¹ See generally Slaughter, A.M. & Helfer, L., Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 899 (2005)Google Scholar.

² For a survey of current IHL see Henkaerts, Jean-Marie & Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See, e.g., Sullivan, Kathleen M., Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harvard L. Rev. 24, 26 (1991)Google Scholar.

⁴ See, e.g., Contracts Law (General Part), 1973, 27 LSI 117 (1973) (Isr.) arts. 12 & 39.

⁵ Sullivan, supra note 3, at 61.

⁶ Kaplow, Louis, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other scholars used these terms differently, and other terms to describe these. See, e.g., Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire (2nd ed. 1988)Google Scholar.

⁷ Kaplow, supra note 6, at 562

⁸ Sunstein, Cass, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Kaplow, supra note 6, at 569.

¹⁰ Id. at 570.

¹¹ Kaplow supra note 6, at 563.

¹² Sullivan, supra note 3.

¹³ Even if a legal norm would be created as a rule, strong courts would use expansive interpretative methods in order to clarify it as a standard.

¹⁴ American courts, especially, have noted that several international treaties are “non-self-executing” meaning that they cannot be executed without further legal actions (usually domestic). This doctrine allowed U.S. courts to ignore several important international treaties despite the clear constitutional command that approved treaties are “The Supreme Law of the Land (U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2). The question whether a specific treaty is self-executing is decided by courts based on both the language of the treaty and the declarations of the U.S. Senate.

¹⁵ Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 30–35 (1990)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Morrow, James D., The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 41 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ For a survey of all existing literature on the creation and enforcement of treaties see Hathaway, Oona A., Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chicago L. Rev. 469 (2005)Google Scholar

¹⁸ The Doctrine was introduced in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); 7 L. Ed. 415. It was repeated in many cases (usually in lower federal courts). Though the decision about which norm (or treaty) is non-self-executing is based on several factors, chiefly the determinations of the Senate. There is a strong connection between non-self-executing treaties and those that have ambiguous language. See Vazquez, Carlos M., The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Amer. J. Int'l L. 695 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ The ECJ decided that as the GATT and WTO agreements do not have direct effect in the member states see Case 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, and later: Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395 (stating that: “… the lack of reciprocity in that regard in the part of the community's trading partners, in relations to the WTO agreements… may lead to disuniform application of the WTO rules,” ¶ 45 of the Portugal decision).

²⁰ See, e.g., international trade treaties, which comprise a large percentage of modern international treaties.

²¹ Almost half a century ago, Myers McDougal and Florentino Feliciano suggested that the role of custom is the laws of war is to turn abstract treaty norms into workable rules: McDougal, Myers S. & Feliciano, Florentino P., International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 Yale L. J. 771 (1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² Benvenisti, Eyal, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation (Benvenisti, Eyal & Hirsch, Moshe eds., 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Weiler, Joseph H. H., The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (Porter, R. et al. ed., 2001)Google Scholar; see also Goldsmith, Jack L. & Posner, Eric A. The Limits of International Law 160–62 (2005)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Weiler, supra note 23.

²⁵ See, e.g., Kalshoven, Fritz & Zegveld, Liesbeth, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (2001)Google Scholar throughout the book make a distinction between the Hague Law and the Geneva Law.

²⁶ Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 295 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].

²⁷ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention, Second Geneva Convention, Third Geneva Convention, and Fourth Geneva Convention respectively].

²⁸ See, e.g., Green, Leslie C., The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 25, 31 (2nd ed., 2000)Google Scholar

²⁹ Some, especially in the U.S., use these as synonyms. There is however, a tendency in literature to equate the use of LOAC with a more traditional approach to the subject, and the use of IHL, with a modern approach.

³⁰ Chris af Jochnick, & Normand, Roger, The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 Harvard Int'l L. J. 49 (1994)Google Scholar

³¹ Id.

³² It seems that this was also the goal of President Lincoln when he commissioned Professor Francis Lieber to write his celebrated Lieber Code. The Lieber Code is a work written as a suggestion for a military code for the Union Army in the American civil war, at the request of President Lincoln. Lincoln incorporated this code into American military code as General order no. 100. It is usually considered to reflect 19^th century (European) international LOAC. See Hartigan, Richard S., Lieber's Code and the Law of War (1983)Google Scholar. Some claim that in this code Lieber actually created rules which were not necessarily the reflection of historical practice.

³³ Jochnick & Normand, supra note 30.

³⁴ Traditionally, the laws of war were called the Laws of Armed Conflict. This signifies their general goal—to regulate armed conflicts according to pre-agreed forms. During the second half of the 20^th century the terms were changed and the name of this area of law became—International Humanitarian Law. Clearly, this change also changed the focus of the area of law from agreement between armies to protection of civilians. See Benvenisti, Eyal, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 Isr. L. Rev. 81 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 21.

³⁶ Since the preamble to the Hague Regulations in 1899, the Martens Clause (in slightly different phrasings) appears in all IHL instruments. In these regulations it reads:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.

As to its origins and current interpretation see Ticehurst, Rupert, The Martens Clause and the Law of Armed Confict, 317 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 125 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ The Hague Regulations, supra note 26, art. 53. The needs of the army of occupation may, of course, be interpreted as a standard, as has been shown by the continued jurisprudence of the Israeli High Court of Justice, see, e.g., HCJ 302/72 Udah v. The Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(2) 169; HCJ 606/78 Oyub v. Minister of Defense [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 113 (in both cases the court accepted the claims that private property was indeed confiscated for the needs of the army, although it was used for Israeli settlements). However, the original term has quite a specific meaning, understandable to military persons, as well as their legal advisors.

³⁸ The Hague Regulations, supra note 26, arts. 1 & 4 respectively. One of the four conditions (observance of the laws of war) might be a more standard-like—though the content of this specific condition is debatable.

³⁹ The Hague Regulations, supra note 26, art. 32.

⁴⁰ Jochnick & Normand, supra note 30, at 68–77.

⁴¹ The Hague Regulations, supra note 26, art 27 (protection of cultural objects), art. 23(g) (protection of civilian objects).

⁴² The Martens Clause (appearing first in the preamble to the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907) reads:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.

Though it seems that the intention of the parties in the Hague conventions was that this clause would be declaratory, later some courts gave this clause an operative meaning, turning into a source of ‘extra-treaty’ development of IHL.

⁴³ Jochnick & Normand, supra note 30.

⁴⁴ Article 27 to the Fourth Geneva Convention seems to be a more standard-like norm:

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

⁴⁵ Common art. 2 to the Geneva Conventions (definition of conflicts); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 4 (definition of combatants). Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 147 (definition of grave breaches).

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 60:

The Detaining Power shall grant all prisoners of war a monthly advance of pay, the amount of which shall be fixed by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the following amounts:

Category I: Prisoners ranking below sergeants: eight Swiss francs.

Category II: Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, or prisoners of equivalent rank: twelve Swiss francs.

Category III: Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the rank of major or prisoners of equivalent rank: fifty Swiss francs.

Category IV: Majors, lieutenant-colonels, colonels or prisoners of equivalent rank: sixty Swiss francs.

Category V: General officers or prisoners of war of equivalent rank: seventy-five Swiss francs.

⁴⁷ Kennedy, David, Of Law and War (2006)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ On the history of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions see, e.g., Danner, Allison Marston, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2006)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I[. For security issues concerning AP-I see Sofear, Abraham D., The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 784 (1988)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ For a general survey of the proportionality principle in jus in bello see Gardam, Judith G., Proportionalily and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 391 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Berman, Nathaniel, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 41 Columbia J. of Transnat'l L. 1 (2004)Google Scholar.

⁵² Id.

⁵³ See, e.g., in matters of parallel application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 106 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].

⁵⁴ Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 126 (Oct. 2, 1995), “the general essence of those rules [rules of IHL AC.], and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.”

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kurperskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, ¶¶ 515–36. (Using the principle of proportionality, the Martens Clause, and relaxing the requirements of proving Customary International Law regarding the question of belligerent reprisals).

⁵⁶ The ECHR can only use human rights in judgments. In some recent cases, the ECHR applied vague human rights standards to situations which seem to be more in the sphere of jus in bello. See, e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rt., App. Nos. 57950/00 [Feb. 24, 2005] (unpublished) (claiming that some actions of the Russian army in Chechnya violated the rights to life of the applicant)

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Kretzmer, David, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories 187 (2002)Google Scholar. Cohen, Amichai, Administering the Territories: An Enquiry into the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the IDF in the Occupied Territories, 38 Isr. L. Rev. 24 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁸ Kretzmer, supra note 57, at 187.

⁵⁹ Barak-Erez, Daphne, The International Law of Human Rights and Constitutional Law: A Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 I-CON 611–32 (2004)Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Ben-Naftali, Orna & Michaeli, Keren, Ajuri, 9 Hamishpat (2003)Google Scholar [in Hebrew].

⁶¹ See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807, at ¶ 42 [hereinafter Beit Sourik]. An English translation is available in H.C.J. 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village v. Government of Israel 58(5) PD. 807, 38 Isr. L. Rev. 83 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and also available on the Israel Supreme Court website, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.htm (last visited May 18, 2008).

⁶² HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393, ¶ 74, an English translation is available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf.

⁶³ HCJ 2732/05 Chairman of the Azun Municipality Council v. The Commander of IDF in the West Bank [May 28,2006] (unpublished).

⁶⁴ HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza Strip [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 385 (The IDF must allow relatives of civilians killed in an IDF operation to participate in their funerals, despite the fighting still going on in the area. The Court based its decision on Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

⁶⁵ HCJ 10356/02 Yoav Hass v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [2004] IsrSC 443.

⁶⁶ Cohen, Amichai, The Supreme Court and the Arab-Israeli Conflict:An International Law Perspective, 6 Kiryat Hamishpat 263 (2006)Google Scholar [in Hebrew].

⁶⁷ For a general description of parallel application see Ben-Naftali, Orna & Shany, Yuval, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territorias, 37 Isr. L. Rev. 17 (2003–2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁸ The ICJ explicitly stated this position in two advisory opinions: See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 53, ¶ 25 and in Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 53.

⁶⁹ Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rt., App. Nos. 57947-49/00, ¶ 169 (unpublished) [given Feb. 24, 2005) and Isayeva. v. Russia, supra note 57, ¶ 173.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 67.

⁷¹ Gross, Aeyal, Are Human Rights the Emperor's New Clothes of the International Law of Occupation?, 18 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Id. at 5.

⁷³ Meron, Theodor, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 239 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ For an extensive review of the practice of domestic courts see Benvenisti, Eyal, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Use of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007453 (last visited June 6, 2008). IHL is the legal basis of almost all decisions of the international criminal tribunals see, e.g., Wald, Patricia M. The International Criminal Tribunals; Crime and Punishment in the International Arena, 25 Nova L. Rev. 463 (2001)Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ Judges, of course, do not claim that they endeavor to widen their discretion in order to posses more power, but rather they claim that they want more discretion in order to be able to protect justice and moral sensibilities. This may very well be so. Either way, courts tend to standardize the use of legal norms.

⁷⁶ Of course, such a claim needs to be substantiated, but for the purposes of this paper, I simply assume it is a possibility. A priori it is at least as feasible as is the opposite claim.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Ben Naftali & Shany, supra note 67.

⁷⁸ Schabas, William, Lex specialis? Belt and suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of jus ad bellum, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 592 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁹ I have found time and again that international lawyers and legal scholars find that claim hard to accept. It seems that despite the sophisticated scholarship that inquires into the motives of judges, we still take court decisions on face value. If a court claims that it is using human rights to add protection to those existing in IHL, we tend to accept this. We sometimes fail to analyze the counter-factual hypothesis—i.e., what could have been the decision of the court had it been limited to the rule analysis. Is it not reasonable to think that if IHL was the only available tool, the court might completely ban measures that it now allows and uses human rights standards to limit.

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 47, at 115.

⁸¹ I do not intend to get here into the discussion of the desirability of using expansive methods of interpretation versus a more textual interpretation. I point to the obvious observation that if courts use a more expansive method of interpretation, there is less chance that the decision maker can foresee the exact outcome. The outcome will be based on many factors which the decision maker cannot possibly take into account at the time of the decision.

⁸² Kennedy, supra note 47, at 109.

⁸³ Kaplow, supra note 6, at 565.

⁸⁴ Trust in the courts to make decisions in applying standard norms is a hotly debated issue itself. See, e.g., Scalia, Antonin, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1175 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁵ Morrow, supra note 16.

⁸⁶ Some examples of such courts are: The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, formed according to S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 12, 1993); International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994); The International Criminal Court, created by the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (International Criminal Court); Some international courts are a merge between international courts and national courts, and hence called “The Hybrid Courts.” See, e.g., The Special Court of Sierra Leone, formed according to S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) and agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone (2002), available at: http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/pdfSL/SpecialCourtAct2002.pdf (last visited June, 8, 2008).

⁸⁷ Berman claims that AP-I was a compromise between colonialist and anti-colonial movements. See Berman, supra note 51.

⁸⁸ See discussion earlier in text adjacent to note 51.

⁸⁹ See Gross, supra note 71.

⁹⁰ Kaplow, supra note 6.

⁹¹ See, e.g., Posner, Eric & Yoo, John C., Judicial Independence and International Adjudication, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar.

⁹² As to the role of the lawyer in U.S. Armed Forces see Anderson, Kenneth, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting a Ksion of the Laws of War, 4 Chi. J. Int'l L. 445 (2003)Google Scholar. As to one (a little one sided) perspective on the issue in Israel see Noiman, Noarn, The Legal Adviser in Combat, 41 1 Ma'Arachot 36 (2007)Google Scholar [in Hebrew].

⁹³ Kretzmer, supra note 57.

⁹⁴ For a general description of attitudes of the IDF toward IHL see Cohen, supra note 57.

⁹⁵ Feldman, Yuval & Harel, Alon, Social Norms, Self interest and Ambiguity: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, Rev. L. & Eco. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.comisol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989216 (last visited June 6, 2008)Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ That is when the social norm is of non-compliance.

⁹⁷ Minka-Brand, Hadas, The Correlation between Personality and\ Violence against Palestinians Among IDF Soldiers: From a Psychological Perspective to a Systems Approach, 4 Psychologyiah Tzvyit (Military Psychology) 149 (2005)Google Scholar [in Hebrew].

⁹⁸ Elitzur, Yoel & Yishai-Koren, Nofar, How Can That Be?, 31 Alpayim (2007)Google Scholar [in Hebrew]

⁹⁹ See Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, see especially 32-34, available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/TR3.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ David Kennedy's point is that my distinction between “official violations” and “non-official violations” is no longer valid. The soldier is aware of the attitude prevalent among the top echelons and thus translates it into actions see Kennedy, supra note 47, at 133.

¹⁰¹ Elitzur & Yishai-Koren estimate that about 7-8% of the soldiers misbehave. Elitzur & Yishai-Koren supra note 98.

¹⁰² Is there actually a problem? It is possible to claim that I am trying to deal with the wrong problem here. The problem is not that the rules are not clear. but rather that the clear rules are not enforced. I agree that there is a problem of both. It is not my claim that all problems of violations by IDF soldiers emanate from the phrasing of law as a rule or standard. My claim is that this is an important factor which is often ignored.

¹⁰³ HCJ 3799/02 Adalah v. The Central Command, IDF [June 23, 2005] (unpublished), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/990/037/a32/02037990.a32pdf [hereinafter the Neighborhood Practice]. The job of the Palestinian civilian is to call the suspected terrorist to get out. If the suspect refuses, the civilian is taken out of the picture, and the military unit attempts a more violent arrest.

¹⁰⁴ HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Dec. 13, 2006] (unpublished); an English translation is available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Id. at ¶ 60.

¹⁰⁶ Kennedy, supra note 47, at 149.

¹⁰⁷ Schlag, Pierre, Rules and Standards, 33 Uclal. Rev. 379 (1985–1986)Google Scholar.