¹ Recounted by Susskind, Ron, ‘Without a Doubt’, in The New York Times, 17th October 2004Google Scholar.

² See for example National Security Council member, Bob Blackwill quoted in the Financial Times, March 16th 2004, ‘Washington Hardliners wary of engaging Iran’, Guy Dinmore: “Bush has a vision for the Greater Middle East but not a policy.” The notion that US policy towards Iran, inasmuch as it exists, has failed is of course not new, see for example, Chubin, S & J D Green Engaging Iran: A US Strategy Survival Vol 40, no 3 Autumn (1998): 153–169Google Scholar.

³ Contrast Rice's comments with those of Richard Armitage after the State of the Union address in 2002, “The axis of evil speech was a valid comment [but] I would note there is one dramatic difference between Iran and the other two axes of evil, and that would be its democracy. [And] you approach a democracy differently…I wouldn't think they were next at all.” Armitage, Richard quoted in the Los Angeles Times 15th February 2003Google Scholar.

⁴ In this paper, ‘realism’, and the ‘rationality’ that it implies are culturally defined and determined, and therefore reflect particular interpretation as opposed to general laws. ‘Myth’ is here is used as a concept in the social sciences. See for example, P Ricouer Science and Ideology in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, (Cambridge1981): 222–246. My reading of myth draws extensively on Barthes, R, Mythologies (London, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁵ See for example, Harder, Leon, ‘Operation Iranian Freedom?’ The American Conservative 25th April, 2005: 3–4Google Scholar; “…the neocons are more entrenched in the power centres while the realists have been cleansed from the CIA and other government agencies.”.

⁶ As Sands, Philippe notes in Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (London 2005): xiGoogle Scholar, “The rules which were intended to constrain others became constraining of their creators.”.

⁷ See for example, W Beeman @Double Demons: Cultural Impedance in US-Iranian Understanding', Iranian Journal of International Affairs Summer-Fall (1990): 319–334.

⁸ For details of this interpretation see Sick, Gary, October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan (London, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁹ The notion of ‘national interest’ became more prominent in discourse, see for example Seifzadeh, Hossein ‘Estrateji-ye Melli va Siyasatgozari-ye khareji’ (National Strategy & Foreign Policy-Making), The Journal of Foreign Policy, Vol VII, (1994): 705–722Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See the editorial in the Tehran Times, February 23rd 1993, which boldly proclaimed now to be the time for ‘realism’. There was also an attempt to out-intellectualise and out-rationalise the West, which often took some striking turns. For example one of the key proponents of this movement, Mohammad-Javad Larijani, could offer the following assessment of the Islamic Republic: “While an Islamic society is not at ease with technical rationality, it finds itself quite in harmony with the authentic one. Therefore, Islamic modernity goes far beyond historical modernity and is basically a post-modern phenomenon.” ‘Islamic Society & Modernism’, in The Iranian Journal for International Affairs, VII, 1, (1995): 58.

¹¹ See Khatami, M ‘Observations on the Information World’ in Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks, trans. Mafinezam, A, (Binghamton 1997): 61–71Google Scholar.

¹³ SWB ME/3099 S1/6 dated 11th December 1997, Khatami's speech to the OIC conference dated 9th December 1997. See also BBC SWB ME/3339 MED/2 dated 23rd September 1998, President Khatami addresses Iranian expatriates in the USA, dated 20th September 1998: “the first rule of dialogue…is to know yourself and identity. The second rule is to know the civilisation with which you want to maintain a dialogue…”.

¹⁴ BBC SWB ME/3120 MED/5 dated 9 January 1998, CNN interview dated 8th January 1998.

¹² ‘Hegemony’ is here used in the Gramscian sense.

¹⁵ The importance of the myth of Mosaddeq to contemporary Iranian political culture can hardly be exaggerated. See for example the Persian periodical Nameh, 25, Mordad 1382/August 2003, Special Issue on the 50th anniversary of the Coup; or the previous year's issue, Mordad 1381/August 2002, special issue on ‘National Unity’, in which the spectre of Mosaddeq looms large.

¹⁶ The notion (myth) that ‘conservatives’ are easier ‘to do business with’, would in turn be replicated by the Europeans. The standard mantra of this myth is the argument, ‘Only Nixon could go to China’.

¹⁷ For a traditional conservative critique of the neo-conservative agenda see Pat Buchanan ‘No End to War’ in The American Conservative 1st March 2004.

¹⁸ Abrams was initially appointed National Security Council Staff Chief for ‘Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations, before moving up in 2002, to become Special Assistant to the President and Senior Dircetor on the NSC for SW Asia, Near East and North African Affairs. See David Corn, ‘Elliot Abrams. Its Back!’ The Nation July 2 2001; Terry J Allen, ‘Public Serpent: Iran Contra villain Elliot Abrams is back in Action’ In These Times August 2001; ‘The Return of Elliot Abrams’ TomPaine.com, www.tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/6895 11th December 2002; see also ‘Iran-Contra, Amplified’ www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/8625 18th August 2003.

¹⁹ It was noticeable for example that the standard chants of ‘death to America’ at Fridays prayers were suspended; see the interesting reflection on the attack and Iranian sympathies for Americans in Hajizadeh, M ‘Aqazadeh-ha’ (Their Excellencies' Sons) (Tehran, 1381/2002): 143–146Google Scholar. Popular sympathy for the United States continued, see Aftab-e Yazd 5th Esfand 1382/24th February 2004, p 5.

²⁰ Leon Hardar op cit p 4; see also A Killgore, Neocons ‘Concentrate on Promoting US-Iran War’ in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs March 2005: 32–33.

²¹ The United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, publicly made the claims on 18th January 2002, see Iran Press Service 18th January 2002, www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2002/Jan_2002/afqanestan_iran_qaeda_18102.

²² See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129‐11.html; the ‘terrorist underworld’ highlighted by President Bush was limited to Hamas, Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad, and for good measure Jaish-e-Mohammad.

²³ See commentary in Nowruz, 2nd February 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. For an interesting exception to the standard line (albeit written abroad), see G Qoreishi & M Soleimani ‘Iran va Amrika: Bazi-ye na-tamam’ (Iran & America: The unfinished game), Aftab, 2, 15, Ordibehesht 1381/April–May 2002: 14–21, trans J Kheirkhahan.

²⁸ ISNA website, 2nd February 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol.

³⁰ Ahmad Zeydabadi quoted in ISNA website 16th March 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol; See also Jala'ipour's comments in Bonyan 18th March 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol.

²⁴ Khamenei calls Bush ‘thirsty for human blood AFP 31st January 2002. See for example, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol, Nowruz website 18th March 2002, on continuing calls by conservatives for a declaration of martial law.

²⁵ See for example, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol, IRIB, 12th July 2002, Demonstrators support Khamene'i, call for trial of ‘fifth columnists’; also, Etemad, 29 Mordad 1381/20th August 2002: 2. There was of course, plenty of public scepticism, see the reader's comment, Aftab-e Yazd, 25 Ordibehesht 1381/15th May 2002: 11.

²⁶ see Elahe Koulaee's comments in Nowruz, 24 Ordibehesht 1381/14th May 2002, p 2; also Aftab-e Yazd, 21 Khordad 1381/11th June 2002: 1.

²⁷ The alternative was of course Israel, despite the best attempts of overseas observers, see A Sheikhzadeh Iran va Emrika: taqabul ya tafahum (Iran and America: confrontation or understanding) Aftab, 2, 17, Tir-Mordad 1381/July–August 2002: 16–25.

²⁹ Majlis deputies welcomed the possibility of inter-parliamentary talks following comments by Senator Joe Biden, Hambastegi website, 16th March 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. Ahmad Zeydabadi quoted in ISNA website 16th March 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol; See also Jala'ipour's comments in Bonyan 18th March 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. See for example, Nowruz, 31 Ordibehesht 1381/21st May 2002: 1.

³¹ Nowruz, 19 Ordibehesht 1381/9th May 2002: 5.

³² For a later analysis of these developments see Guy Dinmore ‘Washington Hardliners wary of engaging with Iran’ Financial Times March 16th 2004.

³³ See the detailed analysis of the various claims in Nowruz 26th May 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol.

³⁴ See Armin's comments in Nowruz, 24 Ordibehesht 1381/14th May 2002:2, and Rafsanjani's reply in Nowruz, 25 Ordibehesht 1381/15th May 2002: 2; see also, Guy Dinmore op cit Financial Times, March 16th 2004. See also K Royce & T M Phelps ‘Secret Talks with Iranian’, Newsday.com 8th August 2003.

³⁹ Hayat-e No website, 1st June 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. See also Nowruz, 19 Khordad 1381/9th June 2002: 7; Hayat-e No, 11 Khordad 1381/1st June 2002: 1.

³⁵ Mirdamadi, the Head of the Majlis National Security Commission, had been at the forefront of the charge that ‘conservatives’ had initiated un-authorised talks, see for example, Entekhab 23rd May 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. He was charged with putting the country's national security at risk by the head of the Tehran Judiciary, Alizadeh! See Resalat website, 27th May 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol.

³⁶ See Mohajerani's comments in Bonyan, 14 Ordibehesht 1381/4th May 2002: 2; for public frustration see, Aftab-e Yazd, 25 Ordibehesht 1381/15th May 2002: 11; Comment by Habibollah Asgarowladi, 15th June 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol.

³⁷ Nowruz, 5 Khordad 1381/26th May 2002: 1.

³⁸ Nowruz, 6 Khordad 1381/27th May 2002, pp 1–2; Editorial in Hadis-e Qazvin 2nd June 2002, BBC SWB Mon MEPol. See also Mehdi Karrubi's press conference, Nowruz 12 Khordad 1381/2nd June 2002: 1–2; Hayat-e No, 12 Khordad 1381/2nd June 2002: 1.

⁴⁰ For details see, Mardomsalari, 18 Dey 1381/8th January 2003: 4/9; there was some evidence of Ministry of Information collusion, see Entekhab website, 24th December 2002, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol; Bahar, 19 Dey 1381/9th January 2003 p 1; it was indeed February 2003, before the Judiciary provided details to President Khatami, ISNA website, 2 February 2003, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol.

⁴¹ See Jannati's speech, IRIB, 8th November 2002, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol.

⁴² See for example the reader comment, Aftab-e Yazd, 17 Shahrivar 1381/8th September 2002, p 5, “In my opinion America has provided the greatest help to Muslims and Iran…”; also reader comment, Aftab-e Yazd, 28 Azar 1381/18th December 2002, p 5; see also a critique of the ‘myth’ of America, see Bana S ‘Bar gharari rabeteh bah amrika: faseleh gereftan ba romantism-e siyasi (Establishing links with America: moving away from political romanticism), Aftab, Farvardin 1382/April 2003: 84.

⁴³ ‘Letter of Sholeh-Saadi to Khamenei’ December 2002 www.web.peykeiran.com/iran/news/ir_news_92.asp.

⁴⁴ For details see the editorial in the magazine, Aftab, Farvardin 1382/April 2003, along with the interview with Habibollah Peyman. For Elahe Koulaie's criticism of bias of Iranian television against the Americans see Tehran Times website, 7th April 2003, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol. There was of course a certain amount of anxiety in official circles about the rapidity of the fall of Iraq, Hayat-e No, 16 Shahrivar 1381/7th September 2002: 1; Aftab-e Yazd, 25 Ordibehesht 1381/15th May 2002: 11; see President Khatami's press conference, Jaam-e Jam 28th August 2002, BBC SWB Mon ME1 MEPol. Discomfort at US policies gradually emerged after the war, see R Mostaqim Iranian Reformers Back Hardliners Against War Inter Press Service News Agency, April 2nd 2003. See also the concerns expressed in the Editorial in ‘Jang va Ghodrat menhaye Mardom’ (War and power without the people) Jame'eh No, 2, 15, Ordibehesht 1382/April 2003: 1–2, these views were reflected in the tone of the rest of the special issue.

⁴⁵ Among observers of US policy that continued to be translated into Persian were the standard bearers of ‘realism’, whether as proponents or critiques. See for example, N Chomsky ‘Tahlil-e Eqdam Bush dar Araq’ (An analysis of Bush's actions in Iraq), Aftab, 3, 21, Azar 1381/Nov–Dec 2002): 84–85 trans M Malekan; A Bigdeli ‘Amrika: Ostoreh ta Vagheyat’ (America: myth to reality) Jame'eh No, 2, 13, Esfand 1381/March 2003: 27–28.

⁴⁶ See for example in this vein, F Fukuyama ‘Mohafezeh-kari-ye Emrakayi’ (American conservativism) Aftab, 3, 22, Dey-Bahman 1381/Jan–Feb 2003: 88–89 trans M Malekan; particularly pertinent to this interpretation is the following article: G Nassri ‘Tammoli marafat shenakhti bar falsafe-ye siyasi-ye Habbs va mabna-ye qodrat va amniat dar’ an (An Epistemological Meditation on the Political Philosophy of Hobbes) Etele'at Siyasi-Eqtesadi Vol 16: 177–178 Khordad-Tir 1381/June–July 2002: 18–31.

⁴⁷ A view which panders to the inevitable ‘clash of civilisations’. This perspective was admirably critiqued by Soroush, Abdolkarim in The Three Cultures in Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: essential writings of Abdolkarim Soroush trans & ed by Sadri, M & Sadri, A, (Oxford, 2000): 156–170Google Scholar. See also Bulliet, Richard The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilisation (New York, 2005)Google Scholar.