¹ Piskei Din is a publication of law reports of the Supreme Court. In this survey, cases will be cited according to their file number and year of filing. The following abbreviations are used: H.C. — High Court of Justice; C.A. — Civil Appeal; Cr.A. — Criminal Appeal; F.H. — Further Hearing; S.P. — Sundry Petitions.

² (1982) 17 Is. L. R. 223, 371.

³ R. Ma'ay an and others v. The Director General, The Ministry of Health (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 477.

⁴ (1982) 17 Is. L. R. 371.

⁵ S. Shapiro… Ltd. and others v. The State of Israel (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 337.

⁶ (1982) 17 Is. L. R. 374.

⁷ F.H. 12/81, S. Shapira… Ltd., and others v. The State of Israel (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 645.

⁸ S.H. (1982) No. 1049 of April 5th, 1982, p. 99.

⁹ J. Baruch and another v. The Minister for Building and Housing and others (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 124.

¹⁰ This judgment was handed down before the above mentioned Law was enacted.

¹¹ The Association of Foreign Journalists in Israel and another v. The Government of Israel and others (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 637. See infra, n. 45.

¹² (1982) 8 lyunei Mishpat 497 at 499.

¹³ The fourth part appeared at the beginning of 1983.

¹⁴ S.H. (1982) 8.

¹⁵ 18 L.S.I. 51. On matters related to the Standard Contracts Law, 1964, see the following articles published in this Review: Hecht, A., “The Israel Law on Standard Contracts” (1968) 3 Ts. L. R. 586Google Scholar; Adler, G.M., “Restrictive Covenants and the Standard Contracts Law” (1970) 5 Is. L. R. 580CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Elman, P., “Restrictive Terms in a Standard Contract” (1972) 7 Is. L. R. 433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Sec. 2 states: “Standard Contract: means a contract all or any of whose terms have been fixed in advance by one of the parties with the purpose of constituting conditions of many contracts between him and persons undefined as to their number or identity” (Unofficial translation). See that sec. 23(4) only excludes applicability of the new law to collective agreements under the Collective Agreements Law, 1957 (11 L.S.I. 58).

¹⁷ Sec. 1, supra n. 15.

¹⁸ Sec. 15, supra n. 15.

¹⁹ Sec. 14, supra n. 15.

²⁰ See secs. 3 and 23(a) (1) (2) (3).

Sec. 3 states:

“The court and the tribunal shall consider as void or shall modify, in accordance with the provisions of this law, the conditions of a standard contract that, having regard to the terms of the contract in their entirety and to other circumstances, are prejudicial to the customers or give an unfair advantage to the supplier, likely to prejudice the customers (hereinafter referred to as prejudicial term)”. (Unofficial translation).

Sec. 23 states:

“(a) The provisions of this Law are not applicable to

(1) A condition which fixes the price that shall be paid by the customer;

(2) A condition which is in accordance wiith conditioning established or confirmed by law;

(3) A condition which is in accordance with conditions established by an international agreement to which Israel is a party”;

(4) … (Unofficial translation).

²¹ Sec. 4.

²² Sec. 5.

²³ 13 L.S.I. 159.

²⁴ Sec. 2, supra n. 15.

²⁵ Sec. 6.

²⁶ Sec. 12(a).

²⁷ Sec. 12(b). The recently published Regulations of Standard Contracts, 1983, ((1983) K.T. 1518) have recognized in reg. 3, as respondents the Israel Consumer Protection Council and the Consumer Protection Authority of the Histadrut (General Labour Association of Israel).

²⁸ Sec. 10. See the recently published Regulations of Standard Contracts (Procedure before the Tribunal and Procedure on Appeal), 1983, ((1983) K.T. 1519) which has implemented the new Law.

²⁹ Sec. 14.

³⁰ Sec. 15. See Regulations of Standard Contracts, 1983, supra n. 27, reg. 2.

³¹ Secs. 13 and 14, supra n. 15.

³² (1981) 16 Is.L.R. 516.

³³ Sec. 16. The Regulations of Standard Contracts, 1983, supra n. 27, in reg. 4 confer upon the Israel Consumer Council and the Consumer Protection Authority of the Histadrut the right to apply to the tribunal to invalidate prejudicial terms.

³⁴ Sec. 17.

³⁵ Sec. 18.

³⁶ Sec. 19.

³⁷ Sec. 22.

³⁸ Sec. 24.

³⁹ S.H. (1982) 234.

⁴⁰ S.H. (1982) 258.

⁴¹ S.H. (1982) 259.

⁴² S.H. (1982) 266.

⁴³ H.H. (1982) 414.

⁴⁴ 1 L.S.L [N.V.] 145.

⁴⁵ The Association of Foreign Journalists in Israel and another v. The Government of Israel and others (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 637.

⁴⁶ I.e. all members who wished to enter and whose number was estimated by the petitioners' attorney to be about two hundred.

⁴⁷ The evacuation had to be effected as a result of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.

⁴⁸ To which the authorities, as stated above, had agreed.

⁴⁹ J. Sheon v. The Government's Committee for Names (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 103.

⁵⁰ Meir Tajar v. The State of Israel (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 386.

⁵¹ Of the Court's personnel.

⁵² See sec, 244 of the Penal Law, 5737–1977, L.S.I. Special Volume 70.

⁵³ See also S.P. 613/82, The State of Israel v. 5. Awad (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 612, where the Supreme Court accepted the State's request to make an order for the respondent's re-arrest until the termination of proceedings against him. Earlier the District Court had ordered to release the respondent on bail. The District Court did so because the judgment in the respondent's trial had to be delayed owing to the fact that the file of the case had been held back by the staff of the Court's secretariat, as part of the struggle for better working conditions. Barak J. before whom the petition was brought also ordered to return the case to the District Court for judgment. He held that it was the duty of the court to give judgment and stated that the court has the powers necessary to ensure that the relevant material be brought before it, mainly by ordering the clerks of the court to do so.

⁵⁴ J. Sarid, M.K. v. The Speaker of the Knesset (1982) (II). 36 P.D. 197.

⁵⁵ 11 L.S.I. 157.

⁵⁶ This term being taken from the judgment of Shamgar J. in H.C. 306/81, S. Flotto Sharon v. The Knesset Committee (1981) (IV) 35 P.D. 118.

⁵⁷ P. Shallem v. The Licensing Officer under the Firearms Law, 5709–1949 (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 317.

⁵⁸ The interim period between the expiry date from 1 Jan. 1978 to 7 May 1980—the day of the renewal, is of no importance to the case, since the Court regarded the licence extended on 7 May 1980 as a mere renewal.

⁵⁹ A different attitude may be spotted in the judgment of Bach J. in H.C. 237/81, J. Daabul v. The Municipality of Petach-Tikva, The Licensing Authority and another (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 365—where he held that the rule of non-interference with the deliberations of the competent authorities is especially applicable when decisions of military or police authorities are at issue. It should, however, be noted, that in the Shallem case, supra n. 57 the dispute was in regard of the cancellation of a licence whereas the dispute in the Daabul case concerned the refusal to issue a licence, or rather to re-issue a licence which had expired.

⁶⁰ Deak & Co. Inc. and another v. The Governor of the Bank of Israel and others (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 803.

⁶¹ The Governor of the Bank of Israel and the Comptroller of Foreign Exchange.

⁶² J. Daabul v. The Municipality of Petach-Tikva, The Licensing Authority, and another, supra n. 59.

⁶³ J. Cott v. D. Cott (a minor) and others (1982 (I) 36 P.D. 236.

⁶⁴ 21 L.S.I. 41.

⁶⁵ Kenig v. Cohn (1981) (I) 35 P.D. 176.

⁶⁶ Kenig v. Cohn (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 701.

⁶⁷ 19 L.S.I. 58.

⁶⁸ With all due respect we feel obliged to suggest replacing the words: “any defect with regard to the signature” used in the authorized translation, with the words: “any defect in the signature”, which appear to be more accurate.

⁶⁹ This survey does not include judgments of the National and Regional Labour Courts.

⁷⁰ R. Fellner v. Koor Metal Ltd., and the National Labour Court in Jerusalem (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 74.

⁷¹ 12 L.S.I. 100 and see the Wage Protection (Amendment No. 12) Law, 5737–1977 (31 L.S.I. 115).

⁷² 15 L.S.I. 215. See also the Adjudication of Interest (Amendment No. 3) Law, 5739–1978 (33 L.S.I. 31). An English transaltion of these two laws also appears in (1979) 14 Is.L.R. 520.

⁷³ Guardian Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd., v. A. Rossman and Co. Ltd., and counter appeal (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 295.

⁷⁴ D. Lazar v. Forcester Ltd. (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 475.

⁷⁵ Sec. 9(a) of the Adjudication of Interest, (Amendment No. 3) Law, 5739–1978.

⁷⁶ B. Winkler and another v. S. Sudari, Building Co. Ltd. (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 365.

⁷⁷ 25 L.S.I. 11.

⁷⁸ N. Nowitz v. S. Leibowitz and counter appeal (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 537.

⁷⁹ This judgment includes more details about the Court's deliberations and conclusions in regard to contracts and it refers to a large number of previous judgments on the topics discussed. Unfortunately, for lack of space, we cannot consider the further problems with which this judgment deals.

⁸⁰ M. Ness and others v. N. Golde and others (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 204.

⁸¹ Who apparently knew about the hindrances in registering the sale at the Land Registry, but not about the Court's order.

⁸² Who were the plaintiffs in the court of first instance.

⁸³ All four defendants in the court of first instance.

⁸⁴ The third and the fourth defendants.

⁸⁵ The amount exceeding that to which the plaintiffs were entitled as damages for the breach of contract with them by the first two defendants.

⁸⁶ The Supreme Court also dealt with the relationship of the facts in this case to some of the provisions of the Land Law, 5729–1969 (23 L.S.I. 283), especially with regard to the registration of land in the Land Registry, but we cannot here give details of this part of the case.

⁸⁷ Proverbs II, 20.

⁸⁸ M. Raundnaf-(Koren) v. l. Chackim (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 757.

⁸⁹ 6 L.S.I. 147. See also Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) (Amendment No. 2) Law, 5732–1972 (26 L.S.I. 151).

⁹⁰ Petition for leave to appeal No. 4592/78.

⁹¹ Civil Claim 419/77.

⁹² 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 74.

⁹³ From a remark in the judgment of Ben-Porat J. it appears that the State undertook to pay the adjudicated debt in this case.

⁹⁴ S. Barsheshet v. J. Hashash and others (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 281.

⁹⁵ Seemingly by “at present” he meant: at present—before the accident.

⁹⁶ It is not evident from the judgment if the additional sum was adjudicated on account of loss in future earnings or on account of loss in earning capacity.

⁹⁷ B. Lachdar v. The State of Israel (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 836.

⁹⁸ 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 90.

⁹⁹ 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 5.

¹⁰⁰ 22 L.S.I. 114.

¹⁰¹ J. Na'im and others v. M. Barda and the State of Israel (and counter appeal) (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 762.

¹⁰² The child was as stated in the judgment, a normal boy at the age of five years—at the time when the accident occurred—and as a result of the accident, he became an imbecile forever, and in need of permanent assistance and care throughout his life.

¹⁰³ Machtesh … Ltd., v. Assessing Officer for Large Enterprises (income Tax and Property Tax) (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 1.

¹⁰⁴ 32 L.S.I. 277 at 289.

¹⁰⁵ A. Churi v. The State of Israel (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 85.

¹⁰⁶ S.H. (1979/80) 14, An English translation appears in (1980) 15 Is.L.R. 575.

¹⁰⁷ H. Avitan and I. Asher v. The State of Israel (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 684.

¹⁰⁸ O. Chalbuni v. The State of Israel (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 748.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ The State of Israel v. M. Calmi (1982) (I) 36 P.D. 838.

¹¹¹ The State of Israel v. I. Ben Shalom Averg'il (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 640.

¹¹² 19 L.S.I. 158, at 164. Now sec. 53 of the consolidated version of this law (S.H. (1982) 43).

¹¹³ Sec. 49 in the Law of 1965 is sec. 54 in the consolidated version of 1982.

¹¹⁴ Motion 119/74, The State of Israel v. Meshat (1974) (I) 28 P.D. 585.

¹¹⁵ But see also S.P. 591/82, J. Aharon v. The State of Israel, (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 838, described at the end of this survey.

¹¹⁶ S.P. 220/82, M. Bottershvily v. The State of Israel (1982) (II) 36 P.D. 132, and S.P. 518, 535/82, M. Bottershvily v. The State of Israel (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 682.

¹¹⁷ It seems that such a remark, based on the Judge's own previous experience, is not common practice, but what he stated may perhaps be regarded as what is termed as “judicial notice”.

¹¹⁸ J. Aharon v. The State of Israel (1982) (III) 36 P.D. 838.

¹¹⁹ S.H. (1982) 43 at 50.

¹²⁰ It seems to us, that this decision is not reconcilable with that given in the Averg'il case, supra n. 111. Although in the Averg'il case the request for the petitioner's release was based on what is now sec. 53 of the Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], and the request for the petitioner's release in the Aharon case, supra n. 118, rested on sec. 52 of this version, the section which empowers a Supreme Court Judge to order an extension of arrest is in both cases the same section, i.e. sec. 54 of the consolidated version.