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Comments on R. Harrison Wagner’s War and the State: The Theory of International Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2010

James D. Fearon
James D. Fearon*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
*
*E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Symposium on War and the State
Information
International Theory , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , July 2010 , pp. 333 - 342
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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