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Between Cease-Fires in the Middle East

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

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The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 (“the November Resolution”) will obviously be a main focus of international attention in the diplomacy following the renewed Israel-Egypt Cease-Fire of August 8, 1970. And the writer has published a study of it in “The ‘November Resolution’ and Middle East Peace: Pitfall or Guidepost”? The present study, parallel to that one, is a stocktaking for the three years or so between the Cease-Fires of 1967 and 1970, of the conduct of Israel and the Arab States, as this bears upon their obligations under international law. The detailed aspects of conduct involved will be clear enough from the headings. All of them obviously pertain either to conduct affecting the regime of cease-fire, or to conduct affecting the regime of Israel's administration of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Egypt and Syria, with massive Soviet support, have more than restored their armaments virtually to pre-June 1967 levels. According to Washington Post figures of May 23, 1970, Egypt's front-line aircraft then numbered 600 (including 320 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's) as compared with 450 immediately before, and only 100 immediately after, the Six Day War. To these, after the disclosure of actual Soviet air patrols in Egypt, it is clear that by July 1970 a further 100 Mig 21's with accompanying Soviet pilots have to be added; and the arrival of another 50 Soviet-piloted aircraft was reported to be then impending. Syria was reported by Aviation Week and Space Technology (at about the same date) to have 230 planes (including 100 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's). That magazine estimated that the Arab States involved marshalled a total of 1230 fighter bombers (including the 100 Soviet-manned planes), and that this represented a four to one superiority over Israel's 330 aircraft which included 60 Mirage 3J's, 42 Phantoms, and 48 Skyhawks. (The London Institute of Strategic Studies estimated Israel's holdings in May as only 325, including 50 Phantoms).

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1971

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References

1 University of Toledo, A Collection of Essays in Honor of Joseph L. Kunz (1970)Google Scholar.

2 Washington Post, May 23, 1970.

3 According to the Deputy Foreign Minister on October 27, 1968.

4 See, for example, Garcia-Mora, M. R., International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons against Foreign States (1962) 3033.CrossRefGoogle ScholarCf. on the less stern rule above, Wright, Q., “The Prevention of Aggression” (1956) 50 Am. J.I.L. 514, 527.Google Scholar

5 See Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 241–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Soviet Note, Dec. 5(3) (sic), 1929, in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1929, ii, pp. 404–406.

6 Draft of League of Nations Committee on Security Questions, 193, and various Conventions Defining Aggression, on which see (1933) Am. J.I.L. Supplement 193.

7 See Stone, J., Aggression and World Order (1958) 3, 115, 135, 150, 205–206, 211.Google Scholar

8 Jerusalem Post (hereafter referred to as J.P.), May 24, 1970.

9 Statement of Deputy Prime Minister Allon, March 3, 1970, in J.P., March 4, 1970.

10 Jerusalem Post Weekly (hereafter referred to as J.P.W.), July 13, 1970.

11 See, for example, the Prime Minister's statements of February 2, 9, 12 and 17, 1970.

12 J.P., April 20, 1970.

13 These and other complaints by Israel were elaborated by the Israel representative in the Security Council. (S/PV 1401, S/PV 1404, S/PV 1407, S/PV 1409–1412).

14 Radio Cairo, December 12, 1969, as monitored by the BBC.

15 Rabat Radio, December 21, 1969, as monitored by the BBC.

16 Ath-Thawra, Baghdad, December 12, 1969; cf. Iraqi Foreign Minister Sheikhaly's declaration of full support for the “Palestine resistance” (Arab News Agency, Baghdad, February 4, 1970).

17 Libyan Radio and P.L.O. Radio, of dates mentioned, as monitored by the BBC.

18 Algiers Radio, as monitored by the BBC.

19 Amman Radio, February 14, 1970, as monitored by the BBC.

20 J.P., April 9, 1970.

21 Al-Hayat, Beirut, January 7, 1970.

22 An-Nahar, Beirut, January 20, 1970.

23 The Australian, June 16, 1970.

24 J.P., January 13, 1970.

25 J.P., June 8, 1970, figures of the Police Minister Hillel.

26 J.P.W., July 13, 1970, p. 5.

27 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law, (6th ed.) vol. 1, § 130, p. 266.Google Scholar

28 See Soviet Note, Dec. 5(3), 1929, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. 2, p. 405, and see supra p. 171.

29 J.P., February 13, 1970 and February 22, 1970.

30 J.P., February 24, 1970.

31 J.P., March 15, 1970.

32 J.P., February 23, 1970.

33 I.C.A.O. Legal Committee, Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Doc. 8865, LC/159, March 16, 1970. For an admirable summation to October, 1970, see McWhinney, E., “Hijacking of Aircraft” Provisional Report, Institut de Droit InternationalGoogle Scholar.

34 For the three acceptances see Docs. S/7947, S/7953, S/7958, S/7985. For Iraq's statement see S/7990, S/8894.

35 See Doc. S/8279 of November 24, 1967.

36 A/6761.

37 Bulloch, John in The Australian, August 25, 1970, p. 13.Google Scholar

38 J.P., April 1, 1970.

39 Cf. the view in Lall, A., The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (1968) 279.Google Scholar

40 Doc. S/9634, February 2, 1970.