1. Negareshī be avvalīn dawreh-ye majles-e shūrā-ye Eslāmī (Tehran: Majles Public Relations Publications, 1985), 4.

2. Polsby, Nelson W., “Legislatures” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W., eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 257–310Google Scholar.

3. Kalaycioglu, Ersin, “Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1 (February 1980)Google Scholar; Opello, Walter C., “Portugal's Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jewell, M. E., and Kim, Chong Lim, “Sources for the Legislature in a Developing Nation,” Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 4 (January 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sager, Samuel, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Sisson, Richard and Shrader, Lawrence L., “Social Representation and Political Integration in the Indian State: The Legislative Dimension,” in Eldridge, Albert F., ed., Legislatures in Plural Societies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

4. Interparliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World 1, 2nd ed. (1986), 3–23.

5. Milani, Mohsen, The Making of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Boulder: Westview Press 1988), 54Google Scholar. For a collection of Nuri's writings see Turkaman, M., Shaykh FaÌlollāh Nūrī (Tehran: Institute for Cultural Research, 1982)Google Scholar.

6. Saudi Arabia is another self-declared Islamic state that has never been anything but a classic fundamentalist state, with the Qur'an as its constitution and the sharl'a its criminal and civil law. “Our Islamic faith,” said King Fahd, “includes an integrated system and complete creed.” The Institution of parliament “is inappropriate and only suitable to Western-style democracy” (The Economist, 4 April 1992). 7. Unicameral parliaments are predominant in the developing countries because bicameral system is regarded as leading to complications, delays and expenses, with few if any, compensating advantages. In a study of 83 countries, 55 had adopted a unicameral system. See Interparliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World, 3–10.

8. What the Italians call correntocrazia (loosely translated, “factionocracy“) has been a major impediment to the centralization of power in revolutionary Iran. Policy differences over such issues as the extent of the state power, limits on private property, the export of the revolution, and relations with the Western countries, have led to the emergence of two factions within the ruling elite: the pragmatists, and the radicals. The former is made up of groups and individuals who cluster around the current president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The latter is made up of groups and individuals whose shared ideological and programmatic values has been the basis of their coming together, that is, Khomeinism.

9. Madani, S. J., Ḥoqūq-e asāsī dar jomhūrī-e Eslāmī-e Irān, vol. 3, “The Legislature” (Tehran: Sorush Publications, 1986), 66–71Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., 69.

11. Personal interview, Qasem Sho'lesa'di, deputy from Shiraz, 19 August 1991.

12. For an excellent analysis of the events that led to the death sentence on Salman Rushdie see James Piscatori, “The Rushdie Affair and the Politics of Ambiguity,” International Affairs 66 (October 1990).

13. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the amended edition (Tehran: The Ministry for Islamic Guidance Publications, 1991), 47.

14. Until 1988, the electoral law for the Assembly of Experts required that candidates submit “three references from recognized theologians that attest to the theological knowledge of the candidates.” From Rafsanjani's point of view, this was an important loophole through which radicals may gain admission to the assembly. With the tacit approval of Khomeini, the Council of Guardians became the body for examining this requirement. Moreover, it was stated that those who could not substantiate their theological learnings could take “an exam administered by the Council.” Radicals like Mohtashami and Kho'iniha condemned this new requirement. See Saldm, 31 July 1991.

15. Personal interview, ‘Ali Akbar Mohtashami, deputy from Tehran (1990–92), editor of the weekly, Bayan, and the chair of committee on defense and armed services (1990–91), 18 August 1991.

16. Mohammad Gilani, Mohammad Emami-Kashani, and Mohammad Mo'men.

17. For an analysis of Rafsanjani's cabinet see A. Ehteshami, “After Khomeini: The Structure of Power in the Iranian Second Republic,” Political Studies 49 (1991): 148- 57.

18. The Washington Post, 18 August 1989.

19. Personal interview, ‘Abbas ‘Ali ‘Amid Zanjani, deputy from Tehran, and chair of the judiciary committee (1990–91), 22 August 1991.

20. FBIA/SA, 21 September 1989.

21. Iran Times, 15 May 1992.

22. The Society of Combatant Clergy is anything but “combatant.” Composed of conservative clerics, the society had its origins in 1977 when “a group of revolutionary disciples of Imam Khomeini” started a weekly session to discuss and exchange information. The idea belonged to the late Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari (assassinated in 1979). The first participants were Rafsanjani, Khamane'i, Beheshti (assassinated in 1981), Nateq-Nuii (the current speaker of the Majles), Bahonar (assassinated in 1981), and Mahdavi-Kani (the current executive secretary). The society was a secret cell and a crucial link for Khomeini who was in exile in Iraq. After the revolution, the members of the society founded the Islamic Republican Party and controlled the Revolutionary Council. The members of this society have in common one characteristic: political conservatism and links to the powerful merchant class in Iran, the bazaar. According to its charter, it has a sixteen-member central committee, and its platform calls for measures to open up economic and foreign policy, including privatization, foreign investment, and diplomatic ties with the outside world. On the other hand, the Association of Militant Clergymen is made up of hard-liners who believe they most closely adhere to “the Imam's [Khomeini's] line.” In 1986, these hard-liners had effectively taken control of the IRP, but influential members of the society (Khamane'i and Rafsanjani) convinced Khomeini to dissolve the IRP, leaving the radicals without any organization. In 1987, two radicals, M. Kho'iniha and M. Karrubi, asked Khomeini to permit them the same rights as given to the society. On 10 April 1987, Khomeini wrote a letter to Kho'iniha and Karrubi that stated: “Creating an organization to augment independent and revolutionary viewpoints should not necessarily lead to factionalism. This will happen when unacceptable methods are used to advance individualistic goals. With the knowledge and understanding that I have, I am confident this will not happen.” Khomeini also gave the association 500,000 tumans ($3,000) a month to carry out its mission. Current executive secretary of the association is M. Musavi-Kho'iniha. Sources: personal interviews, Zanjani and Mohtashami; Society of the Combatant Clergy, Resalat, 6 April 1992; the Association of the Militant Clergymen, Salam, 7 April 1992.

23. There were several riots in the cities of Mashhad, Shiraz, Arak, and the southern part of Tehran. See Robin Wright, “Reporter-At-Large,” The New Yorker, 22 June 1992.

24. Ibid., 79. For other criticisms of Rafsanjani see Salām, 9 June and 15 July 1992.

25. “Pre-Agenda Speeches by the Deputies in the Third Majles,” Resālat, 26 August 1991.

26. Abrār, 17 August 1990.

27. Quoted in Shahram Chubin, “Iran and the Gulf Crisis,” Middle East Insight 7, no. 4 (1990). For more on the reaction of the fundamentalists to the war see James Piscatori, Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (The Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts and Science, Chicago, 1991), 52–69.

28. Resālat, 19 October 1991.

29. Personal interview, Qasem Sho'lesa'di, deputy from Shiraz, 16 March 1992.

30. Wright, “Reporter,” 70.

31. Iran Times, 29 November 1991.

32. Quoted in Resālat, 16 March 1992.

33. Personal interview, ‘Abdol-Vahid Musavi-Lari, deputy from Damavand, member of the governing board (1991–92), 16 march 1992.

34. Salām, 19 March 1992.

35. Resālat, 12 March 1992.

36. Iran Times, 3 April 1992.

37. Besides Asgharzadeh, two other incumbents who were involved in the taking of the American hostages were disqualified: Hedayat Aqa'i and Mohammad Behzadian.

38. Mohammad Reza Tavassoli was the only candidate elected.

39. All data are from the office of public relations, Islamic Consultative Assembly; Resālat, 20 and 26 may 1991; Iran Times, 29 May 1992.

40. “Pre-Agenda Speeches by the Deputies in the Majles,” Resālat, 23 April 1992.

41. Ibid.