Dr Abdel Hamid Afana, MA, PhD, is the President of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, Director of the Training and Research Department at the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, a non-governmental organization established in 1990 which adopts a community-based approach to tackle mental health problems, and President of the Board of Directors of the Jesoor Organization that deals with community rehabilitation for trauma and human rights abuse victims. He is a psychotherapist, a graduate of the University of Oslo in Norway, and has extensive experience in torture rehabilitation. Dr Afana is one of the scholars who believe that mental health and human rights are inseparable and that mental health professionals have a role in community development and building bridges for peace through health. He is the founder and former head of the international board of a postgraduate diploma in Community Mental Health and Human Rights and a member of national, regional and international organizations and professional bodies in fields related to health and human rights. Through transcultural psychiatry at McGill University, Dr Afana is analyzing the social representation, meaning of and means of coping with traumatic experiences in protracted conflicts.

The principle of humane treatment, as Jean Pictet wrote in 1958, is in truth the leitmotiv of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 3 common to these Conventions and other provisions of International Humanitarian Law embody this absolute and minimum rule by prohibiting torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity. These notions can be interpreted in meaningful and practical ways through the existing instruments and jurisprudence on the prohibition of ill-treatment. Their assessment must take into account the need to respect the human being in all his or her physical, mental and moral integrity, mindful of all the circumstances of the case.

During its war against the armed nationalist movement fighting for Algerian independence (1954–62), France made extensive use of torture, for which the main justification given was the terrorism employed by the National Liberation Front, even though such terrorist violence was neither the nationalists' main form of action nor the French army's true target. Research into the methods used and the aims pursued challenges that justification, shedding light on the way in which torture really operates in a war of this kind, even though the Algerian War has been presented as a model for many subsequent conflict situations.

The use of torture by the US armed forces and the CIA was not limited to “a few bad apples” at Abu Ghraib but encompassed a broader range of practices, including rendition to third countries and secret “black sites”, that the US administration deemed permissible under US and international law. This article explores the various legal avenues pursued by the administration to justify and maintain its coercive interrogation programme, and the response by Congress and the courts. Much of the public debate concerned defining and redefining torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. While US laws defining torture have moved closer to international standards, they have also effectively shut out those seeking redress for mistreatment from bringing their cases before the courts and protect those responsible from prosecution.

Torture during interrogation often includes methods that do not physically assault the body or cause actual physical pain and yet entail severe psychological pain and suffering and profoundly disrupt the senses and personality. Solitary confinement and prolonged sleep deprivation are just two examples of these psychological torture methods. Even psychological methods which do not amount to ill-treatment when considered in isolation, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment or torture, when applied in conjunction with other techniques, cumulatively and/or over a long time. Often they are part and parcel of the whole torture process and constitute a “background environment” of harassment and duress. The “cumulation over time” factor must thus be considered as part of a system of psychological torture.

The author argues that torture affects not only its victims, and also that torture is not a disease of the victim but an endemic illness of civilization which has the effect of shattering the social network that makes us human. In order to rebuild healthy social relationships, it is vital to detect and accept the existence of this invisible pathology. We must listen to the intense groan of torture victims and understand them if we are to dare to look at the oppressive order which destroys them.

How is it possible? What are the personal, professional and political contexts that allow physicians to use their skills to torture and kill rather than heal? What are the psychological characteristics and the social, cultural and political factors that predispose physicians to participate in human rights abuses? What can be done to recognize at-risk situations and attempt to provide corrective or preventive strategies? This article examines case studies from Nazi Germany in an attempt to answer these questions. Subjects discussed include the psychology of the individual perpetrator, dehumanization, numbing, splitting, omnipotence, medicalization, group dynamics, obedience to authority, diffusion of responsibility, theories of aggression, training, cultural and social contexts, accountability and prevention.

A special challenge posed by the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of equality of belligerents in the context of non-international armed conflict is the capacity of armed opposition groups to pass sentences on individuals for acts related to the hostilities. Today this situation is conflated by the concurrent application of international human rights and criminal law. The fair trial provisions of IHL can incorporate their human rights equivalents either qua human rights law or by analogy, recognizing that human rights law does not account for the anomalous relationship between a state and non-state party. It is argued that the preferred solution is the latter. This would put greater focus on the actual fairness of insurgent courts rather than on their legal basis. Moreover, it would be consistent with the equality of belligerents principle, a vital condition to encourage IHL compliance by armed opposition groups.

Transitional justice encompasses a number of mechanisms that seek to allow post-conflict societies to deal with past atrocities in circumstances of radical change. However, two of these mechanisms – truth commissions and criminal processes – might clash if the former are combined with amnesties. This article examines the possibility of employing the Rome Statute's Article 53 so as to allow these two mechanisms to operate in a complementary manner. It considers three arguments – an interpretation of Article 53 in accordance with the relevant rules on treaty interpretation, states' obligations to prosecute certain crimes and the Rome Statute's approach to prosecutorial discretion – and concludes that Article 53 is ill-suited to accommodate truth commissions in conjunction with amnesties.