1 The application of political criteria in employment procedures is a common practice in almost every non-democratic nation. The Iranian innovation in this regard is that unlike other countries, the Iranian regime has established formal and institutionalized mechanisms for this task. In other nations the procedure is informal, and at least a nominal commitment to the principle of equal opportunity is echoed by the regime.

2 We ignore staged elections held periodically in totalitarian regimes.

3 Russell (1977), p. 113.

4 Most experts on educational planning believe that educational systems are inherently political. According to Rowley, “Only in short periods in history and in the especially favored situations of some national systems, has it been possible to imagine that education may be divorced from politics.” Rowley (1971), p. 13.

5 Halsey et. al. (1961), p.

6 Pareto (1935), p. 1796.

7 Munro (1971), p. 257.

8 China, for example, experienced several oscillating policies with respect to the political loyalty of technical experts. Initially it followed the well-known ‘red and expert’ policy. Afterwards a more practical policy was initiated by Vicepresident Chen Yi who argued that technical experts should not be forced to participate in politics. Lewis (1965), p. 434.

9 They are seen as fertile ground for secret conspiracies and plots against the regime.

10 There are only two occasions when job discrimination is officially sanctioned in democratic states. The first case is the limited number of sensitive political jobs. An executive leader, for example, is allowed to choose his associates and aides, whose jobs are inherently political. The other provision is for careful screening of applicants for highly sensitive jobs which relate to national security matters.

11 With regard to this dichotomy between the political elite and the technocratic elite in communist China, Lewis notes: “The technocratic elite are recruited from the same social strata, or the same ethnic or cultural groups, as members of the dominant political elite, so that there is a mutual interdependence and interaction among elites in different institutional spheres.” Lewis (1965), p. 361.

12 In an article entitled “Cultural Revolution and Educational Revolution,” Ayatollah Khomeini is quoted as saying that an impure scientist (measured against puritanical Islamic values) is more dangerous for his society than an ignorant man. He also blames the non-religious college faculty for the social corruption before the revolution (Keyhān, May 5, 1981). In another news report Khomeini was quoted as saying that after the universities are reopened, they should not become centers of conspiracy and anti-regime activities (Keyhān, April 13, 1981).

13 Ever since 1953, when the popular Mossadeq government collapsed in a coup d'état which restored the Pahlavi monarchy, university students became a major and consistent opposition group to the Pahlavi regime. Periodically, activist students were involved in clashes with security forces. During the 1970s the underground guerilla groups recruited many college students (Halliday [1979], pp. 224-5).

14 Political factions in the early years of the revolution subscribed to one of the following orientations: Islamic, leftist, and liberal/nationalist. The most important representatives of each orientation were: the Islamic Republic Party, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, and the National Front, respectively.

15 Keyhān quoted Ayatollah Khomeini as saying that one of the worst aspects of the college environment during the Pahlavi regime was the implantation of negative attitudes in the minds of college students and faculty towards the clergy and the religion of Islam. He called for close interaction between the clergy and university students. Keyhān, June 14, 1989, p. 15.

16 An editorial in Keyhān analyzed this problem and put the blame on the educational planners of the previous regime. Keyhān, June 15, 1981.

17 Khomeini is quoted in Keyhān as emphasizing that after the universities are reopened, they must not become centers of conspiracy and anti-revolutionary activities. But he also adds that even secular scholars can teach in universities as long as they do not conspire against the regime. Keyhān, June 13, 1981, p. 9.

18 This policy was introduced in 1980-1. During this period random arrests and political violence were at a peak.

19 “Center for Evaluation and Selection of College Applicants.” The Center administers a national scientific examination for nearly half a million candidates. Almost 10 percent of these candidates can enter the various nationalized colleges and universities. The center also cooperates with organizations responsible for political screening of the higher education system.

20 Along with the state controlled universities, a major private university (the Azad University of Iran) has been established in the past six years. It has branches in most major cities. The Azad University of Iran is also subject to political screening, but the criteria are less restrictive. However, the high tuition of this school puts it beyond the reach of most college candidates.

21 Priority for overseas studies and scholarships, as stated in the 1988-9 official guidebook for advanced degrees, goes to persons with one or some of the following qualifications:

1. 1)

   1) A clear proven record of struggle for the victory of the Revolution;

2. 2)

   2) active participation in revolutionary organs;

3. 3)

   3) acceptance of sensitive and important responsibilities in the Islamic regime;

4. 4)

   4) active participation in the nine-year-long war against Iraq.

Source: Exam Guide for Advanced Degrees, 1989-90 (Tehran: Ministry of Higher Education, 1989).

22 The official government guidelines, which appear in The Employment and Administration Laws and Regulations, list a series of religious and political criteria for public sector recruits. These include support for the constitution and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, lack of ideological affiliation with either East or West, and no association with opposition groups.

23 Ibid., p. 708.

24 In most Iranian universities, for example, experienced faculty who were educated and employed under the previous regime do not meet the political and ideological standards for presidency or vice-presidency of their schools. Consequently, the presidents and vice-presidents of most universities are younger, less experienced and in some cases even less educated than the faculty of their respective universities.

25 See note 9.

26 This is the Dāneshgāh-e tarbiyyat-e modarres, founded in 1982.

27 The social scientists who have remained in Iran after the revolution generally exercise self-censorship in their scientific and academic activities.

28 For security reasons he shall remain anonymous.

29 The importance of national economy has been noted as far back as Adam Smith (Smith, 1776, II:1). In the past three decades various empirical and theoretical studies have demonstrated the importance of human capital as an agent of economic growth (Schultz: 1961; Harberger: 1966; Ito: 1963).

30 This report appeared in Sharīf, the newsletter of the Sharif Technical University (Sharif, February 1989).

31 It has also led to a very fast turnover of university presidents. Some universities have had four or five presidents in a matter of five years.

32 Reports of these internal tensions never appear in the official state media. They are spread through private citizens.

33 In 1976, the distribution of the labor force in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors was 34 percent, 34.2 percent and 31.8 percent respectively. In 1986, these respective shares were 29.1 percent, 25.5 percent, and 45.5 percent. These statistics clearly demonstrate the decline of industrial and agricultural employment shares over this period (Razzaghi: 1988, p. 117).

34 Various forms of corruption, such as bribery, shirking, favoritism, nepotism, and particularism are visible at all levels of Iranian bureaucracy. The unfair and biased treatment of employees in the public sector leads to dissatisfaction. The dissatisfied employees will eventually lose their ethical values. In addition, the government policy of covering up cases of corruption in order to avoid ‘weakening the regime’ reduces the threat of punishment for most employees, thus making it easier for them to engage in illegal activities.

35 The sectors which depend heavily on skilled professionals, such as medical services or higher education have suffered the most. The average faculty-to-student ratio for institutions of higher education has risen from 1:13 in 1980-1 to 1:27 in 1988-9. (Sharīf, May 1989, p. 8).

36 This attitude was most common during the early years of the Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, believed that a scientist lacking a pure soul was far more dangerous for society than an ignorant man (Nikmanesh: 1981).

37 Table I indicates that the sum of political quotas in math and engineering degrees has increased from 8.8% in 1985-6 to 30.6% in 1988-9. A similar trend is visible in other fields.

38 Neuman: 1957, p. 236.

39 Both China and the Soviet Union had to modify their procurement and admission policies for the same reason. The process often involved a recognition of the differences between the government functions and the activities of the Communist Party. Khrushchev introduced major reforms in this direction in the U.S.S.R. (Horowitz: 1972, p. 192).