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Negotiations leading to Anglo-Polish agreement of 31 March 1939
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2016
Extract
By March 21 the British prime minister had discovered that, owing to difficulties raised by Poland and Russia, as well as by Rumania, it would be impossible to secure the support of all the four great powers for the declaration he had suggested on March 20. Chamberlain accordingly altered his course, and on the same day, through Halifax, threw out the suggestion of a bilateral arrangement for mutual consultation between Britain and Poland. The foreign secretary had a long discussion with Count Raczynski, who had received instructions from Warsaw to inform London of Polish objections to the proposed four-power declaration.
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1 Part I appeared in the last issue. It concluded at the point where the British government acting under the impact of the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15 and of information subsequently proved false concerning a German ultimatum to Rumania, had altered drastically its previous policy towards Germany. On March 17, the day after which news was received of a threat to Rumanian independence, the prime minister had announced his intention of organising a ‘peace front’ directed against further German expansion. On March 20, Lord Halifax the foreign secretary had asked the governments of Soviet Russia, Poland and France to sign a four-power declaration for mutual consultation in the event of further threats or actions calculated to change the territorial ‘status quo’ in Europe.
2 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 471, pp. 434-36. Halifax to Kennard (Warsaw), 21 Mar. 1939.
In footnotes 18, 21, 24, 26, 29, 31, 38, 41, 45, 49, in Part I, ‘series D’ should read ‘third series’.
3 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. v, doc. 361, pp. 415-20. Memo. of R. L. Speaight, 4 May 1939, which pointed out that it had taken the foreign office a very long time ‘to worm the truth’ out of the Poles, and that it was not until April 20, and more particularly until Hitler’s speech of April 28, that the Poles were willing to give anything like a precise account of the German demands. He made no bones about his view that the Polish foreign service had deliberately misled the foreign office in concealing the German ‘concessions’ which Hitler and Ribbentrop offered in return for Polish acceptance of the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich and the establishment of a corridor across the Corridor. However no conclusion seems to have been drawn by the foreign office which affected their subsequent negotiations with Warsaw. It should be added that there is no evidence to suggest that Count Raczynski withheld information. He appears not to have been informed.
4 Noel, Léon, L’aggression allemande contre la Pologne (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), pp. 283-4, 296, 319-20, and passimGoogle Scholar.
5 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 405, p. 373. Phipps (Paris) to F.O., 18 Mar. 1939. However, Mr Anthony Eden in a letter to the foreign office on April 5 stated his personal belief in the honesty of Beck’s policy, however complicated and devious a form it might take. Ibid., vol. 5, doc. 11, pp. 36-38.
6 Szembek, op. cit.; cf. entry for 23 Mar., pp. 434-5.
7 Ibid., cf. entry for Mar. 24, p. 435. Beck, op. cit., pp. 181-91. Beck wrote: ‘I had begun by thinking that England would begin by giving preference to a very general and vague arrangement which would be published—under a provision that it is completed later by a secret agreement, perhaps between the general staffs’. He was to find, in fact, but only after March 31, that the English were prepared to go much further and were willing indeed to envisage ‘a much greater and more lasting solution’.
8 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 518, pp. 500-3. Halifax to Kennard, recording conversation with the Polish ambassador in London, Mar. 24. Cf. also doc. 471, pp. 434-6; Halifax to Kennard, Mar. 21, recording conversation with the Polish ambassador in which Beck’s distrust of the proposed declaration was expressed. Anglo-French conversations were held the same day in London. Bonnet agreed that the time had come to call a halt to Germany, but the proposed obligation was so vast that it was necessary to know how each country stood. The French government was in a good state, he pointed out, but the French did not want to have to bear the burden of the war alone. British help on land would at first be very small. If in an eastern war there was no help from Poland or from any other eastern country, France would be in a bad position.
9 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 465, pp. 431-2. Kennard to Halifax, 21 Mar. 1939. Kennard also reported on the evening of Mar. 22 that ‘the difficulty about Danzig is that it is not itself a good casus belli, and that while M. Beck would be glad to know (though he could not admit it) that he was not without backing in the event of negotiations with Germany taking a nasty turn, yet he is naturally thinking more of what he can get than of what he can give in the way of collective security’ (doc. 489, pp. 466-7, Kennard to Halifax, 22 Mar. 1939).
10 Polish white book, doc. 64, p. 69. Minute of conversation, Beck-Moltke, 28 Mar. 1939. Ribbentrop in return said that any Polish move against Danzig would be regarded as a hostile act by the German government. See also Beck’s remark to Moltke, the German ambassador, in Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges (Berlin, 1939), vol. i, pp. 196-7. Cf. D.G.F.P., series D, vol. vi, doc. 118, pp. 147-8.
11 Ibid., vol. vi, doc. 90, p. 111 (marginal note by Weizaecker Mar. 25). See also Hitler’s speeches at Nuremberg on 12 Sept. 1938, and to the Reichstag on 30 Jan. 1939, The Times 13 Sept. 1938, and 31 Jan. 1939. Cf. also Kordt, Erich, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1947), pp. 109-11Google Scholar; Ribbentrop, op. cit., pp. 41-3. In the course of one year Hitler was to react with similar violence on the spur of the moment against what he considered foreign pressure, namely in relation to Austria on 9 Mar. 1938, Czechoslovakia on 28 May 1938, and against Poland between March 21 and 26, and more particularly between March 31 and April 3, 1939.
12 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. v, pp. 802-3 (Henderson to Halifax, 11 May 1939). Ibid., vol. iv, doc. 546, p. 524. Halifax to Kennard, Mar. 28.
13 This is pure speculation. It is grounded on the fact that it was widely known that the Germans were intercepting diplomatic mail. Another explanation is that Beck preferred to keep his ambassadors more or less ignorant of his inner motives. He certainly kept the ambassador in London unaware of much that was happening in Poland. Polnische Dokumente zum Ausbruch des Krieges (Berlin, 1940), Nr. 3, doc. 12, pp. 30-32. Raczynski to Beck, 29 Mar. 1939.
14 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 538, pp. 515-17. Halifax to Kennard, Mar. 27.
15 Polish white book, doc. 64, p. 69. Memo of conversation, Beck-Moltke, Mar. 28.
16 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 523, p. 506. Kennard to Halifax, Mar. 25.
17 Ibid., doc. 535, pp. 513-4. Kennard to Halifax, Mar. 27 (telegraphic). Kennard added his own view that ‘crux of problem … is that Polish opinion is unprepared for even reasonable [? concessions] over Danzig, and that army probably takes the same die-hard attitude’.
The French ambassador also was not informed of what was actually happening (Noel, op. cit., p. 319).
18 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 535, loc. cit.
19 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 560, pp. 540-1. Sir G. Ogilvy Forbes to Halifax, 29 Mar. 1939. The German press had hitherto exercised restraint in relation to the reporting of anti-German demonstrations in Poland in the previous month.
20 John Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of power (1954). p. 437.
21 The Times, Mar. 30.
22 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 566, p. 545.
23 Ibid., doc. 571, p. 547. Halifax to Kennard, Mar. 30. A footnote to doc. 571 states that the information was given to the foreign office on March 28. Kennard replied to Halifax in a telegram received at the foreign office on 31 March, at 3 p.m. (that is, after the British government had decided to make its declaration in respect of aggression against Polish territory) that ‘this information was given him by German journalist who has connection with American Press Agency in Berlin, and has on previous occasions been reliable. Mr Biddle passed it on to his government and American ambassador in London for what it was worth’. In fact it was not worth much on this occasion. Ibid., doc. 577, p. 550.
24 D.G.F.P., vol. vi, doc. 708, n. 4, p. 966-7.
25 Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges Nr 8, doc. 17, p. 71. This Polish omission was presumably due to the fact that the Poles did not wish to make the Soviets any less distrustful of the Germans. Ribbentrop did, however, emphasise that ‘obviously an understanding between us would have to include explicit anti-Soviet tendencies’. However he later left this aside for the future.
26 Ibid., Nr 8, doc. 16, pp. 67-70. The internal German account is more brief; cf. German white book, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, Nr 2 (Berlin, 1939), doc. 203, pp. 187-9.
27 Szembek, op. cit. Entry for 22 Mar. 1939, p. 386.
28 Ibid. Entry for Mar. 24, pp. 389-91.
29 Hitler, according to Ribbentrop’s version, assumed the protectorate of Slovakia without any prior discussion with his foreign minister. Ribbentrop, Memoirs (London, 1954), p. 151.
30 I.M.T., vol. xxxviii, pp. 274-6. Hitler stated subsequently, in an address to his army commanders on 23 Nov. 1939, ‘The creation of the protectorate then took place, and we thus established a base for operations against Poland. But I did not then see clearly whether I should begin by striking in the east in order to continue with the west, or vice-versa’. Op. cit., vol. xxvi, p. 329.
31 Polish white book, doc. 63, pp. 66-9. German white book, Nr 2, doc. 208, pp. 191-4. The German account was much briefer. Ribbentrop took particular exception to the fact that the Polish answer to the interview of the 21st was to mobilise part of her army. According to his version it was Lipski who first raised the question of war between the two countries. He then answered that any Polish intervention in Danzig would also be regarded by Germany as a hostile act. Lipski, in reply, described Polish troop movements as ‘a precautionary measure’. There was also a question of Beck paying a visit to Berlin. Lipski is alleged to have waived aside this German suggestion, and to have pointed out that it would be wiser to solve these questions by the ordinary diplomatic channels before the foreign minister considered the desirability of travelling to Germany. As it turned out, Beck was to visit London a week later.
32 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 560, pp. 540-1. Ogilvy Forbes to Halifax, Mar. 29; D.G.F.P., series D, vol. vi, doc. 108 (footnote), p. 135.
33 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 573, p. 548. Kennard to Halifax, Mar. 30.
34 Ibid., doc. 584, p. 554. Halifax to Kennard, Mar. 31.
35 Cf. Parliamentary debates, fifth series, house of commons, vol. 345, col. 2415.
36 I.M.T., vol. xxxiv, doc. C—120, pp. 380-81. Another directive was issued by Hitler on Apr. 11. The preamble to this second document included the sentences:
The political leadership considers that in this case its task is to isolate Poland, if possible, that is to say to limit the war to Poland. An aggravation of the internal crisis in France and the withdrawal of England which would follow from such a situation could easily bring about such a development in the near future.
Op. cit., vol. xxxiv, pp. 388-9.
37 This was the constant refrain of his public statements. It was not contradicted by his private actions. There must have been many in the foreign office who had decided that war with Germany was inevitable, and that the sooner it came, the better. This was, after all, the argument of those who had opposed Munich in the previous year.
38 M. G. Gafencu, Rumanian minister for foreign affairs, gives an account of a conversation he had with Halifax on 24 Apr. 1939:
Halifax, who was as convinced as the prime minister that no faith could be placed any more in Hitler’s word, was taking all possible care to avoid any action which could be construed as provocative. War perhaps was inevitable, but it was necessary to act as if it could still be avoided. It was in this spirit that he negotiated with Poland. He had not tried to force her to come to an understanding, against her will, with the Soviet Union. The arguments of Beck on this point seemed to him quite plausible. In order to avoid provoking dangerous reactions, he wished first to test out the ground in Moscow before drawing Poland more openly into the general front against Hitler.
Gafencu, , Derniers jours de l’Europe, en voyage diplomatique 1939 (Freiburg, 1946), p. 131 Google Scholar.
39 Gamelin, General, Servir: le prologue du drame (Paris, 1946), p. 413 Google Scholar. Strang, Lord, Home and abroad (London, 1956), pp. 160-61Google Scholar.
40 Sir Nevile Henderson seemed, on occasion, to associate himself with this view. D.B.F.P., third series, vol. v, p. 798. Henderson to Halifax, 26 Apr. 1939; ibid., vol. vi, doc. 158, pp. 137-8. Henderson to Halifax, 22 Aug. 1939.
41 Templewood (i.e. Sir S. Hoare), op. cit., p. 394.
42 The Times, 4 Apr. 1939. Beck himself wished to reinforce this unilateral guarantee (to use his own words) by making it bilateral between the two countries. He felt it would strengthen his own policy, and gain for it more decisive support from the western powers. He considered it obvious that France would follow in the wake of Britain, as London had been for some time deciding the direction of French foreign policy. He realised that a bilateral arrangement would make relations between Poland and Germany even more tense. He was none the less convinced, however, that the conclusion of a formal alliance with England was the last effective way to gain for Poland a powerful ally in the event of it proving impossible to induce Germany to abandon her demands. Beck, op. cit., pp. 189-92. The agreement was subsequently made bilateral in its obligations.
43 It may be felt that extreme decisions betray nervousness. The sudden change from appeasement to encirclement was in itself indicative of the premier’s insecurity. The statements of Sir Horace Wilson in the summer also indicate the vacillation which lay behind the policy of strength.
44 Szembek, op. cit.; cf. entry for 10 Dec. 1938, pp. 386-7.
45 D.B.F.P., third series, vol. vi, doc. 223, pp. 246-8.
46 Beck, op. cit., p. 189.
47 I.M.T., vol. xxiv, p. 382-7. By May 23, however, Hitler was less confident that he could isolate Poland. I.M.T., vol. xxxvi, pp. 546-56.
48 Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin and Sir Percy Lorraine in Rome frequently advised policies which did not meet with the approval of their chiefs in London. Phipps in Paris, Kennard in Warsaw, and Mallet in Washington do not appear to have disagreed with the views held in the foreign office. One question which remains to be cleared up is how far the foreign office was influenced by the advices of the military attachés in Berlin and Rome. Colonel Mason MacFarlane, at Berlin, for example, took the view that, if war was to break out between Britain and Germany, it would be better to have it as soon as possible—i.e. within a few months. D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, appendix 5, pp. 623-7.
49 Hitler frequently emphasised this point himself. Henderson also mentioned it on one or two occasions. Cf. The Times, 29 Apr. 1939, reporting the Fuehrer’s speech to the Reichstag the previous day.