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Illogicality and Roman Law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

Alan Watson
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It is a commonplace that Rome's greatest contribution to the modern world is its law. Whether this is strictly true or not, Roman law is certainly the basis of the law of Western Europe (with the exception of England and Scandinavia), of much of Africa including South Africa, Ethiopia and in general the former colonies of countries in continental Europe, of Quebec and Louisiana, of Japan and Ceylon and so on. Perhaps even more important for the future is that International law is very largely modelled, by analogy, on Roman law. Just think of the perfectly serious arguments of a few years ago as to whether outer space (including the moon and planets) were res nullius or res communes and whether they were, or were not, susceptible of acquisition by occupatio. This persistence of Roman law has had undesirable consequences. First, Roman law as an academic subject has got into the hands of lawyers whose love of technicalities has frightened off classical scholars who tend not to use the legal sources. Secondly, scholars of antiquity, since Roman law is left well alone, have also been reluctant to look at other ancient legal systems. So have lawyers since these other systems have no ‘practical” value. Thirdly, following upon these but worse still, the usefulness of Roman law for later ages, coupled with its enforced isolation from other systems of antiquity, has often led to an exaggerated respect for it, and to its being regarded as well-nigh perfect, immutable, fit for all people. Many in “the Age of Reason” were ready to regard Roman law as “the Law of Reason”.

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Articles
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Israel Law Review , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , January 1972 , pp. 14 - 24
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1972

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References

1 Nonetheless in number of publications non-lawyers have contributed proportionally more—and perhaps even absolutely more—to the study of Greek and Near Eastern legal systems than to Roman law. It should also, in fairness to Roman lawyers, be said that Near Eastern law is more immediately comprehensible to the non-lawyer.

2 Aulus Gellius, Nodes Atlicae 4.2.12; D. 21.1.11.

3 “Interpolations in the Digest” (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 343 at 347.

4 The Common Law (Boston, 1881) 1.

5 Familiam pecuniamque tuam endo mandatela tua custodelaque mea esse aio, eaque, quo tu iure testamentum facere possis secundum legem publicam, hoc aere aeneaque libra esto mihi empia.

6 G. 2.104.

7 If the will was reduced to writing, which it need not be.

8 G. 2.104.

9 Later he became a mere figurehead: G. 2.103.

10 Though Suetonius, , Dwus Iulius, 83Google Scholar, shows that already in the late Republic a validly made will could somehow be revoked.

11 G. 2.151.

12 G. 2.144.

13 E.g., Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht I (Munich, 1955) 578Google Scholar; Voci, P., Diritto ereditario romano, ii (Milan, 1963) 492f.Google Scholar

14 Possibly they did once, but if so there is no trace in the sources. The possibility does not affect the point being made.

15 It is likely that this procedure for revocation was accepted at an early date. Other theoretical problems connected with the familiae emptor being regarded as owner—e.g., there was no action against him if he failed to carry out the testator's instructions; and what if he died before the testator?—do not appear as practical difficulties and hence it is likely that almost from the start the testamentum per aes et libram was regarded as a true will.

16 See in general Buckland, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law, revised by Stein, P. (Cambridge, 3rd ed., 1963) 441 ff.Google Scholar

17 See now Watson, A., The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1967) 185 ff.Google Scholar

18 See, ibid., 226 ff.

19 For what follows see Watson, A., “Drunkenness in Roman Law” Sein und Werden im Recht; Festgabe für Ulrich von Lübtow (Berlin, 1970), 381 ff.Google Scholar

20 Cf. e.g., G. 3.197; D. 47.2.23. The precise nature of the animus furandi and the extent of corruption in the sources do not really concern us. But see most recently Thomas, J.A.C., “Animus furandi” (1968) 19 Iura 1Google Scholar; Watson, A., Roman Private Law Around 200 B.C. (Edinburgh, 1971) 147.Google Scholar

21 Cf. e.g., D. 23.2.2; 23.2.16.2; Corbett, P., The Roman Law of Marriage (Oxford, 1930), 53ffGoogle Scholar; Watson, A., Ferions, 41ff.Google Scholar

22 Thus, in sale it is especially clear that error which was sufficiently grave stopped the contract coming into existence: e.g., D. 18.1.9; ibid., 11; ibid., 14.

23 Thus in England, Ruse v. Read [1949] 1 K.B; 377; [1949] 1 All E.R. 398 (incapacity to form intention to steal bicycle); in Scotland, Johnston v. Brown (1823) 2. S. 437 (incapacity during 3 whole days to form intention to marry).

24 The others are, Aulus Gellius, Nodes Atticae, 4.14; D. 48.3.12pr; 24.1.4.2; ibid., 25.6 (idem); 49.16.6.7 Codex Theodosianus 3.16.1.

25 Cf. e.g., D. 9.2.5.2.; J. 1.10 pr; D. 41.2.32.2; 50.17.5.

26 Just at we are told in sale, D. 18.1.15.1: Ignorantia emptori prodest, quae non in supinum hominem cadit (Only such ignorance as does not betray negligence will avail a buyer).

27 Cf. Watson, A., The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1968) 81ff.Google Scholar

28 D. 41.2.32.2 (Paul 15 ad Sab.) Infans possidere rede potest, si tutore auctorc coepit, nam judicium infantis suppletur auctoritate tutoris: utilitatis enim causa hoc receptum est, nam alioquin nullus sensus est infantis accipiendi possessionem, pupillus tarnen etiam sine tutoris auctoritate possessionem nancisci potest, item infans peculiari nomine per servum possidere potest. On the text and for questions of interpolation see Watson, A., “Acquisition of Possession and Usucaption per servos et filios” (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 205 at 223 ff.Google Scholar

29 G. 2.80–84.

30 Cf. e.g., Buckland, W.W., Textbook, 157 ffGoogle Scholar; Kaser, M., Privatrecht i, p. 306.Google Scholar

31 That in the Republic it was held an infant could acquire possession without his tutor's authority appears from D. 41.2.1.3: cf. Watson, A., Property, 82f.Google Scholar

32 Cf. Ankum, J.A., “Utilitatis causa receptum”, Symbolae David, M. (Leiden, 1968), 1 ff.Google Scholar D. 41.2.32.2 is discussed at 10 ff.

33 The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 155.

34 The others are D. 17.2.18; ibid., 63.2.

35 Si servus meus societatem cum Titio coierit et alienatus in eadem permanserit, potest dici alienatione servi et priorem societatem finitam et ex integro alteram inchoatam, atque ideo et mihi et emptori actionem pro socio competere, item tam adversus me quam adversus emptorem ex his causis quae ante alienationem inciderunt dandum actionem, ex reliquis adversus emptorem solum.

36 See G. v. Beseler (1925) 45 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 466; Solazzi, S. (1955) 21 Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris, 306 ff.Google Scholar Interpolations suggested by these two authors do not affect us, and we need not consider them.

37 Even if the master was the socius, D. 17.2.58pr would be a totally different kind of case, and irrelevant.

38 It should perhaps be stressed again that the illogicality here is greater than in, say, sale where a slave seller could be regarded as a representative for his master, and the sale to be the master's.

39 G. 3.100.

40 G. 3.100. The literature on the text is enormous.

41 Cf. e.g., recently, Solazzi, S., “Sull' obbligazione a termine iniziale” (1950) 1 Iura 34 at 52Google Scholar, and the authors he cites; contra, e.g., Oven, J. Van, “Gaius 3. 158: mandatum post mortem mandantis” (1956) 48 Eos 528Google Scholar, Paola, S. Di, Contributi ad una teoria della invalidità e della inefficacia in diritto romano (Milan, 1966) p. 21 n. 46.Google Scholar

42 No need here to explain why.

43 Cf. G. 3.110–114.

44 G. 3.117.

45 G. 3.117.

46 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis iv (1821), 240; see more recently, Arangio-Ruiz, V., Il mandato in diritto romano (Naples, 1949), 148Google Scholar; Watson, A., Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford, 1961) 136.Google Scholar

47 On postliminium in general see Amirante, L., Captivitas e postliminium (Naples, 1950).Google Scholar

48 Cf. e.g., D. 49.15.12pr; ibid., 17; 49.16.5.6.

49 Cf. e.g., D. 24.2.1; 49.15.12.4; ibid., 14.1.

50 C. 8.50(51).1; D. 49.15.25.

51 D. 23.2.45.6. For these exceptions see above all Watson, A. “Captivitas and matrimonium” (1961) 29 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52 G. 3.187; D. 27.3.7.1; 27.3.8; 46.6.4.5; 26.4.3; 26.1.15; cf. Amirante, L., Captivitas, 60 ff.Google Scholar

53 G. 1.129; Gai Epitome 1.6.2; Pauli Sententiae 2.25.1; D. 14.6.1.1; 37.9.1.8; 38.6.15; 49.15.12.1; 49.15.22.2; cf. Amirante, L., Captivitas, 51 ff.Google Scholar

54 Of course, in each branch of family law particular problems could arise no matter what rule was adopted.

55 Ut qui servum servamve alienum alienamve quadrupedemve pecudem iniuria occident, quanti id in eo anno plurimi fuit, tantum oes dare domino damnas esto. D. 9.2.2pr (Gaius 7 ad ed. prov.).

56 Apparently formulated (D. 9.2.7.6.) by Celsus (Consul for the second time in 129 A. D.); but it existed at least since Labeo, in the very early Principate (sec D. 9.2.9pr).

57 D. 9.2.7.6.

58 D. 9.2.9pr.

59 D. 9.2.9.2.

60 G. 3.219.

61 D. 9.2.52.2.

62 Collatio 1.3; 1.3; cf. D. 48.8. 1pr.