¹ See generally Akzin, B., Studies in Law and Politics (1966) (Hebrew) 110 ff.Google Scholar (hereafter referred to as Akzin, Studies); Akzin, B., “Problems of Constitutional and Administrative Law” in Papers Read at the International Lawyers' Convention in Israel (1958) 168 ff.Google Scholar and the comments thereon (hereafter referred to as Akzin, Problems); Rubinstein, A., “Israel's Piecemeal Constitution”, XVI Scripta Hierosolymitana (1966) 201Google Scholar; Freudenheim, Y., Government in Israel (1967) 8 ff.Google Scholar

² 5 Divrei HaKnesset 1717, 1743. Doubts have been voiced as to the original and continuing legal force of the resolution; Akzin, Studies 112, and Rubinstein, op cit. 202. Even if it was merely a parliamentary compromise, winding-up an otherwise inconsequential debate on the Constitution and binding, if at all, only on the Knesset during which it was carried, its political significance and the fact that later Knessets have acted substantially within its terms, set it up as more than a mere political declaration of intention.

³ For the legislative process, see my Comment in (1968) 3 Is.L.R. 462, 463–64.

⁴ See e.g. Rubinstein, op. cit. 201 and Likhovski, E., “The Courts and the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset” (1968) 3 Is.L.R. 345.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Sec. 7(a), Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948; the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1948; secs. 1 and 3, the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 1949; sec. 1, the Transition Law, 1949; sec. 5, the Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951.

⁶ Z. Silberstein in a comment on Akzin, Problems, op. cit., 239 ff. This was the position at least until the adoption of the Polish Constitution in 1952: Peaslee's, , Constitutions of Nations (3rd ed.)Google Scholar sub Poland.

⁷ Cf. Rubinstein, op. cit. 206, and Akzin, , Studies 115 ff.Google Scholar

⁸ The question is discussed ibid. 109–27.

⁹ The provision appeared in the original State Comptroller Law of 1950.

¹⁰ Rubinstein, op. cit. 207 points out two Laws which have provisions repugnant to Basic Law: The Knesset and therefore claims that the courts should assume the powers of judicial review, at least of the present entrenched clauses; cf. Likhovski, op. cit., generally.

¹¹ Akzin, , Studies 110.Google Scholar

¹² At the moment, the major omissions are Basic Laws dealing with civic and human rights and the judiciary. There are indications that the latter will shortly be dealt with.

¹³ In introducing the Bill of the present Law for first reading, Mr. Eshkol observed that once it and a Basic Law on fundamental rights were enacted the task of consolidating the various chapters could be undertaken: 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2503.

¹⁴ Ibid. 2504.

¹⁵ These provisions (which are not the only ones in earlier Laws that are pertinent) were repealed by a separate Law passed immediately after the present Law was adopted. No similar repeal accompanied Basic Law: The Knesset because apparently it did not incorporate the earlier statutory provisions dealing with the legislature, e.g., sec. 7 (speaking of legislative authority) and sec. 9 (power to make emergency regulations) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948. In the case of Basic Law: The President of the State, there is a repealing section within the Law itself. Possibly the new mode adopted in the present Law is indicative of the enhanced status it is desired to give the Basic Laws.

¹⁶ Basing himself on U.S. experience, Prof. Akzin wrote in 1958: “A fundamental act which purports to serve as the most stable part of the political structure can be said to be fairly flexible if it is subject to change on the average every 13 or 15 years”: Akzin, , Problems 161, note 1.Google Scholar Having regard to the very special conditions of the foundation of Israel, the six changes which have been made over some twenty years in the Transition Law, 1949, are not excessive. The first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitution which came into effect in 1789 were proposed in that same year and ratified by the required number of states within two years thereafter: Deschler, L., Constitution of the United States (1951) 83, note a.Google Scholar

¹⁷ 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2509 ff.

translation is appended, which forgoes stylistic elegance for greater fidelity to the Hebrew original.

¹⁸ Owing to its fundamental nature and in order as well to assist the reader, an English

¹⁹ See e.g. 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2506.

²⁰ Significantly perhaps in the Bill they formed part of one section.

²¹ Cf. sec. 14 ibid.

²² See e.g. 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2506, 2510 and 2521. It was also suggested that the Government is not the executive but an executive authority. The President, for instance, has fairly important executive functions, e.g. diplomatic accreditation, which at least in law are his alone. And if “executive” is given a wide meaning, all local government falls outside the Government sphere of activity.

²³ Cf. the generally similar view taken by Likhovski, op. cit. 346, of the Knesset's legislative powers.

²⁴ Indeed, at the second reading it was suggested, but without positive response, to add a section requiring Knesset approval for declarations of war and entry into treaty obligations: Protocol No. 115, Sixth Knesset, 3rd Session 261 (mimeograph).

²⁵ I have “translated” the original appellations of the bodies concerned into those of their present counterparts.

²⁶ See Schwartz, B., American Constitutional Law (1955) 87.Google Scholar

²⁷ Cf. Akzin, Problems 166; 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2505, where Mr. Eshkol pointed out that the Government had up to then solved the problems resulting from the noman's-land which exists in the separation of powers in the spirit of the English unwritten Constitution. He used this argument to justify the generality of sec. 1.

²⁸ 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2505.

²⁹ The need for notice in Reshumot under sec. 42(b) of things done in accordance with sec. 31 is of relatively little importance. Why, however, was sec. 33(b) omitted from this requirement?

³⁰ Cf. Rubinstein, op. cit. 201.

³¹ 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2511.

³² Ibid. 2507.

³³ Ibid. 2505.

³⁴ The Hebrew text of sec. 5(b) is a little clumsy. I read it in the sense translated.

³⁵ During the first reading it was proposed to limit the number of Ministries to 12 by combining a number of “kindred” Ministries; 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2512.

³⁶ Sec. 36(5) was voted into the Law on the second reading.

³⁷ Cf. Peaslee, op. cit. generally. Some Constitutions have no provision at all for an oath or declaration.

³⁸ Cf. Klinghoffer, H., “Parlamentarische Demokratie in Israel” (1965) 14 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 499Google Scholar, generally, and on the effect of this upon collective responsibility.

³⁹ Sec. 27, Interpretation Ordinance (New Version), now repealed.

⁴⁰ As it is for the purposes of the official secrets provisions of the Penal Law Revision (State Security) Law, 1957.

⁴¹ Protocol No. 115, Sixth Knesset, 3rd Session 227.

⁴² The question whether the distinction between “Prime Minister” and “Minister” is significant is discussed by Klinghoffer, op. cit., 494–95.

⁴³ This provision was introduced during the committee stage, which adds to its significance. On the other hand a second reading suggestion to give the power to the Prime Minister alone was rejected: Protocol No. 115, Sixth Knesset, 3rd Session 197.

⁴⁴ The Bureau coordinates links with other Ministries and sees to internal political contacts of the Prime Minister. The Government Secretariat prepares material for the cabinet agenda and committees, drafts decisions and ensures their fulfilment. Is all this consonant with sec. 26?

⁴⁵ Israel Government Year Book, 1967–68, 48.

⁴⁶ A proposal to give the Prime Minister the power of dismissal was turned down during the second reading: Protocol No. 115, Sixth Knesset, 3rd Session 197.

⁴⁷ See e.g. Keith, A. B., The British Cabinet System (1952) 64–76Google Scholar, and Mackintosh, J. P., The British Cabinet (1962) 384–95.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Cf. Brown, A. H., “Prime Ministerial Power” (1968) Public Law 28 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Akzin, , Studies 168.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ One general impression gained by Knesset members was that at least in terms of the Bill the Prime Minister had not been given any special rights over other Ministers; the Government presented a picture more or less of a cooperative entity; 46 Divrei HaKnesset 2516.

⁵¹ See Jennings, I., Cabinet Government (1959) 267–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keith, op. cit. 124–25; Amery, L. S., Thoughts on the Constitution (1964) 71Google Scholar; Morrison, H., Government and Parliament (1960) 136–37Google Scholar; Anson, , Law and Custom of the Constitution (1935) II, Part I, 122.Google Scholar

⁵² See generally, Encel, S., Cabinet Government in Australia (1962)Google Scholar and Dawson, R. M., The Government of Canada (1949).Google Scholar Contrast the situation in the U.S.A. where the executive is a body of disparate advisers and not a council of colleagues with whom the President has to work and upon whose agreement or approval he depends. The powers and functions of congressional committees also tend to encourage open conflict among the Secretaries of State: Schwartz, op. cit. 15, 97; Finer, H., Theory and Practice of Government (1950)Google Scholarpassim; Horn, S., The Cabinet and Congress (1960) 184–85.Google Scholar

⁵³ Cf. Rubinstein, op.cit. 207 ff., and for a fuller discussion Likhovski, cit. 361–67.

⁵⁴ There are a number of obvious reasons why the Irish Constitution should be chosen for comparison.

⁵⁵ The comparisons are not altogether accurate because of the variations in the contents of the sections but for the present purpose they are accurate enough to make the point I have in mind. Kohn, it should be noted, provided for a presidential system along American lines. For Kohn, see Organization of the State (1949) vol. 5Google Scholar (in Hebrew) and for Akzin, see Studies, 182 ff.Google Scholar