David Kilcullen is a leading expert on counter-insurgency policy. He served twenty-four years as a soldier, diplomat, and policy advisor for the Australian and United States governments. He was Special Advisor to the US Secretary of State in 2007–2009 and Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq in 2007. He has provided advice at the highest levels of the Bush and Obama administrations, and has worked in peace and stability operations, humanitarian relief, and counter-insurgency environments in the Asia-Pacific region, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. He is a well-known author, teacher, and consultant, advising the US and allied governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. His best-selling books The Accidental Guerrilla and Counterinsurgency are used worldwide by civilian government officials, policymakers, and military and development professionals working in unstable and insecure environments. Mr Kilcullen holds a PhD from the University of New South Wales. He is the founder and CEO of the consultancy firm Caerus Associates.

Armed actors dominate contemporary conflict environments dramatically. Their degree of dispersion, influence, and effect on international politics make it necessary to establish strategies for interaction with them. This article makes a contribution by assessing particular strategies and their suitability and applicability with regard to specific actors. First, it delineates options for dealing with armed actors based on three perspectives from international relations theory: realist, institutionalist, and constructivist. Second, it matches these perspectives to the capabilities of international actors. Finally, it offers an assessment of the difficulties that arise from the plurality of forms of armed actors, as well as of external actors.

This article identifies two countervailing sets of norms – one promoting humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict in order to protect populations in need, and the other prohibiting such engagement with listed ‘terrorist’ groups in order to protect security – and discusses how this conflict of norms might affect the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving assistance in areas under the control of one of these groups. Rooted in international humanitarian law (IHL), the first set of norms provides a basis for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in non-international armed conflict for the purpose of assisting populations under their control and promoting compliance with the rules of IHL. The second set of rules attempts to curtail financial and other forms of material support, including technical training and co-ordination, to listed ‘terrorist’ organizations, some of which may qualify as NSAGs under IHL. The article highlights counter-terrorism regulations developed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, though other states and multilateral bodies have similar regulations. The article concludes by sketching ways in which humanitarian organizations might respond to the identified tensions.

The topic of participation of armed groups in the development of legal instruments binding them is particularly important and needs to be addressed urgently. Many scholars and organizations have advocated recently for the participation of armed groups in the development of legal instruments binding them, with a view to ensuring their adhesion to the law. However, practical and legal considerations seem to make this participation extremely difficult in practice. Creative solutions have to be found. After reviewing five main reasons why armed groups should be involved in the advancement of the law governing armed conflicts, this article offers a brief overview of selected means by which armed groups should be engaged in the creation of future norms, as well as in the interpretation and contextualization of existing norms.

Armed non-state actors are involved in most armed conflicts today, yet international law provides few mechanisms to ensure that they comply with humanitarian norms applicable to them. In particular, monitoring and verification mechanisms that address the conduct of armed non-state actors rarely appear in multilateral treaties, and, even when they do, are weak and not applied in practice. Over the past few years, a number of alternative mechanisms have been developed to better monitor respect of humanitarian norms during internal armed conflicts and verify allegations of violations. This article examines the strength of these various mechanisms and then focuses on the Deed of Commitment, an innovative instrument developed by the Swiss-based non-governmental organization Geneva Call, to hold armed non-state actors accountable. Experience with the Deed of Commitment on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines shows that these alternative mechanisms can be effective in ensuring better compliance with at least some humanitarian norms.

The French government and an armed insurrectionary movement – the National Liberation Front (FLN) – confronted each other for over seven years in the Algerian War, which would become the archetype of wars of national liberation. It brought the new conditions of struggle in revolutionary warfare to a convulsive climax characterized by terrorist attacks, underground warfare, and repression. On the humanitarian front, the challenge of ensuring respect for humanitarian rules in asymmetric warfare was posed more bluntly than in any previous conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) faced the triple challenge of offering its services to a government facing an armed insurgency that it claimed to be able to bring under control through police action alone, of entering into contact with a liberation movement, and of conducting a humanitarian action in the context of an insurrectionary war.

While detention by armed opposition groups in non-international armed conflict is a reality that is foreseen and not prohibited by international humanitarian law, the grounds upon which it may take place are not defined. This article looks more closely at the customary international humanitarian law prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and how it can apply to armed opposition groups in a manner that makes compliance realistic. It focuses on the legal bases upon which armed opposition groups may detain persons who are taken into custody in order to remove them from hostilities or for security purposes. An approach to detention by armed opposition groups based on the principles of international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts is explored and its limitations defined.

Armed conflict and deprivation of liberty are inexorably linked. Deprivation of liberty by non-state armed groups is a consequence of the predominantly non-international character of contemporary armed conflicts. Regardless of the nature of the detaining authority or the overarching legality of its detention operations, deprivation of liberty may nonetheless have serious humanitarian implications for the individuals detained. Despite a need for humanitarian action, effective engagement is hampered by certain threshold obstacles, such as the perceived risk of the group's legitimization. Since the formative work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s founder, Henry Dunant, the ICRC has sought to overcome these obstacles. In doing so it draws upon its experience of humanitarian action in state detention, adapting it to the exigencies of armed groups and the peculiarities of their detention practice. Although not without setbacks, the ICRC retains a unique role in this regard and strives to ameliorate the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of liberty by armed groups.

The question of whether non-state armed groups could and should provide reparations to their victims has been largely overlooked. This article explores this gap, with a particular focus on symbolic reparations, such as acknowledgement of the truth and apologies. It argues that, while the question is fraught with legal, conceptual, and practical difficulties, there are some circumstances in which armed groups are capable of providing measures of reparations to their victims. The article identifies the issue of attacks on informers as one potential area for armed groups to provide such measures, and demonstrates that in a few cases armed groups have already engaged in actions that could be seen as analogous to symbolic reparations. The article's main case study is provided by recent actions by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in relation to its past attacks against suspected informers.

Every day, and in a range of contexts, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas harms civilians. Evidence is growing that elevated levels of civilian harm fit a recurrent pattern, suggesting that more coherent and effective humanitarian responses are needed to enhance civilian protection, especially changes in behaviour of users of explosive weapons. This article describes the effects of explosive violence, critically examines how the existing humanitarian law regime tends to address this issue and explores some current developments in building a research and policy agenda to try to reduce civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons.

The European Court of Human Rights' judgment in the Al-Jedda case dealt with the lawfulness of UK detention practice in Iraq under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court's opinion could, however, be read as having broader implications for the ability of states parties to that treaty to conduct detention operations in situations of armed conflict. This article analyzes what the Court did – and did not say – about the application of international humanitarian law.

The biannual report on national legislation and case law is an important tool in promoting the exchange of information on national measures for implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL). The ICRC was asked to undertake this task of information exchange through a resolution adopted at the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1996.