¹ Lawson justifiably categorizes Kāshānī's works into two categories, “works for the majority of Shi‘is and works aimed at an elite cognoscenti.” See Lawson, Todd, “The Hidden Words of Fayd Kāshānī,” Actes du 4e Colloque de la Societas Iranologica Europaea, Paris, septembre 1999 in Cahiers de Studia Islamica, ed. Szuppe, M. et al. (Leuven, 2002), 2: 434Google Scholar.

² See Lewisohn, Leonard, “Sufism and the School of Isfahān,” in The Heritage of Sufism, ed. Lewisohn, Leonard and Morgan, David (Oxford, 1999), 3: 123–30Google Scholar. Rasūl Ja‘farīyān discusses this (and the anti-sufi climate coinciding with Fayd's later life) in his “Fayz va Tasawwuf,” in Fayznāmih, ed. Muhsin Nājī-Nasrābādī and Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Naqībī (Tehran, 2008–9), 221–44. This is a reprinting of the source mentioned by Lewisohn, a chapter of Ja‘farīyān's Dīn va Siyāsat dar Dawrih-yi Safavī (Qum, 1991–92), 271–95.

³ See Gleave, Robert, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shī‘ī School, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, ed. Daiber, H., vol. 72 (Leiden and Boston, 2007)Google Scholar.

⁴ For this translation of the term ijtihād, see Gleave, Robert, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shī‘ī Jurisprudence, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, ed. Peters, Ruud and Weiss, Bernard, vol. 12 (Leiden, 2000), 260Google Scholar, as well as 4–6. The Akhbārī movement's defining principle was a rejection of the ijtihād espoused by Usūlīs and an emphasis on interpreting according to the text of the akhbār or ahādīth. For Fayd, this rejection of ijtihād seems to have been somewhat more nuanced than many of his Akhbārī colleagues. Fayd primarily took issue with usūl al-fiqh, the science serving as the theoretical groundwork of ijtihād, and the preference given to it by Usūlīs over and above the akhbār, yet Fayd—exceptional among Akhbārīs—was not opposed to some degree of interpretation in deriving laws from the narrations, nor did he bind himself to the most apparent meaning of a narration, as is evidenced in his body of work. See Ghulāmhusayn Dīnānī's interview with Irshād, Muhammad Rizā, “Savār bar Safīnih-yi Nijāt-i hikmat va falsafih,” in Fayznāmih, ed. Nasrābādī, Muhsin Nājī and al-Qāsim Naqībī, Sayyid Abū (Tehran, 2008–9), 198–9Google Scholar.

⁵ Lewisohn, “Sufism and the School of Isfahān,” 127.

⁶ Ibid., 126.

⁷ See Newman, Andrew J., “Clerical Perceptions of Sufi Practices in Late Seventeenth-Century Persia,” in The Heritage of Sufism (see note 2), 3: 135–64Google Scholar.

⁸ As Rizvi discusses, the reigns of Shah ‘Abbās I (r. 996–1038/1588–1629) and Shah ‘Abbās II (r. 1052–77/1642–66) showed tolerance for non-tarīqa, non-Sunnī, non-musical, and non-antinomian sufism. Later, however, a spirituality advocating the potential supremacy of an individual—whether the spiritual master, his trainees, or his readers—was shunned in favor of deference to the spiritual supremacy of the absent imam, as well as the temporal authority of that imam's two representatives, the shah and the jurists. See Rizvi, Sajjad, “A Sufi Theology Fit for a Shī‘ī King: The Gawhar-i Murād of ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhījī,” Sufism and Theology, ed. Shihadeh, Ayman (Edinburgh, 2007), 85–86Google Scholar.

⁹ Rizvi, Sajjad H., “Mullā Sadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy,” Journal of Semitic Studies, Supplement 18 (2007): 22Google Scholar. By “Mullā Sadrā” I refer to Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635–36).

¹⁰ In these treatises, Kāshānī treats each kalima not as a single word, but rather as an extended declaration; this is not uncommon in Arabic, seen, for example, in the “kalima” declaring God's oneness, referred to as kalimat al-tawhīd (lā ilāha illā Allāh). The grammarian Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn Mālik (d. 672/1274) says in his famous al-Alfiyya that “sometimes by kalima (word), kalām (sentence) is meant.” See Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 769/1367), Sharh Ibn ‘Aqīl ‘alā Alfiyyat Ibn Mālik (Qum, 1429 AH), 1: 16.

¹¹ This text, like most of the texts used in this paper, has been published by the Madrasih-yi ‘Ālī-yi Shahīd Mutahharī in Tehran, commemorating the international conference devoted to Fayd held in Tehran, Qum, and Kashan in early November of 2008.

¹² See Nājī-Nasrābādī, Muhsin, Kitābshināsī-yi Fayz-i Kāshānī (Tehran, 2008–9), 241–3Google Scholar, 251–3, 233–6, and 239–40, respectively.

¹³ Mullā Sadrā uses both al-hikma and al-ma‘rifa in one sentence, describing them as the heritage of the philosophers (al-hukamā’) and sufis (al-sūfiyya, here in a positive sense) who taught their followers to acquire knowledge by purifying their souls. Of course, in this description, al-hikma emerges as the sum “wisdom” of these two types of knowledge, but—at times—Sadrā and Kāshānī need the term ma‘rifa to describe the direct knowledge of God and His creation belonging to sufis who did not necessarily engage in philosophical arguments and proofs. See Sadrā, Mullā, Kasr al-Asnām al-Jāhiliyya, ed. Jahāngīrī, Muhsin (Tehran, 2002–3), 53–5Google Scholar.

¹⁴ al-Kāshānī, Fayd, Safīnat al-Najāh wa-l-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa, ed. Gulbāghī, Sayyid ‘Alī Jabbār (Tehran, 2008–9), 218Google Scholar. This quotation comes from al-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa; all subsequent citations of this text will cite it as al-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa.

¹⁵ al-Kāshānī, Fayd, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, ed. Asgharī, ‘Alī-Rizā (Tehran, 2008–9)Google Scholar, author's introduction, 23. All subsequent references to this text will use this edition, despite my having consulted another recent edition, published one year earlier: Kalimāt-i Maknūnih, ed. Sādiq Hasanzadih (Qum, 2007–8).

¹⁶ See Henry Corbin's discussion of the terms tasawwuf and ‘irfān in his En Islam iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques (Paris, 1972), 4: 22. Fayd does refer to the ahl-i ‘irfān in his dīwān, but the substitution of ‘irfān for ma‘rifa is for reasons of prosody; see al-Kāshānī, Fayd, Kulliyyāt-i Fayz-i Kāshānī, ed. Fayzī-Kāshānī, Mustafā (Tehran, 2002), 2: 715Google Scholar, ghazal #255.

¹⁷ Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #97, 281. Henceforth the chapter or “word” number will be indicated before the page number.

¹⁸ The word “infallible” refers to those who have ‘isma (divine protection from error), especially the fourteen infallible ones (the Prophet, his daughter Fātima, and the twelve imams). Fayd discusses the relationship between ‘isma, the imam, and the right of interpretation in al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #86, 248. See also al-Kāshānī, Fayd, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn fī a‘azz al-funūn (Tehran, 2008–9)Google Scholar, #7/5, 121. Chapter numbers from Qurrat al-‘Uyūn include maqāla number followed by kalima number.

¹⁹ A discussion of walāya and al-insān al-kāmil in Kāshānī's writings, specifically influences of Haydar al-Āmulī seen in al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, can be found in Kamada, Shigeru's “Fayd al-Kāshānī's Walāya: The Confluence of Shi‘i Imamology and Mysticism,” Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy, and Mysticism in Islamic Thought. Essays in Honour of Hermann Landolt, ed. Lawson, Todd (London, 2005), 455–68Google Scholar.

²⁰ Lawson, “The Hidden Words of Fayd Kāshānī,” 427–47.

²¹ His second title possibly alludes to verse 56:23 describing the houris of Paradise's foremost ones as being like “hidden pearls” (al-lu'lu’ al-maknūn), coinciding with the word maknūna in his original title.

²² Frequently, Fayd will refer to the hadith of the “Two Weighty Things,” since it verifies the stance of the Twelver Shi‘i school that all knowledge must come from the Qur'an or the Prophet and his family (which includes Fātima, the twelve imams, and their narrations). In this hadith the Prophet Muhammad is reported to proclaim, “I leave among you the Two Weighty Things, that which—if you cling to it—you will never go astray: God's book and my progeny, my household (ahl baytī). These two will never separate until they return to me at the pool [of Kawthar, in Paradise].” Fayd discusses this hadith in Kāshānī, Tafsīr al-Sāfī (Tehran, 1415 AH), 1: 55.

²³ al-La’āli' from Fayd al-Kāshānī, Majmū‘ih-yi Rasā’il (vol. 3): Panj risālih-yi falsafī va ‘irfānī, ed. ‘Alī-Rizā Asgharī and Mahdī Hājjīyān (Tehran, 2008–9), author's introduction, 135.

²⁴ I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggested interpretation of the number forty-one.

²⁵ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn fī a‘azz al-funūn, author's conclusion, 238.

²⁶ Nājī-Nasrābādī comments that, for this reason, some eminent Shi‘i scholars have also referred to Qurrat al-‘Uyūn as al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna. See Kitābshināsī, 233.

²⁷ See Bīdārfar's extremely useful introduction to his edition of Fayd al-Kāshānī's ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn fī Usūl al-Dīn, ed. Muhsin Bīdārfar (Qum, 1426 AH), 1: 34.

²⁸ This can be seen, for example, in the ninth chapter, “A word [declaration] in which is an allusion to the manner in which existence and the immutable identities interconnect in the external [world],” Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #9, 54–6.

²⁹ See Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #3/2, 40–6 (for the intellect), and #2/4 and #2/5, 35–8 (for the divine names).

³⁰ See Kāshānī, ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, 1: 34. Bīdārfar mentions an instance where haqā’iq al-makhlūqāt has replaced al-a‘yān, or where “the infallible human” (al-insān al-ma‘sūm) has replaced “the Perfect Man” (al-insān al-kāmil). In both cases, terms found in scripture (the Qur'an and narrations) replace terms clearly associated with Ibn ‘Arabī and his school.

³¹ Those are chapters 8, 9, 11, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37 (where hikma is added), 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 76, and 77. The reference often seems to be to previous sufi and philosophical writers, but I have only traced a few of them.

³² Those are 11/1 and 12/3.

³³ Those are 1/5, 2/5, 3/2, 4/3, 4/4, 4/5, 5/1, 6/5, 7/1, 7/2, 7/3, 7/4, 9/3, 9/5, 10/5, 11/3, 12/1, and 12/2.

³⁴ Those are 14, 34, 35, 36, 68, 79, 85, 91, and 92.

³⁵ Those are 68 and 91. In the first, the first sentence indicates that these traditions function as scriptural support for what has passed, and in the latter, the title does so.

³⁶ Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #100, 289. Fayd uses the word tawshīh to mean “to embellish or adorn by means of illustrative example,” as can be seen more clearly in his use of the same word in ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, 1: 296. There he describes his chapter concerning the contemplation of God's creation: “Most of that which I have conveyed in this chapter I have taken from the words of a certain scholar [as the editor notes, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, in his Ihyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn], condensing it and adorning by illustrative example from Qur'anic verses, narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt, and a negligible number of words from other than them [tawshīhan bi-āyāt qur’āniyya wa …].” He refers to an authorial style evident in ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn and also evident in al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, in which Qur'anic verses and narrations are added to a discussion without comment, whether before that discussion or after.

³⁷ See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #29, 96–7.

³⁸ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #3/2, 44.

³⁹ The connection Fayd highlights between water and the intellect as two aspects of one creative force intimated in Shi‘i scriptural sources is also nothing new. It can be found, for example, mentioned by al-Sayyid Haydar al-Āmulī (d. after 787/1385). See al-Sayyid Haydar al-Āmulī, Tafsīr al-Muhīt al-A‘zam wa-l-Bahr al-Khidamm, ed. al-Sayyid Muhsin al-Mūsawī al-Tabrīzī (Qum, 1428 hijrī-qamarī), 4: 49–50. Mullā Sadrā makes the same observation in his commentary on al-Kāfī, as Henry Corbin discusses; see Corbin, En Islam iranien, 1: 315–16, n. 307.

⁴⁰ To this pseudo-hadith Fayd adds one alternate prepositional phrase, “with it.” See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #1, 26. See also Kāshānī, al-La’āli', #1, 138.

⁴¹ See Ibn al-‘Arabī, al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya (Beirut, 1968), in numerous instances: (1) 1: 110, ch. 5; (2) more directly, 1: 415, ch. 69, section on recitation in prayer; (3) 1: 483, ch. 69, section on the prostration of forgetfulness; (4) 1: 584, ch. 70; (5) 1: 607, ch. 71; (6) narrator not mentioned, 1: 664, ch. 71; (7) narrator not mentioned, 2: 5, ch. 73; (8) narrator not mentioned, 2: 209, ch. 126; (9) 2: 356, ch. 178; (10) 2: 454, ch. 198, section 3; (11) 2: 514, ch. 220; (12) 2: 567, ch. 266; (13) 3: 116, ch. 331; (14) 3: 147, ch. 338; (15) 3: 147, ch. 353; (16) 3: 255, ch. 356; (17) 3: 378, ch. 369, section 7, with reference to ‘Umar's seeing God with each thing, and allusion to ‘Uthman and others; (18) 3: 559, ch. 396; (19) 4: 7, ch. 405; (20) 4: 56, ch. 443; and (21) 4: 83, ch. 463, al-Qutb #6, with reference to ma‘ahu being at a higher station than qablahu. See also Ibn ‘Arabī, al-Tadbīrāt al-Ilāhīya fī Islāh al-Mamlaka (Leiden, 1917-8), 179. Ibn ‘Arabī's attribution of this saying to Abū Bakr is discussed by al-Sayyid Ja‘far Murtadā al-‘Āmilī in his Ibn ‘Arabī: Sunnī Muta‘assib (Beirut, 2009), 153, where al-‘Āmili makes use of Ibn ‘Arabī's Kitāb al-I‘lām bi-Ishārāt Ahl al-Ilhām as well as the Rasā’il Ibn ‘Arabī, and al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya. In the sources mentioned by al-‘Āmilī, it is clear that Ibn ‘Arabī attributes seeing God before all things (qablahu) to Abū Bakr, seeing God with all things (ma‘ahu) to ‘Umar, seeing God after all things (ba‘dahu) to ‘Uthmān, and does not specify any speaker for the other versions of this saying that he quotes, including fīhi and ‘indahu.

⁴² Commenting on the 224th narration in Kitāb al-Tawhīd, Mullā Sadrā cites it in his Sharh Usūl al-Kāfī, ed. Mahmūd Fāzil Yazdī-Mutlaq (Tehran, 2006–7), 3: 104, attributing to the “Commander of the Believers,” which in Twelver Shi‘i literature is synonymous with Imam ‘Alī. Commenting on the first hadith of the Bāb annahu lā yu‘raf illā bihi, al-Māzandarānī also attributes the hadith to the Commander of the Believers; see al-Māzandarānī, Muhammad Sālih, Sharh Usūl al-Kāfī, ed. al-Sayyid ‘Alī ‘Āshūr, (Beirut, 2008), 3: 83Google Scholar.

⁴³ Kāshānī does not attribute the hadith to Imam ‘Alī, but does have the anonymous narrator assert his seeing God before, after, and with all things. For mentioning of khawwāss, see Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #1, 26. See also Kāshānī, al-La’āli', #1, 138.

⁴⁴ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #1/1, 12. Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna, #1, 25. The narration: “You disclosed yourself to me in everything, so I saw You manifest in everything, for You are the Manifest for everything.” Fayd did include it in the original al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #1, 28.

⁴⁵ Kāshānī, al-La’āli', author's introduction, 135.

⁴⁶ The word used for conjecture, al-zann, would be especially aimed at claimants to ijtihād.

⁴⁷ See note 22.

⁴⁸ The word here, mutakallaf, alludes to the Shi‘i mujtahids of Fayd's time who claimed to bear the legal burdens (takālīf) of others. This word might be translated as “one who claims to take upon oneself someone else's burden.” In describing these four groups in al-Insāf, Fayd labels this last group the “in-my-opinion people” (min ‘indīyīn). See Kāshānī, al-Insāf in Dah Risālih-yi Muhaqqiq-i Buzurg, Fayz-i Kāshānī, ed. Rasūl Ja‘farīyān (Isfahan, 1992), 184, as well as Bīdārfar's introduction in Kāshānī, , ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, 1: 23Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, author's introduction, 7–8. The phrases “with a cup of spring water” and “translucent, sweet to those who drink it” are from the Qur'an, 37: 45–6.

⁵⁰ al-Kāshānī, Fayd, al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna from Majmū‘ih-yi Rasā’il (3): Panj Risālih-yi Falsafī va ‘Irfānī, ed. Asgharī, ‘Alī-Rizā and Hājjīyān, Mahdī (Tehran, 2008–9)Google Scholar, author's introduction, 23.

⁵¹ See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna, #26, 80–4. See also ‘Irāqī, Fakhr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Hamadānī, Lama‘āt-i Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Irāqī, ed. Muhammad Kh^wājawī (Tehran, 1992–93), 68–72.

⁵² See Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #2/5, 36–8, replacing Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #58, 157–8. Fayd discusses Adam as one who makes manifest all the divine names, centered around the Qur'an 2: 31.

⁵³ Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna, #37, 118–20.

⁵⁴ The poem attributed to ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib can also be found in a collection currently circulating in the Shi‘i world, Dīwān al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib, ed. Husayn al-A‘lamī (Beirut, 1999), a compendium that does not specify its sources. In this dīwān, there is one additional line (bayt) not quoted by Kāshānī: “So you should have no need of the outer world / to inform you of that which they have written.” See ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (attributed), Dīwān, 67. In al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, Fayd places lines of his own poetry after those of Imam ‘Alī and lines from Rūmī's Masnavī-yi Ma‘navī after his own lines. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, 157–8, as well as 158, n.1 in which the editor locates these lines in Fayd's dīwān; see also Rūmī, , Masnavī-yi Ma‘navī, ed. Isti‘lāmī, Muhammad (Tehran, 2000–01), 4: 46Google Scholar, (Book Four) lines 810–12.

⁵⁵ Clearly, an animosity toward philosophy and sufism, one grounded in an emphasis on doctrine verified by recorded narrations, existed among certain Shi‘i scholars. This can be seen in the case of prominent Safavid hadith scholar al-Hurr al-‘Āmilī (d. 1099/1688), who refutes sufi doctrine and interpretation on the basis of the akhbār and whom Robert Gleave rightly highlights in a discussion of “Anti-Sufi Akhbārism.” See Gleave, Robert, “Scriptural Sufism and Scriptural Anti-Sufism: Theology and Mysticism amongst the Shi‘i Akhbāriyya.” Sufism and Theology, ed. Shihadeh, Ayman (Edinburgh, 2007), 161–6Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ See Hasan Tārimī's discussion of the composition of Mirāt al-‘Uqūl in his ‘Allāmih-yi Majlisī (Tehran, 1996), 124.

⁵⁷ The obscure hadith recounts a conversation between a bedouin and Imam ‘Alī, and the multiplicity of the soul appears clearly in it. Imam ‘Alī informs the bedouin of “a developing, vegetative soul (nafs nāmīya nabātīya), a sensing, animal soul (nafs hissīya haywānīya), a rational, sanctified soul (nafs nātiqa qudsīya), and a godly, higher-worldly universal soul (nafs ilāhīya malakūtīya kullīya).” Imam ‘Alī continues to give his audience more detail for each of these souls, describing the first two (and Kāshānī reminds us that most human beings never progress beyond the first two) in terms that correspond to classical Greek-influenced Islamic medicine. Imam ‘Alī describes the vegetative soul's origin as the “four natures” (al-tabā’i‘ al-arba‘a) and its location as the liver. He describes the animal soul as an “instinctual heat” (harāra gharīzīya) and its origin as the astronomical spheres. All of these descriptions, namely, the four natures, emphasis on the liver as the moderator of the body's inner balance, attention to the heat and cold of the body, and the anatomical link to the celestial spheres, are found in classical Islamic medicine in which the theories of ancient Greek medicine were adopted and altered by Muslim physicians, as seen, for example, in descriptions of the three kinds of drives in the body by the master of classical Islamic philosophy and medicine Avicenna, Abū ‘Alī al-Husayn ibn ‘Abdullāh ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). See sections 448–50 of Sīnā, Ibn, The Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn fī’l-tibb), adapted by Bakhtiar, Laleh from multiple translations (Chicago, 1999), 131Google Scholar.

It seems to me that this hadith is among those that Nājī-Nasrābādī describes as being in al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna despite their “not existing, according to a number of books of narrations and elders of hadith;” see Nājī-Nasrābādī, Kitābshināsī, 241. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #34, 106 and Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #4/3, 59.

⁵⁸ As Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi has discussed, Kāshānī also allows for the most spiritually elite non-infallibles to have access to the “Spirit of Sanctity” (rūh al-quds) as part of his esoteric epistemological system, a seemingly more controversial position. Amir-Moezzi states that Kāshānī even refers to the initiated possessor of these secrets as a mujtahid, clearly not referring to the Usūlī/rational-legalist use of the term. See Ali Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad, “Remarques sur les critères d'authenticité du hadîth et l'autorité du juriste dans le shi'isme imamate,” Studia Islamica 85 (1997): 32Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, 4/3, 58. For the full text, see ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulaynī, Abū Ja‘far Muhammad (d. 329/941), Usūl al-Kāfī, ed. al-Ghaffārī, ‘Alī-Akbar (Tehran, 1996–97)Google Scholar, Kitāb al-Īmān wa-l-Kufr, Bāb al-Kabā’ir, #16, 2: 281–4. The language here (instead of utilizing specialized terms like those used in the obscure hadith mentioned in note 57) employs the Qur'anic categorization of people into three groups in chapter 56 (al-wāqi‘a), and attributes that which is above the animal not to the intellect, but rather to piety and inspiration. Qur'anic references are even more abundant in the full text of the hadith, which Fayd has summarized.

⁶⁰ In the original al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, Fayd cites this hadith on the five spirits in the context of the antecedence of spirits, yet he does allude to this hadith in the final sentence of his chapter on the multiplicity of the soul; see #34, 107. Thus, he clearly held the position that the narrations can present the two (al-rūh and al-nafs al-nātiqa) as one, even if he does so much more evidently in the later revision.

⁶¹ Indeed, Muhammad Sālih al-Māzandarānī (d. 1081/1670–71) discusses the correspondence of the hadith term rūh to the philosophical term nafs at some length in his commentary on one of two parallel narrations in al-Kāfī that discusses the varieties of al-rūh. Here al-Māzandarānī provides detailed support for the equation of rūh and nafs, citing the opinion of al-Shaykh al-Sadūq ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991), adding to that the opinion of Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Āmilī (d. 1030/1621) that the spirit (al-rūh) when mentioned in the Qur'an and ahādīth refers to the rational soul (al-nafs al-nātiqa), bringing further evidence from a number of Shi‘i and Sunni sources. See al-Māzandarānī, Sharh Usūl al-Kāfī, 6: 70–1.

⁶² al-Majlisī, Muhammad Bāqir, Mirāt al-‘Uqūl fī Sharh Akhbār Āl al-Rasūl, ed. al-Mahallātī, al-Sayyid Hāshim al-Rasūlī (Tehran, 1404 AH), 1: 28–9Google Scholar. He mentions the rūh's correspondence to al-nafs al-nātiqa in 3: 166.

⁶³ See Kalin, Ibrahim, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Sadrā on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (New York, 2010), 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, n. 27. Fayd's primary discussion of tajarrud al-nafs in Qurrat al-‘Uyūn occurs in the chapter directly preceding that under discussion; see Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #4/2, 56–8 and compare to Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #30, 98–101.

⁶⁴ al-Majlisī, Mirāt al-‘Uqūl, 3: 167–8.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3: 166–7. Mullā Sadrā makes this assertion in his Sharh Usūl al-Kāfī, ed. Rizā Ustādī (Tehran, 2005–6), 1: 88. He clarifies elsewhere that the active intellect is identical to what the sharī‘a calls the angel Gabriel, what “a people” (qawm, which means the sufis) call the Holy Spirit, and what “a group” (tā’ifa, which means the philosophers) call the active intellect; see Sadrā, , Sharh Usūl al-Kāfī, 1: 519Google Scholar. I have had to cite a separate editor and date for this volume because the commentary published by Bunyād-i Hikmat-i Islāmī-yi Sadrā has different editors and dates for varying volumes.

⁶⁶ Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna, #29, 97.

⁶⁷ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, #3/2, 42.

⁶⁸ al-Majlisī, Mirāt al-‘Uqūl, 3: 167. It should be mentioned that—in this instance—al-Majlisī does not cite the concept to engage in debate, but rather to illustrate a point.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 1:27. Context indicates that al-Majlisī means “existent” and not “existence” by wujūd. The more contemporary hikma philosopher and Qur'an/hadith commentator, ‘Allāma Muhammad Husayn Tabātabā’ī (d. 1981) took issue with some of al-Majlisī's anti-hikma stances, including his stance on the immateriality of the intellect, in footnotes to an edition of Bihār al-Anwār. These notes have since been removed. See Medoff, Louis Abraham's “Ijtihād and Renewal in Qur'anic Hermeneutics: An Analysis of Muhammad Husayn Tabātabā'ī's al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2007), 22–3Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ al-Majlisī, Mirāt al-‘Uqūl, 1: 25; other possible meanings of al-‘aql in Shi‘i narrations are outlined in 1: 25–7.

⁷¹ al-Majlisī, Mirāt al-‘Uqūl, 1: 28. The argument here is subtle. While it is true that this exact narration is not mentioned in al-Kāfī or other authoritative Shi‘i collections, al-Majlisī acknowledges that one does appear in al-Kāfī that God created the intellect as the first of the spiritual entities (al-rūhānīyīn). According to al-Majlisī, this does not contradict the precedence of bodies (such as water and air, as mentioned in other narrations) and can be interpreted in a variety of ways without confirming the interpretation of the philosophers, namely that it refers to a primordial disembodiment of the soul.

⁷² That is, Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna #29, 96, and Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn #3/2, 44.

⁷³ Nevertheless, anti-sufi sentiment seems to have been acute. As Babayan points out, even al-Majlisī, who was the Shaykh al-Islām under Shah Sulaymān (r. 1076–1105/1666–94), despite his status, had to strive to discredit accusations that his father was a sufi, accusations that stemmed from the “political and religious vicissitudes of his age.” See Babayan, Kathryn, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2002), 463Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Similar to that mentioned in the following paragraph, in al-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa, Fayd criticizes those who only concern themselves with philosophy (falsafa), not the law, or revelation, or the sunna, reckoning the philosophical sciences to be higher than the religious ones, when in fact such knowledge is only attained through disciplining practice. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa, 196–7.

⁷⁵ See al-Kāshānī, Fayd, al-Insāf in Dah Risālih-yi Muhaqqiq-i Buzurg, Fayz-i Kāshānī, ed. Ja‘farīyān, Rasūl (Isfahan, 1992), 188Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ For the date of composition, see Nājī-Nasrābādī, Kitābshināsī -i Fayz-i Kāshānī, 153.

⁷⁸ Fayd al-Kāshānī, Tehran, University of Tehran Library, MS 7154, folio 64b.10. See also Bīdārfar's introduction in Kāshānī, ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, 1: 41.

⁷⁹ Kāshānī, MS 7154, folio 64b.19–65a.5. Kāshānī cites a certain Quṭb al-Dīn ibn Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kūshaknārī as making this comment.

⁸⁰ Colin Turner outlines the undertakings of anti-sufi ‘ulamā’ in his Islam Without Allah? The Rise of Religious Externalism in Safavid Iran (Richmond, Surrey, 2000), 173. The description “all-out crusade” is his.

⁸¹ See Algar, Hamid, “Fayz-e Kāšānī, Mollā Mohsen Mohammad,” Encylopaedia Iranica (1999), 9: 452–4Google Scholar.

⁸² See Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs, 448.

⁸³ Fayd tries to set up a balanced, ethical approach to resolving the tension between the scholars (‘ulamā’) and the ascetics. Concerning the false claimants to sufism, Fayd does condemn their loud dhikr, their adding words to the tahlīl (the declaration “there is no god but God”), and their use of poetry and inappropriate statements, especially “such as [saying] that everything is one and such statements that they do not understand; rather they have heard them from others and adopted them in blind imitation, while it is completely unknown [to them] what others meant by it … ” This clearly displays his stance that wahdat al-wujūd as a principle cannot be uttered by or before just anyone. See Fayd al-Kāshānī, “Risālih-yi Muhākama bayn al-Mutasawwifa wa Ghayrihim,” ed. Muhammad-Taqī Dānishpajhūh, Nashriyyih-yi Danishgāh-i Adabiyyāt-i Tabrīz, no. 2, year 9 (Tabriz, 1336/1957), 125. Dānishpajhūh discusses the date of composition on page 114.

⁸⁴ For the date of composition, see Nājī-Nasrābādī, Kitābshināsī-yi Fayz-i Kāshānī, 237. Kāshānī criticizes those who call themselves “shaykh” or “dervish,” haughtily thinking they have grasped enough from sufism (al-tasawwuf) and God-becoming (al-ta'alluh) to achieve whatever they wish simply through their attention or supplication, vying in arrogance with other such shaykhs. Fayd blames them for their practice of a forty-day khalwa in a dark room, for their avoiding meat and sleep. He also criticizes those “called the people of dhikr and sufism,” who mix poetry and ghinā' (forbidden music), make moaning and braying sounds, dance, clap, remember God too loudly, and generally replace sunna practices with innovations. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Tarīfa, 216.

⁸⁵ Kāshānī, Qurrat al-‘Uyūn, author's introduction, 8.

⁸⁶ Fayd never took a reclusive or fearful position concerning the scholars of his day and tends to have been very vocal concerning their faults. Indeed, Kāshānī sometimes seems more bothered by the hypocrisy and arrogance of the mujtahidīn, those who claimed to have ijtihād among the Usūlīs, than any theoretical discrepancy, and his criticism is often based on a judgment of their character. Three of the four treatises mentioned (all except the theoretically focused al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna) include a discussion of the hostility and contentions that existed among the scholars of Kāshānī's time, scholars who should be heirs to the prophets. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna (#93, 96, 98, and esp. 100); al-La’āli' (#41); Qurrat al-‘Uyūn (#9/2). Three of the four treatises (again, all except al-Kalimāt al-Makhzūna) also include an analysis of the strife that occurred among the Prophet Muhammad's companions in the earliest Muslim community. Fayd often returns to this conflict, advocating the Shi‘i stance in Shi‘i-Sunni polemics. See Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-Maknūna (#88 and 89); al-La’āli' (#38); Qurrat al-‘Uyūn (all of maqāla #8). In both cases, Fayd's diagnosis is based in the spiritual, where internal ethical corruption yields larger-scale social sedition.

⁸⁷ ‘Abd al-Husayn Zarrīnkūb discusses Fayd's outlook in this regard in his Dunbālih-yi Justujū dar Tasawwuf-i Īrān (Tehran, 2010–11), 255–7.

⁸⁸ See Kāshānī, al-Insāf, 184. See also Kāshānī, ‘Ilm al-Yaqīn, 1: 23.

⁸⁹ The original Madrasih-yi Fayziyyih was built by Shah ‘Abbās II, under the supervision of Fayd, who saw the need for a new structure to take the place of the Madrasat Sittī Fātima, which was in ruins. Fath-‘Alī Shah (r. 1212–50/1797–1834) later expanded and improved upon the original Fayziyyih through the years 1213–18/1798–1804, which involved demolishing the older structure. See ‘Abbās Fayz-Qummī, Kitāb-i Ganjīnih-yi Āsār-i Qum (Qum, 1970–71), 1: 673–5. At the time this paper is being written, a number of cleric-teachers offer classes on hikma and ‘irfān/ma‘rifa in the Fayziyyih (and elsewhere in Qum), including courses on Ibn ‘Arabī's Fusūs al-Hikam and Dawūd al-Qaysarī's commentary on it. Two examples include the hikma class of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Husaynī-Tihrānī and the Fusūs class of Muhammad Hasan Fāzil-Gulpaygānī, both currently taught at the Fayziyyih. Most relevant perhaps to Fayd's approach—using these esoteric sciences as tools for scripture—are the famous sessions on Qur'anic exegesis taught by Āyatallāh ‘Abdallāh Javādī-Āmulī nearby at the Masjid-i A‘zam, in which the Qur'an is discussed very often within the context of hikma and ‘irfān and very often citing Fayd (especially his Qur'anic exegesis al-Sāfī). Fayd's influence should not, however, be overemphasized, since the revival of these esoteric sciences—during the past forty years—in the seminary has more to do with charismatic, contemporary hikma advocates among the clergy, especially ‘Allāma Muhammad Husayn Tabātabā’ī (d. 1981). Its long-term consolidation among hikma-inclined Shi‘i ‘ulamā’, as Rizvi has argued, owes much to a Qajari interpreter of Mullā Sadrā, namely, Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1873); see Rizvi, Sajjad, “Hikma muta‘aliya in Qajar Iran: Locating the Life and Work of Mulla Hadi Sabzawari (d. 1289/1873),” Iranian Studies 44, no. 4 (2011), 473–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.