1 International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, Document prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 26–30 November 2007, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 867, September 2007, p. 721.

2 In 2003, the ICRC organized a series of regional expert seminars on the theme of improving compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) – see Improving compliance with international humanitarian law, ICRC Expert Seminars, Report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, October 2003, annexed to the report presented by the ICRC to the XXVIII International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, December 2003, pp. 48–74, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5tam64?opendocument (visited on 28 May 2009).

3 Article 80, Additional Protocol I (AP I).

4 See Williamson, Jamie Allan, ‘Some considerations on command responsibility and criminal liability’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 870, June 2008, pp. 303–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See also the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber), 10 August 1995, paras. 31 and 36, and Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 128.

6 But also difficulties of legal interpretation. See for example Jean Pictet, The 1949 Geneva Conventions, Commentary, Geneva, ICRC, 1952–1959, Vol. I, p. 37, and Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Commentary on the Additional Protocols), ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. 1359.

7 For the different types of armed conflicts, see Vité, Sylvain, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, March 2009, pp. 69–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Article 1(1), with the restriction subsequently introduced into the Protocol according to which they require ‘such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’.

9 Common Article 3, para. 4.

10 Neither Protocol II nor human rights law can provide legal responses to these situations, as they both presuppose that a State is ‘operational’.

11 In English-speaking countries, the term ‘failed state’ is frequently used. See the results of the first Periodical Meeting of the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 19–23 January 1998, Document No 37, p. 802, Section 2, Armed Conflicts Linked to the Disintegration of State Structures. See also Robin Geiss, ‘Failed States’. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 2005.

12 See the ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872, December 2008, pp. 991–1047.

13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, above note 5, para. 65–67, and Meron, Theodor, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, 1995, p. 561 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 In particular the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, of 12 August 1949 (GC I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, of 12 August 1949 (GC II); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949 (GC III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (GC IV)] and Additional Protocols I and II thereto of 8 June 1977 [Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 (AP I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977 (AP II)]. For a full list of all treaties, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView (visited on 28 May 2008). The point is under consideration every second year by the UN General Assembly: see Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts, A/RES/63/125 (2008).

15 The Geneva Conventions (Article 48, GC I; Article 49, GC II; Article 128, GC III; Article 145, GC IV) and Article 84 of AP I require that the High Contracting Parties ‘communicate to one another, as soon as possible, through the depositary and, as appropriate, through the Protecting Powers’ (in case of hostilities), their official translations of the treaty in question and ‘the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure its application’. The translations (in languages other than those of the original texts) are to be done by their government authorities. The ‘laws and regulations’ to be adopted and communicated are all the legislative acts to be performed by the various authorities invested with the powers to issue primary and secondary legislation that have a connection with the application of these instruments.

16 Article 48, GC I; Article 49, GC II; Article 128, GC III; Article 145, GC IV. AP I sets out the same obligation in Article 84.

17 Defined in Article 50, GC I; Article 51, GC II; Article 130, GC III; Article 147, GC IV; and Articles 11(4) and 85, AP I.

18 Articles 53–54, GC I; Articles 43–45, GC II.

19 At the meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts – see ‘Follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of war victims, (Geneva, 30 August-1 September 1995)’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 304, January–February 1995, pp. 4–38. It included an ICRC proposal of a reporting system and the setting up of an international committee of experts on IHL ‘to examine the reports and advise States on any matters regarding the implementation of IHL’ (pp. 25–27).

20 Article 47, GC I; Article 48, GC II; Article 127, GC III; Article 144, GC IV (the wording is almost identical in the four Conventions); Articles 19 and 83, AP I; Article 19, AP II.

21 Para. 1 of Article 6, AP I requires that the High Contracting Parties ‘also in peacetime, endeavour, […], to train qualified personnel to facilitate the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, and in particular the activities of the Protecting Powers.’ This training should take place with the assistance of the National Society.

22 Article 82, AP I. The role of the legal advisers will be to ‘advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject’.

23 Article 87, para. 1, AP I.

24 Article 83, AP I. Knowledge of international humanitarian law is also required on the part of civilian and military authorities who, in time of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions and this Protocol' and hence in relation to protected persons. Paragraph 2 requires that such authorities ‘be fully acquainted with the text’ of these instruments.

25 Articles 49–54, GC I; Articles 50–53, GC II; Articles 129–132, GC III; Articles 146–149, GC IV and Articles 85–89, AP I.

26 This principle imposes on the states parties to the humanitarian law treaties an obligation to prosecute and punish grave breaches. The obligation is absolute and cannot be attenuated, even by agreement between the interested parties (see common Article 51, GC I; Article 52, GC II; Article 131, GC III; Article 148, GC IV). The principle of universal jurisdiction in itself, however, only means that breaches (grave or not) may be prosecuted and punished by any State.

27 Article 85, para. 5, AP I.

28 See the sanctions issue of the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 870, June 2008.

29 S/RES/827 (1993) resp. RES/955 (1994).

30 See Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 7 July 1998.

31 See Marco Sassòli, ‘Humanitarian law and international criminal law’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 111–120.

32 Article 52, GC I; Article 53, GC II; Article 132, GC III; Article 149, GC IV. The procedure referred to by this common Article must be distinguished from an enquiry carried out by a detaining Power in accordance with Article 121, GC III or Article 131, GC IV (case of prisoners of war or civilian internees wounded or killed in special circumstances).

33 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field of 27 July 1929, Article 30. This mechanism was replicated in each of the 1949 Conventions. For further details, see Sylvain Vité, Les procédures internationales d'établissement des faits dans la mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire, Bruylant, Brussels, 1999, p. 30.

34 The expression ‘grave breach’ has a specific meaning and refers to the breaches listed as such in the four Conventions and Protocol I. However, the expression ‘serious violation’ is to be taken in the ordinary sense, which is left to the Commission's own appreciation. As Eric David remarks in his Principes de droit des conflits armés (4th edn, Bruylant, Brussels, 2008, p. 670), it can be deduced from the very general wording of Article 90(2)(d) that the Commission could be asked to enquire into violations of the law of armed conflict committed in a non-international armed conflict. Article 90(2)(d) refers to ‘other situations’, that is situations other than a ‘grave breach’ or a ‘serious violation’ of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I; it requires the consent not of the ‘High Contracting Parties’ but of a ‘Party to the conflict’ and ‘the other Party or Parties concerned’.

35 Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols, above note 6, p. 1045, para. 3620.

36 The Commission's role can go beyond simple fact-finding, as it is authorized to lend its good offices to facilitate the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and Protocol I. By ‘good offices’, we may understand communication of conclusions on the points of fact, comments on the possibilities of a friendly settlement, written and oral observations by States concerned (ibid., p. 1046, para. 3625).

37 David, above note 34, p. 672.

38 One may wonder what interest a Party against which a violation is committed might have in requesting an enquiry from a Commission that has no power to punish and which does not make public its findings even if it discovers the most abominable massacres. The only possible ‘sanction’ – publication of the results of the enquiry – is virtually ruled out. Although discretion may be justified in the case of a body working for victims on the ground, it is less so when it comes to fact-finding, unless it serves to facilitate domestic criminal prosecutions.

39 Art. 90, AP I. In any case, acceptance of the Commission's competence by the impugned State certainly does not guarantee that the procedure will be a success: a belligerent State accused of violating the law of armed conflicts is hardly likely to assist the fact-finding body mandated to determine the truth of such an accusation (David, above note 34, pp. 673–675).

40 ‘Optional competence’: Article 90(2)(d). However, States that ratify Additional Protocol I can make a declaration recognizing the ‘compulsory competence’ of this body in advance (Article 90(2)(a)).

41 See the website of the Commission at http://www.ihffc.org/ (visited on 1 June 2009).

42 For further details, see Vité, above note 33, pp. 43, 99, 117.

43 For example, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and adopting Resolution 1564 (2004), the Council requested the Secretary-General to rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in Darfur, and determine whether acts of genocide had occurred there.

44 Articles 8 and 10, GC I–III; Articles 9 and 11, GC IV.

45 François Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims, ICRC/MacMillan, Geneva, 2003, pp. 860–901. These events are the Suez conflict (1956), the Goa crisis (1961), the conflict between France and Tunisia over Bizerte (1961), the Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971) and the South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom (1982). ‘Et même dans ces cas, le fonctionnement de l‘institution était soit incomplet, soit le résultat du hasard, soit sujet à controverse’: Saab, Georges Abi, ‘Les mécanismes de mise en œuvre du droit humanitaire’, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, Vol. 82, 1978, pp. 103–129.Google Scholar This failure can be explained mainly in terms of political motives. It is rare for States to agree to submit to supervision by a third State in a situation of armed conflict.

46 For a more detailed discussion of these obstacles, see Vité, note 33 above, pp. 34 ff.

47 Article 5(3), AP I.

48 Articles 10, GC I–III; Article 11, GC IV and Article 5(4), AP I.

49 See the statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) that ‘any breach of an engagement [of international law] involves an obligation to make reparation’ (PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Merits), PCIJ Collection of Judgements, Series A, No. 17, 1928.). See also the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 152 and 153 and Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, para. 221. In general, see Zegveld, Liesbeth, ‘Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851, September 2003, pp. 497–527CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Reparations for violations of international humanitarian law’, idem, pp. 529–553.

50 The duty to make ‘reparations’ for violations of IHL is explicitly referred to in the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (Article 38).

51 See Articles 30–37 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). Rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition are not included therein, but are considered part of the concept of reparation in Principle 18 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005 (Basic Rights on the Right of Remedy and Reparations). Measures to sanction perpetrators of violations are sometimes also considered as part of reparations; see Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Durand y Ugarte v. Perú (Reparations), Judgement of 3 December 2001, Series C, No. 89, para. 68; Art. 22 (f) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

52 The Inter-American Court, for instance, recognized as victims 702 displaced persons who had fled their homes because of the lack of protection of the State against massacres of armed groups, and ordered measures to facilitate their return as reparation – see Case of the Ituanga v. Colombia, Judgement of 1 July 2006, Series C, No. 148, para. 234.

53 See International Criminal Court (ICC), Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, Judgement on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on victim's participation of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, para. 38. See also European Court of Human Rights, Cakici v. Turkey, Judgement of 8 July 1999, Reports 1999-IV, para. 98.

54 See e.g. Rule 97 (1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, as well as Rule 98 on the Trust Fund for victims. See also Art. 6 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of 1997 and Art. 5 of the Cluster Munitions Convention of 2008, which contain clauses on victim assistance that require States to develop and implement assistance plans and programmes, but are not focused on an individual right to reparations.

55 See for instance the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in cases concerning indigenous communities: Principal Guidelines for a Comprehensive Reparations Policy (Colombia), OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131, Doc. 1, 19 February 2008, para. 15.

56 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, ICRC/Cambridge University Press, Geneva/Cambridge, 2005, p. 541. See in particular the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparations, above note 51.

57 National courts rejected individual claims, notably the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 2 BvR 1476/03 – Decision of 15 February 2006, para. 20–22, available at http://134.96.83.81/entscheidungen/rk20060215_2bvr147603.html (visited on 29 May 2009) and the Japanese Court (Claims for compensation from Japan arising from injuries suffered by former POWs and civilian internees of the ex-Allied Powers, Decision rendered by the Civil Division No. 31 of the Tokyo District Court, 26 November 1998, reprinted in Fujita et al., War and the Right of Individuals, Nippon Hyoron-sha Co. Publishers, Tokyo, 1999, p. 104).

58 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above note 56, p. 549.

59 Para. 6. See also the Victims Trust Fund, established pursuant to Article 79.

60 Article 2(3), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) Art. 13 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) Art. 10 and 25, African Charter on Human and Peoples Right (Art. 7 (1)a (implicit)).

61 See in particular Karine Bonneau, ‘Le droit à réparation des victimes des droits de l'homme, le rôle pionnier de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme’, Droits fondamentaux, No. 6, janvier 2006–décembre 2007, available at www.droits-fondamentaux.org (visited on 1 June 2009); Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 397–454.

62 See the UN Compensation Commission established by S/RES/687 (1991) and 692 (1991), which reviews claims for compensation for direct loss and damage arising ‘as a result of (Iraq's) unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.’ See Wooldridge, Fred and Eljas, Olufemi, ‘Humanitarian considerations in the work of the United Nations Compensation Commission’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851, September 2003, pp. 555–581.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63 See for example the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, Article 1(1). It established the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating that these persons have the right to restitution of property of which they were deprived during hostilities.

64 See in particular the different treaties concluded and laws passed by Germany to indemnify victims of the war and the Holocaust.

65 See the examples in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above note 56, pp. 542–549.

66 See the issue of the International Review of the Red Cross on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Vol. 88, No. 862, June 2006).

67 Article 5(2)(c)–(d), Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These Statutes are approved by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent that brings together the States party to the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The International Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia referred to the ‘fundamental task’ conferred upon it by the international community in accordance with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, namely to ‘assist and protect victims of armed conflicts’.

68 The ICRC: Its Missions and Work, Policy Document, adopted by the ICRC Assembly in June 2008, published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, June 2009.

69 These mainly concern supervision of the application of international humanitarian law, the Central Tracing Agency (CTA), co-operation, dissemination and the repatriation of the wounded.

70 For example, the collection and transmittal of information on protected persons and other tasks of the CTA.

71 See for example Sandoz, Yves, ‘Le droit d'initiative du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge’, German Yearbook of International Law (Jahrbuch für internationales Recht), Vol. 22, 1979, pp. 352–373.Google Scholar

72 See Yves Sandoz, ‘Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge: gardien du droit international humanitaire’, Mélanges Sahovic, Revue yougoslave de droit international, 1996, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/fre/sitefre0.nsf/html/about-the-icrc-311298 (visited on 28 May 2009).

73 Article 81(1), AP I.

74 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion under Rule 73 for a Ruling concerning the Testimony of a Witness (Trial Chamber), 27 July 1999, paras. 47 and 72. See also Jeannet, Stéphane, ‘Recognition of the ICRC's long-standing rule of confidentiality – An important decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 838, June 2000, p. 403–425.Google Scholar

75 See Anne-Marie La Rosa, ICRC and ICC: two separate but complementary approaches to ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, web interview available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/international-criminal-court-interview-101008 (visited on 1 June 2009).

76 To support the efforts made by the ICRC headquarters in Geneva and its delegations in conflict situations, the ICRC has set up a network of delegations that covers almost all countries not directly affected by an armed conflict. These regional delegations currently exist in 21 States, and each of them covers several countries. They are decentralized extensions of the headquarters and serve as relays to help it implement its general objectives and permanent tasks (national implementation measures, dissemination and development of international humanitarian law, co-operation with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, etc.), in other words to perform the ICRC's overall mandate as set out in Article 5 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These delegations are supposed to alert headquarters rapidly in case of an emergency and prepare themselves to become operational during a conflict. They make possible a bilateral and multilateral dialogue with States, as well as with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, to further the implementation of international humanitarian law.

77 The ICRC set up its Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law in 1996 to step up its support to States committed to implementing IHL. Specifically, the Advisory Service organizes meetings of experts, offers legal and technical assistance in incorporating IHL into national law, encourages States to set up national IHL committees and assists them in their work (see National Committees on IHL), promotes the exchange of information (for instance through its database), publishes specialist documents (for instance fact sheets, ratification kits, model laws, biennial report and biannual update) – see ICRC, National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the ICRC Advisory Service, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/advisory_service_ihl?Opendocument (visited on 28 May 2009).

78 See ‘ICRC Prevention Policy’, p. 3, adopted by the ICRC Assembly on 18 September 2008, published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, June 2009.

79 See Article 126, GC III and Article 143, GC IV. In these areas, the ICRC has a real right of intervention and supervision, in addition to its convention-based right of initiative set out in Article 9, GC I–III and Article 10, GC IV. Moreover, it can be appointed as (and act as a substitute for) a Protecting Power.

80 Recent examples: Chad/Libya (1987), the Gulf War (1990), Ecuador/Peru (1995) Ethiopia/Eritrea (1999), Afghanistan (2002), Iraq (2003) Lebanon-Gaza-Israel (2006/2009). On the practice in the Iraq war, see Dörmann, Knut and Colassis, Laurent, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Iraq Conflict’, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 47, 2004, pp. 293–342.Google Scholar

81 A sample was published in the International Review of the Red Cross, No. 787, January–February 1991, pp. 24–27. It is the note verbale and annexed memorandum of 14 December 1990 addressed to all the States party to the Geneva Conventions shortly before the outbreak of the Gulf War.

82 Article 126, GC III and Article 143, GC IV: ICRC delegates (like those of Protecting Powers) ‘shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be […]. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners’ representatives, without witnesses […]. They shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit […]'.

83 As in the case of visits to prisoners of war (Article 126, GC III). Beside Articles 126 and 143, GC IV, the word ‘Supervision’ appears in the margin. The titles that appear in the margins of the Conventions were added by the Secretariat of the diplomatic conference and are not part of the official texts. They therefore have only an indicative value. They are referred to in the edition of the Geneva Conventions published by the ICRC.

84 Although visits by ICRC delegates to prisoners of war (Article 126, GC III) and civilian internees (Article 143, GC IV) are an obligation in international armed conflicts, they nevertheless require negotiations to determine the modalities.

85 Article 9, GC I–III; Article 10, GC IV; Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, paras. 2 and 3.

86 To be distinguished from the consequences related to the causes of a dispute or even its very object. The nature of these actions is already limited by the ICRC's role as a humanitarian organization, the priority to be given to its protection and assistance work, and by the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.

87 For the wounded, sick and dead of the armed forces (see Articles 15–16, GC I; Articles 18–19, GCII).

88 See Articles 70, 71, 120, 122 and 123, GC III for prisoners of war and Articles 107, 112, 113 and 129, GC IV for civilian internees.

89 See Articles 136 and 140, GC IV concerning the centralization of information relating to protected persons.

90 Article 73, AP I.

91 Article 78, AP I.

92 Article 74, AP I.

93 See Jean Pictet, Red Cross Principles, ICRC, Geneva, 1966, and The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Commentary, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1979.

94 See Blondel, Jean-Luc, ‘The meaning of the word “humanitarian” in relation to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 273 November–December 1989, pp. 507–515CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Marion Harroff-Tavel, ‘Neutrality and impartiality – The importance of these principles for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the difficulties involved in applying them’, idem, pp. 536–552.

95 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 243.

96 See the ICRC Assistance Policy, adopted by the ICRC Assembly on 29 April 2004, published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 677–693, as well as the ICRC Protection Policy, adopted by the Assembly of the ICRC on 23 September 2008, published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, September 2008, pp. 751–775.

97 See ICRC Protection Policy, above note 96, p. 752.

98 Ministries of Foreign Affairs are the usual diplomatic channel, but most of the ICRC's representations are made to Ministries of Defence, Security or the Interior, or to the President's office (often with the aid of a liaison officer).

99 See Deborah Manicini-Griffoli and André Picot, Humanitarian negotiation, A Handbook for securing access, assistance and protection for civilians in armed conflicts, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, October 2004. For a practical example of the different interventions, see Toni Pfanner, ‘Principled humanitarian action in the East Timor crisis’, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds), Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and their Craft, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2007, pp. 174–193.

100 On dialogue and confidentiality, see ICRC Protection Policy, above note 96, pp. 758–761.

101 Public statements are subject to specific and cumulative conditions defined in the ICRC's institutional policy (namely, ‘(1) the violations are major and repeated or likely to be repeated; (2) delegates have witnessed the violations with their own eyes, or the existence and extent of the violations have been established of reliable and verifiable sources; (3) bilateral confidential representations and, when attempted, humanitarian mobilization efforts have failed to put an end to violations; (4) such publicity is in the interest of the persons or populations affected or threatened.’ – see ‘Action by the ICRC in the event of violations of international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 858, June 2005, pp. 393–400):

102 The first appeal to the international community in the Iran/Iraq war, based on Article 1 common to the four Conventions, was still an exceptional step (see International Review of the Red Cross, No. 235, July–August 1983, pp. 220–222 and No. 239, March–April 1984, pp. 113–115). In connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia alone, the ICRC issued over 50 public appeals, often in response to particularly tragic or deadly events, in order to express its acute concern at the serious violations of international humanitarian law that were taking place there.

103 See Articles 23 and 55, GC IV; Article 70, AP I; Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and also Compilation of United Nations Resolutions on humanitarian assistance, OCHA Policy Studies Series, 2009, available at http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1112152 (visited on 7 August 2009). See also Article 18, AP II. For more details on the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to relief, see Sylvain Vité, Rights and duties of all actors under international humanitarian law, presented at the Expert Meeting on Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict, 30th June–1st July 2008, Montreux (on file with the author); François Bugnion, above note 45, pp. 658–67, 804–844.

104 See Articles 23 and 55, GC IV.

105 See Article 71(3), AP I (temporary restriction of the movements of relief personnel). However, famine is often illegally used as a weapon, either to gain control of a group of people (by drawing civilians towards regions where supplies are less scarce) or to drive a group of people out of a particular region. Starvation of the civilian population is prohibited according to Article 54 para. 1, AP I.

106 See ICRC Assistance Policy, above note 96.

107 I.e. the requirement that assistance be neutral and impartial – see Article 23, GC IV and Article 18, AP II.

108 Krähenbühl, Pierre, ‘The ICRC's approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 505–514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

109 See Article 3(2), subpara. 3, and Article 5(4)(a), Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

110 See for example Article 26, GC I; Articles 24–25, GC II; Article 63, GC IV; Articles 6 and 17, AP I; Article 18, AP II and Article 3(2), subpara. 2, Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (above note 67).

111 Para. 2.

112 It also calls upon National Societies to provide them with the same facilities under the same conditions (para. 3). For the Co-operation within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement see the Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by the Council of Delegates, Seville, 25–27 November 1997 (Seville Agreement), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP4Y (visited on 28 July 2009). Each Movement component (National Red Cross and Red Cresent Societies, their International Federation and ICRC) has distinct but closely related and complementary rules. The ICRC will act as lead agency, as provided for in Article 4 of the Agreement, in situations of international and non-international armed conflicts, internal strife and their direct results (Article 5.3.1, Seville Agreement).

113 Training of relief workers, supply of drugs and medical supplies, reinforcements for the ambulance service, etc.

114 Mobile clinics, water and sanitation programmes, logistical and administrative support for medical and surgical teams, etc.

115 See Kellenberger, Jakob, ‘Speaking out or remaining silent’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 855, September 2004, p. 593–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

116 See also Sassòli, Marco, ‘The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and Inherent Challenges’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 10, December 2007, pp. 45–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

117 See David, above note 34, p. 645–648. This is rather a restriction that the ICRC imposes on itself, because of the way it perceives its role; for the Protecting Power, the mandate could be construed differently.

118 Cf. Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, above note 93, p. 54.

119 In Protocol II, it is stated that nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked ‘for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State’ or ‘as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs’ (Article 3, paras. 1 and 2).

120 Immediately following its constitutive meeting in Bern on 12–13 March 1993, the International Fact-Finding Commission expressed its readiness to conduct enquiries, subject to the consent of all parties to the conflict, on violations of humanitarian law other than grave breaches and other serious violations, including those committed in civil wars. Although the extension of the Commission's mandate to non-international armed conflicts is to be welcomed, we may wonder whether it really has the capacity to look into all violations. In any given armed conflict, there will be hundreds and even thousands of serious violations. The Commission would be in danger of being flooded with allegations if the offer were to be really taken up.

121 See Somer, Jonathan, ‘Jungle justice: passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international armed conflicts’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 867, September 2007, pp. 655–690.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

122 The ICJ took the view in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (above note 95, p. 129, para. 255) that Article 1 imposed obligations of conduct in relation to an international armed conflict too.

123 Ibid., p. 114, para. 220.

124 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, above note 5, para. 86; Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic, 17 July 1995 (Amicus Curiae brief submitted by the United States), p. 37; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflicts’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), Current Problems of International Law, Giuffrè, Milan, 1975; Meron, above note 13, p. 560. See also Article 8(e), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

125 See Article 8(e), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

126 For example, the rules on conduct of hostilities.

127 Common Article 3, para. 4.

128 See Yves Sandoz, ‘The establishment of Safety Zones for Persons Displaced within their Country of Origin’, N. Al-Nauimi and R. Meese (eds), International Legal Issues Arising under the Decade of International Law, 1995, pp. 899–927.

129 In the Tadic case, the ICTY Trial Chamber did not examine the question of whether the provisions on grave breaches apply as a result of agreements concluded under the auspices of the ICRC. The Appeals Chamber nevertheless concluded that the agreements call for the prosecution and punishment of all violations that take place in the conflict (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, above note 5, para. 136).

130 See the agreements published in the annexes to Michèle Mercier, Crimes sans châtiment – L'action humanitaire en ex-Yougoslavie 1991–1993, Bruylant, Brussels, 1994, Documents III, IV and V, as well as the following agreements: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) Joint Declaration with the Government of Mozambique on the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, 16 July 1992; Frente Farabundo Marti para la liberation national – FMLN, San José Agreement on Human Rights, 26 July 1990 (both reproduced in NSA Database/Geneva Call, ‘Statements of Non-State Armed Actors under International Humanitarian Law’, March 2000, pp. 8 and 14, available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/testi-reference-materials/testi-nsa-states/nsa-states-mar00.pdf; Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, 16 March 1998, available at http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/CARHRIHL-mar98.htm; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to Protect Non-combatant civilians and civilian facilities from military attack, 10 March 2002, available at http://www.vigilsd.org/resolut/agreemsd.htm#Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20of%20the%20Republic (all sites visited on 7 August 2009).

131 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, above note 5, paras. 104–109.

132 As noted in the Commentary to Common Article 3 (Pictet, above note 6, p. 43), a special agreement ‘will generally only be concluded because of an existing situation which neither of the parties can deny, no matter what the legal aspect of the situation may in their opinion be.’ See also Pfanner, Toni, ‘Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005, pp. 149–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

133 See Plattner, Denise, ‘La portée juridique des déclarations de respect du droit international humanitaire qui émanent de mouvements en lutte dans un conflit armé’, Revue belge de droit international, 1984–1985/1, pp. 298–320.Google Scholar

134 See for instance: the response of General de Gaulle of the Comité National Français (which was in effect the ‘Free French’ government between 1941 and 1943) – ICRC archives, A/CICR, B G70/I 1940–1941; Letter of General de Gaulle to Max Huber, 19 November 1941. See also the declarations of the following organizations: the Agence Juive, Vaad Leumi and the Arab High Committee (Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, No. 353 (1948), p. 335; the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (1989 declaration on adherence to the GCs, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c%PS – see also the corresponding note of the Swiss Federal Council, reproduced in the Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, No. 781 (1990), pp. 69–70); the South West Africa People' Organization (SWAPO/Namibia), reproduced in NSA Database/Geneva Call, above note 130; the African National Congress (ANC), International Review of the Red Cross, No. 200 (1977), p. 479 (see also ANC declaration to the ICRC of 28 November 1980, in NSA Database/Geneva Call, above note 130); ANC-ZAPU (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), International Review of the Red Cross, No. 200 (1977), p. 479; the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/Angola, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 219 (1980), p. 320; the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka/1988), quoted in the Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 30, 2000, p. 213, and also available at http://www.tamilnation.org/unitednations/uncom92.htm#a16; the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF/North-East India/1997), available at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/4568/documents/main_d.html; New Peoples' Army/NDFP (Philippines/1973/1991), available at http://home.casema.nl/ndf/; the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/110708.pdf; PKK (Turkey/1994), available at http://www.kurdistan.org/Articles/ismet.html (as well as its 1995 statement to the UN, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/009.html). All sites visited on 7 August 2009.

135 The ‘partial’ declarations relate only to selected aspects of IHL as applicable, mostly the recruitment of child soldiers and the use of anti-personnel mines. For the latter, a number of examples can be found in NSA Database/Geneva Call, above note 130. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment on Landmines and a list of its signatories can be found at http://www.genevacall.org/signatory-groups/signatory-groups.htm (visited on 7 August 2009). Such declarations can, however, also cover particular aspects of IHL (e.g. declarations to refrain from attacking civilians) through various means (including e.g. fatwas).

136 However, it is important to recognize that States also are often politically motivated when ratifying treaties or making other international commitments. This does not stop the international community from accepting these commitments or from attempting to hold States accountable to them.

137 Protocol II does not provide for the same right of initiative for the ICRC, even in cases where this Protocol is applicable. See Sandoz, above note 71, pp. 364–367.

138 If the criteria laid down in Common Article 3 (humanity, impartiality and non-discrimination) are met, any organization may offer its services. On the Red Cross Fundamental Principles as criteria for humanitarian action, see ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 95, para. 243.

139 See Statutes of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Article 5(2)(d) ‘[…] to endeavour at all times – as a neutral institution whose humanitarian work is carried out particularly in time of international and other armed conflicts or internal strife – to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims of such events and of their direct results’ (emphasis added). The ICRC often bases its offers of services on this provision in cases where it does not wish to make a legal classification of a conflict.

140 Pictet, above note 6, Vol. I, p. 57. See also Article 5, para. 2 of the resolution on human rights protection and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States adopted by the International Law Institute on 13 September 1989. Robert Kolb takes the view that a refusal is not arbitrary when, for example, the offer or its implementation is not politically neutral, where the aid offered is to be dispensed to enemy combatants, etc. (Kolb, Robert, ‘De l'assistance humanitaire: la résolution sur l'assistance humanitaire adoptée par l'Institut de droit international à sa session de Bruges en 2003’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 856, December 2004, pp. 853–878).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

141 Institut de droit international, L‘assistance humanitaire, para. VIII.1. See also Carrillo Salcedo, Juan Antonio, ‘Le droit à l'assistance humanitaire: à la recherche d'un équilibre entre les devoirs des autorités territoriales et les obligations des donateurs des secours humanitaires,’ Law in Humanitarian Crises/Le droit face aux crises humanitaires, Vol. II, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995, p. 112.Google Scholar

142 For example, ‘the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations’ is a violation of the right to adequate food (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 19).

143 Sandoz, above note 71, p. 364; Michael Bothe also takes the view that an action undertaken unilaterally by the ICRC would be in keeping with international law (see ‘Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State’, in Frits Kalshoven (ed), Assisting the victims of armed conflict and other disasters, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 96.

144 Pictet, above note 6, vol. I, p. 26.

145 See e.g. A/RES/63/96 (2008).

146 See e.g. S/681 (1990), S/RES/764 (1992) and S/RES/ 955 (1994).

147 ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above note 49, paras. 96–98 and 158–159, ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 95, para. 220.

148 In 1983 and 1984, the ICRC based itself on Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions in issuing formal appeals to the States party to the Geneva Conventions to use their influence with Iraq and Iran, then at war with one another, and prevail upon them to comply with the law of armed conflict (see above note 102).

149 For an account of the means to which States can resort to meet this obligation, see Umesh Palwankar, ‘Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 298, February 1994, pp. 11–27, and the European Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), Official Journal of the European Union, 2005/C 327/04 (in particular part III, Operational Guidelines, Means of Action at the Disposal of the EU in its Relations with Third Countries).

150 Before the ICJ's Wall opinion (above note 49), the legal scope of the obligation to ‘ensure respect for’ international humanitarian law was disputed, particularly with regard to whether the obligation binds only the parties to a conflict or whether it also implies a duty (and, if so, what duty) for third States. At the least, States should ‘not [..] encourage persons or groups engaged in [conflict] to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions’ – ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 95, para. 220. For more details, see Luigi Condorelli and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Quelques remarques à propos de l'obligation de “respecter et faire respecter” le droit international humanitaire “en toutes circonstances”’, in Christophe Swinarski (ed), Mélanges Pictet, ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva/The Hague, 1984, pp. 17–35; Nicolas Levrat, ‘Les conséquences de l'engagement pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes de faire respecter les Conventions humanitaires’, in Frits Kalshoven and Yves Sandoz (eds), Mise en oeuvre du droit international humanitaire, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 263–296; Kalshoven, Frits, ‘The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: from Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 3–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

151 ICRC, Improving Compliance, above note 2, p. 6.

152 See section on the Security Council starting at note 201 below.

153 See Report of the Secretary General on the Respect of Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Doc. UN A/8052 (1970). p. 54.

154 By examining reports presented by States (and even possibly non-state actors), individual complaints procedures, etc.

155 e.g. by the UN General Assembly or the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

156 See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 3, annex 21 and Vol. 2, Sect. B, p. 61.

157 See also the various proposals in ICRC, Improving Compliance, above note 2, p. 28.

158 Acting in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Conventions, the Swiss Government convened the Conference in Geneva, from 19 to 23 January 1998 pursuant to Recommendation VII of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, January 1995) and Resolution 1 of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Geneva, December 1995). The meeting was attended by the representatives of 129 States parties to the Geneva Conventions and 36 observer delegations. Preliminary discussions had indicated that States wished the debates to be informal and did not intend to negotiate any new texts. Accordingly, the Chairman presented his conclusions in a report which is not binding on the participants. See International Review of the Red Cross, No. 323 (1998), pp. 366–394.

159 ICRC, Improving Compliance, above note 2, p. 10.

160 Report of the Secretary-General, We the Peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, A/54/2000, 27 March 2000, para. 212.

161 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, accessible at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (visited on 28 May 2009). See also A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by the Secretary-General of the UN (UN Doc. No. A/59/565), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld (visited on 28 May 2009). The concept has evolved from the initial concept of the ‘droit d‘ingérence’ (cf. General Assembly (GA) Resolutions 43/131 of 8 December 1988 and 45/100 of 14 December 1990). See also the website of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/core-rtop-documents (visited on 1 June 2009) and of the International Crisis Group (including the list of literature) at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521 (visited on 1 June 2009).

162 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, 15 September 2005, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 28 May 2008).

163 On 12 January 2009, the UN Secretary General addressed a report to the UN GA containing proposals regarding the operational implementation of the R2P concept. This report had not yet been discussed by the GA at the time of writing the present document.

164 See Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) operative para. 4. Equally, several States referred to R2P in the deliberations of the Security Council on 14 January 2009 in its debate on the same issue. See Provisional Meeting report S/PV.6066, accessible at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20SPV%206066.pdf (visited on 28 May 2009). The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council.

165 UN GA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 138, 15 September 2005, accessible at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 28 May 2008).

166 Idem, para. 139.

167 See the conclusions in Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights, UN, New York, 2005.

168 The scope of States' obligations, including their secondary responsibilities, is wider under international humanitarian law than under the R2P concept, which focuses only on the four crimes that it covers and does not cover other obligations under international humanitarian law.

169 See also ICJ, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co Ltd, ICJ Reports 1970, paras. 33–34.

170 See Droege, Cordula, ‘Elective affinities? Human Rights and humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, September 2008, pp. 501–548.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

171 UN GA Resolution 2675 (XXV), Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in periods of armed conflict (9 December 1970). The two Additional Protocols explicitly acknowledge the application of the human rights during armed conflicts (Article 72, AP I; Preamble, AP II).

172 ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above note 49, para. 106; confirmed in ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, General List No. 116, para. 216.

173 See Hampson, Françoise J., ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, September 2008, pp. 549–572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

174 On this practice, which dates back to the former United Nations Human Rights Commission, see U. Sundberg, ‘The Role of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Armed Conflict Situations’, Human Dignity Protection in Armed Conflict, Institute for International Humanitarian Law (28th Round Table, San Remo, 2–4 September 2004), Nagard, Milan, 2006, pp. 30–36.

175 Human Rights Committee (CCPR), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Committee Against Torture (CAT) & Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) – Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

176 Article 38(1), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989): ‘States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.’

177 See for example CCPR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), UN Doc. CCPR/C/COD/CO/3, 26 April 2006; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74, 30 November 2001; CERD, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.45, 30 March 1998; CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, paras. 256–302, UN Doc. A/57/38 (Part I), 7 May 2002; CRC, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. CRC/C/COL/CO/3, 8 June 2006.

178 All 47 Members of the Council of Europe are party to the European Convention and 24 of the 35 Organisation of American States are parties to the American Declaration of Human Rights. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), adopted on 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on 21 October 1986. Presently, 25 States are party to it.

179 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Ba'maca Vela'squez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 25 November 2000, Series C, No. 70, para. 209; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard v. the United States of America, Case 10.951, OEA Doc. OEA/ser.L/V/II.106.doc.3rev, 1999, para. 37; Request for Precautionary Measures Concerning the Detainees at Guanta'namo Bay, Cuba, Decision of 12 March 2002, 41 ILM 532.

180 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 February 2005; Ergi v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV; Ahmet Oezkan and others v. Turkey, Judgment of April 6, 2004.

181 See e.g. Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 6780/74 and 6950/75, European Commission of Human Rights Decisions and Reports 125; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-IV.

182 More than 3300 applications have been filed with the ECtHR by ethnic South Ossetians against Georgia. As of 18 March 2008, over 100 cases had been filed against Russia, involving approximately 600 Georgian applicants and Georgia has filed an interstate application against Russia.

183 See e.g. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 doc. 6 rev., 13 April 1998, Original: Spanish; Violence and discrimination against women in the armed conflict in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 67, 18 October 2006, Original: Spanish.

184 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.102, Doc. 9 rev.1, at 72, para. 6, based on AG/RES. 1043 (XX-0/90) of 1990.

185 Las Palmeras, Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 4 February 2000, Series C, No. 67, paras. 32–34; Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, above note 179, para. 207–209. The UN Human Rights Committee has also acknowledged that it can take into account other branches of international law to assess the legality of derogations (General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add.11, 24 July 2001, para. 10).

186 On the practice of the ECtHR, see Abresch, William, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, 2005, pp. 741–767.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

187 Ibid.; Dennis, Michael J. and Surena, Andre M., ‘Application of the international covenant on civil and political rights in times of armed conflict and military occupation: the gap between legal theory and state practice’, European Human Rights Law Review, Issue 6, 2008, pp. 714–73Google Scholar; Bothe, Michael, ‘Die Anwendung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention in bewaffneten Konflikten – eine Überforderung’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 65, 2005, p. 615.Google Scholar

188 Article 11, Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 11 July 2003; Article 22, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999.

189 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (1999), para. 50.

190 See Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, entered into force on 25 January 2004, available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html (visited 7 August 2009); Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 July 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4937f0ac2.html (visited 7 August 2009).

191 ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above note 49, para. 106.

192 Human Rights Committee, General Observation No. 31 [80], CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 10.

193 See IACtHR Report No. 55/97, Case No. 11.137, Argentina, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.97, Doc. 38, 30 October 1997.

194 See the various contributions in Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kaminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, 2004.

195 ECtHR, Issa and others v. Turkey, Judgement of 16 November 2004, para. 71; see also Isaak v. Turkey, Appl. No. 44587/98, Admissibility Decision of 28 September 2008, p. 19. See also House of Lords, Al-Skeini and others v. Secretary of State for Defence, Decision of 13 June 2007, [2007] UKHL 26, paras. 61–83, 91, 105–132.

196 ICRC, Improving Compliance, above note 2, p. 17.

197 ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above note 49, para. 102.

198 Their pronouncements can also refer directly to international humanitarian law. Under Article 89 of AP I, ‘[I]n situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter’. Formally, this provision does not allow them to act in situations other than international armed conflicts. Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions, in which the contracting States undertake to ensure respect for the law, goes further in that it also covers internal conflicts and addresses the entire international community, represented by its world body.

199 Articles 1(3) and Article 55(c), United Nations Charter.

200 See Byron, Christine, ‘A Blurring of Boundaries: The application of International Humanitarian Law by Human Rights Bodies’, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 47 (2007), pp. 839–896.Google Scholar

201 More than thirty Security Resolutions adopted in connection with that conflict contain references to international humanitarian law (see for example S/RES/ 743 (1992) that established the FORPRONU; S/RES/770 (1992) on humanitarian assistance for the former Yugoslavia; S/RES/771(1992) on ICRC access to camps and prisons; S/RES/808 (1993) and S/RES/827 (1993) on the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia; S/RES/913 (1994) on events in Graze; S/RES/941 (1995) condemning ethnic cleansing, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, and S/RES/1010 (1995) on release of detained persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

202 See e.g. S/RES/ 1820 (2008) on women, and peace and security and sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.

203 Article 24, para. 2 of the Charter; cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, above note 5, paras. 28–30.

204 See for instance the critical remarks of the Secretary General on the lack of implementation of travel bans and asset freezes by Member States, Report of the Secretary General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, (S/2009/277), p. 5 (at 21).

205 See the Preamble of AP I, para. 5.

206 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, above note 5, paras. 22 and 31.

207 S/RES/598 (1987) on repatriation of prisoners of war in the Iran/Iraq conflict and S/RES/540 (1983) on attacks against the civilian population in the Iran/Iraq conflict.

208 S/RES/681 (1990) on the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories.

209 S/RES/687 (1991) on repatriation of Kuwaiti detainees held in Iraq; S/RES/674 (1990) and 670 (1990) on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in Kuwait.

210 S/RES/1320 (2000).

211 S/RES/1546 (2004).

212 S/RES/1808 (2008).

213 Among the numerous resolutions, see for example S/RES/1872 (2009) on Somalia; S/RES/1870 (2009) on Sudan; S/RES/925 (1994) on Rwanda, S/RES/1383 (2001) on Afghanistan.

214 S/RES/681 (1990) on Israel and the Occupied Territories.

215 S/RES/598 (1987) on repatriation of prisoners of war in connection with the Iran/Iraq war.

216 S/RES/1870 (2009) on Sudan.

217 S/RES/1572 (2004) on Côte d'Ivoire and 1591 (2005) on Sudan.

218 S/RES/1564 (2004) on Sudan.

219 S/RES/808 (1993) and 827 (1993) for the former Yugoslavia and S/RES/935 (1994) for Rwanda.

220 S/RES/1593 (2005) on Sudan.

221 S/RES/743 (1992) that set up the FORPRONU in the former Yugoslavia.

222 S/RES/824 (1993) on safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 819 (1992) for Srebrenica.

223 S/RES/918 (1994) for Rwanda.

224 S/RES/687 (1991) setting up a fund to compensate foreign governments, nationals and corporations for any direct loss, damage or injury caused by Iraq's unlawful occupation of Kuwait.

225 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children Affected by Armed Conflict, set up under Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005).

226 Report of the Secretary General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above note 204, p. 8 (at 37).

227 See S/RES/1265 (1999) and its sister resolution S/RES/1269 (2000).

228 See the last report of 29 May 2009 (S/2009/277, above note 204) which gives an overview of the last decade.

229 See e.g. the last report S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1). The Security Council furthermore established an Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians.

230 See S/2009/277, pp. 10–12.

231 Art. 10–12, 14 and 15 of the UN Charter.

232 See e.g. A/RES/63/96 (2008) (concerning the Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories).

233 An important part of the Committee's work focuses on the examination of human rights questions, including reports of the special procedures of the newly established Human Rights Council. The Committee hears and interacts with 25 such special rapporteurs, independent experts, and chairpersons of workings groups of the Human Rights Council.

234 ‘Special procedures’ is the general name given to the mechanisms established by the Commission on Human Rights and assumed by the Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Currently, there are 30 thematic and 8 country mandates. Special procedures mandates usually call on mandate holders to examine, monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries or territories (country mandates), or on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide (thematic mandates).

235 See for example Human Rights Council Resolution 9/9, 24 September 2008, on the protection of the human rights of civilians in armed conflict, in which the Council requested relevant special procedures and the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, and invited human rights treaty bodies, within their respective mandates, to continue to address the relevant aspects of the protection of human rights of civilians in armed conflicts in their work.

236 Human Rights Council, S-1/Res.1, 6 July 2006.

237 Israel/OPT (1st session, July 2006), Israel/Lebanon (2nd session, August 2006), Israel/OPT (3rd session, November 2006), Sudan/Darfur (4th session, December 2006), Israel/West Bank-Gaza (6th session, January 2008), Congo (8th session, November 2008), Israel/Gaza (9th session, February 2009), Sri Lanka (11th session, May 2009).

238 Which situations are addressed by the Council, whether a country is condemned for violations or whether a special rapporteur is appointed are all matters subject to political haggling and are not necessarily decided on the basis of objective criteria.

239 In practice, the references to international humanitarian law are often very general. For recent examples, see Report of the independent expert appointed by the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Somalia (Mr Ghanim Alnajjar), A/HRC/7/26, 17 March 2008; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan (Sima Samar), A/HRC/9/13, 2 September 2008.

240 Several of the themes addressed also arise in armed conflicts (torture, mercenaries, terrorism, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, etc.).

241 See for example the UPR process outcome on Israel, Cape Verde, Colombia and Uzbekistan, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VDUX-7QBUCS?OpenDocument (visited on 28 May 2009).

242 Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, composed of 18 experts, has been established to function as a think-tank for the Council and work at its direction. The Advisory Committee replaces the former Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The function of the Advisory Committee is to provide expertise in the manner and form requested by the Council, focusing mainly on studies and research-based advice. Such expertise shall be rendered only upon the latter's request, in compliance with its resolutions and under its guidance. See Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: Establishment, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/advisorycommittee.htm (visited 28 July 2009).

243 See Alston, Philip, Morgan-Foster, Jason and Abresch, William, ‘The competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in relation to armed conflict: Extrajudicial executions in the “war on terror”’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2008, pp. 183–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

244 See the Human Rights Council President's text entitled ‘UN Human Rights Council: Institution Building’ (Resolution 5/1) by which a new Complaint Procedure is being established to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms. ECOSOC resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 27 May 1970 served as a working basis for the establishment of a new Complaint Procedure.

245 See for example the reports prepared by the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children Affected by Armed Conflict, set up under Security Council Resolution 1612, above note 225, which hardly make any reference to IHL in their conclusions.

246 See Chapter X of the UN Charter. Under Article 62 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC may make recommendations ‘for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.

247 Prior to 2006, ECOSOC acted in its capacity as co-ordinator of humanitarian assistance or via recommendations of the Human Rights Commission, set up by ECOSOC in 1946.

248 See e.g. A/64/84-E/2009/87, 28 May 2009.

249 Idem, pp. 7–9, e.g. the safety and security of humanitarian personnel, the increase of actors in humanitarian assistance, the distinguishing between humanitarian and military or political actors.

250 See e.g. ECOSOC resolution 2008/36, 25 July 2008.

251 Article 99, Charter of the United Nations.

252 In Resolution A/RES/48/141 of 20 December 1993, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and the role of the High Commissioner.

253 A/RES/48/141, 20 December 1993, para. 4(f).

254 Of the eleven national OHCHR offices, most are in countries affected by conflict. OHCHR has a Rapid Response Unit that supports its work and helps it to deploy staff into the field very quickly. To enable the UN to anticipate and respond to deteriorating human rights situations in different parts of the world, OHCHR is often asked to send or support missions or commissions of enquiry to look into allegations of serious human rights violations. Since it was set up in 2006, the Rapid Response Unit has sent missions or commissions of enquiry to Timor Leste, Western Sahara, Liberia, Lebanon and Beit Hanoun (Occupied Palestinian Territories).

255 See UN General Assembly, Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991. For the newest resolution on this topic, see A/RES/63/139, 11 December 2008.

256 The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies attend the IASC as observers.

257 The United Nations Secretary-General mandated the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to act as lead agency for the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia in order to provide refugees and displaced persons with protection and assistance (letter of 14 November 1991 addressed by the Secretary-General to the High Commissioner for Refugees – on file with the author). This role has been confirmed in a number of conflicts and has been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly (see for example A/RES/48/116, 20 December 1993).

258 UNICEF and the ICRC conducted a major operation to protect women and children in Cambodia in 1980 (see William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984).

259 For the protection of cultural property in armed conflict.

260 See e.g. A/64/84-E/2009/87, 28 May 2009, p. 9.

261 See Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.

262 See Decisions of the Secretary-General – 25th June meeting of the Policy Committee (26 June 2008). This was followed up by Policy Instructions on OCHA's Structural Relationship Within an Integrated UN Presence, 1 May 2009.

263 See e.g. An ICRC perspective on integrated missions, Official Statement, 31 May 2005, at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/6DCGRN (visited on 7 August 2009).

264 See S/RES/ 1674 (2006), operative para. 21.

265 In particular, the principles of neutrality and independence. For the interpretation of these principles by the ICRC, see Pictet's Red Cross Principles and The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (both above note 93). The principle of neutrality is interpreted differently by the Red Cross and the United Nations (see Umesh Palwankar (ed), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peace-keeping Operations, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, in particular the glossary at the end of the report). See also Kalshoven, Frits, ‘Impartiality and neutrality in humanitarian law and practice’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 273, November–December 1989, pp. 516–535CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Torelli, Maurice, ‘From humanitarian assistance to “intervention on humanitarian grounds”?’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 795, May–June 1992, pp. 228–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

266 Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter authorizes the UN Security Council to enforce the rulings, but such enforcement is subject to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Council.

267 See Article 36, Statute of the International Court of Justice.

268 See Article 38(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice.

269 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 95, paras. 60 and 218. The United States refused to participate after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The US later blocked enforcement by the Security Council, making Nicaraguan attempts at obtaining compliance futile. At the end of 2008, the Nicaraguan head of state made a renewed request for reparations (17 billion USD) based on this judgement: see Ivan Castro, ‘Nicaragua asks U.S. for war reparations in aid row’, Reuters, 2 December 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE4B115920081202 (visited on 7 August 2009).

270 Having found Uganda to be an occupying power in Ituri (DRC), the Court found that Uganda was responsible for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in that territory. Those alleged violations included wide-scale massacres of civilians, acts of torture, and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment. Additional claims included the unlawful seizure by Ugandan soldiers of civilian property, the abduction and forcible conscription of several hundred Congolese children by the Uganda People's Defence Force in 2000, and the failure of Ugandan forces to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as required under international humanitarian law. See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, paras. 181–221. The DRC claimed ten billion US dollars in reparations, but the compensation has to be worked out through bilateral negotiations between the two states. However, the negotiating process could be so protracted that a settlement might take many years to conclude, if ever – it will also be very difficult to enforce this compensation ruling.

271 See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226; ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above note 49, p. 13.

272 AG/RES. 2293 (XXXVII O/07) Promotion of and Respect for international humanitarian law, adopted at the 4th plenary session of the General Assembly, held on 5 June 2007.

273 See for example: African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 163rd Meeting, PSC/MIN/Comm. 4 (CLXIII), 22 December 2008, para. 9 (condemning attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers in Somalia); Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (Central Organ) at Heads of State and Government Level, Communiqué of the Seventh Ordinary Session, Central Organ/MEC/AHG/Comm. (VII), 3 February 2003, para. B.4 (urging respect for human rights and humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire); Central Organ at Ambassadorial Level, Communiqué of the 86th Ordinary Session, Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (LXXXVI), 29 October 2002, para. B.4 and D.4 (calling on parties in the DRC and Liberia to observe humanitarian law).

274 In particular through the organs of the Council of Europe. See in particular the European Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), Official Journal of the European Union, 2005/C 327/04.

275 See Art. 2 of the ASEAN Charter (into force since December 2008): ‘ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles: … (j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States.’

276 See the Brioni Joint Declaration by the Yugoslavian government and the European Troika of 7 July 1991 following the Slovenia war (published in Mercier, above note 131, pp. 260–266) which conferred on the European mediators a broad mandate in relation to the future of the Yugoslav Federation and opened the way to the deployment of a mission by OSCE observers.

277 The OSCE missions are conflict prevention and management instruments. As regards humanitarian law, see chapters VII and VIII of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, adopted at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest, 1994. This Code reminds States at length of their obligations under international humanitarian law, particularly as regards dissemination and instruction. ‘Appropriate CSCE bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review and improve if necessary the implementation of this Code’ (Chapter IX).

278 See for instance Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1857 (2009) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia.

279 A joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1769, 31 July 2007. The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized UNAMID to take necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians, without ‘prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan’. UNAMID formally began operations on 31 December 2007.

280 The different departments responsible for emergency or development aid, which are often present in the embassies of their countries, for example the Canadian International Development Agency (CADI), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Also, at regional level, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

281 Corps Suisse d'Aide humanitaire, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, etc.

282 See for example Ryfman, Philippe, ‘Non-governmental organizations: an indispensable player of humanitarian aid’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865 March 2007, pp. 21–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mario Bettati and Pierre-Marie Dupuis (eds), Les ONG et le Droit International, Economica, Paris, 1986.