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The Security Council in the May 1967 Crisis: A Study in Frustration
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
Extract
Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and have agreed “that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (article 24 of the U.N. Charter). The question may be asked whether the Security Council lived up to this responsibility during the May 1967 crisis in the Middle East which preceded the Six Day War. Did the Security Council do everything in its power to avoid the clash, and what were the reasons for its failure to avert the crisis?
In order to be able to evaluate the Council's stand, it will be necessary to recall summarily the developments which led up to the hostilities of June 1967, as well as the Security Council's powers under the Charter of the U.N.
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References
1 The General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed on 24 February 1949 (U.N. Doc. S/1264/Rev. 1; Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 42, p. 25); The General Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel was signed on 23 March 1949 (U.N. Doc. S/1296/Rev. 1; Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 42, p. 287); The General Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed on 3 April 1949 (U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev. 1; Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 42, p. 303); The General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria was signed on 20 July 1949 (U.N. Doc. S/1353/Rev. 1; Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 2; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 42, p. 327). The agreements are also reproduced in Higgins, R., United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967: Documents and Commentary, Vol. 1, The Middle East (1969) pp. 32–52.Google Scholar For commentaries, see in particular Rosenne, Sh., Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (1951 Google Scholar) and Bar-Yaacov, N., The Israel-Syrian Armistice—Problems of Implementation 1949–1966 (1967)Google Scholar; see also the references in R. Higgins, op. cit. 216–217.
2 The factual background as described in this article is based on objective sources, in particular Keesing's Research Report, The Arab-Israeli Conflict—The 1967 Campaign (1968); Lall, A., The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (1968)Google Scholar; and afficial documens of the United Nations.
3 U.N. Doc. S/7683 (15/2/67)
4 On U.N.T.S.O., see R. Higgins, op. cit. 5–217.
5 U.N. Doc. S/7877, of 8 May 1967.
6 U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/708, of 11 May 1967, 13.
7 See A. Lall, op. cit. 8.
8 Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/7896, of 19 May 1967, p. 2, para. 9.
9 On 16 May the Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Fawzi, requested (in a rather cryptic note) the Commander in the field of U.N.E.F., Major-General Rikhye, to withdraw the Force. Major-General Rikhye referred the matter to the Secretary-General who immediately sought clarification from the Egyptian permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador El-Kony. The Secretary-General took the position, in his conversation with El-Kony, that he would not accept a request for a partial withdrawal of U.N.E.F.; on the other hand, if the U.A.R. withdrew its consent from U.N.E.F., “the Secretary-General would order the withdrawal of all U.N.E.F. troops from Gaza and Sinai….” On 18 May the U.A.R. Foreign Minister, Dr. Riad, informed the Secretary-General that the Government of the U.A.R. “has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza Strip”, and therefore he “requests that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as possible…” It may be mentioned that on 18 May the Secretary-General raised with the Israeli representative the question of stationing U.N.E.F. on the Israeli side of the line (U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add. 3, 26/6/67, para. 21). In line with its previous policy Israel rejected this suggestion. It may be added that at this stage the stationing of U.N.E.F. in Israel would have been of little value: probably the most delicate area of the Force's patrol was Sharm-a-Sheikh, and in that vicinity there was no Israel territory on which the Force could have been stationed.
On the withdrawal of U.N.E.F., see in particular the following reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations: Special report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/6669, of 18 May 1967; Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/7896, of 19 May 1967; Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add. 3, of 26 June 1967.
10 On U.N.E.F., see, e.g., Rosner, G., The United Nations Emergency Force (1963) and Higgins, R., op. cit. 218–529.Google Scholar
11 Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add. 3, of 26 June 1967, p. 8.
12 U.N. Doc. A/6669, of 18 May 1967.
13 U.N. Doc. S/7896, of 19 May 1967.
14 U.N. Doc. A/6669, of 18 May 1967, p. 9, para. 12.
15 See, for instance, Dehaussy, J., “La Crise du Moyen-Orient et l'O.N.U.” (1968) 95 Journal du Droit International 853–888, particularly pp. 860–862 Google Scholar; Higgins, R., “The June War: The United Nations and Legal Background”, (1968) Journal of Contemporary History 253–273 Google Scholar (no. 3), at pp. 260–265; A. Lall, op. cit. 21; Tandon, Y., “U.N.E.F., the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in hte Third Arab-Israeli War” (1968) XXII International Organization 529 Google Scholar, at 536–541; Ch. Yost, W., “The Arab-Israeli War—How it Began”, (1967/1968) 46 Foreign Affairs 304 at 314–315 Google Scholar; Goodhart, A. L., Israel, the United Nations and Aggression (1968) 20–23.Google Scholar See also the severe criticism voiced in London in the House of Commons on 31 May 1967: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth series, vol. 747, House of Commons Official Report, Session 1966–67, columns 105, 106 and 111 (the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown); column 119 (the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath); column 134 (Mr. Jeremy Thorpe); column 193 (Sir Alec Douglas-Home); and column 208 (the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson).
16 See J. Dehaussy, op. cit. 861–862; Gross, A., “Basis for Withdrawal of U.N. Force”, Letter to the Editor of the New York Times of 26 May 1967, published in International Legal Materials (1967) 581 Google Scholar, and the remarks by Dr. A. Gross published ibid., at p. 593. Dr. Gross' letter and remarks are based on an unpublished Aide Mémoire by the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, dated 5 August 1957, published ibid., at pp. 595–602.
17 See, e.g., A. Lall, op. cit. 21.
18 R. Higgins, cited supra n. 15, at 265.
19 O'Brien, W. V., “International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East, 1967” (1967) 11 Orbis 692 at 701–702.Google Scholar
20 The Soviet statement has been quoted in extenso by Mr. Fedorenko in the Security Council; see U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1342, of 24 May 1967, pp. 26–30.
21 U.N. Doc. S/7905, of 24 May 1967 (See Annex I).
22 See below n. 58.
23 Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/7906, of 26 May 1967, at pp. 3 and 4.
23a Keesing's Research Report, supra n. 2 at p. 21.
24 U.N. Doc. S/7906, of 26 May 1967, p. 5, para. 14.
25 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1343, of 29 May 1967, pp. 17–20.
26 Ibid. 31.
27 Ibid. 36.
28 Ibid. 37.
29 Ibid. 46.
30 Ibid. 67–70.
31 Ibid. 71–72.
32 Ibid. 56.
33 Ibid. 102.
34 Supra n. 24.
35 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1343, of 29 May 1967, p. 51.
36 Ibid. 81.
37 Ibid. 82–83.
38 Ibid. 87.
39 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1344, of 30 May 1967, p. 7 (Nigeria), p. 51 (Denmark), p. 56 (U.S.), p. 61 (China).
40 Ibid. 58.
41 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1345, of 31 May 1967, p. 17.
42 U.N. Doc. S/7916/Rev. 1, of 1 June 1967 (See Annex II).
43 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1345, of 31 May 1967, pp. 51–52.
44 Ibid. 76–77.
45 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1346, of 3 June 1967, p. 92.
46 For text of the declaration, see Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East—A Documentary Record, 1914–1956, Vol. II, (1956) pp. 308–311.Google Scholar For a discussion of the declaration, see Feinberg, N., “The Three Power Declaration of 1950”, in Palestine under the Mandate and the State of Israel—Problems in International Law (1963) 219–230 Google Scholar (in Hebrew). On its repudiation by Great Britain, see the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown, in the House of Commons on 31 May, 1967: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth series, Volume 747, House of Commons Official Report, Session 1966–67, column 108. On the repudiation of the declaration by France, see Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 (2nd. ed, 1969) 164.Google Scholar
47 U.N. Doc. S/7896, of 19 May 1967, p. 5, para. 19; U.N. Doc. S/7906, of 26 May 1967, p. 1, para. 1.
48 U.N. Doc. S/7906, of 26 May 1967, p. 4, para. 12.
49 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1341, of 24 May 1967, pp. 38–40.
50 Ibid. 27.
51 Ibid. 28–30. For similar pronouncements by other delegates, see e.g. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1341, of 24 May 1967, pp. 11–12; S/PV. 1342, of 24 May 1967, pp. 11, 17, 21; S/PV. 1343, of 29 May 1967, pp. 48–50, 52, 61, 82; S/PV. 1344, of 30 May 1967, pp. 48–50, 58; S/PV. 1345, of 31 May 1967, p. 17.
52 Great Britain Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 747, House of Commons, Official Report, Session 1966–67, column 201.
53 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1341 of 24 May 1967, p. 17.
54 See for instance Gross, L., “Voting in the Security Council…” (1968) 62 American Journal of International Law 315 at 330 Google Scholar; Reuter, P., Institutions Internationales (6th ed., 1969) pp. 248–249.Google Scholar Professor H. Kelsen maintains that resolutions under chapter VI are mere recommendations, but they “may nevertheless assume a binding character if the Security Council, under Article 39, considers non-compliance with its decision as a threat to the peace…”: Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations (1951) 293.Google Scholar
55 It seems that according to the practice of the Council, the power under article 40 to call upon the parties to comply with “provisional measures” does not depend upon a prior determination under article 39 that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression has occurred—see Bowett, D. W., The Law of International Institutions (1963) 35–36.Google Scholar
56 For a list, see Stone, J., The Middle East Under Cease-Fire (1967) 2–3.Google Scholar
57 A. Lall, op. cit. pp. 4–6.
58 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/1341, of 24 May 1967, p. 6 (the Representative of the Soviet Union); p. 16 (the Representatives of Mali and Bulgaria); p. 26 (the Representative of India); p. 27 (the Representative of France); p. 31 (the Representative of Ethiopia); p. 32 (the Representative of Nigeria).
59 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1341, of 24 May 1967, p. 6. See also, S/PV. 1342, of 24 May 1967, pp. 21, 51, 57.
60 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1342, of 24 May 1967, pp. 37–40.
61 See the addresses by the Representatives of India and Ethiopia, supra n. 58.
62 See the addresses by the Representatives of Ethiopia, India and Nigeria, supra n. 58.
63 A. Lall, op. cit. 30.
64 W. V. O'Brien, op. cit. 702, note 17.
65 See supra n. 10.
66 See A. Lall, op. cit. 21; J. Dehaussy, op. cit. 861.
67 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 (2nd ed., 1969) 167.Google Scholar
68 J. Dehaussy, op. cit. 862.
69 A. Lall, op. cit. 9.
70 Nicholas, H. G., The United Nations as a Political Institution (3rd ed., 1967) 70.Google Scholar
71 U.N. Doc. S/7575/Rev. 1.
72 H. G. Nicholas, op. cit. 71. The last sentence of the citation has been omitted in the latest edition of the book (1967) but it may be found in its first edition (1959), on p. 64.
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