¹ See Mahdavi, A., “The Significance of the Private Archives for the Study of the Economic and Social History of Iran in the late Qajar Period,” Iranian Studies, Vol. XVI, nos. 3-4, pp. 243-78.Google Scholar

² The Ettehadiehs were from Azerbaijan and made their fortune from ṣarrāfi, trade, and real estate. The first of them we know of was Hajj Baqer Amin al-Zarb-e Tabrizi, the son of Lotfallah. His son, Hajj Lotf Ali went to live in Tehran sometime in 1893 as the representative of Sherkat-e Ettehādieh, organized in 1888 by a few Azerbaijani merchants and headed by Hajj Ali and Hajj Mehdi Kuzehkanani. This company was in existence for about 20 years. Lotf Ali took with him his son Rahim, who engaged in a small import and export business of his own, marrying into another Azerbaijani merchant family, and making the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca, thence becoming known as Haji Rahim. Lotf Ali eventually quarreled with Kuzehkanani and left the company in 1899, setting up his own private business, or tejārat khāneh, with his son. Hajj Lotf Ali died around 1912 and was succeeded by Hajj Rahim, who adopted the surname Ettehadieh. He seems to have prospered, engaging in a miscellaneous import and export trade as well as continuing the traditional ṣarrāfi business.

For more details on the Ettehadieh family see: M. Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi, “Masā'el-e Ṣarrāfi az Khelāl-e Soṭūr-e Nāmeh-hā-ye Yek Ṣarrāf” in Yādegār Nāmeh-ye Fakhrā'ī, ed. R. Rezazadeh-ye Langerudi, Tehran: 1363/1984, pp. 315-338. Also, “Līst-e Siyāh-e Īrān dar Jang Jahānī-ye Avval: 1914-1918” in Negīn, no. 146, 1356/1977, pp. 31-4.

³ The papers upon which the present article is based consist of 28 reports in Persian written by Sadaqiyani and countersigned by the Chiari, employees of Ettehadieh. There are also two reports by Mirza Habib, the accountant of the bureau after the death of Sadaqiyani. The rest of the file consists of copies of Ettehadieh's letters to the government, some of the government's replies, a few reports on the condition of tobacco in Kordestan, the contracts between Chiari and Sadaqiyani and Ettehadieh, and also the contracts made by the bureau and some local builders for the building of warehouses. A long report entitled the “History of Tobacco in Kordestan” is also included in these documents.

The other source used for this article is the newspaper Ra‘d; the government published all laws and regulations in the major newpapers for the general public. In addition, Ra‘d also published private letters and complaints by individuals on various issues, including the farming of tobacco. In this context, the documents have been supplemented by the information provided by Ra‘d.

⁴ For more detail on tobacco cultivation and trade see Jamalzadeh, M., Ganj-e Shāyegān, Berlin: 1333/1915Google Scholar; Issawi, C., The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, Chicago: 1971, pp. 136, 250-1Google Scholar; Curzon, J. N., Persia and the Persian Question, London: 1892, v. 1, p. 424Google Scholar; R. T. Olson, Persian Gulf Trade and the Agricultural Economy of Southern Iran in the Nineteenth Century; M. Bonine, E. and Keddie, N., eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectic of Continuity and Change, Albany: 1981, pp. 173-191.Google Scholar

⁵ According to one estimate given by Jamalzadeh, the amount of tobacco produced in Persia was 3,415,000 Tabrizi man, and the geographical distribution of tobacco, in the Tabrizi man, was as follows: Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shāyegān, op. cit., p. 130.

⁶ The amount exported was 600,000 man. However, Jamalzadeh admits that these figures are approximations, ibid., pp. 34, 130.

⁷ For further information see Teymuri, E., Qarārdād-e Regie, 1890, Avvalīn Moqāvemat-e Manfī dar Īrān, Tehran: 1328/1949.Google Scholar

⁸ C. Issawi, op. cit., p. 250.

⁹ Jamalzadeh, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ There has been little discussion of the economic policies of the constitutionalists, especially after the convocation of the majles. Most researchers have focused on the activities which led to the revolution. It has also been generally assumed that the deputies who represented the merchants and the guilds were liberal, enlightened, and nationalist. Later the electoral law was changed so that the deputies were no longer elected according to their class, and there were few merchants in the subsequent parliaments. But with the development of political parties, politics became more partisan and the laws enacted were therefore influenced by such considerations as party affiliations, class or personal interests, and ideology. The best source on this question is Mozākerāt-e Majles, as all the government programs were discussed at length in the majles.

¹² Other attempts were made at creating monopolies such as the salt monopoly in 1911. Another means of increasing revenue was through added incentives for industrial enterprises, for example, granting certain privileges or exempting from taxation equipment needed to build factories for the manufacture of soap and leather. Such an exemption was granted by the Majles to Rabi‘zadeh and his associates in 1911. Real estate and vehicles, too, were taxed.

For more information see: Majmū'e-ye Moṣavabāt-e Majles-e Showrā-ye Mellī dar Chahār Dowreh-ye Taqnīnīyeh, Tehran: n.d., pp. 273, 390, 342, 476, 491, 569.

¹³ Moṣavabāt, op. cit., p. 557.

¹⁴ A distinction was made between raw or unprepared tobacco and cured tobacco prepared for smoking, which was called dokhāniyyāt, after the Arabic dakhana, to smoke. Generally raw tobacco was carried by the cultivators to the towns and sold to the merchants who cured and sold it, or exported it to other parts of the country or abroad. Most of the tobacco which went to Turkey was raw tobacco.

¹⁵ Moṣavabāt, op. cit., p. 557.

¹⁶ Ra‘d, #69, 28 Ramazan 1337.

¹⁷ Ibid., #83, 7 Shavval 1337.

¹⁸ Ibid., #122,5 Zihajjeh 1337.

¹⁹ Ibid., #124, 10 Rabi’ al-Sani 1338.

²⁰ Ibid., #132, 1 Safar 1339.

²¹ Ibid., #447, 11 Jamadi al-Avval 1338; and Ibid., #250, 5 Jamadi al-Avval 1338.

²² Ibid., these districts were: Kashan, farmed for 26,000 toman; Kordestan, for 144,000 toman; Golpayegan and Khonsar, for 32,000 toman; Shahrud and Bastam, for 84,000 toman; and Semnan for 55,000 toman.

²³ Opium, a much more important cash crop in the Persian economy than tobacco, was also farmed out. A bureau called the Edāreh-ye Taḥdīd-e Taryāk, or the Bureau of Restriction of Opium, was organized to regulate the trade and taxation of opium, and to stop the smuggling of this important item. It was referred to as Taḥdīd for short. It did not function too efficiently, or so it seems from the many references to its shortcomings in Ra‘d. Nor was it uniformly set up all over the country. According to Ra‘d, the Taḥdīd had been organized in the northern provinces, whereas opium was grown in central and southern Persia.

²⁴ The merchants in Persia, though perhaps not unduly adventurous, were generally in search of deals with the government, or new enterprises and products to export, import or produce. For instance, we find Hajj Rahim in 1928 farming the salt mine in Tarom, despite his unhappy experience with the tobacco of Kordestan. He was also interested in an opium deal in Kordestan, but Sadaqiyani dissuaded him on the grounds that opium was not profitable in that province. He suggested leasing the tobacco of Savoj Bolagh, Ushni, and Sardasht. At the same time, he urged Ettehadieh to start a lorry service in that part of the country, saying that an Italian company had already obtained the monopoly of the road between Kermanshah, Hamadan, Tehran, and Rasht.

²⁵ According to Jamalzadeh, Kordestan was fourth on the list of tobacco-producing provinces. Jamalzadeh, op. cit., p. 130.

²⁶ The contract between Charles Chiari and Ettehadieh was as follows: Chiari was to be director of the local bureau for three years. He was to execute the lease according to the conditions laid down by the government, and had full reponsibility. All new engagements and expenses were to be undertaken with the consent of Eutehadieh. Chiari had the use of 50 toman to be spent without getting permission. Otherwise, all expenses were to be included in a budget to be approved by Ettehadieh. All correspondence, etc., was to be in Persian. At the end of each month, all the accounts were to be presented to Ettehadieh and the monthly revenue forwarded to the tejārat khāneh. Chiari was responsible for the payment of the installments to the government. His salary was half the net profit, after the payment of the government, and after all expenses were covered. Chiari was to leave a sum with the tejárat khaneh as guarantee. In case he did not fulfill his duties, Ettehadieh had the right to annul the contract and confiscate this sum. Later, Ettehadieh was accused of subleasing the tax farm to Chiari, but the terms of their contract make it clear that it was an agreement for Chiari to manage the business only.

²⁷ The clauses of the contract between Sadaqiyani and Ettehadieh were as follows: Sadaqiyani was the deputy hcad of the bureau for three years. His salary for three years was 4,500 toman, to be paid in monthly installments. If the net profits of the bureau were 2.5 times more than the sum of 4,500 toman, the excess would be paid to him as a bonus to encourage him. He was reponsible for carrying out all the conditions of the contract.

²⁸ Ra‘d, #88, 13 Ziqa'deh 1338.

²⁹ In the latter part of the 19th century, Uraman and Marivan and the surrounding districts were in the hands of the Mandomi and Golbaghi tribes. Recently, they had revolted and the government of Kordestan had no power to quell them. They blocked the roads and did not pay taxes. The government at last sent a gendarmerie detachment against them and defeated them in 1919. An indemnity of 5,000 toman was levied, besides the confiscation of their horses and guns, and the government claimed the back payment of nine years’ taxes. The severity of these terms must have been the cause of the rekindling of the revolt, a fact which was mentioned by Sadaqiyani. Ibid., #113, Safar 1339.

³⁰ Ibid., #114, 25 Ziqa'deh 1338.

³¹ Ettehadieh was the tājerbāshī of Italy, which meant that as a merchant he was protected by the Italian consul. Perhaps in this letter he is alluding to this privilege. It is also possible that this step was suggested to him by Chiari.

³² A little later Ettehadieh was accused of having subcontracted to Chiari, which was indeed contrary to the terms of the contract. Ettehadieh had employed Chiari, but according to the terms of the contract he was to receive half of the net profit after the payment of the government installment. Perhaps this clause was the basis for the accusation.

³³ One of the three arbitrators disagreed with the verdict, but he did not state his opinion.