Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
This study aims to address concerns over Iranian territorial integrity with respect to ethnic identity by examining three interrelated points of:
Center and periphery in Iran.
Territorial attachment and the political borders.
Ethnic identity and social mobility.
I am grateful to Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi for their insightful comments and helpful editing of this article.
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3 Ibid.
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6 Ibid. 156.
7 Ibid. 161.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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The Cossack Brigade formed in 1879, was composed of Iranian troops. Under Russian officers, it soon came to enjoy a reputation for military discipline, rigidity and brutality. The most notorious example of it's the Brigade's intervention occurred in 1907, when under the command of the Russian colonel Liakhov, it bombarded the Majles. Russian control over the Cossack Brigade ceased following the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in 1917, but the Brigade continued to exist and, indeed, provided Reza Khan with military support to launch his coup d'état in 1921. Reza Khan then merged the Brigade with the Gendarmerie as part of his reorganisation of Iran's national army. F.O. 371/2762, Memorandum on the Persian Army, 1907.
26 F.O. 371/4927. In his memoirs, Mokhber al-Saltaneh (Khaterat, 318) says that the Sheikh was found and killed by Cossacks in an exchange of fire, but he also mentions a suicide note by the Sheikh, although he does not vouch for its veracity. According to Bristow, the British Consul in Tabriz,: “The Sheykh was discovered in his hiding place and shot by Cossacks”. See: F.O. 371/1278, 15 September 1920.
27 Azerbayjan (1946), no. 357.
28 Azerbayjan (1946), no. 366.
29 Wash. Nat. Arch., 891.00/12-2346, 23 December 1946.
30 Among such minor cases was the vague resistance organized by the Komiteh-ye Enteqam (Revenge Committee) in a suburb of Tabriz: Mohammad Ruzegar., Khaterat (unpublished memoirs). In an interview with the author, Mohammad Ruzegar described the resistance as ‘purely unprompted’ and denied any possible link between the above-mentioned group and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party leadership.
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34 British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC), Summary of World broadcasts, Middle East and Africa, December 19.
35 While in the referendum for the nature of the political system in the country Tabriz contributed with 718.368 votes, in the second referendum the number of cast votes was 389.063.
36 See for example Shaffer, Brenda, Borders and Brethren. Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijan Identity (Cambridge, 2002): 96–97Google Scholar.
37 The Azerbaijani Society was founded among others by Dr Javad Heyat, Hamid Notqi, Hossein-Ali Katebi and Mohammad-Ali Farzaneh.
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