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The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2017

Ulrich K. Preuss
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Extract

This paper explores the conceptual possibility and implications of the concept of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. In the first section, the author argues that unconstitutional constitutional norms are conceptually impossible within the conventional hierarchical model of norms. In the second section, the author discusses the normative particularity of the amending power and concludes that an unlimited power may endanger the constitution. In sections III and IV, the author explains why so-called “eternity clauses,” in order to fend off such a danger, have been designed to place certain immutable elements of the constitution beyond the limits of the amending power. The paradigmatic case is the German Basic Law and a recent decision by the Federal Constitutional Court that discusses the implications of the “eternity clause” with reference to the distinction between constituent power and the constituted amending power. The author develops an alternative understanding of that distinction and its consequences for the amending power. The possible adverse effects of “eternity clauses” on the normality of the constitution are briefly considered in the final section.

Type
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , 2011 , pp. 429 - 448
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2011

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References

1 Cf. Kirchhof, Paul, Die Identität der Verfassung in ihren unabänderlichen Inhalten, in 1 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 775, 788 et seq. (Isensee, Josef & Kirchhof, Paul eds., 1987)Google Scholar.

2 On this distinction, see Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (1999)Google Scholar.

3 See infra section III.A.

4 See, e.g., Horst Dreier, in 2 Grundgesetz: Kommentar, art. 20 (Rechtsstaat), marginal note 129 (Horst Dreier ed., 1998); 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Bverfge] [Decisions of The Federal Constitutional Court] 14 (45) (1951); 17 BVerfGE 306 (314) (1964); 25 BVerfGE 216 (227) (1969).

5 As argued below, the relationship between constituent power and constituted powers is somewhat less tangible, but for the purposes of the present argument the more conventional conceptualization does no harm.

6 Schmitt, Carl, Constitutional Theory 150 (Seitzer, Jeffrey ed. & trans., 2008) (1928)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Id.

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9 Cf. Luhmann, Niklas, Law as a Social System 76 et seq., 437 et seq.Google Scholar (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004).

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12 Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Constitution of The German Reich], Aug. 11, 1919, RGBl. I at 1383; see Schatten, Weimars Lange—“Weimar” als Argument Nach 1945 (Gusy, Christoph ed., 2003)Google Scholar.

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15 U.S. Const. art. V.

16 1791 Const. tit. VII (Fr.).

17 Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).

18 1958 Const. art. 89 (Fr.).

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21 Huber, supra note 19, at 423.

22 For a detailed historical account of this part of the constitutional history of Weimar, see Huber, supra note 19, at 418 et seq.

23 Schmitt, supra note 6, at 67 (§ 2), 75 (§ 3). The German text refers to: “Die Verfassung als eine Vielheit einzelner Gesetze” vs. “Die Verfassung als Gesamtentscheidung über Art und Form der politischen Einheit.”

24 Schmitt, supra note 6, at 150 et seq.

25 Id. at 151.

26 Id at 153.

27 See, e.g., Schmitt, Carl, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Kennedy, Ellen trans., 1988) (1923)Google Scholar.

28 In the original German: “Eine Änderung dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig.”

29 Möller, Horst, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Konterrevolution oder Revolution?, 31(1) Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25, 26 (1983)Google Scholar; see also Frei, Norbert, “Machtergreifung.” Anmerkungen zu einem historischen Begriff, 31(1) Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 136 (1983)Google Scholar.

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33 BVerfG, June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, § 216.

34 Id. § 228.

35 Id. §§ 179, 218.

36 Lindahl, Hans, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 9, 19 (Loughlin, Martin & Walker, Neil eds., 2007)Google Scholar; see also Preuss, Ulrich K., Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?, in The Twilight of Constitutionalism? 23 (Dobner, Petra & Loughlin, Martin eds., 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Cf. Lindahl, supra note 36, at 32; Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of Law 154 et seq. (Knight, Max trans., 1967) (2d rev. ed. 1960)Google Scholar.

38 Compare the elaborate concept of “constitutional identity” developed by Paul Kirchhof. See Kirchhof, supra note 1.

39 Hirschman, Albert O., Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Societies, in A Propensity to Self-Subversion 231, 244 (Hirschman, Albert O. ed., 1995)Google Scholar.

40 GG, art. 79 § 3, in conjunction with arts. 1 and 20.

41 39 BVERFOE 334 (349) (1975) (with express reference to the “eternity clause” of art. 79 § 3); more recently: BVerfG, May 6, 2008, 2 BvR 337/08.

42 GG.arts. 9 § 2, 18&21 § 2.

43 Bresler, Robert J., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 29 et seq. (2004)Google Scholar.