The development of criteria for determining a just sentence in criminal cases has been the subject of considerable thought and discussion in recent years. To be regarded just, a sentence must meet criteria of proportionality, humane decency and equality. It may not be excessively severe in proportion to the moral wrong committed by the defendant. It may not be so harsh and cruel as to demean him and deny his humanity. The punishment imposed may not be significantly more onerous than that inflicted on other defendants in similar circumstances.

In this brief paper, I would like to suggest an additional factor by which punishment should be judged. I will call this factor the aptness of the penalty. By this I mean the degree to which the penalty itself — note, I say the penalty, not the act of inflicting punishment — expresses moral criticism of the crime for which it is being imposed. Aptness connotes an observable connection between the crime and the offence such that one feels almost instinctively that the particular penalty imposed is the moral consequence of the particular offence committed.