1 There are nineteen international legal instruments: twelve conventions and seven protocols/amendments. See UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, “International Legal Instruments”, available at: www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments (all internet references were accessed in August 2021).

2 For references, see below note 24.

3 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism, 15 March 2017, replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA [2017] OJ L 88/6.

4 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Based on Article 29(1) of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, COM(2020) 619 final, Brussels, 30 September 2020. Barring France and Italy, all member States adopted specific legislation to transpose Directive 2017/541. However, the Commission does note several transposition issues.

5 See Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Art. 43(2); Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), p. 384CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Rule 106, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1.

6 See, for example, Trapp, Kimberley N., “The Interaction of the International Terrorism Suppression Regime and IHL in Domestic Criminal Prosecutions: The UK Experience”, in Jinks, Derek, Maogoto, Jackson N. and Solomon, Solon (eds), Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2014, pp. 177–178Google Scholar.

7 See, notably, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 70; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008, paras 49, 60; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, paras 175–205.

8 ICTY, Haradinaj, above note 7, para. 60; see also ICTY, Boškoski, above note 7, paras 194–205.

9 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and Isak Muslui, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 30 November 2005, para. 170; confirmed by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), paras 447–451, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.

10 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Geneva, November 2019, pp. 58–59, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-report-ihl-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.

11 Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 495.

12 For IACs, see Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 33; for NIACs, see Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Art. 4(2)(d).

13 For IACs, see AP I, Art. 51(2); for NIACs, see AP II, Art. 13(2); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 5, p. 8, Rule 2; recognized as a war crime under customary IHL, see ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 30 November 2006, para. 98.

14 See, for example, Pejic, Jelena, “Armed Conflict and Terrorism: There Is a (Big) Difference”, in Frías, Ana María Salinas de, Samuel, Katja L. H. and White, Nigel D. (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 175Google Scholar.

15 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 5, pp. 568–611, Rules 156–158.

16 Ibid., respectively at p. 3, Rule 1, and p. 25, Rule 7.

17 Chadwick, Elizabeth, Self-Determination, Terrorism and the International Law of Armed Conflict, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1996, pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

18 K. N. Trapp, above note 6, p. 165. See also David Anderson, “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism without Defeating the Law”, European Human Rights Law Review, No. 3, 2013, pp. 234–235.

19 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 3.

20 Ibid., pp. 7, 10–11, 27, 38–45.

21 Erling Johannes Husabø and Ingvild Bruce, Fighting Terrorism through Multilevel Criminal Legislation: Security Council Resolution 1373, the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and their Implementation in Nordic, Dutch and German Criminal Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 135.

22 The exception is the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2178 UNTS 197, 9 December 1999 (entered into force 10 April 2002) (Terrorist Financing Convention), Art. 2(1)(b), on which see the main text at below note 37.

23 B. Saul, above note 19, pp. 8, 38, 130–142.

24 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, 22 April 1998 (entered into force 7 May 1999), Art. 1(2)–(3); OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999 (entered into force 6 December 2002), Art. 1(3) (see also the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law, Final Draft as endorsed by the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Malabo, 30 June–1 July 2011, Art. 4(xxxix)); Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1 July 1999 (entered into force 7 November 2002), Art. 1(2)–(3); Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 15 June 2001 (entered into force 29 March 2003), Art. 1; Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 6 January 2002 (entered into force 12 January 2006), Art. 4(1). Some regional instruments define terrorist offences only by reference to the international sectoral conventions; see Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, 3 June 2002 (entered into force 6 July 2003), Art. 2; ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 13 January 2007 (entered into force 27 May 2011), Art. 2, but see Art. IX(1); Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16 May 2005 (entered into force 1 June 2007), Art. 1(1), as supplemented by the Additional Protocol to the Convention, 22 October 2015 (entered into force 1 July 2017). See B. Saul, above note 19, pp. 142–168.

25 Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 3(2). Note that the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, now Directive 2017/541, also states that the offence must involve acts “which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization”. Some EU member States, such as Belgium, have interpreted this as an extra requirement for the offence. However, as Borgers points out, it is not clear whether the Framework Decision actually requires this, as the said phrase can also be read as a mere statement rather than an additional requirement. See Matthias Borgers, “Een gevaarzettingsvereiste voor terroristische misdrijven?”, in Toine Spapens, Marc Groenhuijsen and Tijs Kooijmans (eds), Universalis: Liber Amicorum Cyrille Fijnaut, Intersentia, Brussels, 2011. Therefore, other States, such as the Netherlands, have not included this phrase in their national legislation implementing the EU Framework Decision/Directive.

26 Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 2(3).

27 See, for example, Antonio Coco, “The Mark of Cain: The Crime of Terrorism in Times of Armed Conflict as Interpreted by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in R v. Mohammed Gul”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2013, p. 438.

28 ICRC, above note 10, pp. 58–59.

29 See: www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/2559/schedules/made/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true.

30 There are some exceptions to this; see the Terrorist Financing Convention, Art. 2(1)(b), and the Canadian, New Zealand, South African and Swiss exclusion clauses, as discussed below.

31 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, EN 31IC/11/5.1.2, Geneva, October 2011 (ICRC Challenges Report 2011), pp. 48–50; ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, EN 32IC/15/11, Geneva, October 2015 (ICRC Challenges Report 2015), pp. 17–18; ICRC, above note 10, p. 58; J. Pejic, above note 14, pp. 172, 184–186. See also A. Coco, above note 27, pp. 438–440; Tristan Ferraro, “Interaction and Overlap between Counter-Terrorism Legislation and International Humanitarian Law”, in Proceedings of the 17th Bruges Colloquium: Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law, 20–21 October 2016, p. 29; Daniel O'Donnell, “International Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism during Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864, 2006, p. 868; B. Saul, above note 19, pp. 88, 317–318; Ben Saul, “The Legal Death of Rebellion: Counterterrorism Laws and the Shrinking Legal Freedom of Violent Political Resistance”, in Benjamin J. Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019, pp. 324, 337–338; Marco Sassòli, “Terrorism and War”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2006, p. 970; M. Sassòli, above note 11, pp. 277, 467, 597; K. N. Trapp, above note 6, p. 170.

32 ICRC Challenges Report 2015, above note 31, p. 18; see also ICRC Challenges Report 2011, above note 31, p. 50; T. Ferraro, above note 31, p. 30; J. Pejic, above note 14, p. 177.

33 ICRC Challenges Report 2011, above note 31, p. 51; J. Pejic, above note 14, pp. 185, 198.

34 ICRC Challenges Report 2011, above note 31, p. 51; ICRC Challenges Report 2015, above note 31, p. 18; UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Counter-Terrorism in the International Law Context, Advance Copy, Vienna, 2021, p. 107, available at: www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/CTLTC_CT_in_the_Intl_Law_Context_1_Advance_copy.pdf; Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011, p. 163; T. Ferraro, above note 31, p. 29; J. Pejic, above note 14, pp. 196–198; B. Saul, above note 31, p. 338; K. N. Trapp, above note 6, p. 180.

35 Also “exclusively humanitarian activities carried out by impartial humanitarian organizations operating in accordance with IHL” should be excluded from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism: see ICRC, “Counter-Terrorism Measures Must Not Restrict Impartial Humanitarian Organizations from Delivering Aid”, statement to United Nations Security Council debate “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts: International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism 20 Years after the Adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001)”, 12 January 2021, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/counter-terrorism-measures-must-not-restrict-impartial-humanitarian-organizations#; as well as ICRC Challenges Report 2011, above note 31, pp. 51–53; ICRC Challenges Report 2015, above note 31, pp. 20–21; ICRC, above note 10, pp. 59–61. However, the “standard” exclusion clause, as discussed below, is limited to the “activities of armed forces”. Also irrespective of this limitation on the personal scope of application of the standard exclusion clause, the above-mentioned humanitarian activities may not always (directly) benefit from the exclusion clauses that we discuss here. Hence, they should be the subject of a separate, so-called “humanitarian exemption” clause, e.g. Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Recital 38. On this topic, see, for example, David McKeever, “International Humanitarian Law and Counter-Terrorism: Fundamental Values, Conflicting Obligations”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2020.

36 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1316 UNTS 205, 17 December 1979 (entered into force 3 June 1983) (Hostages Convention).

37 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art. 2(1)(b).

38 J. Pejic, above note 14, p. 188.

39 In chronological order: (1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105, 16 December 1970 (entered into force 14 October 1971), Art. 3bis (2) (as introduced by Art. VI of the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 9959, 10 September 2010 (entered into force 1 January 2018)); (2) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1456 UNTS 101, 26 October 1979 (entered into force 8 February 1987), Art. 2(4)(b) (as replaced by Art. 1(A) of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, UNTS Reg. No. 24631, 8 July 2005 (entered into force 8 May 2016)); (3) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 UNTS 201, 10 March 1988 (entered into force 1 March 1992), Art. 2bis (2) (as introduced by Art. 3 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21, 14 October 2005 (entered into force 28 October 2010)); (4) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 2149 UNTS 256, 15 December 1997 (entered into force 23 May 2001) (Terrorist Bombings Convention), Art. 19(2); (5) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2445 UNTS 89, 13 April 2005 (entered into force 7 July 2007) (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Art. 4(2); (6) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc. 9960, 10 September 2010 (entered into force 1 July 2018), Art. 6(2).

40 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/68/37, 8–12 April 2013, Annex II –III, pp. 15–27.

41 Terrorist Bombings Convention, Art. 19(2).

42 See, for example, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/52/37, 31 March 1997, Annex II, Art. 3(1), and Annex IV, pp. 53–55.

43 Most vocal were Pakistan (see, for example, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, above note 42, Annex III, UN Doc. A/AC.252/1997/WP.16; UN General Assembly, Sixth Commitee, Pakistan: Proposed Amendments to the Draft Resolution Proposed by Costa Rica (A/C.6/52/L.13), UN Doc. A/C.6/52/L.19, 18 November 1997) and the Syrian Arab Republic (see, for example, UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, UN Doc. A/C.6/52/L.3, 10 October 1997, Annex II, UN Doc. A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.4).

44 See Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Art. 2(a); OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Art. 3(1) (see also the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law, above note 24, Art. 4(xl)(b)); Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Art. 2(a).

45 See, notably, the Belgian proposals: UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Report of the Working Group, above note 43, Annex II, UN Docs A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.11, A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.29, A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.39. See also the proposal by South Africa and Switzerland: ibid., UN Doc. A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.27.

46 See AP I, Art. 43; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 5, p. 14, Rule 4; Mahmoud Hmoud, “Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism: Major Bones of Contention”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2006, p. 1036; E. J. Husabø and I. Bruce, above note 21, pp. 381–383.

47 See AP II, Art. 1(1), on NIACs “in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” (emphasis added), as stressed by the Court of First Instance of The Hague, The Prosecutor v. Imane B. et al., Case No. 09/842489-14 etc., ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:14365 (in Dutch) and ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:16102 (English translation), 10 December 2015 (Context case), paras 7.38, 7.40.

48 See, for example, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, above note 42, Annex IV, pp. 53–55.

49 See, for example, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/62/37, 5–15 February 2007, p. 7; cf. Helen Duffy, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 35–36, 43–44; J. Pejic, above note 14, p. 189.

50 UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Working Group Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 51/210, Statement by the ICRC, UN Doc. A/C.6/53/WG.1/INF/1, 6 October 1998, fn. 3. For a similar view, see UNODC, above note 34, p. 104; Sandra Krähenmann, “Legal Framework Addressing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism”, Proceedings of the 17th Bruges Colloquium: Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law, 20–21 October 2016, p. 21; D. O'Donnell, above note 31, p. 866; J. Pejic, above note 14, pp. 189–193, 203; K. N. Trapp, above note 6, p. 173. Cf. UK Supreme Court (UKSC), R v. Gul (Appellant), Case No. UKSC 2012/0124, Neutral Citation No. [2013] UKSC 64, 23 October 2013, para. 52.

51 See, for example, A. Coco, above note 27, p. 434; Tom Ruys and Sebastiaan Van Severen, “Art. 141bis Sw. – Vervolging tussen hamer en aambeeld van terreurbestrijding en internationaal humanitair recht”, Rechtskundig Weekblad, Vol. 82, No. 14, 2018, p. 531.

52 “‘Military forces of a State’ means the armed forces of a State which are organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defence or security and persons acting in support of those armed forces who are under their formal command, control and responsibility.” See, for example, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, above note 40, Annex III, p. 25, para. 27.

53 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/57/37, 11 February 2002, Annex IV, p. 17.

54 Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Replies Given on 22 March 1999 by the Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Questions Asked by the Delegations of Belgium and Mexico Regarding the Implications of Article 2, Paragraph 1(b), UN Doc. A/AC.252/1999/INF/2, 26 March 1999, p. 3.

55 J. Pejic, above note 14, p. 192; see also p. 203. See also T. Ferraro, above note 31, p. 30.

56 Cf. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009, pp. 31–35.

57 A slight exception is Art. 4(xl)(c) of the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law, above note 24, which contains a variation of the exclusion clause. The provision unambiguously excludes from its definition of “terrorist act” “acts covered by international humanitarian law, committed in the course of an international or non-international conflict by government forces or members of organized armed groups”.

58 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Art. 26(5).

59 EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, above note 25, Recital 11.

60 Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Recital 37.

61 Alejandro Sánchez Frías, “Bringing Terrorists to Justice in the Context of Armed Conflict: Interaction between International Humanitarian Law and the UN Conventions against Terrorism”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2020, pp. 88–89, 98; Dan E. Stigall and Christopher L. Blakesley, “Non-State Armed Groups and the Role of Transnational Criminal Law During Armed Conflicts”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2015, pp. 34–42.

62 A. Sánchez Frías, above note 61, pp. 84–88; D. E. Stigall and C. L. Blakesley, above note 61, p. 39. For the grave breaches regime, see Geneva Convention I, Arts 49–50; Geneva Convention II, Arts 50–51; Geneva Convention III, Arts 129–130; Geneva Convention IV, Arts 146–147; AP I, Arts 85–89. As noted by K. N. Trapp, above note 6, p. 178, AP II does not create a criminal law enforcement regime for IHL violations in NIACs, precisely because it “leaves States free to criminalise any and all conduct during the course of a NIAC, including attacks against military objectives”.

63 K. N. Trapp, above note 6, pp. 174–175; see also p. 181.

64 See, for example, A. Coco, above note 27, pp. 431–435, 439–440; K. N. Trapp, above note 6, pp. 172–181.

65 E. J. Husabø and I. Bruce, above note 21, p. 395. See also UNODC, above note 34, p. 105; T. Ruys and S. Van Severen, above note 51, p. 531.

66 UKSC, Gul, above note 50, para. 53. On this case, see A. Coco, above note 27; Alan Greene, “The Quest for a Satisfactory Definition of Terrorism: R v Gul”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, 2014; K. N. Trapp, above note 6, pp. 175–180.

67 Court of Justice of the EU, A, B, C, D v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Case No. C-158/14, ECLI:EU:C:2017:202, 14 March 2017, para. 95. On this case, see Luca Pantaleo, “To Be Or Not To Be (a Terrorist): Understanding the Interplay between EU Anti-Terrorism Legislation and International Humanitarian Law in Light of Recent EU Case Law”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo, Vol. 44, 2018; Michael Wimmer, “Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Non-International Armed Conflicts and Tamil Tigers: A and Others”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2018.

68 Court of First Instance of the Hague, Context case, above note 47, para. 7.36. On this case, see Hanne Cuyckens and Christophe Paulussen, “The Prosecution of Foreign Fighters in Western Europe: The Difficult Relationship between Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2019, pp. 549–550. See also Court of Appeal of the Hague, The Prosecutor v. Thiruna E. et al., Case No. 22-005123-11, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1082, 30 April 2015, para. 10.5; on this case, see Ward Ferdinandusse and Pieter Rademakers, “The Prosecution of Sanction Busters”, in Larissa van den Herik (ed.), Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and International Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017, pp. 385–388.

69 Swiss Criminal Code, 21 December 1937 (as of 1 July 2020), Art. 260^quinquies, unofficial English translation available at: www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/54/757_781_799/en.

70 Swiss Confederation, Arrêté fédéral portant approbation et mise en œuvre de la Convention du Conseil de l'Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme et de son Protocole additionnel et concernant le renforcement des normes pénales contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé, 25 September 2020, Recueil Officiel 2021 360, pp. 5–6, available at: www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/oc/2021/360/fr.

71 18 US Code Ch. 113B – Terrorism, §2332i(d) and §2332f(d), available at: www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-113B.

72 Ibid., §2339C.

73 UKSC, Gul, above note 50, para. 51.

74 Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, Iris Oifigiúl, No. 2, 2005, Secs 6(4), 10(6), available at: www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/act/2/enacted/en/html.

75 The provision on “terrorist offences” implements the 2002 EU Framework Decision, and hence copied the exclusion clause from its 11th recital. The provision on the “offence of terrorist bombing” implements the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, and copied the exclusion clause from Article 19(2) of that Convention.

76 See Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act, above note 74, Secs 9(5), 13(1)(b)(i).

77 Ibid., Secs 4, 5.

78 Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, Law No. 33, 2004, Government Gazette, Vol. 476, No. 27266, February 2005, Sec. 1(4), available at: www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a33-04.pdf.

79 Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 (as of 26 July 2021), Sec. 83.01(1), available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/index.html. This exclusion clause is also specifically attached to offences relating to nuclear material and terrorist bombings; ibid., Secs 82.7, 431.2(3).

80 Ibid., Sec. 83.02(b).

81 Terrorism Suppression Act, Public Act 2002 No. 34, 17 October 2002 (reprint as at 24 October 2019), available at: www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM151491.html. Note that at the time of writing, amendments to the Terrorism Suppression Act by means of Counter-Terrorism Legislation Bill 29-1, 2021, available at: www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2021/0029/latest/LMS479298.html, are being considered; these include changes to the definition of a terrorist act in Section 5 of the Act. There is currently no proposal to modify the exclusion clause itself. However, the Bill aims to “extend the terrorism finance offence framework to criminalise wider forms of material support for terrorist activities or organisations” (Counter-Terrorism Legislation Bill 29-1, 2001, p. 1). The proposed amendments to Section 4 of the Act include a definition of “material support” that contains a humanitarian exemption (ibid., p. 7).

82 Terrorism Suppression Act, above note 81, Sec. 5(1).

83 Ibid., Sec. 5(1)(a), read together with Sec. 5(2), 5(4).

84 Ibid., Sec. 5(1)(b), read together with Sec. 4(1).

85 Ibid., Sec. 5(1)(c), read together with Sec. 4(1).

86 See, respectively, Canadian Criminal Code, above note 79, Sec. 83.18(1); Terrorism Suppression Act, above note 81, Sec. 13.

87 Canadian Criminal Code, above note 79, Sec. 83.01(1); Terrorism Suppression Act, above note 81, Secs 12–13.

88 We focus on the exclusion clause and hence on the criminal law definition of terrorist activities. This entails that for countries which define terrorist (group) offences based on a combination of such a criminal law definition and the administrative listing of terrorist groups, like Canada and New Zealand, at least technically, our argumentation only applies to the limb of the offence concerning the criminal law definition. Of course, nothing prevents those countries from taking into account the criminal law definition when listing terrorist groups.

89 Belgian Criminal Code, 8 June 1867 (as of 24 February 2021), Art. 141bis, consolidated text available at: www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=1867060801&table_name=wet.

90 For references to these Belgian proposals, see above note 45.

91 For a summary of the facts of the case, see Ontario Superior Court of Justice, R v. Khawaja, File No. 04-G30282, Canadian Legal Information Institute Citation No. 2008 CanLII 92005 (ON SC), 29 October 2008, paras 4–72.

92 Ibid., para. 1.

93 Ibid., para. 109.

94 The three relevant judgments are Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Khawaja, above note 91; Court of Appeal for Ontario, R v. Khawaja, File Nos C50298–C50299, Neutral Citation No. 2010 ONCA 862, 17 December 2010; Supreme Court of Canada, R v. Khawaja, Case No. 34103, Neutral Citation No. 2012 SCC 69, 14 December 2012.

95 Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Khawaja, above note 91, paras 113–125. A judge can take “judicial notice” of a fact that is widely known and accepted to be true and which therefore does not need to be contested or proven.

96 Court of Appeal for Ontario, Khawaja, above note 94, paras 170–176; Supreme Court of Canada, Khawaja, above note 94, para. 99.

97 Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Khawaja, above note 91, paras 127–129.

98 Ibid., para. 127.

99 Ibid., para. 128.

100 See further below on the geographical scope of application of IHL.

101 Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Khawaja, above note 91, paras 130–131.

102 Court of Appeal for Ontario, Khawaja, above note 94, para. 165.

103 Ibid., paras 166–167.

104 Ibid., para. 168.

105 Supreme Court of Canada, Khawaja, above note 94, para. 100.

106 Parts of the discussion of Belgian case law already appear in Jan Wouters and Thomas Van Poecke, “Van strijdkrachten, terroristen en het Belgisch strafrecht”, Rechtskundig Weekblad, Vol. 81, No. 41, 2017; Thomas Van Poecke, “The IHL Exclusion Clause, and Why Belgian Courts Refuse to Convict PKK Members for Terrorist Offences”, EJIL: Talk! – Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 20 March 2019, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/the-ihl-exclusion-clause-and-why-belgian-courts-refuse-to-convict-pkk-members-for-terrorist-offences.

107 The three decisions in the Sharia4Belgium case were Court of First Instance of Antwerp, The Prosecutor v. FB et al., File No. FD35.98.47-12 etc., 11 February 2015, available at: www.rechtbankeersteaanlegantwerpen.be/index.php/83-persinformatie/110-terro; appeal against which was rejected by Court of Appeal of Antwerp, The Prosecutor v. FB et al., Judgment No. C/101/2016, 27 January 2016; appeal against which was rejected by Belgian Court of Cassation, MEY et al. v. ORV et al., Judgment No. P.16.0244.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2016:ARR.20160524.5, 24 May 2016, available at: https://juportal.be/JUPORTAwork/ECLI:BE:CASS:2016:ARR.20160524.5_NL.pdf.

108 Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, p. 31; Court of Appeal of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, p. 50.

109 See further below on the geographical scope of application of IHL.

110 Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, p. 31 (explicitly); Court of Appeal of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, pp. 51–52 (implicitly). See also Julien Tropini, “La rupture de l’équilibre juridique de l'article 141bis du code pénal belge par la jurisprudence sur les ‘combattants étrangers’ – La remise en cause de la répartition des compétences entre le droit international humanitaire et le droit antiterroriste”, Military Law and the Law of War Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2018, pp. 170–171; Marine Wéry, “La jurisprudence relative à la clause d'exclusion prévue à l'article 141bis du Code pénal: La difficile application du droit international humanitaire par les cours et tribunaux belges”, Military Law and the Law of War Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2018, p. 111.

111 See ICTY, Limaj, above note 9, para. 132; J. Tropini, above note 110, pp. 172–173; M. Wéry, above note 110, pp. 132–135.

112 ICTY, Boškoski, above note 7, paras 204–205.

113 See, for example, Jennifer Cafarella, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda, Middle East Security Report No. 25, Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC, December 2014, pp. 13, 22–23, available at: www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf; Mikael Ekman (ed.), Syria 2017, ILAC Rule of Law Assessment Report, International Legal Assistance Consortium, Solna, March 2017, available at: www.ilacnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Syria2017.pdf; Terry D. Gill, “Classifying the Conflict in Syria”, International Law Studies, Vol. 92, 2016, p. 374; Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC), “Non-International Armed Conflicts in Syria”, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, 29 May 2021, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-syria#collapse4accord.

114 Court of Appeal of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, pp. 53–54; cf. J. Tropini, above note 110, pp. 173–175; and M. Wéry, above note 110, pp. 127–132.

115 On these ideological considerations, see the main text at above note 19; cf. J. Tropini, above note 110, pp. 176–179; and M. Wéry, above note 110, pp. 124–127.

116 Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, p. 36; Court of Appeal of Antwerp, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107, p. 52.

117 Belgian Court of Cassation, Sharia4Belgium, above note 107.

118 For a discussion of this similar case law, see, for example, J. Tropini, above note 110, pp. 169–176.

119 The decisions in the PKK case were Court of First Instance of Brussels (Correctional Pre-Trial Chamber), The Prosecutor v. SU et al., File No. FD.35.98.54/09 etc., 3 November 2016; Court of Appeal of Brussels (Chamber of Indictment), The Prosecutor v. SU et al., Judgment No. 2017/2911, 14 September 2017; partly annulled for lack of motivation by Belgian Court of Cassation, The Prosecutor v. SU et al., Judgment No. P.17.1023.N.8, ECLI:BE:CASS:2018:ARR.20180213.2, 13 February 2018, available at: https://juportal.be/JUPORTAwork/ECLI:BE:CASS:2018:ARR.20180213.2_NL.pdf; again decided by, but sitting in a different composition, Court of Appeal of Brussels (Chamber of Indictment), The Prosecutor v. SU et al., Judgment No. 2019/939, 8 March 2019; appeal against which was rejected by Belgian Court of Cassation, The Prosecutor v. SU et al., Judgment No. P.19.0310.N, ECLI:BE:CASS:2020:ARR.20200128.6, 28 January 2020, available at: https://juportal.be/JUPORTAwork/ECLI:BE:CASS:2020:ARR.20200128.6_NL.pdf.

120 Court of First Instance of Brussels, PKK, above note 119, pp. 10–11; Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2017, above note 119, pp. 11–22 (and Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, pp. 20–26).

121 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2017, above note 119, pp. 16–17; cf. Court of First Instance of Brussels, PKK, above note 119, p. 11.

122 As argued by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2018, above note 119, p. 11, the Court only considered one of the three alternative “terrorist aims” of the Belgian Criminal Code, above note 89, Art. 137(1) (which implements Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 3(2)), namely (1) seriously intimidating a population; the Court failed to address the two others, namely (2) unduly compelling a government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, and (3) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization, which may very well have been present (on these aims, see the main text at above notes 25–27).

123 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2017, above note 119, p. 22.

124 Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2018, above note 119. The lack of motivation and annulment were related to a different issue that is not discussed here.

125 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, pp. 15–16.

126 Cf. N. Melzer, above note 56, Recommendation II, pp. 16, 27–36.

127 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, p. 33.

128 Article 137 implements the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, above note 25, Art. 1, as replaced by Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 3.

129 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, pp. 33–34; see also Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2020, above note 119, p. 10.

130 Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2020, above note 119.

131 M. Sassòli, above note 11, p. 198.

132 See main text at above note 127.

133 See main text at above notes 97–98.

134 Canadian Criminal Code, above note 79, Sec. 83.01(1); see main text at above note 79.

135 N. Melzer, above note 56, Recommendation II, pp. 16, 27–36.

136 Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Khawaja, above note 91, paras 127–129.

137 Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2018, above note 119, pp. 7–8; Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2020, above note 119, pp. 10–12. Note that whether or not the nexus requirement coincides with IHL's material scope of application, and hence whether or not this argument of the prosecution on the material scope of application of IHL is different from its argument regarding the nexus (see main text at above note 127), is debated; see M. Sassòli, above note 11, pp. 200–203.

138 Belgian Court of Cassation, PKK, 2020, above note 119, pp. 11–12 (authors' translation).

139 Raphaël Van Steenberghe, “Droit international humanitaire et législation belge antiterroriste: L'article 141bis du Code pénal dans les dossiers syriens et kurdes”, Revue Belge de Droit International, vol. 51, No. 1, 2018, pp. 282–284, 291–293.

140 See, for example, Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 13.

141 See, notably, Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, Paris, 2012–21 (updated June 2021), p. 13, Recommendation 5, available at: www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf: “Countries … should criminalise not only the financing of terrorist acts but also the financing of terrorist organisations and individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or acts.” This has been endorsed by the UN Security Council in several resolutions: see D. McKeever, above note 35, p. 61, fn. 124.

142 Cf. J. Pejic, above note 14, p. 188. Moreover, such activities may often not entail (accessory) individual criminal responsibility for war crimes (or other international crimes), notably due to the lack of a causal link with such crimes. In particular, aiding and abetting generally requires a substantial contribution to or effect on the crime: see Manuel J. Ventura, “Aiding and Abetting”, in Jérôme de Hemptinne, Robert Roth and Elies van Sliedregt (eds), Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019.

143 Terrorist Bombings Convention, Art. 2(1).

144 EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, above note 25, Art. 2; Directive (EU) 2017/541, above note 3, Art. 4; Belgian Criminal Code, above note 89, Arts 139–140; Canadian Criminal Code, above note 79, Sec. 83.18; Terrorism Suppression Act, above note 81, Sec. 13. A predecessor of these offences can be found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, Art. 2(3)(c), which criminalizes contribution to the commission of a terrorist bombing by a group acting with a common purpose: E. J. Husabø and I. Bruce, above note 21, pp. 193–194.

145 See the provisions at above note 144 for the EU and Belgium; cf. Canadian Criminal Code, above note 79, Sec. 83.01(1)(a); and Terrorism Suppression Act, above note 81, Sec. 13(1)(b) (but see also the caveat made at above note 88).

146 Relying on ICTY, Tadić, above note 7, paras 67–70; ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 9, paras 455–464.

147 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, p. 36.

148 Ibid., pp. 37–42.

149 See also A. Coco, above note 27, p. 435; CPenny, hristopher K., “De-Conflicting Canada's Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Khawaja and the Ongoing Challenges of the ‘Armed Conflict’ Exclusion”, Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2009, p. 426CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

150 Nevertheless, case law on jihadist groups has incorrectly relied on the fact that the relevant armed groups did not respect IHL in order to disqualify them as armed forces (see main text at above note 112).

151 ICRC Challenges Report 2015, above note 31, p. 14.

152 See also C. K. Penny, above note 149, pp. 424–425, on Canada's involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan and the UK's involvement in the conflict in Iraq.

153 M. Sassòli, above note 11, pp. 187–190. See also Lubell, Noam and Derejko, Nathan, “A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marko Milanovic and Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, “A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict”, in Nigel D. White and Christian Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013, pp. 288–292; Radin, Sasha, “Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflicts”, International Law Studies, Vol. 89, 2013Google Scholar; Schmitt, Michael N., “Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict”, International Law Studies, Vol. 90, 2014Google Scholar. For a restrictive view of the geographical scope of application of IHL in NIACs, see Bradley, Martha M., “Expanding the Borders of Common Article 3 in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Amending Its Geographical Application through Subsequent Practice?”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

154 M. Sassòli, above note 11, p. 190.

155 Yuval Shany, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror”, in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 13–15. If only for technical reasons, there is no need to delve into the broader lex specialis debate here; we are discussing the armed conflict exclusion clause, the application of which precludes the concomitant application of criminal law instruments on terrorism and IHL.

156 This is so, inter alia, because the Belgian courts rely on established case law of the ICTY stating that in NIACs, IHL applies throughout the territory of the parties to the conflict: for example, Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119, pp. 35–36, refers to ICTY, Tadić, above note 7, paras 67–70. While this case law is authoritative, it is largely irrelevant when discussing the possible extraterritorial application of IHL in NIACs, as the ICTY's jurisdiction was geographically restricted. See Arimatsu, Louise, “Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed Conflict”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 12, 2009, p. 187CrossRefGoogle Scholar: “the only ‘geography question’ that required clarification was to ascertain the reach of the law within the state; the extra-territorial reach of the rules was simply not considered”. See also S. Radin, above note 153, p. 719. The Court of Appeal also referred to the ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 9, paras 455–464, which deals with “internal non-international armed conflicts” and is about the extent to which IHL extends beyond the theatre of hostilities within the territory of the State concerned, rather than about whether IHL applies beyond that State's territory.

157 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119.

158 R. Van Steenberghe, above note 139, pp. 282–284, 291–293, but see the caveat made at above note 142: many activities underlying indirect terrorist offences may not be connected to international crimes closely enough to entail individual criminal responsibility.

159 Cf. S. Krähenmann, above note 50, p. 21.

160 Court of Appeal of Brussels, PKK, 2019, above note 119.

161 Cf. H. Cuyckens and C. Paulussen, above note 68, p. 562.

162 Ibid.

163 See main text and references at above note 33.

164 Eurojust and Network for Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (Genocide Network), Cumulative Prosecution of Foreign Terrorist Fighters for Core International Crimes and Terrorism-Related Offences, The Hague, May 2020, p. 3, available at: www.eurojust.europa.eu/cumulative-prosecution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-core-international-crimes-and-terrorism-related.

165 Ibid., pp. 3–5, 26; compare with the argument for a “tailored approach” proposed by H. Cuyckens and C. Paulussen, above note 68.

166 I.e., IHL as implemented by the Belgian Criminal Code, above note 89, Title Ibis. See also T. Ruys and S. Van Severen, above note 51, p. 538; R. Van Steenberghe, above note 139, pp. 292–293.

167 UNODC, above note 34, p. 104.

168 T. Ruys and S. Van Severen, above note 51, pp. 532–533; R. Van Steenberghe, above note 139, pp. 283–284, 293. See also Christophe Paulussen and Kate Pitcher, “Prosecuting (Potential) Foreign Fighters: Legislative and Practical Challenges”, ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, January 2018, pp. 26–30, available at: https://icct.nl/publication/prosecuting-potential-foreign-fighters-legislative-and-practical-challenges.

169 See, for example, Eurojust and Genocide Network, above note 164, pp. 16–24.

170 See, for example, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 12 June 2002, para. 59: “In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the armed conflict, [one] may take into account, inter alia, the following factors: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator's official duties.”

171 See, for example, Court of First Instance of the Hague, Context case, above note 47, paras 7.19–7.44.

172 C. K. Penny, above note 149, pp. 418–419.