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Accounting for the emergence of violent activism among Irish revolutionaries, 1916–21

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2016

Joost Augusteijn*
Affiliation:
Institute of History, Leiden University

Extract

Why certain Irishmen came to use violence to obtain their political objectives during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919–21 has proved a difficult question. A number of local studies of the experience of volunteers, following the example of David Fitzpatrick, have provided insights into the process of radicalisation but have not dealt with this aspect of the subject explicitly. A more systematic approach has been taken in the attempt to explain the strong variations in the intensity of activity throughout the country. What caused these variations has indeed been a matter of contention ever since the Anglo-Irish War itself. Michael Collins often voiced complaints about ‘slack’ areas in language that left little to the imagination. Since the publication of Erhard Rumpf’s Nationalismus und Sozialismus in Irland in 1959 historians have sought to explain the unequal distribution of violence by comparing the level of I.R.A. activity in a particular county with certain geographically distributed social and economic variables. Hitherto these attempts have been unable to produce a full explanation for regional variations.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd 2007

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References

1 Fitzpatrick, David, Politics and Irish life, 1913–1921: provincial experience of war and revolution (Dublin, 1977)Google Scholar; Augusteijn, Joost, From public defiance to guerrilla warfare: the experience of ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916–1921 (Dublin, 1996)Google Scholar; Hart, Peter, The I.R.A. and its enemies: violence and community in Cork, 1916–1923 (Oxford, 1998)Google Scholar; Farry, Michael, The aftermath of revolution: Sligo, 1921–23 (Dublin, 2000)Google Scholar; Coleman, Marie, County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910–1923 (Dublin, 2003)Google Scholar.

2 G.H.Q. reports (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P17/A/17); Hart, Peter, The I.R.A. at war, 1916–1923 (Oxford, 2003), p. 43 Google Scholar.

3 Rumpf, Erhard and Hepburn, A.C., Nationalism and socialism in twentieth-century Ireland (Liverpool, 1977), pp 4958 Google Scholar; van der Wusten, Herman, Iers verzet tegen de staatkundige eenheid der Britse eilanden, 1800–1921. Een politiek-geografische studie van integratie en desintegratie processen (Amsterdam, 1977), pp 18898 Google Scholar; Fitzpatrick, David, ‘The geography of Irish nationalism, 1910–1921’ in Past & Present, no. 78 (Feb. 1978), pp 11344 Google Scholar; Garvin, Tom, The evolution of Irish nationalist politics (Dublin, 1981), pp 120-25Google Scholar.

4 Hart, Peter, ‘The geography of revolution in Ireland, 1917–1923’ in Past and Present, no. 155 (May 1997), pp 142-76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, repr. in idem, I.R.A. at war, pp 30–61, esp. 58–9.

5 Merkl, Peter, Political violence and terror: motifs and motivations (Berkeley, Calif., 1986), p. 362 Google Scholar.

6 Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 85.

7 Griffith, Kenneth and O’Grady, Timothy E. (eds), Curious journey : an oral history of Ireland’s unfinished revolution (London, 1982), p. 187 Google Scholar; Augusteijn, Public defiance, chs 2–3.

8 Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 38, map 3; Garvin, Evolution, pp 8–22; G.H.Q. reports (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P17/A/17-23); reports to G.H.Q. (N.L.I., Collins papers, P921).

9 Augusteijn, Public defiance, chs 1–4. The role of outside forces has been found to be important in many revolutions: see Aya, Rod, Rethinking revolutions and collective violence: studies on concept, theory, and method (Amsterdam, 1990), p. 59 Google Scholar.

10 Townshend, Charles, ‘The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerrilla warfare, 1916–21’ in E.H.R., xciv (1979), p. 325 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Overall number of indictable offences recorded: R.I.C. Inspector-General’s monthly reports (The National Archives [U.K.] (henceforth T.N.A.), P.R.O., CO 904); Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 69–70, Table 5. The percentage increase in Munster was 290, in Leinster 200. The big increase in Dublin came in the second quarter, with 400 per cent, and in Ulster with 200 per cent.

12 Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 4.

13 Ibid.

14 Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 164–5.

15 I have described the impact of these reactions more extensively in Joost Augusteijn, ‘Why did they fight for Ireland?’ in idem (ed.), The Irish Revolution, 1913–1923 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp 103-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although Hart has shown that in most localities casualties fell first among the crown forces, this does not discount the possibility that police repression, without casualties, could have led to I.R.A. violence (Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 83). Most telling in this regard is the beating the Plant brothers received from the R.I.C. in 1919, causing both young Protestant farmers’ sons to join the I.R.A. and become longstanding gunmen (interview with Elizabeth Plant, Co. Tipperary, 9 Apr. 1990). For the impact of violence by crown forces on the developing conflict see Fitzpatrick, David, ‘Ireland since 1870’ in Foster, Roy (ed.), The Oxford illustrated history of Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 250 Google Scholar. In general, government repression has tended to trigger support for terrorists among the lower social strata: see Merkl, Political violence, p. 364.

16 The total number of R.I.C. posts in 1914 was 1,400 (T.C.D., Goulden papers, MS 7382/2). According to official sources, a total of 447 vacated barracks and 30 courthouses were damaged or destroyed between 1 January 1919 and 1 July 1920: see Townshend, Charles, The British campaign in Ireland, 1919–21: the development of political and military policies (Oxford, 1975), app. V Google Scholar.

17 Hart, I.R.A. and its enemies, chs 3–4; Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, pp 216–17; Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 5; Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 84.

18 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 66–70, Tables 4–5.

19 Townshend, Charles, ‘Telling the Irish Revolution’ in Augusteijn, (ed.), Ir. Revolution, p. 10 Google Scholar.

20 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 34–5.

21 Townshend, ‘Telling the Irish Revolution’, p. 10.

22 Augusteijn, Public defiance, p. 27, map 1. (The five counties studied in this book were: Dublin, Londonderry, Mayo, Tipperary and Wexford.)

23 Idem, Radical nationalist activity in Derry, Co.’ in O’Brien, Gerard (ed.), Derry and Londonderry: history and society ... (Dublin, 1999), pp 589-90Google Scholar; idem, The operations of the south Tipperary I.R.A., 1916–1921’ in Tipperary Hist. Jn., no. 9 (1996), pp 151, 157Google Scholar.

24 Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 174–7.

25 Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary change (Stanford, Calif., 1982), pp 168-94Google Scholar.

26 DeFronzo, James, Revolutions and revolutionary movements (Boulder, Colo., 1996), pp 1022 Google Scholar.

27 Merkl, Political violence,passim; Fathali M. Moghaddam, ‘ Cultural preconditions for potential terrorist groups: terrorism and societal change’ in idem and Marsella, Anthony J. (eds), Understanding terrorism: psychosocial roots, consequences and interventions (Washington, D.C., 2004), pp 103-17Google Scholar. Aya suggests what he calls the ‘vicarious problem solving approach’ which takes the activists’ perspective (Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp 95–102). For Ireland such an approach has also been suggested by English, Richard, ‘Socialist intellectuals and the Irish Revolution’ in Augusteijn, , Ir. Revolution, p. 206 Google Scholar.

28 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.; Peter Hart, ‘The social structure of the I.R.A.’ in idem, I.R.A. at war, pp 110–38; see also Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp 58–60. Charles Tilly has asserted that poorer people simply do not have the resources to participate in revolutionary movements, particularly during the preparatory stages of a revolution ( Tilly, Charles, From mobilization to revolution (Reading, Mass., 1978), pp 75-6)Google Scholar.

29 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 114–16. This picture is confirmed in Longford. The dominance of urban professions there is not so clear, but Coleman has looked at the profession of the father or mother, not of the activists themselves (Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 149–51).

30 Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 48.

31 Ibid., pp 47–8; Coleman, Co. Longford, p.153; Augusteijn, , Public defiance, ch. 4 Google Scholar.

32 The original Fenians were largely an urban phenomenon: see Comerford, R.V., The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society, 1848–82 (Dublin, 1985), p. 111 Google Scholar.

33 Augusteijn, , Public defiance, ch. 1 Google Scholar; Coleman, Co. Longford, p. 163.

34 R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904).

35 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 56–7; Bowden, Tom, ‘The Irish underground and the War of Independence, 1919–1921’ in Jn. Contemp. Hist., viii, no. 2 (1973), pp 910 Google Scholar; Augusteijn, ‘Why did they fight for Ireland?’, pp 109–15.

36 Novick, Ben, Conceiving revolution: Irish nationalist propaganda during the First World War (Dublin, 2001), p. 47 Google Scholar.

37 O’Mahony, Seán, Frongoch: university of revolution (Killiney, 1987), app. 1 Google Scholar; Choille, Breandán Mac Giolla (ed.), Intelligence notes, 1913–16 (Dublin, 1966), p. 238 Google Scholar.

38 Fitzpatrick, ‘Geography of Ir. nationalism’, pp 120–22; Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 51.

39 Hart, ‘Geography of revolution’ in idem, I.R.A. at war, Farry, Aftermath, pp 100–04; Coleman, Co. Longford, p. 161.

40 R.I.C. Inspector-General’s monthly reports, Oct. 1917 -Apr. 1918 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904).

41 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 76–8.

42 Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 17–18, Tables 1–2; Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 43–4. Regional enlistment figures up to the end of 1916, Irish Independent, 14 Nov. 1916.

43 Two years of English atrocities in Ireland [n.d.] (T.C.D., Gallagher papers, MS 10050/626)Google Scholar.

44 See R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports, 1919 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904); raid on Collinstown aerodrome in Dublin, Pat MacCrea (U.C.D.A., O’Malley papers, P17b 110). For the fear among militarists of being sidelined by the political campaign see Townshend, ‘Irish Republican Army’, pp 320–21; Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, pp 215–16. Such a violent response is in line with the rational collective action theory proposed by Charles Tilly and others; see McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan, Explaining Northern Ireland: broken images (Oxford, 1995), pp 258-9Google Scholar.

45 Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 36, Table 1; pp 66–7, Table 5; R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports, 1919 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904).

46 Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 164–5.

47 Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 335–52; see also Merkl, Political violence, p. 350.

48 Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 89–92.

49 Merkl, Political violence, pp 352–3, 364; Moghaddam, ‘Cultural preconditions’, pp 107–8. In the Irish context, the importance of this was first indicated by Fitzpatrick, Politics &Ir. life, p. 218.

50 The experience of the ‘Big Four’ in south Tipperary is the classic example of this process: see Augusteijn, Joost, ‘Why was Tipperary so active in the War of Independence?’ in Tipperary Hist. Jn., no 19 (2006), pp 207-20Google Scholar.

51 Merkl, Political violence, p. 350.

52 Augusteijn, Public defiance, p. 18.

53 Ibid.,passim.

54 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 66–7, Tables 4, 50.

55 For examples of this in various areas see Mark Killilea (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P17/B109); Dr John Madden (ibid., O’Malley papers, P17b113); James Chambers, ‘Statement’ (MS in possession of Michael McEvilly, Dublin); Michael Hughes, ‘Statement’ (MS, ibid.); Jimmy Swift (U.C.D.A., O’Malley papers, P17b136); Liam Langley (ibid., P17b101); Pat Fallon (ibid., MS P17b109); Tom Maguire (ibid., P17b100); Lt M. Sheerin (N.L.I., Collins papers, P921); Peadar O’Donnell (U.C.D.A., O’Malley papers, P17b98); Wexford Brigade report (ibid., Mulcahy papers, P7/A/17/67-8); Eoin, Uinseann Mac (ed.), Survivors (Dublin, 1980), p. 279 Google Scholar; Augusteijn, ‘Operations’, pp 153–4.

56 Ryan, Bryan, A full private remembers the troubled times (Hollyford, 1969), p. 15 Google Scholar.

57 Eamon O’Dwyer, ‘Statement’ (Tipperary S.R. County Museum, Clonmel)Google Scholar.

58 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.

59 Ibid., ch. 2.

60 Van der Wusten, Iers verzet, pp 208–11; see also Augusteijn, , Public defiance, ch. 7 Google Scholar; Mitchell, Arthur, Revolutionary government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann, 1919–22 (Dublin, 1995), pp 123-4Google Scholar.

61 Police boycott: R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904). By November 1916, of the men officially designated as available for service, 25 per cent had joined the army in Connacht, roughly 50 per cent in both Leinster and Munster, while in Ulster, enlistment far exceeded the government’s targets, overrunning to 148 per cent of those deemed available: see Irish Independent, 14 Nov. 1916. For the 1918 election results see Walker, B.M. (ed.), Parliamentary election results in Ireland, 1801–1922 (Dublin, 1978), pp 185-91Google Scholar; Garvin, Evolution, pp 118–22; Mitchell, Revolutionary government, pp 123–4.

62 Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 53; Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, p. 120.

63 The popular admiration for lawbreakers is described in Zimmermann, G.D., Songs of Irish rebellion: political street ballads and rebel songs, 1780–1900 (Dublin, 1967), pp 23-7Google Scholar. See also Garvin, Evolution, p. 116; The memoirs of Regan, John M., a Catholic officer in the R.I.C. and R.U.C., 1909–1948, ed. Joost Augusteijn (Dublin, 2007)Google Scholar.

64 Garvin, Evolution, pp 123–6.

65 Merkl, Political violence, p. 363.

66 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.; Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 116–20. The change in class composition of activists is in line with theory: see Tilly, From mobilization to revolution, pp 75–6.

67 Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, pp 10, 106–11; I.R.A. order of June 1920, General Orders, new series, no. 6 (N.L.I., MS 739).

68 R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904).

69 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 52–3.

70 Strong support and active opposition also went together with extensive I.R.A. activity in Longford: see Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 153–4.

71 R.I.C. County Inspectors’ monthly reports, 1917–21 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904). Although the percentage of civilians among all casualties shot either by the I.R.A. or crown forces between January 1920 and the truce of July 1921 is roughly equal between Connacht (31 per cent) and Munster (35 per cent), the numbers are substantially different: 21 in Connacht, 156 in Munster.

72 Farry, Aftermath, pp 100–04.

73 Coleman, Co. Longford, p. 172.

74 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 51–2; Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 6.

75 Tilly, From mobilization to revolution, pp 69–99; Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp 95–102.

76 For instance, half of the flying column men in Derry city were outsiders: see Liam A. Brady in Derry Journal, 25 May 1953. On Cork volunteers see Hart, I.R.A. at war, p. 116.

77 Hart, ‘Social structure’ in idem, I.R.A. at war, pp 110–38.

78 Memoirs of John M. Regan, ed. Augusteijn, p. 157.

79 Hart, I.R.A. at war, pp 66–70, Tables 4–5.