¹ Ambos, Kai, May a State Torture Suspects to Save the Life of Innocents?, 8 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 261 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This is an extended version of my lecture at the (first) joint symposium on Human Dignity of the Faculties of Law of The Hebrew and Göttingen Universities in Jerusalem on Sept. 2-3, 2007.

² See, e.g., § 136a(1) Strafprozessordnung [German Criminal Procedure Code] [hereinafter StPO]:

The suspect's freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall not be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference, administration of drugs, torment, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be used only as far as this is permitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening the suspect with measures not permitted under its provisions or holding out the prospect of an advantage not envisaged by statute shall be prohibited.

Paragraph (3) states: “The prohibition under subsections (1) and (2) shall apply irrespective of the suspect's consent. Statements which were obtained in breach of this prohibition shall not be used, even if the suspect agrees to their use.” [Translation based on “IUSCOMP, The Comparative Law Society,” available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm#136a (last visited Feb. 19, 2008)]. See also Strafprozessordnung [Austrian Criminal Procedure Code], Bundesgesetzblatt I No. 102/2006, § 166: “To the disadvantage of an accused … it is not allowed to use his testimony, as well as those of witnesses and co-defendants as evidence, as far as they: 1. are made under torture (Art. 7 ICCPR, […], art. 3 ECHR, […], and art. 1(1) as well as 15 UNCAT …) …” (Translated K.A.). See also Kodeks Postępowania Karnego [Polish Criminal Procedure Code], June 6, 1997, art. 171 § 5 according to which it is inadmissible “to influence the statement of the examined person through coercion or unlawful threat” and art. 170 § 1(1) id. according to which an evidentiary motion regarding such evidence shall be denied. In French procedure any investigative act can be appealed before the Chambre d'Instruction which may declare it void and exclude the obtained evidence (“requête en nullité,” art. 170-174 Code de Procédure Pénale) cf. Stefani, Gaston & Levasseur, Georges & Bouloc, Bernard, Procédure pénale [marginal number] (m. no.) 107, 777 (20th ed. 2006)Google Scholar; Fabian Pfefferkorn, Einfuhrung in das französische Strafverfahren 176, 178 (2006)Google Scholar. On the UK Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 see infra III(B)(2).

³ Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; see infra III(A) for a detailed analysis; see also Thienel, Tobias, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law, 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 349, 356 ff (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Beling, Ernst, Die Beweisverbote als Grenzen der Wahrheitsfindung im Strafprozess (1903)Google Scholar [inaugural address at the University of Tübingen]; for earlier literature see Bennecke, Hans & Beling, Ernst, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Reichs-Strafprozessrechts, Breslau (1900), §§ 83 3., at 327 ffGoogle Scholar. See also Senge, Lothar, preliminary observations before § 48 m. no. 20, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (6th ed. 2008)Google Scholar; Jahn, Matthias, Beweiserhebungs- und Beweisverwertungsverbote im Spannungsfeld zwischen den Garantien des Rechtsstaats und der effektiven Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, in 1 Verhandlungen zum 67. Deutschen Juristentag (DJT) Erfurt Part C, C 1–128, C 21 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁵ See also Henkel, Heinrich, Strafverfahrensrecht 271 (1968)Google Scholar; Otto, Harro, Grenzen und Tragweite der Beweisverbote im Strafverfahren, 117 Goltdammer's Archiv für Strafrecht (GA) 289 (1970)Google Scholar.

⁶ See Otto, supra note 5, at 291 referring to, Beling, supra note 4.

⁷ See also Beling, supra note 4, at 37:

Allseitig einverstanden wird man darüber sein, dass auch der Strafprozess die Menschenw ürde achten muss, und dass daher ein unlöslicher Konflikt zwischen Menschenwürde und Strafprozessinteresse zu einem Beweisverbot führen muss. … Aber auch von der Menschenwürde abgesehen wird die moderne Anschauung—und sicher mit Recht—darauf bestehen, dass jedem seine Persönlichkeitssphäre vor Staatszugriff sichergestellt werde, auch im Strafprozess. [Everyone would agree that the criminal trial also must respect human dignity and that an unsolvable conflict between human dignity and the interests of criminal procedure must lead to a prohibition of evidence. … However, even without the idea of human dignity, the modern view demands—surely rightly—that everyone's personal sphere must be protected from intervention of the state, also in a criminal trial.]

See also Rogall, Klaus, Gegenwärtiger Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Lehre von den strafprozessualen Beweisverboten, 91 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 1, 9 (1979)Google Scholar; Eisenberg, Ulrich, Beweisrecht der Strafprozessordnung, Part 1, Cap. 3, par. 330 (6th ed. 2008)Google Scholar; Kühne, Hans-Heiner, Strafprozessrecht, m. no. 880 (7th ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

⁸ Rogall, supra note 7, at 6.

⁹ Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) [German Federal Court of Justice] Judgment, June 14, 1960, reprinted in 14 BGHSt [Official collection of Judgments] 358, 365 reprinted in 13 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1580, 1582 (1960)Google Scholar:

Allerdings hat diese Rechtsauffassung zur Folge, daß wichtige, unter Umständen die einzigen Mittel zur Aufklärung von Straftaten unbenutzt bleiben. Das muß jedoch hingenomen werden. Es ist auch sonst kein Grundsatz der StPO, daß die Wahrheit um jeden Preis erforscht werden müßte (§§ 245, 52 ff, 252, 81 a ff, 95 ff, 69 Abs. 3 StPO).

See also BGH, Judgment, Mar. 17, 1983, reprinted in BGHSt 31, 304, 309, reprinted in 36 NJW 1570, 1571 (1983): die StPO zwingt nicht zur Wahrheitserforschung urn jeden Preis.“

¹⁰ See Kelker, Brigitte, Die Rolle der Staatsanwaltschaft im Strafverfahren, 118 ZStW 389, at 420 ff (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a principled perspective see Murmann, Uwe, Über den Zweck des Strafprozesses, 151 GA 65, 65 ff (2004)Google Scholar; see especially on the subject-object relation, Roberts, Paul, Subjects, Objects, and Values in Criminal Adjudication, in 2 The trial on Trial: Judgment and Calling to Account 37, 40 ff (Duff, A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., & Tadros, V. eds., 2006)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Schmidt, Eberhard, Zur Frage der Eunarkon-Versuche in der gerichtlichen Praxis, Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung (SJZ), 449, 450 (1949)Google Scholar.

¹² Löwe-Rosenberg, (LR)-Gleß, in 2 Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Commentary] § 136a m. no. 79 (Erb, Volker et al. eds., 26th ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

¹³ See especially Rogall, supra note 7, at 16 ff.

¹⁴ It is controversial, though, whether exculpatory information should not be always admitted into evidence since it operates in favor of the accused (in this sense, Roxin, Claus et al. , Die Mühlenteichtheorie, Überlegungen zur Ambivalenz von Verwertungsverboten, 26 Strafverteidiger (StV) 655-56, 659–60 (2006)Google Scholar; Roxin, Claus, Beweisverwertungsverbot bei bewußer Mißachtung des Richtervorbehalts (Bspr. von BGH StV 2007, 337), 27 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 616, 618 (2007)Google Scholar; conc. Jahn, supra note 4, at C 112 ff (114).

¹⁵ On this “vindication” or “remedial” theory see Roberts, Paul & Zuckermann, Adrian, Criminal Evidence 151, 152 ff (2004)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See also IISchmidt, Eberhardt, Lehrkommentar Strafprozessordnung etc. 9 136a m. no. 21Google Scholar for his doctrine of the moral superiority of the state, on the basis of which the demand for a fair trial is developed (id. vol. I, m. no. 40, 44, 49). Gerhard Fezer's doctrine of the state's self-limiting function points in this direction as well see Grundfragen der Beweisverwertungsverbote 20 ff (1995)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Beulke, Werner, Strafprozessrecht, m. no. 454 (10th ed. 2008)Google Scholar; Finger, Thorsten, Prozessuale Beweisverbote—Eine Darstellung ausgewählter Fallgruppen, 38 Juristische Arbeitsblätter (JA) 529, 530 (2006)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); see Dressler, Joshua, Understanding criminal procedure 381 (3rd ed. 2002)Google Scholar (pointing, however, also to the subsequent case law coming close to renouncing the whole Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).

¹⁹ Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 15, at 157 ff.

²⁰ The “disciplinary” or “deterrence” effect is controversial: in favor the U.S. Supreme Court since Mapp v. Ohio, see Dressler, supra note 18, at 381-82; for a critical view see Otto, supra note 5, at 292, 301 (arguing that exclusionary rules are “kein geeignetes Mittel zur Disziplinierung der Strafverfolgungsorgane” [“not a suitable method for disciplining prosecutorial agents”]); see also Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 15, at 155 ff; in this critical vein also decision 2(d). Section of Criminal Law, 67 DJT (2008), supra note 4, according to which the function of the prohibitions or exclusions of evidence should not be the upholding of the lawful conduct of prosecutorial agencies (42 votes in favor, 31 against, 5 abstentions). See Arloth, Frank, Dogmatik in der Sackgasse—Zur Diskussion um die Beweisverwertungsverbote, 153 GA 258, at 259 (2006)Google Scholar (discussing the practical consequences for police training); in this more positive vein, see also Prittwitz, Cornelius, Richtervorbehalt, Beweisverwertungsverbot und Widerspruchslösung bei Blutentnahmen gem. § 81 a Abs. 2 StPo, 28 StV 486, 494 (2008)Google Scholar; Jahn, supra note 4, at C 57 ff.

²¹ See Amelung, Knut, Zurn Streit über die Grundlagen der Lehre von den Beweisverwertungsve rboten, in Festschrift für Claus Roxin 1259, 1279 (2001)Google Scholar; Jäger, Markus, Beweisverwertung und Beweisverwertungsverbote im Strafprozess 128 (2003)Google Scholar.

²² Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] (BVerfG) Entscheidungen [Decisions] vol. 44, at 353, 374.

²³ Roberts & Zuckerman supra note 15, at 159.

²⁴ Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by SC May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].

²⁵ Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].

²⁶ Nemitz, Jan Christoph, Die Hauptverhandlung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Beweisrechts, in Internationale Strafgerichtshöfe 53, 53 (Kirsch, Stefan ed., 2005)Google Scholar.

²⁷ May, Richard & Wierda, Marieke, International Criminal Evidence 93 (2002)Google Scholar; Ambos, Kai, The Structure of International Criminal Procedure: Adversarial, Inquisitorial or Mixed?, in International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedure 429, 477 ff (Bohlander, Michael ed., 2007)Google Scholar; Internationales Strafrecht § 8 m. no. 32 (2d ed. 2008)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Kahn, Karim & Dixon, Rodney, Archbold, International Criminal Courts, Practice Procedure and Evidence § 9-1 (2d ed. 2005)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Cf. May & Wierda, supra note 27, at 95, 98 ff; Kahn & Dixon, supra note 28.

³⁰ ICTY Statute, supra note 24, art. 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 25, art. 14.

³¹ Nemitz, supra note 26, at 56.

³² International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rule 89 U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 42, Feb. 11, 1994, (amended Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/ITO32_Rev42_en.pdf [hereinafter RPE-ICTY] and UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995) [hereinafter RPE-ICTR].

³³ RPE-ICTY, supra note 32, Rule 89 (D).

³⁴ See May & Wierda, supra note 27, at 100; see also Schabas, William, The UN International Criminal Tribunals—The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 459 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ Compare Safferling, Christoph J. M., Towards an International Criminal Procedure 295 (2003)Google Scholar with Nemitz, supra note 26, at 70 according to which Rule 95 has only klarstellende Bedeutung [a clarifying function].

³⁶ Cf. Nemitz, supra note 26, at 70.

³⁷ The original title read is “Evidence obtained by means contrary to international protected human rights”; modified by revision 12 of the RPE. Quoted according to Calvo-Goller, Karin N., The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court—ICTY and ICTR Precedents 97 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Zappalà, Salvatore, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings 151, (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (The original title read is “Evidence obtained by means contrary to international protected human rights”; modified by revision 12 of the RPE).

³⁸ See supra note 2.

³⁹ Calvo-Goller, supra note 37, at 97.

⁴⁰ See particularly Ignor, Alexander, Geschichte des Strafprozesses in Deutschland 1532-1846, 163 ff (2002)Google Scholar (pointing out that torture was not only considered as inhumane but also increasingly as inefficient as to the prosecution and punishment of the true criminals).

⁴¹ Langbein, John H., Torture and the Law of Proof, Europe and England in the Ancien Régime 8 (2006)Google Scholar; Kühne, Hans-Heiner, Strafprozessrecht m. no. 890 (7th ed. 2007)Google Scholar; Pattenden, Rosemary, Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings of Third Party and Real Evidence Obtained by Methods Prohibited by UNCAT, 10 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 6 ff (2006)Google Scholar.

⁴² Langbein, supra note 41, at 5.

⁴³ See infra note 46.

⁴⁴ Burgers, J. Herman & Danelius, Hans, The United Nation Convention Against Torture—Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment 148 (1988)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T. Decision on the Defence Objection to Intercept Evidence (Mar. 1, 2004), para. 61 ff.

⁴⁶ Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, paras. 144, 153 ff (Dec. 10, 1998).

⁴⁷ Id. para. 154; see also Ambos, supra note 1, at 265 ff.

⁴⁸ See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, (Oct. 9, 2002), para. 114; also quoted in Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest, (June 5, 2003), para. 28 [hereinafter Nikolić Appeal Decision].

⁴⁹ Nikolić Appeal Decision, supra note 48, para. 30.

⁵⁰ Safferling, supra note 35, at. 292.

⁵¹ The new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2004 grants such a right, see sec. 164(2).

⁵² Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucić's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence para. 52 (Sept. 2, 1997).

⁵³ Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Nov. 3, 1999).

⁵⁴ Id. para. 73.

⁵⁵ Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, para. 71 (Mar. 31, 2000), referring to new facts that “diminish the role played by the failings of the prosecutor as well as the intensity of the violation of the rights of the appellant.”

⁵⁶ See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 45, para. 63 (no. 9); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić et al., Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Oral Decision of Judge May (Feb. 2. 2000), Transcript 13671: “It's not the duty of this Tribunal to discipline armies or anything of that sort” (referred to in Brđanin id.).

⁵⁷ See Sluiter, Göran, International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 935, 941 see especially n.25 (2002–2003)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 47, para. 154.

⁵⁹ Such a balancing can also be identified in Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 45, paras. 63 (no.7), 63 (no. 8) where the Chamber states (referring to Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution Exhibits 104-108, paras. 18-20 (Feb. 9, 1998)) that its task would be endangered if evidence could not be admitted because of “a minor breach of procedural rules” given the gravity of the charges brought before it in general and in casu against the accused. Thus, “it would be utterly inappropriate to exclude relevant evidence due to procedural considerations, as long as the fairness of the trial is guaranteed.”

⁶⁰ See also Sluiter, supra note 57, at 946-47 (emphasizing the nature of the violation).

⁶¹ On the bases of the national silver platter doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court also originally permitted the use of evidence in federal courts that had been obtained illegally by state officials. However, it later denounced this approach in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437 U.S. (1960); see also Worrall, John L., Criminal Procedure 55 (Repetto, David ed., 2d ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

⁶² United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976).

⁶³ United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893, 895 (S.D. Tex. 1987): “If the conduct of foreign officers ‘shocks the conscience of American courts,’ the fruits of their mischief will be excluded” (further references omitted K.A.). See also Scharf, Michael P., Tainted Provenance: When, if ever, Should Torture Evidence be Admissible?, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 129, 151 ff (2008)Google Scholar (extending this argument to the use of torture evidence by the Tribunals if it is obtained by third parties).

⁶⁴ ICTY Statute, supra note 24, art. 20(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 25, art. 19(1).

⁶⁵ Cf.: Sluiter, supra note 57, at 942 ff (arguing that “every human rights violation” must be taken into account).

⁶⁶ Zappallà, supra note 37 (referring to the ICTY Second Annual Report, para. 26 with n.9 read together with the title) (“To broaden the rights of suspects and accused persons”), available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1995/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).

⁶⁷ Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 45, para. 67.

⁶⁸ Cf.: RPE-ICTY, supra note 32, Rule 62bis, which provides: “If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that: (i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily; …” (emphasis added K.A.).

⁶⁹ Clearly, the analogy to the guilty plea rests on the premise that it is a confession and as such a piece of evidence (Cf.: Hooper, Anthony & Ormerod, David, Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009Google Scholar F17.2 (s. 2645) (2008): “A plea of guilty is a confession for the purposes of PACE 1984, s.82(1), and as such admissible in evidence provided that the provisions of s. 76(2) are complied with”). Strictly speaking, however, it is only a forensic act and its admission into evidence may vary according to the circumstances of the case (Cf.: R v. Rimmer [1972] 1 WLR 268 CA, invoked by Blackstone as cited above, but stressing the importance of the “facts of the case” and judicial discretion and stating that a plea will only “rarely” be admitted into evidence [272]; see also R v. Adams (Ishmael) [2008] 1 Cr App R 35, [2007] EWCA Crim. 3025: “Whether a suggestion of a plea at a case management hearing is or is not a provable admission or is or is not a safe basis for identifying what the issue is will vary from case to case.”).

⁷⁰ See ICTY Statute, supra note 24, arts. 2 (b), 5 (f) and see also ICTR Statute, supra note 25, arts. 4 (a) & 3 (f).

⁷¹ See also Pattenden, supra note 41, at 15.

⁷² Scharf, supra note 63, at 155.

⁷³ The International Criminal Court, created by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 69(4), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute] focuses on the “probative value” of the evidence and possible “prejudice” to a fair trial. See also Piragoff, Donald K., Commentary on ICC Statute, Article 30, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 69, m. no. 54 (Triffterer, Otto ed., 1999)Google Scholar. The RPE-ICC (PCNICC/2000/1/Add 1, Nov. 2, 2000) does not contain more concrete rules, see Rules 63 ff

⁷⁴ For the same result Calvo-Goller, supra note 37, at 286 (“The difficulty does not lie in cases of evidence obtained by means of grave breaches of an internationally recognized human right, such as torture for example, but by means of less severe measures.”)

⁷⁵ See also Piragoff, supra note 73, art. 69 m. no. 75 (“no distinction between evidence proffered by the Prosecutor or the accused, or requested by the Court”). The point is controversial though as for torture evidence used against the torturer; see the discussion of Scharf's position infra notes 101 ff.

⁷⁶ ICC Statute, supra note 73, art. 67(8): “When deciding on the relevance or admissibility of the evidence collected by a State, the Court shall not rule on the application of State's national law.”

⁷⁷ Id. art. 21(3).

⁷⁸ Piragoff, supra note 73, art. 69 m. no. 80; see also Pattenden, supra note 41, at 15.

⁷⁹ See ICC Statute, supra note 73, art. 65(1)(b).

⁸⁰ Fabricio Guariglia, Rules of procedure and Evidence—An Overview, in Commentary on the Rome Statute, supra note 73, at art. 65, m. no. 9.

⁸¹ Sluiter, supra note 57, at 935.

⁸² A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2005] 3 WLR 1249, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand-1.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter A and others, HL].

⁸³ Sections 21-32 of this Act has been repealed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which was subsequently amended by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, available at www.statutelaw.gov.uk. (See also Walker, Clive, Keeping Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1395 (2007)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 10 (Lord Bingham).

⁸⁵ Oberlandesgericht (OLG) [German Higher Regional Court] OLG Hamburg, Decision, June 14, 2005, reprinted in 58 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (NJW) 2326, 2326 (2005)Google Scholar [hereinafter OLG Hamburg, El Motassadeq].

⁸⁶ Agreement with another to commit a crime or instigate it.

⁸⁷ It is not clear where exactly the witnesses were held. The Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2327Google Scholar states that they were “mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zumindest im Zugriffsbereich der Administration der USA …” [“most probably within the domain of the US-administration”].

⁸⁸ See the discussion on the burden of proof, infra IV.

⁸⁹ Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2326Google Scholar refers in the second guiding principle “Leitsatz” to Article 15 CAT and applies this provision to torture testimonies obtained by foreign authorities:

Verbot der gerichtlichen Verwertung von durch Folter herbeigeführten Aussagen, das … auch bei im Ausland durch Organe anderer Staaten mittels Einsatzes von Folter herbeigeführten Aussagen eingreift. [Furthermore, in its third guiding principle, the OLG held that § 136a StPO is also applicable, by analogy, if such prohibited methods of interrogation are practised by foreign authorities and constitute a blatant violation of human dignity] auf die Anwendung unzulässiger Vernehmungsmethoden durch Angehörige anderer Staaten entsprechend anwendbar, sofern die Erkenntnisse, um deren Verwertung es geht, unter besonderes krassem Verstoß gegen die Menschenwürde zu Stande gekommen sind.

⁹⁰ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].

⁹¹ See Burgers & Danelius, supra note 44, at 148.

⁹² A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 39 (Lord Bingham).

⁹³ The provision does not extend to administrative proceedings carried out by the executive branch, for a discussion see Thienel, Tobias, Foreign Acts of Torture and the Admissibility of Evidence, 4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 401, 406 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁴ A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 39 (Lord Bingham). Lord Bingham refers to United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974) but with a different emphasis: “Drawing again from the field of civil procedure, we think a federal court's criminal process is abused or degraded where it is executed against a defendant who has been brought into the territory of the United States by the methods alleged here [torture].”

⁹⁵ The people (Attorney General) v. O'Brien (1965) IR 142, 150; reprinted in A and others, HL, supra note 82, paras. 17, 39 (Lord Bingham).

⁹⁶ I.e., evidence obtained by torturing the defendant or other persons who may incriminate the defendant, see Thienel, supra note 3, at 358-59; Pattenden, supra note 41, at 7; on the application to derivative evidence, i.e., evidence found as a result of a statement made under torture, id., at 8-10.

⁹⁷ For the same result see Bruha, Thomas, Folter und Völkerrecht, in Das Parlament, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2006)Google Scholar, available at www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2006/36/Beilage (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Thienel, supra note 3, at 360-61; Pattenden, supra note 41, at 10; see also OLG Hamburg, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, second guiding principle as quoted in supra note 89.

⁹⁸ Nowak, Manfred & McArthur, Elizabeth, The United Nations Convention against Torture art. 15 m. no. 2, 75 ff 88 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Esser, Robert, EGMR in Sachen Gäfgen v. Deutschland (22978/05), Urt. v. 30.6.2008, 28 NStZ 657, 658–59 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., CAT, supra note 3, art. 2(1), 12 and 13; see also A and others v. Secretary of State for the home Department (No 2) [2004] EWCA Civ 1123, [2005] 1 WLR 414, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008), para. 448 [hereinafter A and others, EWCA].

¹⁰⁰ See CAT, supra note 3, art. 15, “except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”

¹⁰¹ Scharf, supra note 63, at 159 ff.

¹⁰² See http://www.eccc.gov.kh (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see generally Kashyap, Subhash, The Framework of Prosecutions in Cambodia, in New Approaches in International Criminal Justice 189 ff (Ambos, Kai & Othman, Mohamed eds., 2003)Google Scholar (providing a general account of the legal framework).

¹⁰³ Scharf, supra note 63, at 170-71.

¹⁰⁴ See Ambos, Kai & Said, Pirmurat, Das Todesurteil gegen Saddam Hussein, 62 Juristen Zeitung (JZ) 822–28 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ See UK A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 27 (Lord Bingham) with further references; for Germany see) Grundgesetz [German Basic Law], art. 59(2); see also Doehring, Karl, Völkerrecht, m. no. 708 ff (2d ed. 2004)Google Scholar; Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst'S modern introduction to international law 65 ff (7th ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [German Civil Code] see BGBl 1990 II p. 246.

¹⁰⁷ See Doehring, supra note 105, m. no. 731, 735; Herdegen, Matthias, Völkerrecht § 22 m. no. 5 (6th ed. 2007)Google Scholar; Kunig, Philip, in Völkerrecht 99 (Vitzthum, Graf Wolfgang ed., 3rd ed. 2004)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ See also Thienel, supra note 3, at 351 ff.

¹⁰⁹ A and others, EWCA, supra note 99, para. 435.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 90, art. 6; see also Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2328Google Scholar; Thienel, supra note 3, at 352.

¹¹¹ See also Thienel, supra note 3, at 352.

¹¹² BVerfG, decision May 31, 1994 reprinted in 47 NJW 2883 (1994).

¹¹³ For a discussion see Thienel, supra note 3, at 353.

¹¹⁴ Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2326Google Scholar: “innerstaatlich unmittelbar geltendes und im Strafverfahren zu beachtendes Verbot der gerichtlichen Verwertung.…”

¹¹⁵ Id. A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 27 (Lord Bingham):

The appellants rely on the well established principle that the words of a United Kingdom statute, passed after the date of a treaty and dealing with the same subject matter, are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the treaty obligation and not to be inconsistent with it.

(quoting Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1983] 2 AC 751, 771).

¹¹⁶ In favor of such a rule however see Esser, supra note 98, at 658-59.

¹¹⁷ Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A), para. 46 (App. No. 10862/84) (given July 12, 1988); Miailhe v. France, (No. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) at 256-C, para. 43 (App. No. 18978/91) (Sept. 26, 1996).

¹¹⁸ Schenk v. Switzerland, supra note 117, para. 46.

¹¹⁹ Id. para. 48.

¹²⁰ Id. para. 47; Khan v. United Kingdom, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 38 (App. No. 35394/97) (May 12, 2000).

¹²¹ Khan v. United Kingdom, supra note 120, para. 34; see also P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R., para.76 ff (App. No. 44787/98) (Sept. 25, 2001) (stressing that the tainted evidence was “not the only evidence against the applicants” (Id. para. 79)).

¹²² Khan v. United Kingdom, supra note 120, paras. 38 ff; P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, para. 79 ff. See also Meyer-Ladewig, Jens, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Handkommentar, art. 6 m. no. 55b (2d ed. 2006)Google Scholar.

¹²³ In the case Jalloh v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. No. 54810/00) (July 11. 2006 the police forcibly administered emetics to the applicant, who was suspected of drug dealing, in order to obtain drugs hidden in the applicant's body to use as evidence against him).

¹²⁴ Id. para. 99.

¹²⁵ Id. para 107.

¹²⁶ Id. para 105.

¹²⁷ Khan v. United Kingdom, supra note 120, para. 34.

¹²⁸ For a flexible approach Pattenden, supra note 41, at 11, 36 ff (arguing that the exclusion depends on the importance of the evidence for the accused; if it is critical for his defence the exclusion would be unfair); see also infra note 160, and accompanying text.

¹²⁹ Harutyunyan v. Armenia, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 63 (App. No. 36549/03) (June 28, 2007).

¹³⁰ Id. at para 66.

¹³¹ Id. para. 67.

¹³² See also Thienel, supra note 3, at 356-57, 362; Thienel, supra note 93, at 404 (without further arguments).

¹³³ Meyer-Ladewig, supra note 122, art. 6 m. no. 52. See also with a view to the international criminal tribunals, Ambos, Kai, The Right of Non Self-incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, 15 Leiden J. Int. L. 155, 156 ff (2002)Google Scholar.

¹³⁴ Saunders v. United Kingdom, 1996-VI, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 68 ff (App. No. 19187/91) (Dec, 17, 1996).

¹³⁵ Id. at para 68 ff.

¹³⁶ Gäfgen v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H. R., para. 99, 105 ff (App. No. 22978/05) (June 30, 2008).

¹³⁷ Id. para. 99.

¹³⁸ Id. para. 105.

¹³⁹ Conc. Pattenden, supra note 41, at 34 ff for a general exclusionary rule under ECHR, supra note 90, art. 6; see also Gaede, Karsten, Fairness als Teilhabe—Das Recht auf konkrete und wirksame Teilhabe durch Verteidigung Gemäss Art. 6 EMRK 322 (2007)Google Scholar; Thienel, supra note 3, at 404; Lubig, Sebastian/Sprenger, Johanna, Beweisverwertungsverbote aus dem Fairnessgebot des Art. 6 EMRK in der Rechtsprechung des EGMR, 3 Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 433, 439 (2008)Google Scholar, available at http://www.zis-online.com (who, however, only argue in favor of an exclusionary rule in case of a violation of rights of participation); Talmon, Stefan, Der Anti-Terror-Kampf der USA und die Grundrechte, in Kämmerer, Axel (ed.), An den Grenzen des Staates, 75–100, 75, 94 ff (2008)Google Scholar (stressing the “Anspruch auf materielle Beweisteilhabe,” at 98); Esser, supra note 98, at 661-62.

¹⁴⁰ See also Thienel, supra note 3, at 362.

^14l A and Others, HL, supra note 82, para. 26 (Lord Bingham). See also Pattenden, supra note 41. at 13 (emphasizing correctly the seriousness of the violation).

¹⁴² A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 29 (Lord Bingham).

¹⁴³ May, Richard & Powles, Steven, Criminal Evidence 369 (5th ed. 2004)Google Scholar; The Human Rights Act 1998, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980042_en_1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).

¹⁴⁴ Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

¹⁴⁵ Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 97 (App. No. 25803/94) (July 28, 1999).

¹⁴⁶ BVerfG, Decision, Oct. 19, 1983, reprinted in 37 NJW 428, 428 (1984); BGH, Judgment, Feb. 16, 1954 reprinted in BGHSt 5, 332, 333, 7 NJW 649, 649 (1954).

¹⁴⁷ BGH, Judgment, Feb. 16, 1954, supra note 146, at 333 (NJW 649): “Der Beschuldigte ist Beteiligter, nicht Gegenstand des Strafverfahrens” (arguing against the use of a lie detector).

¹⁴⁸ StPO, supra note 2, § 69(3)(§136a StPO is also applicable for witnesses).

¹⁴⁹ BGH, Judgment, Dec. 6, 1961 reprinted in BGHSt 17, 14, 19, 15 NJW 598, 598 (1962); Meyer-Gossner, Lutz, Kurzkommentar zur Strafprozessordnung § 136 a, m. no. 2 (50th ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁰ Meyer-Gossner, supra note 149, § 136 a m. no. 3.

¹⁵¹ Id. § 136a m. no. 3; Jahn, supra note 4, at C 102, 103; see also OLG Celle, Judgment, 19. Sept. 1984 reprinted in 38 NJW 640, 641 (1985) (referring to the analogous application of the nemo tenetur principle towards private parties).

¹⁵² OLG Hamburg, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, third guiding principle as quoted in supra note 89, at 2329; in this sense see also Meyer-Gossner, supra note 149, § 136 a m. no. 3; Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, supra note 12; leaving the question open recently BGH, NStZ 2008, 643. In favor of an exclusionary rule in the case of private information obtained by illegal means or even by a violation of the human dignity; cf. decisions no. 12 c) cc) and dd) of the section “Criminal Law” of the 67 DJT (2008), supra note 4.

¹⁵³ As concluded supra II(A)(1).

¹⁵⁴ In the same vein Lord Bingham noted in, A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 34: “There is reason to regard it a duty of state, … to reject the fruits of torture inflicted in breach of international law” (referring to various international sources); see also Thienel, supra note 3. at 363 ff; cf. Pattenden, supra note 41, at 15 ff; Scharf, supra note 63, at 23.

¹⁵⁵ Meyer-Ladewig, supra note 122, art. 3 m. no. 3.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. CAT, supra note 3, art. 2(1) “under its jurisdiction”; ECHR, arts. 3 with art. 1 “within their jurisdiction”; crit. Thienel, supra note 3, at 361; for a possible extra-territorial application of the ECHR in the rendition cases see infra III(C).

¹⁵⁷ For the majority of the German doctrine this deterrent effect is only a side effect, see Volk, Klaus, Grundkurs StPO, § 28 m. no. 7 (5th ed. 2006)Google Scholar; crit. from a common law perspective Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 15, at 155 ff; for May & Powles, supra note 143, at 298 (it is not the function of the courts to discipline the police); Q.C., Michael Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, at 362 (5th ed. 2005)Google Scholar (referring to the criticism of the Philips Royal Commission).

¹⁵⁸ See Volk, supra note 157, § 28 m. no. 35.

¹⁵⁹ See the discussion supra II(A)(1).

¹⁶⁰ See the discussion supra II(A)(2).

¹⁶¹ This is the majority view see Boujong, Karlheinz, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 136a m. no. 37 (5th ed. 2003)Google Scholar; Hanack, Ernst-Walter, in Löwe-Rosenberg, supra note 12, § 136a m. no. 63 (Rieß, Peter ed., 25th ed. 2004)Google Scholar (note in the new edition the author and the position changed); Meyer-Gossner, supra note 149, § 136 a m, no. 27; Volk, supra note 157, § 28 m. no. 24; for an exception see Dencker, Friedrich, Verwertungsverbot im Strafprozess 73 ff (1977)Google Scholar; see also BGH, Judgment, May 7, 1953, reprinted in BGHSt 5, 290, 290-291 according to which the prohibition of § 136a does not depend on the result obtained (distinguishing in casu between a correct and false confession). See, supra note 128, and accompanying text for a discussion on the international aspects.

¹⁶² See May & Powles, supra note 142, at 285-86; Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 148 ff: Zander, supra note 157, at 360.

¹⁶³ Quoted according to May & Powles, supra note 143, at 286.

¹⁶⁴ On the importance of relevance as the first question of admissibility Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 15, at 96, 98 ff, 150-51.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. May & Powles, supra note 143, at 286 ff.

¹⁶⁶ On its importance see Zander, supra note 157, at 360 ff (366); Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 147.

¹⁶⁷ In this context scholars speak of a “constitutionalization” of the law of criminal evidence, see Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 175; see also May & Powles, supra note 143, at 304-06.

¹⁶⁸ Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 162: “sensible relationship of proportionality between the seriousness of a rule violation and the implications for justice and public safety of excluding evidence …”

¹⁶⁹ See also sec. 11(5) of Code C to PACE (Code of Practice for the Detention. Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers) which prohibits “the use of oppression” in order “to obtain answers or elicit a statement.”

¹⁷⁰ See also A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 15 (where Lord Bingham states that the significance of this principle lies in the fact “that common law has refused to accept that oppression … should go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the confession”).

¹⁷¹ Id. at paras. 16-7 with further references; see also Zander, supra note 157, at 342.

¹⁷² See Zander, supra note 157, at 347 ff.

¹⁷³ The full wording is more complicated: “In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”

¹⁷⁴ See also sec. 82(3) PACE providing that nothing in Part VIII of the Act (relating to evidence in criminal proceedings generally) “shall prejudice any power of a court to exclude evidence at its discretion.” The legislative history shows that it was intended to broaden the court's discretion compared to the traditional common law (cf. Zander, supra note 157. at 363-64; see also Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, § 15–453 (Richardson, P.J. et al. eds., 2007)Google Scholar. Crit. on the concept of judicial discretion in this context, see Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 15, at 96 who, however, concede in their concrete analysis of Section 78, that there “is no feasible substitute for trial judges' good faith judgement in the exercise of their discretion …” (Id. at 174).

¹⁷⁵ See Halawav. F.A.C.T. [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 21, 33.

¹⁷⁶ Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison (ex p. Levin), [1997] AC 741, 748, HL.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 157 ff, 179-80.

¹⁷⁸ On this doctrine see also id. at 179; Pattenden, supra note 41, at 30 ff.

¹⁷⁹ See A and others, EWCA, supra note 99, para. 248; Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 179.

¹⁸⁰ Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 180.

¹⁸¹ This follows from the wording: “evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely …”; see also Pattenden, supra note 41, at 39.

¹⁸² For a thorough and critical analysis see Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 160 ff (164: “judicial task of developing an admissibility regime … remains an unfinished project …”; 174: “little or no concrete guidance for trial judges …” by Court of Appeal); see also Zander, supra note 157, at 67 ff (“on a case-by-case basis, without any clearly articulated theory.” id. at 367:; “no general guidelines” id. at 378); May & Powles, supra note 143, at 293 ff (“no hard and fast rules” id. at 301); but see also Archbold, supra note 174, noting on the one hand “precise scope … unclear” (id. § 15-453), on the other “substantial guidance” by the case law (id. § 15-455) and then again “no general guidance” (id. § 14-457).

¹⁸³ See A and others, EWCA, supra note 99, paras. 137, 252, & 253: “given that the specific rule against involuntary confessions is not engaged (we are not dealing with tortured defendants), the general rule—evidence is admissible if it is relevant, and the court is not generally concerned with its provenance—applies.” Interestingly, none of the Law Lords in A and others, HL, supra note 82, took this view.

¹⁸⁴ See A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 19 (Lord Bingham).

¹⁸⁵ See id. paras. 67 ff (Lord Nicholls); for flexibility and a similar balancing without, however, distinguishing between preventive and repressive torture see Pattenden, supra note 41, at 32 ff; for admissibility in the ticking bomb case see also Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 153.

¹⁸⁶ See Ambos, supra note 1, at 263, n.6.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. May & Powles, supra note 143, at 300.

¹⁸⁸ Supra Section II.

¹⁸⁹ Supra Section III(B).

¹⁹⁰ See supra Introduction & B in fine.

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 111 (App. No. 14038/88) (July 7, 1989).

¹⁹² See also Thienel, supra note 3, at 366.

¹⁹³ See the meaning of jurisdiction in ECHR, supra note 90, art. 1. See also supra note 156 and Thienel, supra note 3, at 366-67.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. May & Powles, supra note 143, at 300; for the same result with reference to extradition Talmon, supra note 139, at 93-94.

¹⁹⁵ On these with further references Ambos, supra note 1, at 265 ff.

¹⁹⁶ Cf.: May & Powles, supra note 143, at § 04-35 (“The burden of establishing the conditions of admissibility of other evidence will fall on whichever side is seeking to adduce it.”); Seabrooke, Stephen & Sprack, John, Criminal Evidence & Procedure 14 (2d ed. 2004)Google Scholar (“In general the burden of proof in the ‘voir dire’ will be upon the party who asserts that the evidence should be admitted.”); Roberts & Zuckermann, supra note 15, at 331 (“rule of thumb that the proponent on any issues bears the burden of proof”).

¹⁹⁷ See StPO, supra note 148, § 244(2).

¹⁹⁸ BGH, Judgment, Apr. 4, 1951, reprinted in BGHSt 1, 94, 96; BGH, Decision, Oct. 17, 1983, reprinted in BGHSt 32, 115, 122 = 37 NJW 247, 248 (1984).

¹⁹⁹ BGH, Judgment, June 28, 1961, reprinted in BGHSt 16, 164, 167 = 14 NJW 1979, 1980 (1961); Meyer-Gossner, supra note 149, § 136 a m. no. 32.

²⁰⁰ Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2326, 2328Google Scholar.

²⁰¹ A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 55 (Lord Bingham) and para. 116 (Lord Hope). For the same reasons Sir Nigel Rodley, UN-Special Rapporteur on Torture, recommended that no “conclusive proof of physical torture“ should be required of the detainee, in Report of Visit to Turkey, para. 113(e), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/61/ Add.1 (1999), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/104/37/PDF/G9910437.pdf??OpenElement; in a similar vein see Nowak & McArthur, supra note 98, at m. no. 81.

²⁰² A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 56 (Lord Bingham), see also para. 116 (Lord Hope): “All he can reasonably be expected to do is to raise the issue …” Cf.: Nowak & McArthur, supra note 98, at m. no. 84. Cf. with regard to ECHR, supra note 90, art. 6(1); see Thienel, supra note. 93, at 407.

²⁰³ Cf. May & Powles, supra note 143. at 308.

²⁰⁴ A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 56 (Lord Bingham), cf. para. 80 (Lord Nicholls) and para. 98 (Lord Hoffmann) (It is important to recognize that this decision is not concerned with section 78 PACE but rests on general common law given that the SIAC proceedings are administrative, not criminal proceedings). Cf.: Nowak & McArthur, supra note 98, at m. no. 82, 84. For another view see Zander, supra note 157, at 380-81 (according to which the defence has “to persuade the court that there is a serious issue as to unfairness …” which, in sum, comes “remarkably close” to laying the burden of proof on the defendant); see similarly Archbold, supra note 174, at § 15-462 (“evidential burden … that there is an issue to be decided … will rest on the defence”).

²⁰⁵ P.E. v. France, Communication No. 193/2001, at 150, para. 6.3, U.N. Doc. A/58/44 (2003), G.K. v. Switzerland, Communication No. 219/2002, id. at 185 para. 6.10; Thienel, supra note 3, at 355 (follows from this that Article 15 reduces “any burden of proof on persons other than the state to an evidentiary burden only of triggering the positive obligation of the state”).

²⁰⁶ BGH, Judgment, June 28, supra note 199, at 166.

²⁰⁷ See, e.g., Volk, supra note 157, at § 18, m. no. 22 in the case of § 136 a StPO; in this context see also Talmin, supra note 139, at 84.

²⁰⁸ For the underlying reversal of the burden of proof see also Jahn, supra note 4, at C 109; Talmon, supra note 139, at 84.

²⁰⁹ BGH NStZ-Rechtsprechungs Report [RR] 2007, 80 (81) requiring hinreichend verlässliche Anhaltspunkte [sufficient reliable indicia].

²¹⁰ See supra note 204 and main text.

²¹¹ See A and others, HL, supra note 82, para. 120 ff, 121 (Lord Hope): “Is it established, by means of such diligent inquiries into the sources that it is practicable to carry out and on a balance of probabilities, that the information relied on by the Secretary of State was obtained under torture?” (emphasis in the original K.A.); see also id. paras. 138 ff (Lord Rodger), paras. 156 ff (Lord Carswell), paras. 172 ff (Lord Brown).

²¹² The OLG Hamburg required overwhelming proof of torture and considered that remaining doubts about the circumstances of the questioning concern the weight, not the admissibility of the statements (Hamburg, OLG, El Motassadeq, supra note 85, at 2326, 2328Google Scholar).

²¹³ See also Jahn, supra note 4, at C 109 (proof “practically impossible”); in the same vein Talmon, supra note 139, at 84.

²¹⁴ For this argument with regard to ECHR, supra note 90, art. 6(1); see also Thienel, supra note 93, at 408-09. On the European Court's similar standard of “presumptions of fact” see Esser, supra note 98, at 660 (left colum. no.).

²¹⁵ For the same result see Thienel, supra note 93, at 409 (not clearly distinguishing between real risk and high probability though); Nowak & McArthur, supra note 98, at m, no. 84; similarly Jahn, supra note 4, at C 109 with constitutional considerations.

²¹⁶ See the appellants' position as quoted in A and Others, HL, supra note 82, para. 28(6) (Lord Bingham).