1 This article is sparsely footnoted. Those who are not convinced by the argument on its face will hardly be convinced by a flood of footnotes. To those who believe that a single legal rule always exists out there somewhere which will yield a single correct, independent, neutral, just solution to whatever conflict is presented to the judge, the argument here is a contingent one. It applies only when judges do not seek the single rule and the correct answer but choose to make judgments on the basis of preferences. Those who believe that there are single correct rules and single correct legal answers and that judges always pursue them are excused reading what follows. For them it is simply nonsense with or without footnotes.

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