Dr Sima Samar was born in Jaghoori, Ghazni, Afghanistan, on 3 February 1957. She obtained her degree in medicine in February 1982 from Kabul University, one of the few Hazara women to do so. She practised medicine at a government hospital in Kabul, but after a few months was forced to flee for her safety to her native Jaghoori, where she provided medical treatment to patients throughout the remote areas of central Afghanistan.

One year after the communist revolution in 1978, her husband was arrested and was never heard from again. Some years later, Dr Samar and her young son fled to the safety of nearby Pakistan. She then worked as a doctor at the refugee branch of the Mission Hospital in Quetta. In 1989, distressed by the total lack of healthcare facilities for Afghan refugee women, she established the Shuhada Organization and Shuhada Clinic in Quetta. The Shuhada Organization was dedicated to the provision of health care to Afghan women and girls, the training of medical staff, and education. In the following years, further branches of the clinic/hospital were opened in central Afghanistan.

After living in Quetta as a refugee for over a decade, Dr Samar returned to Afghanistan in December 2001 to assume a cabinet post in the Afghan Interim Administration led by Hamid Karzai. In the interim government she served as Deputy Chairperson and first ever Minister for Women's Affairs. She was forced to resign from her post after receiving death threats and being harassed for questioning conservative Islamic laws, especially sharia law, during an interview in Canada with a Persian-language newspaper. During the 2002 Loya Jirga, several religious conservatives published an advertisement in a local newspaper calling Dr Samar the Salman Rushdie of Afghanistan.

She currently heads the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).1 She was a nominee for the Nobel Peace Price in 2009.

Afghanistan's current difficulties are in large measure the product of a troubled history and a troubled geographical location. These have combined to produce a debilitated state, open to meddling from a range of external powers, that has now experienced decades of trauma. The current insurgency that afflicts the country is sustained by the sanctuaries in Pakistan from which the Taliban operate. Unless and until there is progress on this front, the situation in Afghanistan will remain stalemated.

In approaching this subject the most important thing to understand is how Afghans perceive things to be. On to this must be grafted factors about their environment, beliefs, and character that most affect their response. The physical characteristics of their environment are easy to define and describe, but their character, relationship to Islam, and how the two combine and affect their mode of warfare is more complex – a knot of truly Gordian proportions. However, if the past is accurately factored into the present, this enables contextual understanding, which is the key to unlocking the puzzle.

Besides a surge in terrorist activities, events following the 11 September terrorist attack on the United States have raised a new challenge for the world: the emergence of transnational Islamic networks, predominantly influenced by organizations such as Ikhwan al Muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood) and Al Qaeda, which are helping to spread a particular religious ideology across the globe and are also having an impact on pre-existing groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This article gives an overview of the role of Islamist networks and their influence, drawn from Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, in South and South-west Asia and the Afghanistan–Pakistan region in particular. It also explains how local like-minded outfits have used Al Qaeda's anti-Western jargon to recruit foot soldiers and enlist support within their society, besides serving as financial conduits for the radical Wahabite/Salafi reformists.

The judgement of key decision-makers to ignore the critical problem of impunity – the lack of accountability for egregious human rights violations – contrary to the wishes of the vast majority of Afghans has had devastating, if predictable, consequences. Disillusionment with the continued abuse of power, along with the steady increase in war-related casualties, is a significant driver of the escalating insurgency. Experience over the past nine years highlights an urgent need to address the strategic issue of systemic and structural injustice. It is not realistic to envisage an end to armed conflict and the development of democratic and accountable state institutions while impunity reigns.

In Afghanistan, rule of law projects have placed a heavy emphasis on rebuilding courts and law enforcement institutions. Little attention has been given to the critical element of defence, particularly criminal defence services for the poor. Yet, without defence lawyers, there can be no rule of law. This article examines the right to counsel in Afghanistan and the indispensable role that defence lawyers are playing in the development of the justice system, illustrated by the experience of the International Legal Foundation. By providing early and effective representation to their clients, lawyers ensure that Afghanistan's new laws and constitutional provisions protecting the rights of the accused are implemented.

Since the 1990s, the concept of ‘state-building’ has become the means by which intervenors have attempted to tackle ‘state failure/fragility’. The ‘ideal’ referred to when attempting to do this – both theoretically and in practice – has been that of the classic ‘nation-state’ as developed by Max Weber. To answer the question posed by the title above, the article first looks generally at the evolution of the current state-building paradigm and global governance discourse. Second, a background of historical attempts at state-building in Afghanistan is given. Third, an assessment is made of the international community's approach to Afghanistan since 2001. Finally, the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more traditional societies such as Afghanistan – where modes of governance and authority are often informal, complex, and characterized by historical and charismatic sources of legitimacy – is addressed. Until now, such contexts have barely been acknowledged, still less understood, by intervenors. Today, however, some academics are beginning to outline an alternative response to state fragility, recognizing more traditional sources of legitimacy and a hybridity of political order.

Bad news about Afghanistan is a daily reality. War has plagued the country for three uninterrupted decades. Afghan women and men face daunting survival struggles. The majority of them have known nothing else but war. Considerable responsibility lies on the shoulders of Afghans themselves, who have caused extensive suffering for their fellow countrywomen and men. This article, however, argues that the future of Afghanistan lies in Afghan hands. The solution to its current problems cannot and will not come from outside. It is time for Afghan men and women to confront their problems, to address their divisions, and to envisage home-grown solutions.