1 In 1945 at the inception of the U.N. there were 51 members of which 8 were Asian and 3 African. By the end of 1976 membership numbered 146 members with 18 Asian and 43 African States! The increase in Third World membership is clearly the outcome of Chap. XI and XII of the U.N. Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2621, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) and the creation of the Special Committee of Seventeen (1961), enlarged to twenty-four (1962), reflecting a shifting impetus from the Trusteeship Council. Whereas in the immediate post-World War II era the major world powers, East and West, controlled the U.N. through the Security Council, today there is an 82 nation coalition, representing almost three-fifths of the total membership of the U.N., in a position to mould policy in the General Assembly. On the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and its work within the institutional framework of the U.N. see Menon, P., “U.N. Special Committee and Decolonization” (1969) 9 Indian J. Int. L. 19.Google Scholar

2 For a discussion of transnational organizations see generally Sumida, G., “Transnational Movements and Economic Structures” in Black, C. and Falk, R., eds., The Future of the International Legal Order (1972) vol. 4, p. 524.Google Scholar See also the theme of “Transnational Relations and World Politics” in (1971) 25 Int'l Organization, Keohane and J. Nye, eds., 329.

3 Bertelson, J., ed., Non-State in International Politics: Comparative System Analyses (1977).Google Scholar

4 Falk, R., “A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals” (1975) 84 Yale L.J. 969.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Mansbach, R., Ferguson, Y., Lampert, D., The Web of World Politics: Nonstate Actors in the Global System (1976).Google Scholar

6 Verzijl, J., International Law in Historical Perspective (1969) vol. 2, p. 205.Google Scholar

7 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Positions at 29th U.N. General Assembly” Special Rep. No. 13 (1975) 4.

8 Anzilotti, D., Cours de Droit International (1929) 134.Google Scholar

9 Schwarzenberger, G., International Law (3rd ed., 1957) 140, 155Google Scholar; A Manual of International Law (2nd ed., 1950) 50, 52; “The Protection of Human Rights in British State Practice” (1948) 1 Current Legal Problems 152 at 153.

10 Duguit, A., Traité de Droit Constitutional (3rd ed., 1927) 713.Google Scholar

11 Krabbe, B., The Modern Idea of the State (1927) 241, 243.Google Scholar

12 Scelle, G., Manuel de Droit International Public (3rd ed., 1948) 507–509, 543.Google Scholar

13 Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law (1952) 96, 114, 124, 126Google Scholar; A General Theory of International Law (1945) 59, 65, 83, 347.

14 Verdross, A., Völkerrecht für Veubearbeitete und Erweiterte Auflage (1959) 128, 155, 157–158, 160–161.Google Scholar

15 Brierly, J., Law of Nations (5th ed., 1955)Google Scholar; “Règles générales du droit de la paix” (1936) 58 Hague Recueil, IV, 5–237.

16 Briggs, H., The Law of Nations (2nd ed., 1953) 95.Google Scholar

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19 “Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission,” Memo. Submitted by the Secretary-General. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Rev. 1 (1949) p. 19, para. 27, p. 21, para. 31.

20 “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case” [1949] I.C.J. 178, 179. See also Verzijl, J., Jurisprudence of the World Court (1966) vol. 2, p. 36Google Scholar; Rama-Montaldo, M., “International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations” (1971) 47 Br. Year Book Int. L. IIIGoogle Scholar; and Parry, C., “The International Public Corporation” in Friedmann, W., ed., The Public Corporation: A Comparative Symposium (1954) 495.Google Scholar

21 Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 12.

22 The Palestinian National Covenant (1964).

23 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1947–48] I.C.J. Reports (1948) 57.

24 A clarification of the distinction between Art. 32 and Rule 39 and the participation of “states” and “persons” are discussed in Kerley, E.. “The Powers of Investigation of the United Nations Security Council” (1961) 55 Am. J.I.L. 917, n. 88.Google Scholar

25 Nawfal, S., “The Arab Summits and Inter-Arab Cooperation” (1965) 41 Middle East Forum 57.Google Scholar

26 Hasan, S., “Why the Palestine Liberation Organization?” (1956) 2 Arab J. 6.Google Scholar See also Hamid, R., “What is the PLO?” (1975) 4 J. Palestine Studies 90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The Arab League did not, however, see fit to make the PLO a full member of the regional organization until September 1976: N.Y. Times, 7 September 1976, p. 7.

27 “The Palestinian National Charter of 1964” in Moore, J. Norton, ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Documents (1974) vol. 3, pp. 699–704.Google Scholar (For the original, in Arabic, , see “By-Laws of the New Palestinian Popular Organisation” (1965) 2 Arab J. 52–60).Google Scholar This version was subsequently revised. For the revised text which is still in force, see Kadi, L., ed., Basic Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (1969) 137–141.Google Scholar For a learned Israeli commentary and analysis, see Harkabi, J., Palestinians and Israel (1974) 46–69Google Scholar, and for the perspective by a Palestinian Arab, see Sharabí, H., Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (1969) 201.Google Scholar

28 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6003 (1966), p. 12. Military training was provided during the early stage largely by Algeria: Arab Observer, No. 231 (23 November, 1964) 25.

29 The London Times, 30 May, 1964, p. 7. There is no U.N. documentation acknowledging receipt of the letter and/or the organisation's claim.

30 U.A.R. Information Department, Synopsis of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries 59.Google Scholar

31 Arafat has claimed that a total of 105 countries have recognized the PLO. However, this claim is probably a reference to the 105 U.N. member states who voted to invite the PLO to participate in the General Assembly as an observer: CBS News, Transcript, Face the Nations, 7 September, 1975, p. 11. PLO information offices have been established in the following places (date of establishment stated where known):

Middle East: Algeria, Bahrain/Qatar, Cyprus (Mar. '75), Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, PDRY, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (Mar. '65), Tunisia, UAE, Yemen; Africa: CAR, Gambia, Guinea, Mali (Feb. '75), Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta (Feb. '75), Zaire (May '75), Zanzibar; Asia: Bangladesh (Aug. '75), Cambodia (Aug. '75), DRVN, India (Jan. '75), Indonesia (May '75), Japan (July '75), Pakistan, PRC (Mar. '65), S. Vietnam (Sept. '75), Sri Lanka (Jun. '75); Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary (Sept. '75), Poland (Oct. '75), Rumania, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia (Bureau Office, and Political Representative Office, Feb. '75); Western Europe: France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain (June '75), Sweden (Feb. '75), Switzerland (July '75), United Kingdom; Americas: Cuba, Mexico (Sept. '75), U.S., U.N. (Observer status, Oct. '74).

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Peretz, D., “Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?” (1970) 48 Foreign Affairs 322–333CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hudson, M., “The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis” (1969) 23 Middle East J. 291.Google Scholar

35 The development of al-Fatah preceded that of the PLO by ten years when Yasir Arafat, while a student in Cairo, set up a group to act as a small guerrilla movement. Then in 1958, Arafat organised the Harakat Tahrir Filistin (The Palestine National Liberation Movement or Hataf). The acronym initials HTF were reversed to become al-Fatah. Kiernan, T., Yasir Arafat (1975) 155–167Google Scholar; Yaari, E., Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (1970)Google Scholar; Cooley, J., March, Green, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (1975) 90–95Google Scholar; Kimche, D. and Bawley, D., The Sandstorm: The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Prelude and Aftermath (1968) 1–20Google Scholar; Schliefer, A., The Fall of Jerusalem (1972) 61–78.Google Scholar See also Laffin, J., Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (1973)Google Scholar; O'Neill, B., Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East: The Israelis v. the Fedayeen (1974).Google Scholar

36 Abu-Shanab, R., “The Aspirations of the Palestinian Resistance” (1972) 9 Int. Rev. of History and Political Science 107.Google Scholar In effect, al-Fatah assumed the function of the PLA: Beirut Daily Star, 16 February, 1969, p. 7; and ibid., 18 February, 1969, p. 4.

37 These—apart from the PFLP, which withdrew from the PLO Executive Committee but remaining with the Palestine National Council—the Syrian Ba'th-backed as-Saiqa and the Iraqi-supported Popular Struggle Front come under the PLO's authority. For the relationship between the insurgent groups and a number of Arab governments, see Hussein, M., “The Palestine National Movement and Arab Régimes” (1973) 8 Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) 2023Google Scholar; Jabber, F., The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics (1971)Google Scholar; and Joiner, C., The Fedayeen and Arab World Politics (1974).Google Scholar

38 See Khadduri, W., ed., International Docs., on Palestine, 1970 (1973) 795–796.Google Scholar

39 N.Y. Times, 24 November, 1973, p. 3; ibid., 25 November, 1973, p. 17; ibid., 26 November, 1973, p. 22; ibid., 27 November, 1973, p. 1; ibid., 28 November 1973, p. 1. For the text of the declaration, see ibid., 29 November, 1973, p. 16. The Fifth Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (Cairo, January 1972) recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Second Islamic Summit Conference (Lahore, February 1974) accorded it political representation for the Palestinians: Akhtar, R., ed., (1974) Pakistan Yearbook 124–128Google Scholar; Ali, M., “The Second Islamic Summit Conference, 1974” (1974) 27 Pakistan Horizon 29, 202.Google Scholar The ministers of representative states of the OAU followed suit in June 1974. Res. CM/Res. 332 in Executive Secretariat, Organization of African Unity to the United Nations, Resolutions of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers.

40 “Joint Communiqué Egypt and Jordan, July 1974” (1974) 4 J. of Palestine Studies 192. For the PLO's response see N.Y. Times, 20 July, 1974, p. 2. The communiqué failed to make any distinction between those Palestinians residing in Jordan East and West of the Jordan River, and created a great deal of anxiety in the PLO. Egypt then qualified its position by explaining that only West Bank Palestinian residents of Jordan were excluded and stating that if negotiations took place Jordan could hold the West Bank “in trust” for the PLO. The latter was subsequently denied by Jordan. Washington Post 18 August, 1974, p. A6. The relationship between Jordan, the Palestinians and the PLO was further strained when the Jordanian ambassador to the U.N. spoke of a special relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan without mention of the PLO. U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2253 (1974), p. 26. In November 1974, after the Rabat Conference, the Jordanian Parliament, meeting in emergency session, amended articles 34 and 73 of the Jordanian Constitution, waiving all Jordanian claims to the West Bank in favour of the PLO, ostensibly to give West Bank Pales tinians the choice between Palestinian and Jordanian citizenship; N.Y. Times, 5 November, 1974, p. 1; ibid., 6 November, 1974, p. 12; ibid., 14 November, 1974, p. 1. For a brief review of social changes and attitudes in West Bank society see Shamir, S. et al. , The Professional Elite in Samaria: Summary of Findings (1976)Google Scholar and Cohen, A., “West Bank Sentiments 1967–1973” in Curtis, M. et al. eds., The Palestinians: People, History, Politics (1975) 88Google Scholar and Rejwan, N., “The West Bank Since Rabat” (1975) 21 Midstream 13.Google Scholar Given the history of internecine and family conflict in Arab Palestine, we speculate that prominent West Bank Palestinian Arabs would probably not be happy with the PLO in a position of authority. An alternative to which many of them look, is participation in a newly constituted Jordan. See Lustig, I., “What do the Palestinians Want? Conversations in the Occupied Territories” (1974) 17 New Outlook 25Google Scholar; “Palestinian Trilogy: Views from the West Bank” (1972) 44 New Middle East, 11; Shihadeh, A., “Fatah Does Not Speak for Democratic Palestine: A Reply to Yasir Arafat” (1969) 6 New Middle East 11Google Scholar; “To Vote or Not to Vote: West Bank on Eve of Crisis” (1972) 40 New Middle East 34. The Soviets appeared to be checking the ambitions of the PLO leadership by strengthening Jordan's position vis-à-vis the West Bank. N.Y. Times, 16 March, 1975, p. 16; Ibid., 1 May, 1975, p. 3; Norton, A., Moscow and the Palestinians: A New Tool of Soviet Policy in the Middle East (1974) 17.Google Scholar For Soviet hesitation toward open acceptance of the PLO, see N.Y. Times, 6 May, 1975, p. 3. For a review of Arab governments' hostility toward an overly ambitious PLO see S. Karnow's column, ibid., 25 March, 1975, p. 33.

41 Ibid. 29 October, 1974, p. 1. See generally Sakhnini, I., “P.L.O., The Representative of the Palestinians” (1974) 6 Arab Palestinian Resistance 42.Google Scholar

42 U.N. Doc. A/9742, Cor. 1, Add. 1–4 (1974). This item had actually been held in abeyance in the General Assembly since 1952 and in the Security Council since 1967. See an explanation by a former Syrian Representative to the U.N., Tomeh, G., “When the U.N. Dropped the Palestinian Question” (1974) 4 Journal of Palestine Studies 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 G.A. Res. 194, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), p. 36; G.A. Res. 2792E, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 47; G.A. Res. 2851, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doe. A/8429 (1971), p. 48; G.A. Res. 2963D, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), p. 28; G.A. Res. 3005, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), p. 27; G.A. Res. 3089C, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), p. 27; and G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), p. 78. U.N. specialized agencies have acted similarly. Thus, the World Health Organization (WHO) called for the return of displaced persons in the Middle East in order to ameliorate their health conditions. WHO Res. WHA21.38 in Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board, 1948–1971 (1971) 21; 23 U.N. SCOR, 1361st meeting (1968), p. 5 See also ECOSOC Res. 1336, 44 U.N. ECOSOC 50, Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968), p. 19 and again ECOSOC Res. 1592 (L), 48 U.N. ECOSOC 53, Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5044 (1971), p. 19.

44 G.A. Res. 2535B, 24 U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), p. 73; G.A. Res. 2672C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), p. 36; G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 82; G.A. Res. 2792D, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 47; G.A. Res. 2963E, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), p. 29; G.A. Res. 3070, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 (I), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), p. 78; and G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 (I), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), p. 78. For an overall analysis see Sureda, A., The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (1973)Google Scholar; Shukri, M., The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations (1965).Google Scholar For the view that there is nothing inherently natural or human to self-determination but the outcome of historical-political development, see Bos, , “Self-Determination by the Grace of History” (1968) 15 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor International Recht 362.Google Scholar For a strictly African viewpoint, see Umozurike, U., Self-Determination in International Law (1972).Google Scholar Some states, notably Eastern European and members of the Afro-Asian bloc, subscribe to the thesis that national liberation movements do not employ methods which come under traditional legal controls. See the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Observations of States Submitted in Accordance with G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII). U.N. Docs. A/AC. 160/1 and Adds. 1–3 May-July 1973. For general elaboration of claims of justification, see Paust, infra n. 51.

45 Resolution No. 1, Christman, H., ed., Neither East Nor West (1973) 122.Google Scholar

46 Resolution No. 5, ibid., p. 176.

47 Resolution No. 4, U.N. Doc. A/9810, Annex (1974), p. 6.

48 Resolution 3(c), Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, op. cit. At the Ninth Summit Conference of the OAU, “liberation movements” were given the status of representatives of their people at OAU sessions instead of the former status of observers. M. Resulovic, “Ten Years of the Organization of African Unity” (1973) 24 Review of International Affairs No. 555, at 34. See also Y. Alimov, “OAU: Ten Years of Existence” (1973) 10 International Affairs, 59–64. The OAU at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Addis Ababa, agreed publicly to call for financial support for the PLO. N.Y. Times, 19 February, 1975, p. 16. African support for the Palestinian Arab cause did not begin with the PLO. At the first Conference of Independent African States (Accra, April 1958) the delegates expressed “deep concern”, and called for a “just solution of the Palestine Question”. Legum, , Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (1962) 148.Google Scholar At the Casablanca Conference (January 1961) a group of African states, for the first time, joined with an Arab state in a series of anti-Israeli resolutions; similar statements are to be found in the Protocol of the African Charter (5 May, 1961), Legum, ibid., pp. 188, 196.

49 Insurgency may be defined as “a situation in which a people may seek or are seeking revision of their social, politicai, economic or cultural environment through the application of some degree of violence and the results thereof.” Silverburg, , “Insurgency in the Middle East” (1969) 7 International Problems 55.Google Scholar

50 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961), p. 66. See also Rowe, E., “The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations” (1964) 8 J. Conflict Resolution 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For the political effect of the relevant resolutions, see Anand, R., New States and International Law (1972) 58Google Scholar; Claude, I., “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations” (1966) 20 International Organization 367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Article 2(4) of the Charter in fact only prohibits the use or threat of use of force by member states, which raises the question whether it is binding upon non-members and organizations, politically, diplomatically or otherwise recognized. Article 2(6) refers to non-members States but this has been discussed in terms of neutrality. See Komarnicki, , “The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International Law” (1952) 80 Hague Recueil vol. 1, p. 468.Google Scholar See also Castren, , The Present Law of War and Neutrality (1954) 433Google Scholar; “The Present Position of Neutral States” (1947) 1 Int. L. Q. 212, 214. Whether Article 2(6) relates to the use of force by anti-colonialists, see Jessup, , “Non-Universal International Law” (1973) 12 Colum. J. Transnat. L. 424.Google Scholar Because third party involvement in civil wars during the twentieth century has been a common occurrence, the question of the legitimacy of the Arab states' support of the Palestinian claims since 1948 cannot, it has been argued, be authoritatively resolved. Taulbee, and Forsythe, “International Law and Conflict Resolution: Palestinian Claims and the Arab States” (1972) 6 Vand. J. of Transnat. L. 127.Google Scholar The argument seems specious and contrary to the basic legal principle that violation of a legal rule does not vitiate it. Falk adopts this position in “The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law” in Deutsch, K. and Hoffmann, S., eds., The Relevance of International Law (1969) 143–144.Google Scholar

51 In support of anti-colonial violence, see generally Ali-Saab, G., “Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War” (1972) 3 Annals of International Studies 93Google Scholar, and see also Hingorani, , ed., International Law Through United Nations (1972) 6.Google Scholar For a discussion of the relationship of international law to the Palestinian insurgents specifically, see Belkherroubi, A., “Essai sur une théorie juridique des mouvements de libération nationale” (1972) 28 Rev. Egyptienne de Dr. Int. 20Google Scholar, and Wedel, H. von, “Zum Status der Palestinensischen Befreiungsbewegungen im Völkerrecht” (1974) 52 Rev. de Dr. Int. de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques 185Google Scholar; Paust, J., “Selected Terrorist Claims Arising from the Arab-Israeli Context” (1974) 7 Akron L. Rev. 407–408.Google Scholar

52 The rationale as argued by Arzinger, R., Sellbsbestimmungsrecht im Algemeinen Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (1966) 274Google Scholar, is that “…based on the right of self-determination, the war of national liberation of the oppressed colonial peoples is legitimate. This is so in every case, even when the armed clashes are not begun directly by the colonial power, because the very fact that, in order to maintain colonial domination, armed forces are kept and stationed in the territory of the oppressed people constitutes an act of permanent military aggression.”

53 G.A. Res. 1815, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963), p. 66.

54 G.A. Res. 1966, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964), p. 70.

55 G.A.Res. 2103, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), p. 91; G.A. Res. 2181, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. 6316 (1966), p. 96; G.A. Res. 2327, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967), p. 83; G.A. Res. 2463, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969), p. 89; G.A. Res. 2533, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), p. 106.

56 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), p. 121. For a full discussion of this resolution, see Rusk, D., “The 25th U.N. General Assembly and the Use of Force” (1972) 2 Georgia J. Int. and Comp. L. 19.Google Scholar

57 25 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. 1180–84th meeting. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. (1970).

58 U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1860 (1970).

59 U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1182 (Sept. 30, 1970). For the argument supporting the legality of the Declaration, see Johnson, C., “Toward Self-Determination—A Reappraisal as Reflected in the Declaration on Friendly Relations” (1973) 3 Georgia J. Int. and Comp. L. 145.Google Scholar

60 Ibid. Emphasis added.

61 G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 82. Reaffirmation is found in G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), p. 87. See also Resolution No. 8 of the Conference on Human Rights (Teheran, 1968), that “freedom fighters in colonial territories, when captured, are to be treated as prisoners of war under the Red Cross Geneva Conventions of 1949.” U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968), p. 9.

62 Franck, T., “Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States” (1970) 64 Am.J.I.L. 809.Google Scholar

63 Resolution No. 3, Non-Aligned-4th Summit, Algiers '73, 34.

64 G.A. Res. 2628, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), p. 5; G.A. Res. 2672C, ibid., p. 36; G.A. Res. 2792D, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 47; G.A. Res. 2949, 27 U.N. GAOR 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973), p. 6; G.A. Res. 2963E, ibid., p. 29; G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), p. 27.

65 Resolution No. 2, Second Conference, reaffirmed at the meeting in Lusaka; NAC/CONF. 3/Res. 8. Zambia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka Declaration of Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations and Resolutions of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 15 and again at the conference of Foreign Ministers in Georgetown, August 1972. U.N. Doc. A/9810 (1974), p. 6.

66 Supra n. 63.

67 U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2388 (1973), p. 1.

68 G.A. Res. 104(S–1), 2 U.N. GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Resolutions, U.N. Doc. A/310 (1947), p. 6, reaffirmed in regard to the invitation of the Arab Higher Committee in G.A. Res. 105 (S–1), ibid. The Arab Higher Committee refused however, to work with the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), see 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 11, vol. 2, U.N. Doc. A/364 (1947), Supp. 5, 8, vol. 1, paras. 32–34, p. 4.

69 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Committee (1947), p. 225.

70 U.N. Doc. A/SPC/104 (1965).

71 U.N. Doc. A/SPC/105 (1965).

72 U.N. Doc. A/SPC/L. 112 and Rev. 1 (1965).

73 U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR. 436 (1966)), acting upon the personal request of Mr. Emile al-Ghouri. U.N. Doc. A/SPC/105 (1965). The personal privilege of speaking in committee has been granted to non-governmental groups or individual involved with non-self-governing territories. Individual Palestinian refugees spoke at the General Assembly's Sixth Session. In 1963, Mr. Oliver Tambo appeared (at his personal request) as the Vice-President of the African National Congress of South Africa (U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR. 379 (1963). Representatives of national liberation movements appeared at the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee and the Committee of Twenty-Four (Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). 20 U.N. GAOR/C.4/1518 (1965), p. 1. Requests to appear and speak were granted to Mr. Emil Appolus, representative from the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) (U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR. 1518 (1965), U.N. Doc. A/C.4/641 (1965)) and Mr. Robert Edwards, Chairman, Committee for the Rights of Oman (U.N. Doc. A/C.4/643 (1965), U.N. Doc. A/C.4/641 (1965)). See also Khol, A., “‘Committee of Twenty-Four’ and the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (1970) 3 Rev. de Dr. Int. et Comparé 21.Google Scholar

74 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30(1), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), p. 40.

75 Yearbook of the United Nations 1971, vol. 25, pp. 591–595; 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. A/8410/Rev. 1 (1973), p. 59.

76 U.N. Doc. A/8537 (1971).

77 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971), p. 81.

78 The move apparently rested on the so-called “Vienna formula”, which provided the basis for U.N. member states, or members of the U.N.'s specialized agencies, members of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, being invited to international conferences or becoming parties to conventions held under U.N. auspices. Under the “formula”, it should be noted, specifically named parties to which certain activities were related could be invited by the General Assembly.

79 The first reference to Palestinians as refugees is found in G.A. Res. 194, 3 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), p. 21. On the legal status of refugees see Krenz, F., “The Refugee as a Subject of International Law” (1966) 15 I. & Comp. L.Q. 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and on the Palestinians, see Tomeh, G., “Legal Status of Arab Refugees” (1968) 33 L. and Contemp. Prob. 110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Even in Security Council Resolution 242 (22 U.N. SCOR, 1382d meeting (1967), p. 8), the reference to the Palestinians is to their status as refugees. Partly because of this reference the PLO rejected the Resolution. See “Palestine National Council Endorses 10-Point Plan” (1974) 6 Arab Palestinian Resistance 71; Moore, J., “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes” (1971) 19 Kan. L. R. 419–421Google Scholar; Little, T., “The New Arab Extremists: A View from the Arab World” (1970) Conflict Studies 10–11.Google Scholar Reference to Palestinians as refugees in Resolution 242 may also be contested by the PLO or its supporters because of subsequent political discussions and resolutions.

80 G.A. Res. 2535В, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1968), p. 73. See Culhane, J., “Political Rights—Just What Does That Mean?” (1970) 14 Mid-East 10.Google Scholar

81 The legal status of a “Palestinian people” cannot, however, be fully acknowleged since there has never been a Palestinian political authority or other body legally capable of granting citizenship. The British, during the mandatory period, first introduced the concept of Palestinian citizenship applicable to both Jews and Arabs. See R. v. Ketter, (1940) 1 K.B. 787 (9 Ann. Dig. 46); Schwarzenberger, G., “British and Palestinian Nationalities” (1930) 3 Mod. L. R. 164.Google Scholar Palestinian citizenship was merely a legal form in view of the inability to integrate the two communities. Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Report), Cmd. 5479 (1937) 120. For the League of Nations criticism see League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission Proceedings (1934) vol. 25, pp. 20–21. It may be observed that Mandatory Palestine originally consisted of present day Israel and Jordan, the latter being detached in 1921 by the British. The result was that when a Palestinian sought Trans-Jordanian citizenship, he automatically relinquished his Palestinian citzen-ship. See Jawal Badami Sha'ban v. Commissioner for Migration and Statistics [1945] P.L.R. 551 (12 Ann. Dig. 15). Transjordanian legislation granted citizenship only to those who resided in Transjordan in 1924. Report by H.M.G.'s to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1938 (1939) 331. That Transjordan might be an area for the resettlement of Palestinian Arabs, see Kirkbride, A., A Cradle of Thorns (1956) 19.Google Scholar

82 G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), p. 3.

83 G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), p. 4.

84 G.A. Res. 3375 (1976). Emphasis supplied.

85 G.A. Res. 3247, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), p. 142.

86 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 67/15, Annex (1975), p. 1.

87 Resolution No. 29. Int'l Telecommunications Union, Int'l Telecommunications Convention, Final Protocol, Additional Protocols, Resolutions, Recommendations and Opinion, ITU Doc. M. 13.902–1974 (1974) 228.Google Scholar

88 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. (Preliminary English Text) (1974) 1.Google Scholar In preparation for the second session of the Conference in Geneva the PLO sent a letter to the Swiss Foreign Minister, giving notice that the organization accepted the 1949 Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 75 U.N.T.S. 979–973. In March 1975, 29 countries, mostly Arab and Communist, submitted a proposal to the Conference, which although not specifically naming the PLO, is worded in such a way as to allow the PLO to become a party to the conventions, by giving (he I CRC the right to make a “unilateral declaration” in order to apply the convention to people fighting against “colonial and alien domination and against racist régimes in the exercise of their rights to self-determination.” N.Y. Times, 22 January, 1975, p. 8, ibid., 22 March, 1975, p. 4. National liberation movements indeed were subsequently invited to the second session of the Conference. G.A. Res. 3319, 29 GAOR Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. 9631 (1974), p. 147.

89 WHO Resolution WHA 27.37, 27th World Health Assembly, A/27/VR/13 (1974). See also WHO Resolution EB 53.R58 which recommended that national liberation movements recognized by the OAU be given permission to participate in WHO activities. Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board (1st ed., 1973–1974) vol. II, para. 4, p. 76.

90 Resolution Nos. C3 and C4. Universal Postal Union, Congress de Lausanne 1974, Décisions autres que celle Modifiant les Actes (Resolutions, Voeux, etc.) (1974) 9.Google Scholar

91 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules of Procedure U.N. Doc. A/CONF-62/30/Rev. 1 (1974), p. 15.

92 56 U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1835, Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5544 (1974), p. 1. See also Report of the United Nations World Population Conference (1974) pt. 1, ch. 2.

93 Report of the Executive Committee to the Plenary on Agenda Item 17 [Resolution of the U.N. concerning invitations to liberation movements to attend meetings of Specialized Agencies], ICAO Doc. A21-WP/145 (1974).

94 ITU, op. cit., Annex 1, p. 22; J. Terry, “The Evolving Law of Aerial Warfare” (1975) 27 Air University Rev. 35.

95 Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the [UNESCO] Executive Board at its 95th Session, UNESCO Doc. 95 EX/Decisions (1974) 25–26; (1974) 11 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 156. As a result of Arab and other Third World pressure, parallel action was taken by UNESCO, severely to limit Israel's status in the international cultural organization. “UNESCO and Israel” (1975) Harv. Int. L.J. 676.

96 56 U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1840, Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5544 (1974), p. 4 Resolution 20 of the Conference reflects how politicized international humanitarian efforts have become. Participants of the Conference agreed to defray all travel costs and other expenses of those national liberation groups that attend. Report of the World Food Conference, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 65/20 (1975), p. 17; PLO participation is discussed specifically at p. 37. Rules of procedure for organizational participation and granting of observer status can be found in Food and Agricultural Organization, Report of the Ninth Session of the Conference (November 2–23, 1957) (1958)Google Scholar, Annex C, pp. 221–222. The PLO also received observer status at the 1975 FAO conference. N.Y. Times, 9 November, 1975, p. 14.

97 G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), p. 4. (Emphasis added). For a critical analysis unfriendly to the resolution see J. Stone, “Palestine Resolution: Zenith or Nadir of the General Assembly” (1957) 8 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. and Politics 1.

98 G.A. Res. 3376, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976) p. 3. For the required Secretary-General's report concerning the Palestine question see U.N. Doc. A/10265 (1975).

99 G.A. Res. 3375, ibid., p. 2.

100 G.A. Res. 3237, op. cit. Mower, A. Jr., “Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the United Nations” (1966) 20 Int. Organization 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar, states that: “Observer status cannot be defined in formal terms because the United Nations has never taken any action which could explicitly create or describe this relationship. Since the role is based on usage, not legal prescription, its meaning must be found in the behavior, privileges, and liabilities of observer countries as they actually function at United Nations Headquarters” (emphasis added). See also Frowein, , “The United Nations and Non-Member States” (1970) 25 Int. J. 337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For the official U.N. view, see “Question of Invitations to Certain Regional Organizations Invited to Attend Previous Session of the Council (ECOSOC)”, U.N. Doc. E/2028, June 20, 1951, p. 3, and “Accreditation of Permanent Observers by Non-Members at United Nations Headquarters” (1962) U.N. Juridicial Yearbook 236–237, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/8 (Provisional edition, 1962). See also Steppuhn, D., “Der Beobachter bei internationalen Gremien” (1960) 8 Archiv des Völkerrechts 257Google Scholar, which describes the role of the observer at international conferences, and id., “Der Beobachter, seine Stellung and seine Bedeutung” (1965) 8 Associations Internationales 78, which discusses the role of observers in non-governmental organizations. It is interesting to note that the granting of observer status to the PLO was greatly publicized, whereas little attention was paid when the European Economic Community and its Eastern European counterpart, the Council for Mutual Assistance, were given similar status. G.A. Res. 3208, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), p. 2 and G.A. Res. 3209, ibid.

101 U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2282 (1964); N.Y. Times, 14 November, 1974, p. 22. The only other time a non-member state representative addressed a plenary session of the General Assembly was when Pope Paul VI appeared. See “Moment of Reflection—The Visit to the United Nations of His Holiness Pope Paul VI, 4 Oct. 1964” (1965) 2 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 14; U.N. Doc. S/6707 (1965); Bailey, S., “Some Procedural Problems in the U.N. General Assembly” (1975) 31 World Today 26.Google Scholar

102 ECOSOC Doc. E/ECWA/22 (1975).

103 ECWA Res. 12(11), ECOSOC Doc. E/ECWA/RES(H) (1975).

104 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 67/15, (1975), Annex, p. 1.

105 For the ILO rules governing observers see International Labour Organization, Constitution of the International Labour Organization and Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference (1968) para. 3e, p. 31. For the PLO's request for observer status, see International Labour Conference, Record of Proceedings, 59th Sess., 21st Setting (1974), p. 385.Google Scholar For a discussion on participation of national liberation movements in meetings of the ILO see International Labour Conference, Provisional Record, No. 3, 60th Sess. (1975), para. B, ibid., No. 13 (1975) and No. 14 (1975).

106 The PLO was also able to engineer a strong denunciation of Zionism in the conference's final statement, known as the Declaration of Mexico City. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 66/C.l/L. 38 Add. 3 (1975), p. 6; U.N. Doc. E/5725 (1975), pt. 1, §1; Christian Science Monitor, 23 July, 1975, p. 18; “Mexico Conference Launches Plan of Action for Women” (1975) 12 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 49. For the decision to invite the PLO to the conference see G.A. Res. 3276, U.N. GAOR Supp. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), para. 2, p. 93.

107 N.Y. Times, 23 July, 1975, p. 5. Near East Report (24 September, 1975), p. 166. Mr. William Davis, Prime Minister of Ontario wrote a letter to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on 28 May, 1975, to protest the invitation of the PLO to a diplomatic meeting on crime prevention. Arab Report and Record, No. 10 (May 16–31, 1975), col. 1, p. 326. The organized Jewish community in Toronto also publicly demonstrated against the invitation, Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 July 1975, p. 1. See the Israeli reaction in N.Y. Times, 30 August, 1975, p. 2. In a somewhat similar action, UNESCO postponed a conference planned to be held in January 1976, in Paris, to debate allegations that Zionism is a racist doctrine. The sensitivity of the subject matter resulted in too few acceptances to attend the conference. N.Y. Times, 16 January, 1976, p. 2.

108 U.N. Doc. A/RES/3414 (1975).

109 U.N. Doc. S/RES/381 (1975). For a critical analysis of the PLO's participation in the debate on the resolution, see L. Gross, “Voting in the Security Council and the PLO” (1976) 70 Am.J.I.L. 470 and the responses to Gross's position by C. Murphy in (1977) 71 Am.J.I.L. 131 and Silverburg, loc. cit. (forthcoming).

110 U.N. Doc. S/11883 and Add 1 (1975).

111 U.N. Doc. A/RES/3414 (1975).

112 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1856, 30 November, 1975, p. 16; N.Y. Times, 1 December, 1975, p. 1. The statement was agreed upon by the powers that formulated the initiating resolution, but no vote was taken. “Mandate of Golan Heights Force Renewed; PLO Invitation to Mid-East Favored” (1975) 12 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 5.

113 N.Y. Times, 13 January, 1976, p. 1.

114 U.N. Doc. S/11893 (1975) and for the request by Lebanon for an urgent meeting of the Council see U.N. Doc. S/11892 (1975). The draft resolution calling for a condemnation of the Israeli air attacks was not adopted as the U.S. as a permanent member of the Council, used its veto. U.N. Doc. S/11898 (1975). For the U.S. recommended amendment, see U.N. Doc. S/11901 (1975).

115 Rule 37 provides that any Member of the United Nations, not a member of the Security Council, may be invited on a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specifically affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35(1) of the Charter. Rule 39 provides that: The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence. See, “Provision Rules of Procedure of the Security Council,” U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev. 4 (1950), p. 4 in Sohn, L., ed., Basic Documents of the United Nations (1956) 73.Google Scholar Precedents exist for the participation of the PLO. Under the same Rule 39 the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine was invited to speak at the 253rd meeting of the Security Council. 3 U.N. SCOR 253rd meeting (1948), pp. 256–257. At the Council's 330th meeting the same person was recognized as representing the State of Israel, although Israel was not a member of the U.N. until 11 May, 1949. 3 U.N. SCOR 330th meeting (1948), p. 2. See also U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946–1951 (1954), p. 114. Again in July 1974 Archbishop Makarios, already the deposed President of Cyprus, was permitted to speak before the Security Council as if he were a head of state. N.Y. Times, 20 July, 1974, p. 1; (1974) 11 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 8–9.

116 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1959, 4 December, 1975, p. A1; N.Y. Times, 5 December, 1975, p. 1; Washington Post, 5 December, 1975, p. 1.

117 U.N. Doc. S/11940 (1976). The British attempted to modify the stridency of the original resolution but were unable to do so. U.N. Doc. S/11942 (1976).

118 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1856, 30 November, 1975, p. 16.

119 See text supra at n. 21.

120 “The Subjects of the Law of Nations” (1947) 63 L.Q.R. 444–445. Lauter-pacht's generally liberal treatment of the subjects of international law is also evident when in International Law, Collected Papers (1970) vol. 1, p. 137 he says that: “the range of subjects of international law is not rigidly and immutably circumscribed by any definition of the nature of international law but is capable of modification and development in accordance with the requirements of international intercourse.”

121 See especially P. Gajendragadja, Law, Liberty and Social Justice (1965) 45.

122 “Orthodoxy and Innovation in the Law of Nations” in Proceedings of the British Academy (1971) vol. 57, p. 222. On how international law can be adaptive to political change through already established judicial forums see Fitzmaurice, G., “Judicial Innovation—Its Uses and its Perils—As Exemplified in Some of the Work of the International Court of Justice During Lord McNair's Period of Office” in Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair (1965) 24.Google Scholar

123 Green, L., “Representation Versus Membership: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations” (1972) 10 Can. Year Book I.L. 104.Google Scholar See also Alexandrowicz, C., “The Quasi-Judicial Function in Recognition of States and Governments” (1952) Am.J.I.L. 631.Google Scholar

124 Third Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Nations Conference. Granma (Havana), 30 March, 1975, p. 7. Expulsion from the U.N. comes within the purview of the General Assembly, upon recommendation of the Security Council, under Article 6 of the Charter. Although the attempted expulsion of South Africa during the 30th session of the General Assembly failed, the credentials of the South African delegation were rejected, a step recognized by several international organizations as a procedural alternative to expulsion. See Ciobanu, D., “Credentials of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations” (1976) 25 I. and Comp. L.Q. 351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

125 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT, July 16, 1975; N.Y. Times, 1 July, 1975, p. 3, 16 July, 1975, p. 7, 17 July, 1975, p. 7. The Islamic group, however, met again at the U.N. on September 30 and suspended their anti-Israeli resolution. Ibid., 12 November, 1975, p. 17.

126 AHG/Res. 77 (XII) in Resolutions Adopted at the Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of Slate and Government of the Organization of African Unity (1975), Annex II, p. 9.

127 Resolution No. 9 in Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, Lima Program for Mutual Assistance and Solidarity (1975), Annex I, p. 17.

128 See the statement by Scali, the U.S. representative, made in plenary on “Strengthening the Role of the U.N.”, 6 December, 1974, (1975) 72 Dep't State Bull. 114; the remarks made by President Ford at the swearing-in ceremony of Moynihan as U.S. Representative to the U.N. on 30 June, 1975, (1975) 11 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 693; the address by Kissinger before the Institute of World Affairs on 14 July, 1975, (1975) 73 Dep't State Bull. 149; and his address before the Upper Middle West Council on 15 July, 1975, ibid., p. 172. In general see U.S. Department of State, “The Challenge of the Third World” (1975) Selected Documents, No. 1. This apparent awareness of changes in power distribution in the U.N. is not completely new. Nearly a decade earlier Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke on the same issues, (1964) 50 Dep't State Bull. 112.

129 N.Y. Times, 18 July, 1975, p. 34.

130 S. Res. 214, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §121 (1975).

131 H.R. Res. 673–682, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 8189–8190 (1975).

132 N.Y. Times, 26 August, 1975, p. 11.

133 Higgins, R.The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963) 11–57Google Scholar; Rosenne, S., “Recognition of States by the U.N.” (1949) 26 British Year Book Int. L. 427.Google Scholar