Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
This paper critically analyzes the Sharafnama, a history of the Kurds, written by the late sixteenth century ruler of Bitlis, Şeref Xan. Given the politically sensitive nature of the Middle East's “Kurdish Question,” the Sharafnama has become an extremely important resource through which Kurdish nationalists have sought to construct a coherent “national narrative.” This is due to the fact that Şeref Xan's book constitutes one of the few systematic histories of the Kurds written before the twentieth century. This paper moves away from nationalist inspired interpretations of the Sharafnama, which see the work as a “national(ist)” history. Instead, it posits that, although the piece can be regarded as a manifestation of Kurdish “ethno-politics,” it is necessary to look at it within the context of the relationship between the Kurdish tribal princes who ruled large areas of “Kurdistan,” on one hand, and the Ottoman and Safavid empires who competed for control of this region, on the other. In particular, it brings to the fore an often forgotten and/or ignored aspect of Şeref Xan's history, namely its pro-Ottoman bias. In this way, the article makes broader points relating to the nature of the Kurdish identity in the early modern period, and the influence of such conceptions on the later construction of the modern Kurdish identity.
1 Transcription and transliteration of words and names is a tricky business, especially in the field of Kurdish studies, in which the utilization of sources in a number of different Arabic-script based languages is necessary. I have opted, therefore, to use the Latinized Kurdish Alphabet for the names of Kurds. Thus, instead of the Persian “Sharaf Khan” or the Turkish “Şerefhan,” I have opted for the Kurdish “Şeref Xan.” However, as Şeref Xan's history was written in Persian, I have transliterated it according to the scheme forwarded by Iranian Studies as “Sharafnama.” Other Persian names and terms have been dealt with in a similar fashion. Similarly, (Ottoman) Turkish names and terms follow their modern Turkish spelling. Needless to say, there are issues with my somewhat idiosyncratic decision as it might be seen as “imposing” a “nationality” on individuals who may not have seen themselves in such a light. This is not my intension. In the preparation of this paper, citations are from the Mehmet Emin Bozarslan Turkish translation of the Sharafnama, first published in 1971. Şerefhan Bitlisi, Şerefname Kürd Tarihi (Birinci Bölümü), trans. M. Emin Bozarslan (Istanbul: Deng, 2006). However, I have also consulted M.R. Izady's 2005 partial English–Persian edition, Prince Sharaf al-Din Bitlisi, The Sharafnama or the History of the Kurdish Nation, trans. M.R. Izady (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2005), as well as François Bernard-Charmoy's three-volume French–Persian edition, Chèrefou'ddîne, Chèref-nameh, ou, Fastes de la nation kourde, trans. François Bernard-Charmoy (St.-Petersburg: Commissionnaires de l'Académie Impériale des sciences, 1870). I would specifically like to thank Monsieur Boris James of Paris for bring to my attention some extremely important Arabic sources and for his valuable feedback on this paper.
2 For examples of “modernist” scholarship on nationalism see for example Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)Google Scholar; Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991)Google Scholar; Hobsbawm, Eric, “Introduction,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Hobsbawm, Eric and Granger, Terence (London: Canto, 1992), 1–14Google Scholar; Hobsbawm, Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)Google Scholar.
3 This understanding of the term Kurdish nationalism is based largely on Ernest Gellner's well-known definition of nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent…” see Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.
4 For some of the most recent modernist inspired literature see Strohmeier, Martin, Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity (Leiden: Brill, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Özoğlu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004)Google Scholar; Süleyman Azad Aslan, “The Clash of Agencies: The Formation and Failure of Kurdish Nationalism 1918–1922” (PhD diss., Royal Holloway and Bedford Collage, 2007); Natali, Denise, The Kurds and the Statee (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; Bozarslan, Hamit, “Some Remarks on Kurdish Historiographical Discourse in Turkey,” in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Vali, Abbas (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2003), 14–39Google Scholar; Vali, Abbas, “Genealogies of the Kurds: Constructions of Nation and National Identity in Kurdish Historical Writing,” in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Vali, Abbas (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2003), 58–105Google Scholar; Gunter, Michael, “The Modern Origins of Kurdish Nationalism,” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Ahmed, Mohammed M.A. and Gunter, Michael (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2007), 1–17Google Scholar.
5 See for example Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)Google Scholar; Smith, Anthony D., “Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations,” Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1 (1995): 3–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Armstrong, John, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Hutchinson, John, “Myth against Myth: The Nation as Ethnic Overlay,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1–2 (2004): 109–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hutchinson, John, Nations as Zones of Conflict (London: SAGE Publications, 2005)Google Scholar.
6 I use here the term “prince” which covers a number of titles used to describe the rulers of the Kurdish tribal principalities of Eastern Anatolia, such as Bey/Beg, Khan/Han/Xan and Mîr/Emir.
7 The modern Kurdish translation is published by the Istanbul-based Avesta publishing house. Şerefxanê Bedlîsî, Şerefname, trans. Ziya Avci and Azad Aktürk (Istanbul: Avesta, 2007).
8 See for example the poem “Hakim û Mîrekanî Kurdistan” [The rulers and princes of Kurdistan], in Hacî Qadirê Koyî, Dîwan Hacî Qadirê Koyî 1815–1897 (Stockholm: Nefel, 2004), 124–5. Koyî, as one of the pioneers of the Kurdish “ethnic revival,” idealized the autonomy of the Kurdish principalities. “Hakim û Mîrekanî Kurdistan” bemoans the destruction of the Kurdish principalities, which occurred during the mid-nineteenth century, and presents an idealized image of Kurdish self-rule.
9 Smith, Anthony D., Myth and Memories of the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17Google Scholar.
10 Cewdet, Ebdullah, “Bir Hitab,” Roj-i Kurd, 6 Haziran 1329 (June 19, 1913)Google Scholar. Ebdullah Cewdet's statement works out as a play on words in Turkish: “Bir Şerefnâme ile bir millet şeref-i tarihisini ve yahud tarih-i şeref tasarruf ve muhafaza edemez.” Ebdullah Cewdet was one of the founding members of the opposition to Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909). He was a central figure in the development of the early “Young Turk” movement. However, he was of Kurdish origin and maintained strong links to the Kurdish movement prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For greater detail on the relationship between Ebdullah Cewdet and Kurdish nationalism see Malmîsanij, , Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (Uppsala: Jina Nu, 1986)Google Scholar.
11 Beg, Muhammed Emin Zeki, Kürtler ve Kürdistan Tarihi, trans. İnce, Vahdettin, Dağ, Mehmet, Adak, Reşat and Aslan, Şükrü (Istanbul: Nû Bihar, 2011), 22Google Scholar.
12 Mehmet Emin Bozarslan translated several important historical works on Kurds into modern Turkish. For more on the career and intellectual development of Mehmet Emin Bozarslan see Yüksel, Metin, “A ‘Revolutionary’ Kurdish Mullah from Turkey: Mehmed Emin Bozarslan and His Intellectual Evolution,” The Muslim World 99, no. 2 (2009): 356–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Sahir Erman, Yılmaz Altuğ and Duygun Yarsuvat, “İlk Bilirkişi Raporu” (Istanbul: Istanbul C. Savcılığı Basın Bürosuna, 1971) (emphasis added).
14 See Hassanpour, Amir, “Making the Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Discourses,” in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Vali, Abbas (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2003), 106–62Google Scholar.
15 Of particular importance are three articles discussing the myths surrounding the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. See Imber, Colin, “Canon and Apocrypha in Early Ottoman History,” in Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V.L. Menage, ed. Heywood, Colin and Imber, Colin (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994), 117–37Google Scholar; Imber, Colin, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” in Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern World, ed. Kunt, Metin and Woodhead, Christiane (London: Longman, 1995), 138–53Google Scholar; Imber, Colin, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth,” Turcica no. XIX (1987): 7–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 For instance, M.R. Izady, who represents a particularly virulent strain of Kurdish nationalism, entitled his English translation of sections of the Šaraf-nāma: “The Sharafnâma: Or the History of the Kurdish Nation” (emphasis added).
17 With regard to the zone of Kurdish settlement, Şeref Xan described “Kurdistan” as stretching “in a straight line from the Sea of Hürmüz [The Persian Gulf] to the provinces of Malatya and Maraş. In this way the line's northern side includes Fars, Iraq al-Ajami, Azerbaijan, Greater and Lesser Armenia. To the south it falls upon the provinces of Iraq al-Arab, Mosul and Diyarbakır.” He points out, however, that “Together with this, many people and tribes from this race [the Kurds] have spread to many countries from east to west.” Şerefhan, Şerefname, 20. Two points need to be made here: the term Kurdistan does not imply a Kurdish demographic majority in these regions and “Kurdistan” was not the only zone of “Kurdish” political activity.
18 Mustafa ibn Abdullah Katib Chalabi Haji Khalifa, “Sharafname,” in Kashf al-zunun, ed. Gustav Fluegel (Lepizig, 1837).
19 Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Chahryar Adle, “Quatre lettres de Šeref Beg de Bitlîs (1516–1520),” Études turco-safavides XI, Der Islam, 63 (1986): 90–116.
20 According to Ottoman sources, Mîr Şeref revolted and was recognized as governor by the Safavids, after which Sultan Süleyman appointed Olama Beg Takkalu, the former Safavid governor of Azerbaijan, in his place. See Solakzâde, Mehmed, Tarih-i Solakzâde (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1298 [1881–1882]), 483–4Google Scholar; and Efendi, Peçevi İbrahim, Peçevi Tarihi I, trans. Baykal, Bekir Sıtkı (Ankara: Kültür bakanlığı yayınları, 1981), 129Google Scholar. The Sharafnama presents a different version of events surrounding Mîr Şeref's defection. Şeref Xan claims that Mîr Şeref had no intention of deserting the Ottoman side. However, as a result of Olama Beg Takkalu's intrigues, as well as promises that if he were to be awarded the governorship of Bitlis he would be able to bring Azerbaijan into the Ottoman fold, Mîr Şeref was left with no other option but to seek sanctuary with the Safavids. Şerefhan, Şerefname, 319–33. According to an Iranian source, Olama Beg Takkalu, who had been amir al-omara of Azerbaijan, wished to become vakil (viceroy) and mokhtar al-saltana (executive of the affairs of state) in place of Chuha Soltan Takkalu. He therefore marched on the royal camp but was forced by Shah Tahmasp to flee to Van. Consequently, he “withdrew his allegiance from the Safavid house and … departed for Istanbul.” The same source makes no mention of Mîr Şeref's defection, merely noting that he, Şeref Xan Rojkî, “the Kurd, governor of Betlīs [Bitlis], was a vassal of the Safavid House” and later that he had been governor of “Tonakābon in Gīlan”: Monshi, Eskandar, History of Shah ‘Abbas, trans. Savory, Roger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 1: 83, 110 and 227Google Scholar.
21 Qezelbash refers to the predominantly, although not exclusively, Turkmen followers of Shah Isma'il (and the Safavids) who were named so for their distinctive red headgear.
22 According to Peçevi, Hüsrev Pasha was a keen advocate of renewing hostilities with Iran. Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi II, 32.
23 For Şeref Xan's life and career see Şeref Xan's autobiographical notes in Şerefhan, Şerefname, 340–48; Chèrefou'ddîne, Chèref-nameh, vol. 1, part 2, 1–10. Also see Naficy, Said, “Bidlīsī, Sharaf Al-Dīn Khān, Commonly Known as Sharaf Khān,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. Bearman, P. et al. (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1993), 1208–09Google Scholar; Glassen, Erika, “Bedlīsī, Šaraf-al-Dīn Khan,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989), IV: 76–7Google Scholar; Ṣafizadah, Ṣiddiq Būrahkah, Tarīkh-i Kord va Kordestan (Tehran: Nashr-i Atiyah, 1999), 21–2Google Scholar. It should be noted that most biographies on Şeref Xan's life and career are based on his autobiographical account given in the Sharafnama.
24 Murphey, Rhoads, Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700 (Oxford: Routledge, 1999), 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25 See for example Şerefhan, Şerefname, 313–21; Solakzâde, Tarih-i Solakzâde, 378–2; Celâl-zade Mustafa, Selim-nâme, trans. Ahmet Uğur and Mustafa Çuhadar (Ankara Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), 169–71. For an overview of Selim's campaigns again Iran based on Ottoman sources see Tansel, Selâhattin, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Ankara: Millî Eğitim Basimevi, 1969), 31–94Google Scholar; also see Bruinessen, Martin van, Agha, Shaikh and State (London: Zed Books, 1992), 136–45Google Scholar; Özöğlu, Hakan, “State–Tribe Relations: Kurdish Tribalism in the 16th and 17th Century Ottoman Empire,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 1. (May 1996): 5–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mehdi İlhan, M., Amid (Diyarbakır) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000), 5–14Google Scholar. For a pro-Safavid take on events see Monshi, , History of Shah ‘Abbas, 1: 67–74Google Scholar; Also see the various accounts given in Genç, Vural et al., İranlı Tarihçilerin Kaleminden Çaldıran (1514), trans. Genç, Vural (Istanbul: Bengi, 2011)Google Scholar.
26 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 315.
27 Ménage, V.L., “Bidlīsī, Idrīs,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. Bearman, P. et al. (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1993), 1207–08Google Scholar; Fleischer, Cornell H., “Bedlīsī, Ḥakīm-al-Dīn Edrīs,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, IV: 75–6Google Scholar.
28 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 319.
29 For the ferman (edict) granting these powers to İdris-i Bitlisi see Zeki Beg, Kürtler ve Kürdistan Tarihi, 168–9, footnote 386.
30 Solakzâde, Tarih-i Solakzâde, 378.
31 Efendi, Aziz, Kanûn-Nâme-i Sultânı li Aziz Efendi, trans. Murphey, Rhoads (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Office of the University Publisher, 1985), 14Google Scholar.
32 Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi I, 223.
33 Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi II, 34.
34 Özoğlu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 53Google Scholar. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 158–9. The broad outlines of this system of autonomy can be found in a ferman dating from the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. “[Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent] gives the Kurdish princes who during the time of his father Selim the Grim fought the Qezelbash, and who at the moment serve the state with faith and who joined in the campaign of commander and chief Sultan İbrahim Pasha's against Iran with bravery. As a reward for their loyalty and courage and considering their petitions and requests, the provinces and citadels that have been ruled by them individually as their yurtluk and ocaklık since time immemorial along with those areas assigned to them under separate imperial licenses. Their provinces, citadels, cities, villages and pasture lands with all their products, under the condition of inheritance from father to son, are also given to them as their inheritable property. There should never be any external aggression and conflict amongst them. This great order will be obeyed and under no condition changed. In the case of the death of a prince, his province will be given, in its entirety, to his son, if there is only one. If there is more than one son, they [the sons] should divide up the lands by mutual agreement. If they do not come to any compromise, then whomever the princes of Kurdistan decide is the best choice shall succeed, and under the conditions of private ownership, he shall become the holder of the land in perpetuity. If the prince has no heir or relative then the land will not be given to an outsider. Through consultation with the princes of Kurdistan, the area shall be given to either princes or a member of the princes’ family recommended by the princes of Kurdistan.” Reproduced in Nazmı Sevgen, Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri: Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Kültür Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1982), 42–3.The English translation is based largely on that by Özoğlu.
35 Bey, Koçi, Koçi Bey risalesi: şimdiye elde edilememiş olan tarihî eserin tamamî, trans. Aksüt, Ali Kemalî (Istanbul: Vakıt Kütüphanesi, 1939), 26Google Scholar.
36 It has been argued that the autonomy of the Kurdish princes was progressively reduced over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 57–9. For instance, in a document produced just after the Ottoman conquest of the region, the territories of the Kurdish princes were listed under a separate administrative heading—Vilayet-i Kürdistan (The Province of Kurdistan). This administrative division included the following Kurdish principalities, which were described using the term Eyalet (Territory): Bitlis, Soran, Çemişkezek, Cezire Hasankeyf, İmadiye Hakkâri (described as the “Great Princes of Kurdistan”) and Sasun, Çapakçur, Sinar Ziddîk (Zirrîk?), Hizan, Palu, Eğil, Atak and Hîzzo. See TSA D. 5246 (1525) reproduced in Kunt, Metin, The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650 (New York: Columbia University Press 1983), 109–16Google Scholar. If we compare this to the Ayn-i Ali Efendi's sixteenth century treatise, we see that the Kurdish principalities and “noble counties” are listed as parts of regular provinces. For example, the Province of Diyarbakir is described as consisting of eleven Osmanlı Sancaks (Ottoman/Regular Counties), eight Ekrâd Beyi Sancaks and five Hükûmets. The same source recorded that the Province of Van consisted of thirteen Sancaks and one Hükûmet. See Efendi, Ayn-ı Ali, Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman der Hülâsa-i Mezâmin-i Defter-i Dîvân (Istanbul: Kalem Yayınları, 1979), 29 and 33Google Scholar. However, given the continued existence of powerful Kurdish principalities well into the nineteenth century, this reduction in autonomy should not be seen as a unidirectional shift.
37 Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi I, 316
38 Aziz Efendi, Kanûn-Nâme-i Sultânı li Aziz Efendi, 14–15.
39 For example, as late as the nineteenth century, the defection of the Mahmûd Pasha Babanî, the ruler of the Baban principality, from the Ottomans to the Iranians precipitated the Ottoman–Iranian War of 1820–1821. Sabri Ateş, “Empires and the Margin: Towards a History of the Ottoman–Iranian Borderland and Borderland Peoples” (PhD diss., New York University, 2006), 74–5.
40 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 24.
41 Hassanpour, “Making the Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Discourses,” 112.
42 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 13. These were: the Marwanids of Diyarbakir and Cezire, the Hassanwaihids of Dinever and Şehrizor, the Greater and Lesser Lurs and the Ayubbids of Syria and Egypt.
43 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 14.
44 The striking of coins and the reading of the Friday sermon in the name of the ruler are both symbolic acts denoting sovereignty in the Islamic world.
45 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 14.
46 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 15.
47 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 16.
48 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 21.
49 See Izady's notes in Bitlisi, The Sharafnama or the History of the Kurdish Nation, 40.
50 Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 30.
51 Hassanpour, “Making the Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Discourses,” 112.
52 Ali, Mustafa, Mustafa Ali's Counsel for Sultans of 1581, trans. Tietze, Andreas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979), 63Google Scholar. Quoted in Hassanpour, “Making the Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Discourses,” 111.
53 In 1585 Mustafa Ali received an appointment from Grand Vizier Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha to the position of defterdar (financial director) of Baghdad. However, he found upon arrival that the position had been granted to the Kurdish sancak beyi of Derteng, Sohrab Beg. Fleischer, Cornell, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 119CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
54 Hassanpour, “Making the Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Discourses,” 113. For the quote see Şerefhan, Şerefname, 22.
55 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 22–3
56 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 320.
57 Other sources indicated that Sultan Selim had promised Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha the governorship of Kurdistan prior to the 1515 campaign of relieve Diyarbakir from Safavid forces under that command of Qara Khan. See İlhan, Amid, 12.
58 Kurdish intellectuals during the early twentieth century continued to maintain that the Kurds had joined the Ottoman Empire of the own volition. See for example Zeki Beg, Kürtler ve Kürdistan Tarihi, 167–8; Hilmi, Rafiq, Kurdistan at the Dawn of the Century (Yaddasht) (London: New Hope, 1998), 20–21Google Scholar; Khan, Sureya Bedr, “The Case of Kurdistan against Turkey (1928),” The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 18, no. 1–2 (2004): 123Google Scholar.
59 See Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, 80. Also see Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 140; Genç et al., İranlı Tarihçilerin Kaleminden Çaldıran, 119, 138 and 187.
60 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 11.
61 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 13.
62 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 11.
63 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 20.
64 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 22.
65 See Kunt, Metin, “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, no. 3 (1974): 233–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
66 Şerefhan, Şerefname, 18–19.
67 For example, the rulers of Hakkâri were said to be of Abbasids lineage, while the rulers of Cezire the descendants of Khālid ibn al-Walīd, an important Arab general of the early Islamic period. Şerefhan, Şerefname, 76 and 94.
68 Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 31.
69 See Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 23–7. Also see Özoğlu, Hakan, “The Impact of Islam on Kurdish Identity Formation in the Middle East,” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Ahmed, Mohammed M.A. and Gunter, Michael (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2007), 19–35Google Scholar. Similar views have been expressed by other scholars of Kurdish history. For instance, Vladimir Minorsky noted that “The vague and indiscriminate use of the term Kurd goes back to early times. According to Hamza Isfahani (circa 350/961) … ‘The Persians used to call Daylamites “the Kurds of Tabaristan”, as they used to call Arabs “the Kurds of Suristan”, i.e. of “Iraq”.’ Other Arab and Persian authors of the tenth century A.D. mean by Kurds any Iranian nomads of Western Persia, such as the tent-dwellers of Fars.” Minorsky, Vladimir, “The Gūrān,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 11, no. 1 (1943): 75–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wadie Jwaideh interprets this as meaning that Kurd was synonymous with “nomad.” Jwaideh, Wadie, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 12Google Scholar. In a similar vein, one Armenian scholar has argued that Kurd (Kurtān) in Pahlavi texts (sixth and seventh century) described a nomadic population; while in later Arabic and Persian (eighth to twelfth century) sources Kurd (Akrād/Kurdān) was synonymous with “nomads, cattle-breeders, brigands.” Asatrian, Garnik, “Prolegomena to the Study of the Kurds,” Iran and the Caucasus, no. 13 (2009): 1–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar especially 28.
70 James identified two broad stages in the evolution of the term Kurd in the Middle Ages: Phase One (ninth to eleventh centuries) and Phase Two (twelfth to fourteenth centuries). However, he contends that, although the term “Kurd” clearly changed its meaning and connotations over time, it was used consistently as an ethnonym. See James, Boris, “Ethnonymes arabes (‘ağam, ‘arab, badw, turk…): le cas kurde comme paradigm des façons de penser la difference au Moyen Âge,” Annales islamologiques no. 42 (2008): 93–126Google Scholar.
71 The labeling of this region as “Kurdish” does not imply that Kurds constituted a demographic majority.
72 Ibn Fadl Allāh al-‘Umarī, al-Ta‘rīf bil-Mustalah al-Sharīf, ed. D. Samîr al-Durûbî (Jīmi‘at mu'ta, 1992), 47.
73 Al-‘Umarī, al-Ta‘rīf bil-Mustalah al-Sharīf, 147.
74 Boris James, “The Construction of a Kurdish Political Space in the Middle Ages: Kurdish ‘In-betweenness’, Mamlûk Ethnic Engineering and the Emergence of ‘al-mamlaka al-hasîna al-akrâdiyya’” (forthcoming).
75 The aristocratic ethnie is contrasted to a demotic ethnic identity which is not based on class but upon a strong sense of cultural (or religious) unity. See Smith, Anthony D., National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 52–4Google Scholar; Smith, Anthony D., Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 193–4Google Scholar. Martin van Bruinessen makes a similar point. See Bruinessen, Martin van, “Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problem,” in The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, ed. Kreyenbroek, Philip and Sperl, Stefan (London: Routledge, 1992), 39Google Scholar.
76 Bruinessen, Martin van, “Introduction,” in Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir, ed. Bruinessen, Martin van and Boeschoten, Hendrik (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 27Google Scholar.
77 T.C. Başbakanlik Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 397 Numarali Haleb Livâsi Mufassal Tahrîr Defteri, (943/1536) (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2010), 40–42.
78 Nevertheless, as Reşat Kasaba has noted, Ottoman policies most likely did have an influence of the survival of the Kurds as a distinct group. Kasaba, Reşat, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants and Refugees (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 25Google Scholar.
79 Rich, Claudius James, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, and on the Site of Ancient Nineveh; with Journal of a Voyage down the Tigris to Bagdad and an Account of a Visit to Shirauz and Persepolis (London: James Duncan, 1836), 80Google Scholar. He notes the distinction between the “Sipah,” i.e. the military/clannish Kurds, and the “Rayah” or “Keuylees,” i.e. the peasantry.
80 Rich, Narrative, 89.
81 See Bruinessen, Martin van, “Ehemdi Xani's Mêm û Zîn and Its Role in the Emergence of Kurdish National Awareness,” in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Vali, Abbas (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 40–57Google Scholar.
82 For detailed information on the Sharafnama manuscripts see Soltani, Anwar, “The Sharafnama of Bitlisi Manuscript Copies, Translations and Appendixes,” The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 20, no. 1–2 (2006): 209–14Google Scholar. Also see Soltani, Anwar, 35 Destnûsî Şerefnamey Betlîsî le Kitêbxanekanî Cîhan (Jönköping: Kitêbî Erzan, 1997)Google Scholar.
83 Ardalani, Mihemed Ebrahim, The History of Ardalanids (1590–1810), ed. Borna, Nasrin and Soltani, Anwar (Stockholm: Nawroz förlag, 1997), 73Google Scholar.
84 However, this seems not to be true in all cases. For instance, in 1849 Nurullah Beg, the prince of Hakkâri, was removed from his position in the aftermath of the revolt of Bedirxan Beg, the prince of Cezire. However, when interviewed he objected to his dismissal, arguing that he was not a member of that zümre-i bağiyye (rebellious community), i.e. the Kurds, but a descendant of the Abbasids. Clearly for this prince his Arabo-Islamic lineage took precedence over any sense of Kurdishness. BOA, İ.DH 193/10884, May 16, 1849.
85 See Özoğlu, Hakan, “Does Kurdish Nationalism have a Navel,” in Symbiotic Antagonisms, ed. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe and Keyman, Fuat (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), 199–222Google Scholar.
86 Ellen Comisso notes, in her investigation of the role of nationalism in the dissolution of Europe's multi-national empires, that while modernization did result in increasing “national” consciousness and political activities by groups claiming to speak in the name of their particular ethnic constituency, this did not translate “inevitably” into demands for an independent nation-state. A number of stratagems, besides separatism, remained open to the ethnic activists including accommodation, defection and assimilation. See Comisso, Ellen, “Empires as Prisons of Nations Versus Empires as Political Opportunity Structures: An Exploration of the Role of Nationalism in Imperial Dissolution in Europe,” in Empire to Nation, ed. Esherick, Joseph W, Kayalı, Hasan and Young, Eric van (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 144–53Google Scholar.
87 See Bajalan, Djene, “Osmanlı Devleti, Osmanlı-Kürt Aydın Sınıfı ve “Jön Kürtçülük” Akımı Üzerine (1898–1909),” Dipnot, no. 2 (2010): 141–57Google Scholar.
88 See Kürdistan, 9 Nisan 1314 (April 21, 1898). This was later changed to “A Kurdish newspaper published every fifteen days which encourages scientific and artistic education amongst the Kurds and includes Kurdish literature and works.” See Kürdistan, 7 Mayıs 1314 (May 19, 1898).
89 Mîqdad Mîdhet Bedirxan, “Şevketlu Azmetlu Sultan Abdülhamid-i Sanî Hazretlerine Arzıhal-i Abîdanemdir,” Kürdistan 7 Mayıs 1314 (May 19, 1898).
90 Mîqdad Mîdhet Bedirxan, “Untitled”, Kürdistan, 9 Nisan 1314 (April 21, 1998).
91 Members of the Bedirxan family, who would play a leading role in the Kurdish movement right down to the 1940s, continued to regard themselves as “crown princes” and “kings” of Kurdistan. Even as late as the 1970s Kamuran Bedirxan, a professor at the Sorbonne, styled himself as “emir” or “prince.”