scholar; Seridei Esh. 345; Mishpetei Ouziel, 212.
114 Seridei Esh. ibid. Also see Feldman, at 251.
115 See supra n. 113.
116 Note that in Jewish Law, a bastard is a product of an adulterous or an incestuous union, and not merely someone born out of wedlock.
117 She'elat Ya'avetz, supra n. 113.
118 Tzitz Eliezer, 236.
119 See R. Moses Feinstein, at 467.
120 E.g. R. Samuel Kaidanower (1614–1676), Responsa Emunat Shmuel, no. 14; Torat Hesed, 31; R. Solomon Kluger (1785–1869), Responsa Zelutah D'avraham, no. 60; Palaggi, R. Hayyim (1788–1869), Responsa Hayyim Veshalom, vol. 1, no. 40Google Scholar, and see Sedei Hemed, supra n. 106.
121 (1863–1940).
122 Following the opinion of R. Nissim.
123 See Seridei Esh. 350.
124 Torat Hesed, 31.
125 Supra, p. 116 ff.
126 See e.g. R. Feinstein, supra n. 81, at 469, who states quite categorically that “I have written all this in the light of the general breakdown in morality, both in the world at large and in the State of Israel…. In such times, it is necessary to make a fence around the Torah.” Cf. Havvot Yair, supra n. 28.
127 According to R. Moses Jonah Zweig, supra n. 78, at 45, in an article discussing the abortion of a thalydomide foetus, a strict attitude is necessary in order to ensure that the Divine Name is not profaned by stating a lenient position in Jewish Law, “when jurists, physicians, and the Church have come out clearly against foeticide”.
128 Supra n. 28.
129 Mishpetei Ouziel, 213.
130 R. Zweig, supra n. 78.
131 R. Unterman, supra n. 39.
132 Supra n. 7.
133 See Sanh. 74a; Maimonides, , Hilkhot Yesodei Hatorah, 5.Google Scholar Homicide is one of the three cardinal offences, which may not be committed, even on pain of death (See Minhat Hinukh 2, 296).
134 R. Unterman, supra n. 39 at 8.
135 Born 1920. Responsa Yabiah Omer, vol. 4, Even Ha'ezer, no. 1.
136 Supra n. 79.
137 Tzitz Eliezer 209.
138 Responsa Maharit, nos. 97, 99, supra n. 107: Responsa Radbaz, supra n. 6.
139 Supra n. 79.
140 The Tosafot in Nidd., supra n. 89, and R. Joseph Trani's responsum, supra n. 107.
141 R. Jacob Emden's responsum and R. Weinberg's view. R. Feinstein cites R. Waldenberg's opinion, which appeared in a halakhic medical journal (1976) 13 Assiah 8, without mentioning him by name, and dismisses it as totally without basis. In relation to R. Emden's responsum, he argues that the phrase “there is a ground for leniency in a case of great need” (infra p. 18) implies that there are more grounds upon which one may reach a strict decision than a lenient one. R. Waldenberg dismisses this contention as far-fetched (Steinberg, A. ed., Hilkhot Rof'im u'Refuah (Jerusalem, 1978) 43Google Scholar).
142 Hilkhot Rof'im u'Refuah, 30.
143 On the question of methodology, the view put forward by Erusi, supra n. 34, that responsa do not constitute Jewish Law for the purposes of a comprehensive definition of the legal position in relation to abortion on the grounds that they are too indirect, seems totally without foundation. It is clear that the responsa do constitute a major source of Jewish Law (see Elon, at 1213 ff.), and if Erusi's point is that the Jewish attitude to abortion in a non-legal context is not to be found in the responsa, then the discussion is not a legal one, but a philosophical one, and should be argued in those terms. It may also be significant that R. Feinstein expressed his views in an article and not in a responsum. This may be an indication of the fact that he was more concerned to state the general attitude of Judaism to the abortion of a Tay-Sachs foetus rather than the legal position in a particular case. See M. Drori, supra n. 31, at 225, n. 8, for criticism of Erusi.
144 E.g., R. Waldenberg's decision.
145 E.g., R. Unterman's view.
146 See supra, p. 118 for the position in the Didache and the views of Clement and Tertullian. It is noteworthy that this became the view of the Orthodox Church which, in the words of Basil of Cappadocia (329–379), rejected the “hairsplitting difference between the formed and the unformed” (Letters 188).
147 345–430. Augustine of Hippo was the most influential of the Church Fathers and his doctrines became the accepted ones of the Church of Rome. See Bonner, G., St. Augustine of Hippo (Philadelphia, 1964).Google Scholar
148 Questions on the Heptateuch, 80.
149 See supra, p. 116; Noonan, J.T. ed., The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) 17.Google Scholar Elsewhere, Augustine expressed his utter abhorrance of abortion on moral grounds (On Marriage and Concupiscience 1:12), but on legal grounds, he holds that abortion of an unformed foetus is not considered homicide.
150 335–420.
151 Epistles 121:4.
152 “He is not a murderer who brings about abortion before the soul is in the body” (Concordia Discordentiura Canonum, Decretum 2:32:2). Gratian was a Camaldolese monk of the early twelfth century and compiler of the Decretals.
153 Cimetier, P., Les Sources du Droit Ecclésiastique (Paris, 1930).Google Scholar
154 1550–1610. Professor of moral theology and master of the Canon Law, his De Sancto Matrimoni is still a classic work on the law of marriage.
155 De Sancto Matrimoni Sacramento 3:20. See Noonan, supra n. 149 at 29, and Grisez, G.G., Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments (N.Y., 1970) 117.Google Scholar Also, note the similar view of Torreblanca, Franciscus, Epitome Delictorum sive de Magia, 2:43.Google Scholar
156 Enchiridon Sybolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, ed. Denzinger, H., Schonmetzer, A., n. 2134. 157 Canon 2350:1.Google Scholar
157 Canon 2350:1.
158 Noonan, at 45. It is noteworthy that Noonan in his comprehensive essay, “An Almost Absolute Value in History”, supra n. 149 at 1, does not mention the lenient opinion of Torreblanca and his school. This is quite possibly due to the influence of the current view under which all abortion is forbidden.
159 Originally it was based on the Aristotlean distinction, 40 days for a male and 80 for a female. See Granfield, D., The Abortion Decision (N.Y., 1969) 65.Google Scholar
160 It is in this form that the distinction is found in Medieval English Law (Bracton J., De Corona, 4:121; see Winfield, P.H., “The Unborn Child” (1944) 5 Cambridge Law Journal 76Google Scholar). In Coke's day, however, abortion of a foetus after quickening was “a great misprision but not murder” (Institutes of the Law of England, 3:50). Coke's view was held by Hale, (Pleas of the Crown, 1:437)Google Scholar, Hawkins, (Pleas of the Crown, 1:121Google Scholar), and Chitty (Criminal Law, 3:800). It was not abolished until 1837 and not entirely removed from the Criminal Law of England until 1931, when the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act provided that the commuting of a pregnant woman's death sentence to life imprisonment no longer depended upon whether her foetus had quickened or not (Archbold's Procedure, 229).
161 For a comprehensive discussion of the old statutes, see Quay, E., “Justifiable Abortion—Medical and Legal Foundations” (1961) 4 Georgia Law Review 395.Google Scholar
162 See e.g. Abulafiah, R. Meir, Yad Remali Sanh., 91b and 72b.Google Scholar See generally, Feldman, at 272.
163 See supra p. 128 andd not the following statement in Havvot Yair: “There are a number of distinctions … after 40 days … after foetal movement which occurs just after the third month … However, it is not our intention to follow arbitrary or baseless opinions, but the law of the Torah.”
164 Such a discussion would require treatment of the relationship between scientific postulates and law, a subject which merits a separate article.
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