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Constitutional Experience in the Nordic Countries*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
Extract
With the exception of Great Britain and, for the present at least, of Israel, probably all states possess a written constitution, systematically arranged and with set articles. Another term often used for constitution is basic or fundamental law, since the constitution provides a foundation and framework for the other regulations and norms which form the legal system of the country. In most countries, in fact, the constitution is made in such a way that it is more difficult to change than are ordinary laws; for instance, a set majority in parliament may be required for amendment, or the lapse of a certain amount of time, perhaps there must be an intervening parliamentary election between the proposal and adoption, or an amendment must be ratified by popular vote, etc. An exception to this is the procedure in New Zealand, where although the constitution is systematically arranged, no attempt is made to ensure the stability of it by means of such technical procedures; it can be changed in the same way as an ordinary law.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1970
References
1 A new and excellent description and analysis of the constitutions of the Nordic countries is given by Herlitz, , Elements of Nordic Public Law, Stockholm, 1969.Google Scholar
2 A strikingly new and divergent concept of the nature of the constitution and its development in Finland has recently been presented by Jussila, Osmo, Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808–1863 (English summary: Finnish fundamental laws as interpreted by Russia and Finland 1808–1863), Helsinki, 1969.Google Scholar
3 See Kastari, Paavo, “The Historical Background of Finnish Constitutional Ideas”, Scandinavian Studies in Law Uppsala, 1963, pp. 73–75.Google Scholar
The same method was practised in Germany during the 19th century and also during the Weimar Republic, but in the present constitution of the German Federal Republic it has been prohibited (art. 79). See Laband, Paul, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches 1911, pp. 38 ff.Google Scholar, and Loewenstein, Carl, Erscheinungsformen der Verfassungsänderung 1931, pp. 282, 293 ff. and 304.Google Scholar
4 Seip, J. A., “Den norske Hoyesterett som politisk organ”, Lov og rett. 1955, pp. 1–20Google Scholar, and Johs Andenaes, ibidem pp. 21–43 and Herlitz, Nils, “Politik i rattslivet”, Tidskrift for retsvidenskap, 1966, pp. 137–143.Google Scholar
5 Of its 112 articles, 37 are preserved in their original form. A considerable number of the articles concerning the power of the executive and of the King were amended in 1905, at the time of the separation from Sweden. In Norway the constitutional institution of so-called “emergency powers” has developed without any express delegation by the constitution or by amendment. By virtue of this “emergency powers” institution the official concerned has the power, during the period of emergency, to deviate from any provision of the constitution to the extent and degree required by the emergency. But after the emergency situation has passed the constitutional rules return to force. It was on this basis that although in exile in London the King and government of Norway were able to take legal action as regards the affairs of the country during the German occupation (1940–45). This situation is to some extent reminiscent of the “exceptional statute” procedure in Finland, but the method does not even require obtaining the approval of Parliament, let alone a special majority.
However, in Norway as well as in Sweden and Denmark special legislation altering the constitution has been approved, so that certain powers vested by the constitution in national organs could be transferred by Parliament to international bodies. Such a decision, however, requires a special majority. (Cf. Anderson, S. V., “Supranational Delegation Clauses in Scandinavian Constitutions”, (1965) 15 Western Pol. Q. 840–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar (Inst. of Govt. University of Utah). In Finland no such special delegation is required, because an exception to the constitution can be adopted there in urgent circumstances by a 5/6 majority.
6 Miller, J. N., “Dead Hand of the Past,” (1968) National Civic Review, pp. 183–88Google Scholar, (National Municipal League, N. Y.).